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Serving Two Flags: Neo-Cons, Israel and the Bush Administration

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    Serving Two Flags: Neo-Cons, Israel and the Bush Administration By Stephen Green February 28 / 29, 2004 A CounterPunch Special Report www.counterpunch.com
    Message 1 of 1 , Mar 5, 2004
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      Serving Two Flags: Neo-Cons, Israel and the Bush Administration
      By Stephen Green

      February 28 / 29, 2004
      A CounterPunch Special Report

      Since 9-11, a small group of "neo-conservatives" in the
      Administration have effectively gutted--they would say reformed--
      traditional American foreign and security policy. Notable features of
      the new Bush doctrine include the pre-emptive use of unilateral
      force, and the undermining of the United Nations and the principle
      instruments and institutions of international law....all in the cause
      of fighting terrorism and promoting homeland security.

      Some skeptics, noting the neo-cons' past academic and professional
      associations, writings and public utterances, have suggested that
      their underlying agenda is the alignment of U.S. foreign and security
      policies with those of Ariel Sharon and the Israeli right wing. The
      administration's new hard line on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
      certainly suggests that, as perhaps does the destruction, with U.S.
      soldiers and funds, of the military capacity of Iraq, and the current
      belligerent neo-con campaign against the other two countries which
      constitute a remaining counterforce to Israeli military hegemony in
      the region--Iran and Syria.

      Have the neo-conservatives--many of whom are senior officials in the
      Defense Department, National Security Council and Office of the Vice
      President--had dual agendas, while professing to work for the
      internal security of the United States against its terrorist enemies?

      A review of the internal security backgrounds of some of the best
      known among them strongly suggests the answer.

      Dr. Stephen Bryen and Colleagues

      In April of 1979, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert Keuch
      recommended in writing that Bryen, then a staff member of the Senate
      Foreign Relations Committee, undergo a grand jury hearing to
      establish the basis for a prosecution for espionage. John Davitt,
      then Chief of the Justice Department's Internal Security Division,
      concurred. The evidence was strong. Bryen had been overheard in the
      Madison Hotel Coffee Shop, offering classified documents to an
      official of the Israeli Embassy in the presence of the director of
      AIPAC, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee. It was later
      determined that the Embassy official was Zvi Rafiah, the Mossad
      station chief in Washington. Bryen refused to be poly-graphed by the
      FBI on the purpose and details of the meeting; whereas the person
      who'd witnessed it agreed to be poly-graphed and passed the test.

      The Bureau also had testimony from a second person, a staff member of
      the Foreign Relations Committee, that she had witnessed Bryen in his
      Senate office with Rafiah, discussing classified documents that were
      spread out on a table in front of an open safe in which the documents
      were supposed to be secured.

      Not long after this second witness came forward, Bryen's fingerprints
      were found on classified documents he'd stated in writing to the FBI
      he'd never had in his possession....the ones he'd allegedly offered
      to Rafiah.

      Nevertheless, following the refusal of the Senate Foreign Relations
      Committee to grant access by Justice Department officials to files
      which were key to the investigation, Keuch's recommendation for a
      grand jury hearing, and ultimately the investigation itself, were
      shut down. This decision, taken by Philip Heymann, Chief of Justice's
      Criminal Division, was a bitter disappointment to Davitt and to Joel
      Lisker, the lead investigator on the case, as expressed to this
      writer. A complicating factor in the outcome was that Heymann was a
      former schoolmate and fellow U.S. Supreme Court Clerk of Bryen's
      attorney, Nathan Lewin.

      Bryen was asked to resign from his Foreign Relations Committee post
      shortly before the investigation was concluded in late 1979. For the
      following year and a half, he served as Executive Director of the
      Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), and provided
      consulting services to AIPAC. In April, 1981, the FBI received an
      application by the Defense Department for a Top Secret security
      clearance for Dr. Bryen . Richard Perle, who had just been nominated
      as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy,
      was proposing Bryen as his Deputy Assistant Secretary! Within six
      months, with Perle pushing hard, Bryen received both Top Secret-SCI
      (sensitive compartmented information) and Top Secret-"NATO/COSMIC"

      Loyalty, Patriotism and Character

      The Bryen investigation became in fact the most contentious issue in
      Perle's own confirmation hearings in July, 1981. Under aggressive
      questioning from Sen. Jeremiah Denton, Perle held his ground: "I
      consider Dr. Bryen to be an individual impeccable integrity....I have
      the highest confidence in [his] loyalty, patriotism and character."

