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Hiroshima, Nagasaki, 58 Years on

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    The Lessons of the History Hiroshima, Nagasaki, 58 Years on By Jean-Marie Matagne, Ph.D, ACDN President
    Message 1 of 1 , Nov 4 1:23 PM
      The Lessons of the History
      Hiroshima, Nagasaki, 58 Years on
      By Jean-Marie Matagne, Ph.D, ACDN President

      On August 6, 1945, at 8.15 a.m., local time, the crew of the US
      bomber "Enola Gay" dropped over Hiroshima the first atom bomb used
      against a city. Nicknamed "Little Boy", this was a uranium bomb, a
      single prototype never previously tested. The US army's first
      estimate of casualties was 78150 dead; but to approach the real
      figure we must multiply by three: between 200 000 and 300 000 died
      immediately or subsequently, not counting the "hibakusha" - those who
      lived on bearing the impact in their flesh, their minds and their
      social relationships.

      The above facts are well known. What is known less, and often
      concealed, is that the operation had been conducted like a scientific

      For nearly a year, a special unit (special group 509 of the 20th Air
      Fleet) had been training exclusively for this new type of bombing.
      Since mid-January 1945 - by a decision taken even before the German
      counter-attack was defeated in the Ardennes - their training covered
      distances which implied not a German target but a Japanese one. The
      commission entrusted with the operation recommended that it be
      conducted "on populous cities" and "without any warning". On April
      16, 1945, four of the biggest Japanese cities (not including Tokyo,
      which was already ravaged by conventional and incendiary bombing,
      notably on March 9) had been identified as potential targets and
      spared from all other bombing, so that all observable damage could be
      attributed to the atom bomb alone. These cities were, in order of
      "preference", Hiroshima, Niigata, Kokura and Nagasaki; the old
      cultural and religious centre Kyoto had been removed from the list
      because of "humanist" scruples. On August 6, three reconnoissance
      planes preceded the "Enola Gay", so as to inform it by agreed code of
      the weather conditions above three of the cities - the bombing was
      not to be done by radar but by sight, for the sake of maximum
      precision. The exceptionally fine weather over Hiroshima that morning
      (predicted since April by a Norwegian meteorologist specialising in
      the region) gave 10 miles visibility and so confirmed this city as
      the ideal target. Two observation planes followed the "Enola Gay" at
      a distance, one to release the measuring devices over the bombed city
      and one for photography and filming. That made altogether six B-29s,
      flying practically out of reach of anti-aircraft fire. Further steps
      had been taken to deter the few capable Japanese fighter-planes and
      to counter any passive defense measures: in the preceding days the
      target cities had been regularly overflown by isolated planes which
      did no bombing. The moment chosen for the bombing was not random one
      either: accustomed to false alerts, the inhabitants were already busy
      with their day's work.

      The bombing was "a complete success", and President Truman, when he
      heard of it in mid-Atlantic aboard the ship returning him from the
      Potsdam Conference, exclaimed: "This is the greatest day in history!"
      Once home in the USA, he gave a broadcast to the American people, in
      which he thanked God for favouring the Americans.

      On the morning of August 9 it was Nagasaki's turn. In the interim the
      weather had deteriorated, but it determined the fate of this other
      city too.

      The announcement of a large depression approaching Japan prompted the
      special staff of General LeMay, located on Guam beside the HQ of
      General Spaatz, to set the second bombing date for August 9, two days
      earlier than scheduled and without seeking new instructions from
      President Truman: it was very likely that the "weather window" would
      close definitively. General Leslie Groves, the engineer who had
      directed the "Manhattan District" after building the Pentagon, and
      also his colleagues on Guam and the score of scientists hurriedly
      preparing the third and final bomb available, considered it essential
      that they seize the chance of using it before Japan surrendered.
      Nicknamed "Fat Man", it was even more promising than "Little Boy",
      because it was the same type as the plutonium bomb tested
      triumphantly on July 16 at Alamogordo in the New Mexico desert.

      Since one of the targets had been deleted from the plan, only five
      B-29s flew in this new mission. The bad weather and the storms on the
      path led to a series of problems: drifting off course, excessive use
      of fuel, one missed rendez-vous, one radio failure. On arrival over
      the island of Kyushu the "Bock's Car" - the plane with the bomb -
      headed first for Kokura, its main target, but circled over it in vain
      because it was covered by cloud. At the controls, young Major Sweeney
      had to turn back towards base, via Nagasaki. By the time his radar
      identified the city. The plane no longer had enough fuel to return to
      its starting-point, Tinian Is, or even to Iwo Jama. The only way to
      avoid ditching at sea with an atom bomb on board was to head for
      Okinawa - and that is what he did, on his last drops of fuel, but not
      carrying the primed bomb which weighed 5 tons. In a tricky situation,
      Sweeney quickly consulted three members of his crew, and the four
      decided to drop it by radar, despite orders to the contrary. It was
      11.01 a.m., local time. This inaccurate bombing, plus the irregular
      topography of Nagasaki, explains why "Fat Man" was a disappointment:
      it ended up causing fewer casualties than "Little Boy". But the
      reason for the misery of this city was another small technical hitch:
      if the fuel had flowed properly from a reserve tank, Major Sweeney
      could have made a different decision... Thus the dead of Nagasaki owe
      their fate to a silly little blocked pipe.

