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Re: Gen. Shelton shocks Celebrity Forum,

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  • __________guruoo
    I m not sure what led to the Clark - Shelton rift, or the subsequent petty sniping, but Gen. Shelton at the very least now owes General Clark, and the
    Message 1 of 3 , Sep 30 6:26 PM
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      I'm not sure what led to the Clark - Shelton rift, or the subsequent
      petty sniping, but Gen. Shelton at the very least now owes General
      Clark, and the American public a more detailed explanation of what he's
      refering to.
      Shelton should either back up this vague assertion with facts, or issue
      a complete retraction.

      >
      > The New Republic
      >
      > From
      > http://www.thenewrepublic.com/magazines/tnr/current/heilbrunn053199.html
      > <http://www.thenewrepublic.com/magazines/tnr/current/heilbrunn053199.html%22>
      >
      > Courage Under Fire
      >
      >
      > by Jacob Heilbrunn
      >
      > Wes Clark wages a two-front war.
      >
      > General Wesley Clark, NATO's supreme allied commander, is one of the
      > few American military officers who really knows Slobodan Milosevic. In
      > fact, he's been dealing with the Serbian leadership longer than almost
      > anyone else in the Army or the Clinton administration. As a result,
      > explains a State Department official, "Wes is someone who really
      > understands the Serbs' evil." And, in his initial briefings on
      > Operation Allied Force, Clark made that understanding abundantly
      > clear. "President Milosevic and his military leaders should understand
      > that there is no sanctuary for them," Clark declared to reporters in
      > Brussels on March 25, right after the first night of bombing. Yet, as
      > the air war drags on, Clark himself might need sanctuary--from his
      > many detractors within the U.S. military.
      >
      >
      > Gen. Wesley K. Clark
      >
      > Almost as soon as the bombs started falling on Belgrade, harsh--and
      > usually unattributed--words began to seep out of the Pentagon and
      > other redoubts of the U.S. military, and the sniping has only
      > increased in recent weeks. Clark is "elitist and aloof," a colonel who
      > worked for him told me. "Frankly, he's more Westmoreland--handsome,
      > attuned to political considerations--than Schwarzkopf," says a retired
      > general. Not surprisingly, conservatives in the press have chimed in.
      > Robert Novak derided Clark, who grew up in Little Rock and won a
      > Rhodes Scholarship, as "the perfect model of a 1990s political
      > four-star general"--someone who earned his stars by being a Clinton
      > crony. David Hackworth, the retired colonel turned pundit, went even
      > further, dubbing Clark the "ultimate perfumed prince." Hackworth's
      > insult, according to a retired Army officer, "has shot around the
      > military."
      >
      > Take these critical words with a grain of salt. Sure, the air campaign
      > over Yugoslavia has, to this point, been a failure, which means Clark,
      > as the campaign's commanding officer, must take his share of the
      > blame. But is Clark really a new Westmoreland? Or is he something
      > else--a casualty of the military's antipathy toward intervening in
      > foreign conflicts at the behest of a civilian leader it doesn't
      > particularly like or respect or even trust?
      >
      > Part of the disdain for Clark among many military types comes down to
      > plain jealousy. As an all-American swimmer who graduated first in his
      > class from West Point in 1966, Clark has always been an object of
      > envy. "The Army, like the church, has a hierarchy of seven layers,"
      > says retired Lieutenant General Theodore G. Stroup Jr., who attended
      > West Point with Clark. "Some guys move up to be a bishop faster than
      > others. Clark moved very fast." After serving in Vietnam, where he was
      > wounded while leading a heroic assault on a North Vietnamese
      > encampment, Clark came home to plum assignments: first a 1975-76 White
      > House fellowship in the Office of Management and Budget, then a stint
      > on the staff of Alexander Haig, at NATO, before joining the elite
      > office of the chief of staff of the Army in 1983. He earned his third
      > star in 1994 with a promotion to director of strategy for the Joint
      > Staff, and his fourth came as commander of the U.S. Southern Command
      > in Panama from 1996-97.
      >
      > Along the way, Clark's cerebral approach did not endear him to the
      > Army brass or foot soldiers. "He's not the kind of guy that inspires a
      > willingness to get yourself killed on principle," says one officer. An
      > order from Clark, the officer adds, "is just an order." Clark also
      > weakened his standing in the Army when he accepted the appointment
      > with the Joint Chiefs. Since his joint position required him to work
      > in tandem with all four branches rather than representing the Army's
      > interests alone, resentment of him within the Army only intensified.