      Several years later in early 1988, Israel was in the final stages of
      development of a prototype of its ground based "Arrow" anti-ballistic
      missile. One element the program lacked was "klystrons", small
      microwave amplifiers which are critical components in the missile's
      high frequency, radar-based target acquisition system which locks on
      to in-coming missiles. In 1988, klystrons were among the most
      advanced developments in American weapons research, and their export
      was of course strictly proscribed.

      The DOD office involved in control of defense technology exports was
      the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) within Richard
      Perle's ISP office. The Director (and founder) of DTSA was Perle's
      Deputy, Dr. Stephen Bryen.

      In May of 1988, Bryen sent a standard form to Richard Levine, a Navy
      tech transfer official, informing him of intent to approve a license
      for Varian Associates, Inc. of Beverly, Massachusetts to export to
      Israel four klystrons. This was done without the usual consultations
      with the tech transfer officials of the Army and Air Force, or ISA
      (International Security Affairs) or DSAA (Defense Security Assistance

      The answer from Levine was "no". He opposed granting the license, and
      asked for a meeting on the matter of the appropriate (above listed)
      offices. At the meeting, all of the officials present opposed the
      license. Bryen responded by suggesting that he go back to the
      Israelis to ask why these particular items were needed for their
      defense. Later, after the Israeli Government came back with what one
      DOD staffer described as "a little bullshit answer", Bryen simply
      notified the meeting attendees that an acceptable answer had been
      received, the license granted, and the klystrons released.

      By now, however, the dogs were awake. Then Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for ISA, (and now Deputy Secretary of State) Richard Armitage
      sent Dr. Bryen a letter stating that the State Department (which
      issues the export licenses) should be informed of DOD's "uniformly
      negative" reaction to the export of klystrons to Israel. Bryen did as
      instructed , and the license was withdrawn.

      In July, Varian Associates became the first U.S. corporation formally
      precluded from contracting with the Defense Department. Two senior
      colleague in DOD who wish to remain anonymous have confirmed that
      this attempt by Bryen to obtain klystrons for his friends was not
      unusual, and was in fact "standard operating procedure" for him,
      recalling numerous instances when U.S. companies were denied licenses
      to export sensitive technology, only to learn later that Israeli
      companies subsequently exported similar (U.S. derived) weapons and
      technology to the intended customers/governments.

      In late1988, Bryen resigned from his DOD post, and for a period
      worked in the private sector with a variety of defense technology
      consulting firms.

      Bryen and the China Commission

      In 1997, "Defense Week" reported (05/27/97) that, ...." the U.S.
      Office of Naval Intelligence reaffirmed that U.S.- derived technology
      from the cancelled [Israeli] Lavi fighter project is being used on
      China's new F-10 fighter."

      The following year, "Jane's Intelligence Review" reported (11/01/98)
      the transfer by Israel to China of the Phalcon airborne early warning
      and control system, the Python air-combat missile, and the F-10
      fighter aircraft, containing "state-of-the-art U.S. electronics."

      Concern about the continuing transfer of advanced U.S. arms
      technology to the burgeoning Chinese military program led, in the
      last months of the Clinton Administration, to the creation of a
      Congressional consultative body called the United States-China
      Economic and Security Review Commission. The charter for the "The
      China Commission", as it is commonly known, states that its purpose
      is to...."monitor, investigate, and report to the Congress on the
      national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic
      relationship between the United States and the Peoples Republic of
      China." The charter also reflects an awareness of the problem
      of "back door" technology leaks: "The Commission shall also take into
      account patterns of trade and transfers through third countries to
      the extent practicable."

      It was almost predictable that in the new Bush Administration, Dr.
      Stephen Bryen would find his way to the China Commission. In April
      2001, with the support of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
      and Senator Richard Shelby (R-Alabama) Bryen was appointed a Member
      of the Commission by Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert. Last
      August, his appointment was extended through December of 2005.

      Informed that Bryen had been appointed to the Commission, the
      reaction of one former senior FBI counter-intelligence official
      was: "My God, that must mean he has a "Q clearance!" (A "Q"
      clearance, which must be approved by the Department of Energy, is the
      designation for a Top Secret codeword clearance to access nuclear

      Michael Ledeen, Consultant on Chaos

      If Stephen Bryen is the military technology guru in the neo-con
      pantheon, Michael Ledeen is currently its leading theorist,
      historian, scholar and writer.