      As for the "compelling reasons" for these two great massacres, two
      have been mentioned most frequently, and both are highly debatable.

      The first reason given is the need to shorten the war with Japan and
      thus spare the lives of US servicemen (other people counting less).
      This was the reason stated by President Truman in his speech of
      August 9, and also by a chaplain of the US crews giving a religious
      version intended to save them any moral scruples ("to restore peace
      as soon as possible"). In any case, they were kept in almost total
      ignorance about the first device they were carrying, including its
      atomic nature.

      In military terms, however, the atom-bombing was unnecessary. General
      Curtis LeMay, the grand organiser of the bombing of Japan, opposed
      this operation (which was imposed on him, and which he carried out
      efficiently), and estimated that a few more conventional bombings
      would have sufficed to "bring Japan to her knees" - operations like
      that of March 9 which had used 279 flying fortresses to drop 1667
      tons of bombs. He still believed this forty years later. Other high-
      ranking officers too, including General Eisenhower, objected the use
      of the bomb. So did a group of scientists, including Albert Einstein
      and Leo Szilard (though they had been at the start of the US nuclear
      effort), who in March 1945 sent Roosevelt a memorandum advocating non-
      use. In the diplomatic sphere, even before July 17 (the start of the
      Potsdam Conference), Japan was wishing to surrender. The Americans
      knew this from July 13 onwards: knowing the Japanese code, their
      information services had intercepted and deciphered an exchange of
      messages between the Japanese government and its ambassador in Moscow
      which gave formal proof of this. The only condition for surrender was
      that this should be honourable surrender, with the Emperor Hirohito,
      as a sacred figure, retaining his throne - which is what eventually
      occurred. The ultimatum delivered to Japan on July 26 from Potsdam by
      the US, UK and Chinese nationalist allies, by speaking of
      "unconditional surrender", could only block this path. By this time
      President Truman had already ordered the use of the available bombs
      "as soon as possible after August 2" (order of July 17). Thus the two
      bombs, transported and prepared in feverish haste, did not hasten the
      Japanese surrender but on the contrary helped to delay it - and this
      delay was created knowingly.

      The other "compelling reason" given later by some historians is the
      claim that President Truman wanted to use this bombing to prevent
      Soviet expansion in the Far East, and to display US power in
      anticipation of the future Cold War of which he allegedly had
      presentiments. This is an illusion of hindsight. The Cold War really
      started in 1947, and the first signs of it in Truman's mind scarcely
      go back beyond January 1946 when one can observe a turnaround in his
      position towards the "Soviets", perhaps motivated by a brutal and
      outrageous "outburst" by Stalin against him at the end of December
      1945, mentioned later by Khrushchev in his memoirs and that may been
      reported to Truman at the time through his minister Byrnes. Until
      then, he was not at all in a "cold-war" frame of mind. At Potsdam and
      in the months following, he considered "Uncle Joe" to be a personal
      friend - in September 1945 he wrote he would always keep his picture
      as a happy memento of their very pleasant collaboration at Potsdam -
      and viewed Stalin politically as a sort of Tsar who could be handled
      quite easily provided one stayed firm. At Potsdam, far from
      discouraging Stalin from entering the war against Japan (as had been
      planned at Yalta), Truman urged him to do so as soon as possible. The
      Hiroshima bomb was to be another contributing factor: it was on the
      night of 8-9 August that the USSR declared war against Japan,
      immediately launching its strike against Manchuria. It is noteworthy
      too that the minister in Truman's cabinet then most hostile to the
      USSR - Navy Secretary Forrestal - was a declared opponent of the use
      of atom bombs. Forrestal was perhaps the most lucid about the real
      nature of Stalin's regime and about the longterm consequences of atom-

      The real reasons for the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are rather
      to be found elsewhere. They are of three kinds. First, the Americans
      had a score to settle with the Japanese. This is actually what Truman
      said first in his speech of 9 August, before declaring his wish to
      shorten the war and spare American lives. According to him, the
      Americans had used [the atom bomb] against those who treacherously
      attacked them at Pearl Harbor, those who starve, maltreat and execute
      American prisoners of war, those who violate every international
      rule. Revenge - one may venture the term - revenge was paramount.
      Secondly, the bombs were available. The A-bomb operation had
      mobilised some 150 000 people, and required considerable financial,
      scientific and military efforts which needed appropriate
      justification: therefore they had to be used. Finally, last but not
      least, the pure and simple will to power - power to affirm an
      overwhelming domination over the other, and to be masters over
      physical nature in a way that was quasi-divine (delegated by God, as
      it were) and in fact diabolical (being utterly destructive) - this
      will to power certainly played a determining role, though not one
      that could be avowed.