      > John Hillen, a retired Army captain and currently a senior fellow at
      > the Center for Strategic and International Studies, admires Clark but
      > admits that many in the Army don't; in their minds, he says, Clark is
      > "outside the system."
      >
      > AAA Webaholics <http://www.aaa.com.au/webaholics/>
      >
      > But petty jealousy and personality conflicts alone cannot account for
      > Clark's difficulties. Clark is mainly reviled by those who believe
      > that, in leading the current Kosovo campaign, he has strayed from the
      > "Powell Doctrine," which holds that, if and when the United States
      > fights, it should apply overwhelming force suddenly and swiftly.
      > Ironically, Clark--like many officers shaped by the Vietnam
      > experience--subscribed to this doctrine long before it bore Powell's
      > name. As an Army captain in 1975, he wrote an Army Command and General
      > Staff College thesis (excerpted in the April 26 Time magazine) arguing
      > that "once committed to actual combat, anything less than overwhelming
      > and rapid military success for the intervening power will be
      > diplomatically disastrous." Later, as commanding general at the
      > National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California, Clark trained
      > troops in the techniques of breaching trench defenses that would help
      > win the Gulf war. "Wes Clark's military enjoyed a great renaissance,"
      > says Boston University's Andrew Bacevich, himself a former Army
      > colonel (and TNR contributor). "If you wanted to see that renaissance,
      > Fort Irwin was the place to go.... That renaissance was guided by the
      > absolute determination of officers never to let Vietnam happen again."
      >
      > But Clark's experience in the Balkans shook him up. Clark learned that
      > the Powell Doctrine, while sound in theory, could be a cover for
      > inaction--armor-plated isolationism. With his appointment to the Joint
      > Chiefs as the strategy officer, Clark was fated to be involved in the
      > Balkan mess. At first, things didn't go so well. In 1994, for
      > instance, Clark infamously exchanged gifts with Bosnian Serb General
      > Ratko Mladic, who was later indicted for war crimes. Clark handed
      > Mladic his hat; Mladic gave him his--plus a bottle of plum brandy and
      > a handgun with a Cyrillic inscription.
      >
      > But Clark eventually found his footing. He worked closely with Richard
      > Holbrooke, then assistant secretary of state for Europe and the
      > Clinton administration's point man for the Balkans. The bond between
      > the two men was forged on August 19, 1995, when they were traveling
      > over Mount Igman, a famously dangerous road to Sarajevo. A French
      > armored personnel carrier, which was transporting several of their
      > colleagues and traveling behind them, plunged down the mountainside.
      > Clark bravely rappelled down the mined area only to discover that
      > three of his colleagues had perished. "He and I were bonded from that
      > moment," says Holbrooke. "Clark is Mount Igman. He is a can-do general."
      >
      > Indeed, Clark was a key ally to Holbrooke--one of the few military
      > officers who supported his relentless efforts to deal forcefully with
      > the Serbs and end the war in Bosnia. Clark was instrumental in
      > arranging for the August and September 1995 air strikes against the
      > marauding Bosnian Serbs. And, according to Holbrooke's memoir To End a
      > War, Clark clashed with his superior in rank, the crusty Admiral
      > Leighton Smith, when Smith sought to extend a brief bombing pause.
      > Holbrooke recalls Clark sat in an American Embassy car on the Cologne
      > airfield, while Smith yelled at Clark on the telephone for disagreeing
      > with him. General John Shalikashvili, then head of the Joint Chiefs,
      > went so far as to tell Holbrooke that the Army could remove Clark. But
      > Holbrooke stood by the general. In the end, Shalikashvili made sure
      > Clark got his fourth star.
      >
      > At the Dayton negotiations in November 1995, Clark dismayed his fellow
      > military officers by arguing for a strong civilian presence along with
      > the multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia, and he advocated a
      > robust police force that would have authority to make arrests. Clark
      > also persuaded Milosevic--with the help of a classified imaging system
      > called PowerScene that created a video-game-like three-dimensional map
      > of Bosnia--to allow for a substantial corridor between Sarajevo and
      > Gorazde.