      It states in the website of his consulting firm, Benador Associates,
      that he is "...one of the world's leading authorities on
      intelligence, contemporary history and international affairs" and
      that...."As Ted Koppel puts it, 'Michael Ledeen is a Renaissance
      man....in the tradition of Machiavelli.'" Perhaps the following will
      add some color and texture to this description. In 1983, on the
      recommendation of Richard Perle, Ledeen was hired at the Department
      of Defense as a consultant on terrorism. His immediate supervisor was
      the Principle Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs,
      Noel Koch. Early in their work together, Koch noticed with concern
      Ledeen's habit of stopping by in his (Koch's) outer office to read
      classified materials. When the two of them took a trip to Italy, Koch
      learned from the CIA station there that when Ledeen had lived in Rome
      previously, as correspondent for The New Republic, he'd been carried
      in Agency files as an agent of influence of a foreign government:

      Some time after their return from the trip, Ledeen approached his
      boss with a request for his assistance in obtaining two highly
      classified CIA reports which he said were held by the FBI. He'd hand
      written on a piece of paper the identifying "alpha numeric
      designators". These identifiers were as highly classified as the
      reports themselves....which raised in Koch's mind the question of who
      had provided them to Ledeen if he hadn't the clearances to obtain
      them himself. Koch immediately told his executive assistant that
      Ledeen was to have no further access to classified materials in the
      office, and Ledeen just ceased coming to "work".

      In early 1986, however, Koch learned that Ledeen had joined NSC as a
      consultant, and sufficiently concerned about the internal security
      implications of the behavior of his former aide, arranged to be
      interviewed by two FBI agents on the matter. After a two hour
      debriefing, Koch was told that it was only Soviet military
      intelligence penetration that interested the Bureau. The follow-on
      interviews that were promised by the agents just never occurred. Koch
      thought this strange, coming as it did just months after the arrest
      of Naval intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard on charges of
      espionage for Israel.

      Frustrated, Koch wrote up in detail the entire saga of Ledeen's DOD
      consultancy, and sent it to the Office of Senator Charles Grassley,
      then a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which
      had oversight responsibility for, inter alia, the FBI.

      A former senior FBI counter-intelligence official was surprised and
      somewhat skeptical, when told of Koch's unsuccessful attempts to
      interest the Bureau in an investigation of Ledeen, noting that in
      early 1986, the Justice Department was in fact already engaged in
      several on-going, concurrent investigations of Israeli espionage and
      theft of American military technology.

      Machiavelli in Tel Aviv

      Koch's belated attempts to draw official attention to his former
      assistant were too late, in any event, for within a very few weeks of
      leaving his DOD consultancy in late 1984, Ledeen had found gainful
      (classified) employment at the National Security Council (NSC). In
      fact, according to a now declassified chronology prepared for the
      Senate/House Iran- Contra investigation, within calendar 1984 Ledeen
      was already suggesting to Oliver North, his new boss at NSC...." that
      Israeli contacts might be useful in obtaining release of the U.S.
      hostages in Lebanon." Perhaps significantly, that is the first entry
      in the "Chronology of Events: U.S.- Iran Dialogue", dated November
      18,1986, prepared for the Joint House-Senate Hearings in the Iran-
      Contra Investigations.

      What is so striking about the Ledeen-related documents which are part
      of the Iran-Contra Collection of the National Security Archive, is
      how thoroughly the judgements of Ledeen's colleagues at NSC mirrored,
      and validated, Noel Koch's internal security concerns about his

      - on April 9, 1985, NSC Middle East analyst Donald Fortier wrote
      to National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane that NSC staffers were
      agreed that Ledeen's role in the scheme should be limited to carrying
      messages to Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres regarding plans to
      cooperate with Israel on the crisis within Iran, and specifically
      that he should not be entrusted to ask Peres for detailed operational

      - on June 6, 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz wrote to
      McFarlane that, "Israel's record of dealings with Iran since the fall
      of the Shah and during the hostage crisis [show] that Israel's agenda
      is not the same as ours. Consequently doubt whether an intelligence
      relationship such as what Ledeen has in mind would be one which we
      could fully rely upon and it could seriously skew our own perception
      and analysis of the Iranian scene."

