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8685To leave and stay at the same time

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  • World View
    Mar 8, 2008
      The handover of power in Russia is confounding one and all. Eric
      Walberg looks into the crystal ball

      To leave and stay at the same time
      Eric Walberg

      As expected, the Russian presidential elections went smoothly, with
      Dmitri Medvedev reaping a comfortable 70 per cent of the vote, and a
      robust turnout of 70 per cent, virtually tied with President
      Vladimir Putin's 71 per cent in 2004. The Communists garnered a
      surprising 18 per cent, despite what both they and foreign observers
      claimed were clear violations of procedure in some districts.
      However, even the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
      concluded the vote reflected the will of the people.

      "Together we can continue the course set by President Putin.
      Together we'll go further. Together we'll win," Medvedev, dressed in
      jeans and a black leather jacket, told a crowd who braved driving
      sleet to cheer him after the tally. Medvedev did not campaign and
      refused to take part in televised debates. However, no one questions
      his right to move into Russia's powerful presidential seat, despite
      his tender 42 years and the fact that he has never been elected

      Frustrated Western commentators denounced the elections. Italy's La
      Stampa referred to "a democracy that many consider mutilated, even
      destroyed." With the remarkable turnaround of Russia's fortunes
      under Putin, they have reverted to the arcane science of
      Kremlinology, dismissing Russian public life; instead, sifting
      through bits of media fluff — who's sitting next to whom at
      meetings, etc — to try to gaze into Russia's political future. While
      this can be amusing, it's not necessary in order to see the broad
      outlines of what is happening.

      In his eight years at the helm, Putin reversed Russia's decline and
      is deservedly admired and respected. At the same time, the robber-
      baron plutocracy he inherited did not magically reform itself, but
      seems to have settled in to a quasi-state-run group of competing
      power centres — "clans" is a word casually thrown around in the
      Western media, with Putin supposedly keeping the lid on their
      desires to expand their influence. Remarkably, to the extent that
      this scenario indeed reflects the reality, Putin himself has not
      staked out a personal economic empire, unlike his ne'er-do-well
      predecessor Boris Yeltsin.

      Though the latter is universally reviled now, much as is his own
      predecessor Mikhail Gorbachev, Yeltsin is at least given credit for
      plucking the incorruptible ex-KGB agent Putin from obscurity and
      letting him clean up some of the mess he created, though Putin was
      forced to agree to leave Yeltsin and his cronies alone, which he did.

      Now the tables have turned somewhat. Putin could easily retire as
      did Yeltsin and bask in his deserved fame. He could easily have
      agreed to calls to amend the constitution to allow him to continue
      indefinitely as president. Instead, he chose to pass the torch to a
      young liberal lawyer with no background in the security forces, and
      to take on the much less prestigious, much harder task of prime
      minister. It's the PM who takes the heat when the economy screws up.
      He can be dismissed along with the cabinet by the president.

      But what is so enigmatic about this? Russia now has some law and
      order, some stability, some credibility as a bulwark against Western
      imperial pressures. Time to move on. All indications are that Putin
      will continue to be an important political force, quite possibly
      taking on the delicate but important task of taming the siloviki
      (referring to the security forces) who are trying to consolidate
      their economic power with the new, equally clean president backing
      him up.

      The Western view is that Medvedev is merely a puppet that Putin will
      manipulate and discard if he doesn't prove up to the task, a weak
      and hopefully harmless compromise candidate who will ensure that the
      privileges of Russia's political clans are preserved and kept under
      control. That this is in the Russian tradition of the dictator and
      his circle choosing someone who will not rock the boat.

      In fact, none of his predecessors were shrinking violets, even the
      cautious Brezhnev, who pushed aside his patrons and effectively
      destroyed the system he inherited by trying not to rock the boat too
      much. But Medvedev is no Brezhnev. It is very unlikely that he's a
      Gorbachev either. The nightmare that perestroika resulted in is all
      too fresh in Russians' minds. Nor is there the same desperate need
      to radically change the system as there was with Stalin or

      The political landscape eight years on has already changed radically
      from the days of Yeltsin. Not only are the Westernisers cowed, but
      the Communists are now the loyal, if slightly put-out, opposition —
      a complete reversal of the legacy that Yeltsin bequeathed Putin.
      Yes, Russia has effectively reverted to a one-party state, though
      unlike the Communist days, there is lots of room for criticism. Like
      its Soviet predecessor, Russia has a vital role to play in the world
      as the brave voice that will speak out against US imperialism. These
      realities are Putin's most enduring legacy. It is unlikely that
      Medvedev will discard them. Furthermore, he has staked out his
      intentions to engage the private sector, as opposed to his rival
      Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov's desire to establish new state-
      run corporations.

      As for Putin, it seems that he is getting ready to role up his
      sleeves and tackle the troubling stranglehold that economic elites
      still have on Russian life. He is certainly the inspiration for
      Medvedev's announcement that government officials should not hold
      positions on boards of companies. "Truly independent directors
      should replace them," Medvedev has made clear. Which means he will
      himself resign as chairman of Gazprom and surely insist that Kremlin
      Personnel Manager Viktor Ivanov resign as chairman of Almaz-Anbtei,
      Minister of Education Andrei Fursenko as chairman of Ronsnanotekh,
      and Kremlin aide Sergei Chemezov as chairman of Rosoboronexport, all
      protégés of Putin. The recent arrest of the notorious mafia kingpin
      Semyon Mogilevich is also a hopeful sign of things to come. Putin
      already created an investigative commission to operate in parallel
      with the prosecutor-general's office to try to balance these groups,
      chaired by Aleksandr Bastrykin.

      Last October in Kommersant, head of Federal Drug Control Service
      Viktor Cherkesov called for a ceasefire among warring siloviki,
      warning that state corporatism, credited with saving Russia, would
      collapse if the infighting continued. Analyst Alexander Golts
      explains, "they stood together as long as they were robbing others
      of their assets. But after dividing the spoils, they realised that
      they can only expand their wealth by robbing one another."
      That all this is public knowledge shows that no one is deemed
      untouchable. Can Medvedev/Putin call a truce among the warring
      Kremlin factions, and strengthen judicial independence? Or is the
      intent to pursue the "sovereign democracy" which now seems to be the
      norm, establishing an acceptable pax putina within the economic
      elite, a kind of neo-tsarism?

      This is clearly uncharted territory. Everyone agrees that the future
      of the political (and, by implication, bureaucratic) diarchy will
      keep Russians, indeed the world, guessing which of the two has more
      political clout. It is quite possible that Medvedev will continue to
      take directions from Putin. Boris Kagarlitsky, director of the
      Institution for Globalisation Studies and Social Movements in
      Moscow, worries, "will the bureaucratic machine be efficient now
      that neither the law nor the internal administrative regulations say
      how it must function?" Kagarlitsky argues that the transformation of
      the president into the PM could paralyse the presidential
      administration and the cabinet of ministers, that this move is a
      blunder, a dangerous game — to leave and stay at the same time.

      Is this a replay of the legendary Russian tragedy of Boris Godunov,
      regent to Tsarevich Feodor, or a heroic and brilliant strategy to
      continue Russia's return to health? Perhaps it will be clearer by
      this summer, when Russia sends a delegation to the Group of Eight
      meeting in Japan. Will Putin attend, or Medvedev, or both?

      Eric Walberg writes for Al-Ahram Weekly. You can reach him at



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