      >
      > Today, Clark is experiencing numerous frustrations. Certainly, in his
      > public statements, he has shown a willingness to wage war against the
      > Serbs. But a number of those statements have been contradicted by NATO
      > officials--sometimes in the span of minutes. Asked on CNN on the third
      > day of the campaign whether he would bomb Serbian troops, Clark
      > responded, "We will do this." But, just an hour later, NATO spokesman
      > Jamie Shea demurred, "We are not going to systematically target
      > troops." Then there was Clark's contention that "we are going to
      > systematically and progressively attack, disrupt, degrade, and
      > devastate and ultimately ... destroy these forces and their facilities
      > and support." A NATO official told The Washington Times Clark's
      > statement was "a slip of the tongue" and added, "No one's going to
      > destroy the armed forces" of Serbia.
      >
      > Even worse, Clark doesn't appear to be getting the tactical support he
      > needs. Clark wanted Apache helicopters at the beginning of the
      > campaign; the Apaches didn't arrive for four weeks--and they still
      > haven't seen battle. Given Clark's eagerness to take on the Serbs,
      > it's hard to believe that he wouldn't put ground troops in if he could.
      >
      > Some in the military liken Clark's predicament to the one generals
      > faced during Vietnam. In his recent book Dereliction of Duty--which
      > has achieved a cult following among many junior officers--fast-rising
      > officer H.R. McMaster portrays the Vietnam-era generals as a cowardly
      > lot who chose to execute incompetent civilian orders rather than
      > resign in protest. Indeed, the only thing that might endear Clark to
      > his critics at this point would be his resignation.
      >
      > Fortunately, Clark is not about to throw his stars on the table in a
      > fit of pique. That would amount to ratifying a steady and dangerous
      > trend in civilian-military relations over the past decade--namely, the
      > loss of civilian control. It is true that Clark is taking orders from
      > a civilian leadership--both in the United States and in Europe--that
      > remains maddeningly equivocal. But it is just as relevant that Clark
      > is contending with an increasingly independent military brass whose
      > obsession with avoiding another Vietnam has helped trap the Clinton
      > administration into avoiding ground troops, thereby rendering defeat
      > more likely. Clark's impressive record suggests that, given the right
      > tools, he is one of the few military leaders--or perhaps the only
      > one--who could make a go of it in the Balkans. And yet, for all the
      > talk of Clark being Clinton's pet, the irony is that Clinton's own
      > inept strategy may end up delivering Clark into the hands of his
      > Pentagon enemies.
      >
      > (Copyright 1999, The New Republic)
      >


      [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
    • ATTBI
      Kind of like Clark owing a complete explanation for lying about the White House contacting him over getting him to support the invasion of Iraq, you mean? K.J.
      Message 2 of 3 , Oct 1, 2003
      • 0 Attachment
        Kind of like Clark owing a complete explanation for lying about the White
        House contacting him over getting him to support the invasion of Iraq, you
        mean?

        K.J. in Battle Ground
        -----Original Message-----
        From: __________guruoo [mailto:guruoo2@...]
        Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 6:27 PM
        To: veterans@yahoogroups.com
        Subject: [veterans] Re: Gen. Shelton shocks Celebrity Forum,


        I'm not sure what led to the Clark - Shelton rift, or the subsequent
        petty sniping, but Gen. Shelton at the very least now owes General
        Clark, and the American public a more detailed explanation of what he's
        refering to.
        Shelton should either back up this vague assertion with facts, or issue
        a complete retraction.

        >
        > The New Republic
        >
        > From
        > http://www.thenewrepublic.com/magazines/tnr/current/heilbrunn053199.html
        >
        <http://www.thenewrepublic.com/magazines/tnr/current/heilbrunn053199.html%22
        >
        >
        > Courage Under Fire
        >
        >
        > by Jacob Heilbrunn
        >
        > Wes Clark wages a two-front war.
        >
        > General Wesley Clark, NATO's supreme allied commander, is one of the
        > few American military officers who really knows Slobodan Milosevic. In
        > fact, he's been dealing with the Serbian leadership longer than almost
        > anyone else in the Army or the Clinton administration. As a result,
        > explains a State Department official, "Wes is someone who really
        > understands the Serbs' evil." And, in his initial briefings on
        > Operation Allied Force, Clark made that understanding abundantly
        > clear. "President Milosevic and his military leaders should understand
        > that there is no sanctuary for them," Clark declared to reporters in
        > Brussels on March 25, right after the first night of bombing. Yet, as
        > the air war drags on, Clark himself might need sanctuary--from his
        > many detractors within the U.S. military.