      - on 20 August, 1985, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
      informed Ledeen by memorandum that his security clearance had been
      downgraded from Top Secret-SCI to Secret.

      - on 16 January, 1986, Oliver North recommended to John
      Poindexter "for [the] security of the Iran initiative" that Ledeen be
      asked to take periodic polygraph examinations.

      - later in January, on the 24th, North wrote to Poindexter of his
      suspicion that Ledeen, along with Adolph Schwimmer and Manucher
      Ghorbanifar, might be making money personally on the sale of arms to
      Iran, through Israel.

      During the June 23-25, 1987 joint hearings of the House and Senate
      select committees' investigation of Iran-Contra, Noel Koch testified
      that he became suspicious when he learned that the price which Ledeen
      had negotiated for the sale to the Israeli Government of basic TOW
      missiles was $2,500 each.

      Upon inquiring with his DOD colleagues, he learned the lowest price
      the U.S. had ever received for the sale of TOWs to a foreign
      government had been a previous sale to Israel for $6,800 per copy.
      Koch, professing in his testimony that he and his colleagues at DOD
      were not in favor of the sale to begin with, determined that he--Koch-
      -should renegotiate the $2,500 price so that it could be defended by
      the "defense management system." In a clandestine meeting on a Sunday
      in the first class lounge of the TWA section of National Airport,
      Koch met over a cup of coffee with an official from the Israeli
      purchasing mission in New York, and agreed on a price of $4,500 per
      missile, nearly twice what Ledeen had "neg otiated" in Israel.

      There are two possibilities here--one would be a kickback, as
      suspected by his NSC colleagues, and the other would be that Michael
      Ledeen was effectively negotiating for Israel, not the U.S.

      Like his friend Stephen Bryen (they've long served together on the
      JINSA Board of Advisors) Ledeen has been out of government service
      since the lat e1980s....until the present Bush Administration. He,
      like Bryen, is presently a serving member on the China Commission
      and, with the support of DOD Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith,
      he has since 2001 been employed as a consultant for the Office of
      Special Plans OSP). Both involve the handling of classified materials
      and require high-level security clearances.

      The Principals: Perle, Wolfowitz and Feith

      One might wonder how, with security histories like these, Messrs.
      Bryen and Ledeen have managed to get second and third chances to
      return to government in highly classified positions. And the
      explanation is that they, along with other like-minded neo-
      conservatives, have in the current Bush Administration friends in
      very high places. In particular, Bryen and Ledeen have been
      repeatedly boosted into defense/security posts by former Defense
      Policy Council member and chairman Richard Perle (he just quietly
      resigned his position), Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and
      Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith.

      As previously mentioned, Perle in 1981 as DOD Assistant Secretary for
      International Security Policy (ISP) hired Bryen as his Deputy. That
      same year, Wolfowitz as head of the State Department Policy Planning
      Staff hired Ledeen as a Special Advisor. In 2001 Douglas Feith as DOD
      Under Secretary for Policy hired, or approved the hiring of Ledeen as
      a consultant for the Office of Special Plans.

      The principals have also assisted each other down through the years.
      Frequently. In 1973 Richard Perle used his (and Senator Henry "Scoop"
      Jackson's) influence as a senior staff member of the Senate Armed
      Services Committee to help Wolfowitz obtain a job with the Arms
      Control and Disarmament Agency. In 1982, Perle hired Feith in ISP as
      his Special Counsel, and then as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
      Negotiations Policy. In 2001, DOD Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz helped
      Feith obtain his appointment as Undersecretary for Policy. Feith then
      appointed Perle as Chairman of the Defense Policy Board. In some
      cases, this mutual assistance carries risks, as for instance when
      Perle's hiring of Bryen as his Deputy in ISP became an extremely
      contentious issue in Perle's own Senate appointment hearings as
      Assistant Secretary. Every appointment/hiring listed above involved
      classified work for which high-level security clearances and
      associated background checks by th e FBI were required. When the
      level of the clearance is not above generic Top Secret, however, the
      results of that background check are only seen by the hiring
      authority. And in the event, if the appointee were Bryen or Ledeen
      and the hiring authority were Perle, Wolfowitz or Feith, the appointee
      (s) need not have worried about the findings of the background check.
      In the case of Perle hiring Bryen as his deputy in 1981, for
      instance, documents released in 1983 under the Freedom of Information
      Act indicate that the Department provided extraordinarily high
      clearances for Bryen without having reviewed more than a small
      portion of his 1978-79 FBI investigation file.