      It would be a mistake to think that the poignant testimonies of the
      "hibakusha" - such as Keiji Nakazawa Six Years Old in Hiroshima or Dr
      Shuntaro Hida Little Boy: What Happened at Hiroshima - can forever
      immunise the world's political and military leaders against the
      temptation to do it again. Nevertheless, these must be read. But
      there are too many interests at play - the will to power, the taste
      for grand exploits, the hatred of the enemy, fear, the wish for
      revenge - too many to permit us any confidence in human wisdom. A
      French academic working in the US asked recently in Le Monde: "What
      Head of State attacked by a first strike would take revenge with a
      second strike and thus risk putting a end to the human adventure?" He
      had doubtless not read these sentences of Giscard d'Estaing:
      "Whatever happens I will never take an initiative that would lead to
      the annihilation of France. But if the [nuclear] destruction of
      France were begun by the enemy, I would immediately take the
      necessary decision to avenge her." It is true that he added:
      "Otherwise I would refrain, wishing and hoping that her landscape,
      the faithfulness of her inhabitants, and their inner convictions,
      albeit hidden [in the presence of occupying forces], will seize the
      final chance and one day revive French culture." (Le pouvoir et la
      vie, II, 1991, 210). We can therefore hope that the previous remark
      by this ex-President was only a "grand phrase", one of the left-overs
      of the "dissuasive posture" that was intended to protect France from
      a nuclear attack which her own nuclear-power status actually might
      have attracted - a posture chosen because it might not be possible to
      avoid being defeated and occupied through conventional arms. But the
      "Samson Complex" ( "Better all die than let our enemies survive")
      exists in many places besides Israel - a nation where various people
      claim to have observed it, notably General Buis.

      Besides, it is a mistake to trust technology. There are numerous
      accidents: nuclear submarines have disappeared with all their crews,
      bombers have crashed or ditched into the ocean with nuclear bombs on
      board, false alarms have been triggered by radar and computers
      confusing wild geese or weather phenomena with nuclear attacks. When
      a blocked pipe can decide the fate of a city, how can one trust
      cybernetic and nuclear technology? And here we have a strange twist:
      in the spring of 2000 the vast nuclear research complex of Los
      Alamos, the very place where the first A-bombs were conceived and
      built, was ravaged by a huge fire, apparently accidental, which
      destroyed 400 buildings, caused the evacuation of thousands of
      people, covered several American states with a huge plume of smoke,
      and emitted into the atmosphere, in all probability, uncontrolled
      amounts of radioactive dust.

      Yet people still claim that they can control the stockpiling, the
      transport, and the non-use of thousands of nuclear weapons, and even
      position them in space, as part of the projected US "nuclear shield",
      the National Missile Defense touted as a security system ! How long
      will the craziness last ?

      In reality it is absurd to opt for the policy of MAD (Mutually
      Assured Destruction) or its variants, such as NUTS (Nuclear
      Utilization Target Selection). Without exception, every nuclear
      strategy has passed its use-by date; they must all be condemned,
      because any one of them, or a combination of them, can one day lead
      to a deliberate or accidental catastrophe. The five main nuclear
      weapons states seem to have recently admitted this, when on May 19
      (in fact 21) in New York they promised to engage "unequivocally" in a
      process aimed at "total elimination" of nuclear weapons. But it is
      another thing for their leaders to really want that, and to embark on
      this process without delay. Unless they do, the other known nuclear
      powers - Israel, India and Pakistan, all located in regions of
      tension - will retain their nuclear option and join neither the Non-
      Proliferation treaty (NPT) nor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
      (CTBT). Besides, they may be joined by other "threshold states". This
      will mean the permanent risk of a future "actual use", like the 1945
      deed which was ordered by Harry Truman - that true democratic and
      Christian man - at a time when there was no really serious reason
      obliging him to do it.

      The only reasonable and rational solution is complete, universal,
      verified disarmament - of nuclear weapons as of chemical and
      biological ones. When will our leaders grasp this point and
      understand the urgency of the moment ? Will not the peoples of the
      world have to make their voices heard ? And since in other places the
      people already have done so - with the result that seven states are
      proposing in the UN a "New Agenda" for disarmament - why shouldn't
      the French people express its wishes, after informed debate? We need
      a referendum on this topic !

      Translated from the French by Peter Low (New Zealand)



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