        >
        >
        > Gen. Wesley K. Clark
        >
        > Almost as soon as the bombs started falling on Belgrade, harsh--and
        > usually unattributed--words began to seep out of the Pentagon and
        > other redoubts of the U.S. military, and the sniping has only
        > increased in recent weeks. Clark is "elitist and aloof," a colonel who
        > worked for him told me. "Frankly, he's more Westmoreland--handsome,
        > attuned to political considerations--than Schwarzkopf," says a retired
        > general. Not surprisingly, conservatives in the press have chimed in.
        > Robert Novak derided Clark, who grew up in Little Rock and won a
        > Rhodes Scholarship, as "the perfect model of a 1990s political
        > four-star general"--someone who earned his stars by being a Clinton
        > crony. David Hackworth, the retired colonel turned pundit, went even
        > further, dubbing Clark the "ultimate perfumed prince." Hackworth's
        > insult, according to a retired Army officer, "has shot around the
        > military."
        >
        > Take these critical words with a grain of salt. Sure, the air campaign
        > over Yugoslavia has, to this point, been a failure, which means Clark,
        > as the campaign's commanding officer, must take his share of the
        > blame. But is Clark really a new Westmoreland? Or is he something
        > else--a casualty of the military's antipathy toward intervening in
        > foreign conflicts at the behest of a civilian leader it doesn't
        > particularly like or respect or even trust?
        >
        > Part of the disdain for Clark among many military types comes down to
        > plain jealousy. As an all-American swimmer who graduated first in his
        > class from West Point in 1966, Clark has always been an object of
        > envy. "The Army, like the church, has a hierarchy of seven layers,"
        > says retired Lieutenant General Theodore G. Stroup Jr., who attended
        > West Point with Clark. "Some guys move up to be a bishop faster than
        > others. Clark moved very fast." After serving in Vietnam, where he was
        > wounded while leading a heroic assault on a North Vietnamese
        > encampment, Clark came home to plum assignments: first a 1975-76 White
        > House fellowship in the Office of Management and Budget, then a stint
        > on the staff of Alexander Haig, at NATO, before joining the elite
        > office of the chief of staff of the Army in 1983. He earned his third
        > star in 1994 with a promotion to director of strategy for the Joint
        > Staff, and his fourth came as commander of the U.S. Southern Command
        > in Panama from 1996-97.
        >
        > Along the way, Clark's cerebral approach did not endear him to the
        > Army brass or foot soldiers. "He's not the kind of guy that inspires a
        > willingness to get yourself killed on principle," says one officer. An
        > order from Clark, the officer adds, "is just an order." Clark also
        > weakened his standing in the Army when he accepted the appointment
        > with the Joint Chiefs. Since his joint position required him to work
        > in tandem with all four branches rather than representing the Army's
        > interests alone, resentment of him within the Army only intensified.
        > John Hillen, a retired Army captain and currently a senior fellow at
        > the Center for Strategic and International Studies, admires Clark but
        > admits that many in the Army don't; in their minds, he says, Clark is
        > "outside the system."
        >
        > AAA Webaholics <http://www.aaa.com.au/webaholics/>
        >
        > But petty jealousy and personality conflicts alone cannot account for
        > Clark's difficulties. Clark is mainly reviled by those who believe
        > that, in leading the current Kosovo campaign, he has strayed from the
        > "Powell Doctrine," which holds that, if and when the United States
        > fights, it should apply overwhelming force suddenly and swiftly.
        > Ironically, Clark--like many officers shaped by the Vietnam
        > experience--subscribed to this doctrine long before it bore Powell's
        > name. As an Army captain in 1975, he wrote an Army Command and General
        > Staff College thesis (excerpted in the April 26 Time magazine) arguing
        > that "once committed to actual combat, anything less than overwhelming
        > and rapid military success for the intervening power will be
        > diplomatically disastrous." Later, as commanding general at the
        > National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California, Clark trained
        > troops in the techniques of breaching trench defenses that would help
        > win the Gulf war. "Wes Clark's military enjoyed a great renaissance,"
        > says Boston University's Andrew Bacevich, himself a former Army
        > colonel (and TNR contributor). "If you wanted to see that renaissance,
        > Fort Irwin was the place to go.... That renaissance was guided by the
        > absolute determination of officers never to let Vietnam happen again."