      Richard Perle: A Habit of Leaking

      Perle came to Washington for the first time in early 1969, at the age
      of 28, to work for a neo-con think tank called the "Committee to
      Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy." Within months, Senator
      Henry "Scoop" Jackson offered Perle a position on his staff, working
      with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And within months after
      that--less than a year--Perle was embroiled in an affair involving
      the leaking of a classified CIA report on alleged past Soviet treaty

      The leaker (and author of the report) was CIA analyst David Sullivan,
      and the leakee was Richard Perle. CIA Director Stansfield Turner was
      incensed at the unauthorized disclosure, but before he could fire
      Sullivan, the latter quit.

      Turner urged Sen. Jackson to fire Perle, but he was let off with a
      reprimand. Jackson then added insult to injury by immediately hiring
      Sullivan to his staff. Sullivan and Perle became close friends and co-
      conspirators, and together established an informal right-wing network
      which they called "the Madison Group," after their usual meeting
      place in--you might have guessed--the Madison Hotel Coffee Shop.

      Perle's second brush with the law occurred a year later in 1970. An
      FBI wiretap authorized for the Israeli Embassy picked up Perle
      discussing with an Embassy official classified information which he
      said had been supplied to by a staff member on the National Security
      Council. An NSC/FBI investigation was launched to identify the staff
      member, and quickly focused upon Helmut Sonnenfeldt.

      The latter had been previously investigated in 1967 while a staff
      member of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
      for suspected unauthorized transmission to an Israeli Government
      official of a classified document concerning the commencement of the
      1967 war in the Middle East. In 1981, shortly before being appointed
      Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
      (ISP)--with responsibility, inter alia, for monitoring of U.S.
      defense technology exports, Richard Perle was paid a substantial
      consulting fee by arms manufacturer Tamares, Ltd. of Israel. Shortly
      after assuming that post, Perle wrote a letter to the Secretary of
      the Army urging evaluation and purchase of 155 mm. shells
      manufactured by Soltam, Ltd.

      After leaving the ISP job in 1987, he worked for Soltam.

      Paul Wolfowitz : A Well Placed Friend

      In 1973, in the dying days of the Nixon Administration, Wolfowitz was
      recruited to work for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
      There was a certain irony in the appointment, for in the late 1960's,
      as a graduate student at the University of Chicago, Wolfowitz had
      been a student and protege of Albert Wohlstetter, an influential,
      vehement opponent of any form of arms control or disarmament, vis a
      vis the Soviets. Wolfowitz also brought to ACDA a strong attachment
      to Israel's security, and a certain confusion about his obligation to
      U.S. national security.

      In 1978, he was investigated for providing a classified document on
      the proposed sale of U.S. weapons to an Arab government, to an Israel
      Government official, through an AIPAC intermediary. An inquiry was
      launched and dropped, however, and Wolfowitz continued to work at
      ACDA until 1980.

      In 1990, after a decade of work with the State Department in
      Washington and abroad, Wolfowitz was brought into DoD as
      Undersecretary for Policy by then Secretary of Defense Richard
      Cheney. Two years later, in 1992, the first Bush Administration
      launched a broad inter-departmental investigation into the export of
      classified technology to China. O particular concern at the time was
      the transfer to China by Israel of U.S. Patriot missiles and/or
      technology. During that investigation, in a situation very
      reminiscent of the Bryen/Varian Associates/klystrons affair two years
      earlier, the Pentagon discovered that Wolfowitz's o ffice was
      promoting the export to Israel of advanced AIM-9M air-to-air missiles.

      In this instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, aware that Israel had
      already been caught selling the earlier AIM 9-L version of the
      missile to China in violation of a written agreement with the U.S. on
      arms re-sales, intervened to cancel the proposed AIM (-M deal. The
      Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time was General Colin Powell,
      currently Secretary of State. Wolfowitz continued to serve as DoD
      Undersecretary for Policy until 1993, well into the Clinton

      After that, however, like most of the other prominent neo-
      conservatives, he was relegated to trying to assist Israel from the
      sidelines for the remainder of Clinton's two terms. In 1998,
      Wolfowitz was a co-signer of a public letter to the President
      organized by the "Project for the New American Century." The letter,
      citing Saddam Hussein's continued possession of "weapons of mass
      destruction," argued for military action to achieve regime change and
      demilitarization of Iraq. Clinton wasn't impressed, but a more
      gullible fellow would soon come along. And indeed, when George W.
      Bush assumed the Presidency in early 2001, Wolfowitz got his
      opportunity. Picked as Donald Rumsfeld's Deputy Secretary at DoD, he
      prevailed upon his boss to appoint Douglas Feith as Undersecretary
      for Policy. On the day after the destruction of the World Trade
      Center, September 12, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz raised the possibility
      of an immediate attack on Iraq during an emergency NSC meeting. The
      following day, Wolfowitz conducted the Pentagon press briefing, and
      interpreted the President's statement on "ending states who sponsor
      terrorism" as a call for regime change in Iraq. Israel wasn't

      Douglas Feith: Hardliner, Security Risk

      Bush's appointment of Douglas Feith as DoD Undersecretary for Policy
      in early 2001 must have come as a surprise, and a harbinger, even to
      conservative veterans of the Reagan and George H.W. Bush
      Administration. Like Michael Ledeen, Feith is a prolific writer and
      well-known radical conservative. Moreover, he was not being hired as
      a DoD consultant, like Ledeen, but as the third most senior United
      States Defense Department official. Feith was certainly the first,
      and probably the last high Pentagon official to have publicly opposed
      the Biological Weapons Convention (in 1986), the Intermediate Nuclear
      Forces Treaty (in 1988), the Chemical Weapons Convention (in 1997),
      the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (in 2000), and all of the various
      Middle East Peace agreements, including Oslo (in 2000). Even more
      revealing perhaps, had the transition team known of it, was Feith's
      view of "technology cooperation," as expressed in a 1992 Commentary

      "It is in the interest of U.S. and Israel to remove needless
      impediments to technological cooperation between them. Technologies
      in the hands of responsible, friendly countries facing military
      threats, countries like Israel, serve to deter aggression, enhance
      regional stability and promote peace thereby."

      What Douglas Feith had neglected to say, in this last article, was
      that he thought that individuals could decide on their own whether
      the sharing of classified information was "technical cooperation," an
      unauthorized disclosure, or a violation of U.S. Code 794c,
      the "Espionage Act."

      Ten years prior to writing the Commentary piece, Feith had made such
      a decision on his own. At the time, March of 1972, Feith was a Middle
      East analyst in the Near East and South Asian Affairs section of the
      National Security Council. Two months before, in January, Judge
      William Clark had replaced Richard Allen as National Security
      Advisor, with the intention to clean house. A total of nine NSC staff
      members were fired, including Feith, who'd only been with the NSC for
      a year. But Feith was fired because he'd been the object of an
      inquiry into whether he'd provided classified material to an official
      of the Israeli Embassy in Washington. The FBI had opened the inquiry.
      And Clark, who had served in U.S. Army counterintelligence in the
      1950's, took such matters very seriously.....more seriously,
      apparently, than had Richard Allen.

      Feith did not remain unemployed for long, however. Richard Perle, who
      was in 1982 serving in the Pentagon as Assistant secretary for
      International Security Policy, hired him on the spot as his "Special
      Counsel," and then as his Deputy. Feith worked at ISP until 1986,
      when he left government service to form a small but influential law
      firm, then based in Israel.

      In 2001, Douglas Feith returned to DoD as Donald Rumsfeld's
      Undersecretary for Policy, and it was in his office that "OSP", the
      Office of Special Plans, was created. It was OSP that originated--
      some say from whole cloth--much of the intelligence that Bush, Cheney
      and Rumsfeld have used to justify the attack on Iraq, to miss-plan
      the post-war reconstruction there, and then to point an accusing
      finger at Iran and Syria.....all to the absolute delight of Prime
      Minister Ariel Sharon.

      Reason for Concern

      Many individuals with strong attachments to foreign countries have
      served the U.S. Government with honor and distinction, and will
      certainly do so in the future. The highest officials in our executive
      and legislative branches should, however, take great care when
      appointments are made to posts involving sensitive national security
      matters. Appointees should be rejected who have demonstrated, in
      their previous government service, a willingness to sacrifice U.S.
      national security interests for those of another country, or an
      inability to distinguish one from the other.

      Stephen Green can be reached at: green@...



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