        >
        > But Clark's experience in the Balkans shook him up. Clark learned that
        > the Powell Doctrine, while sound in theory, could be a cover for
        > inaction--armor-plated isolationism. With his appointment to the Joint
        > Chiefs as the strategy officer, Clark was fated to be involved in the
        > Balkan mess. At first, things didn't go so well. In 1994, for
        > instance, Clark infamously exchanged gifts with Bosnian Serb General
        > Ratko Mladic, who was later indicted for war crimes. Clark handed
        > Mladic his hat; Mladic gave him his--plus a bottle of plum brandy and
        > a handgun with a Cyrillic inscription.
        >
        > But Clark eventually found his footing. He worked closely with Richard
        > Holbrooke, then assistant secretary of state for Europe and the
        > Clinton administration's point man for the Balkans. The bond between
        > the two men was forged on August 19, 1995, when they were traveling
        > over Mount Igman, a famously dangerous road to Sarajevo. A French
        > armored personnel carrier, which was transporting several of their
        > colleagues and traveling behind them, plunged down the mountainside.
        > Clark bravely rappelled down the mined area only to discover that
        > three of his colleagues had perished. "He and I were bonded from that
        > moment," says Holbrooke. "Clark is Mount Igman. He is a can-do general."
        >
        > Indeed, Clark was a key ally to Holbrooke--one of the few military
        > officers who supported his relentless efforts to deal forcefully with
        > the Serbs and end the war in Bosnia. Clark was instrumental in
        > arranging for the August and September 1995 air strikes against the
        > marauding Bosnian Serbs. And, according to Holbrooke's memoir To End a
        > War, Clark clashed with his superior in rank, the crusty Admiral
        > Leighton Smith, when Smith sought to extend a brief bombing pause.
        > Holbrooke recalls Clark sat in an American Embassy car on the Cologne
        > airfield, while Smith yelled at Clark on the telephone for disagreeing
        > with him. General John Shalikashvili, then head of the Joint Chiefs,
        > went so far as to tell Holbrooke that the Army could remove Clark. But
        > Holbrooke stood by the general. In the end, Shalikashvili made sure
        > Clark got his fourth star.
        >
        > At the Dayton negotiations in November 1995, Clark dismayed his fellow
        > military officers by arguing for a strong civilian presence along with
        > the multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia, and he advocated a
        > robust police force that would have authority to make arrests. Clark
        > also persuaded Milosevic--with the help of a classified imaging system
        > called PowerScene that created a video-game-like three-dimensional map
        > of Bosnia--to allow for a substantial corridor between Sarajevo and
        > Gorazde.
        >
        > Today, Clark is experiencing numerous frustrations. Certainly, in his
        > public statements, he has shown a willingness to wage war against the
        > Serbs. But a number of those statements have been contradicted by NATO
        > officials--sometimes in the span of minutes. Asked on CNN on the third
        > day of the campaign whether he would bomb Serbian troops, Clark
        > responded, "We will do this." But, just an hour later, NATO spokesman
        > Jamie Shea demurred, "We are not going to systematically target
        > troops." Then there was Clark's contention that "we are going to
        > systematically and progressively attack, disrupt, degrade, and
        > devastate and ultimately ... destroy these forces and their facilities
        > and support." A NATO official told The Washington Times Clark's
        > statement was "a slip of the tongue" and added, "No one's going to
        > destroy the armed forces" of Serbia.
        >
        > Even worse, Clark doesn't appear to be getting the tactical support he
        > needs. Clark wanted Apache helicopters at the beginning of the
        > campaign; the Apaches didn't arrive for four weeks--and they still
        > haven't seen battle. Given Clark's eagerness to take on the Serbs,
        > it's hard to believe that he wouldn't put ground troops in if he could.
        >
        > Some in the military liken Clark's predicament to the one generals
        > faced during Vietnam. In his recent book Dereliction of Duty--which
        > has achieved a cult following among many junior officers--fast-rising
        > officer H.R. McMaster portrays the Vietnam-era generals as a cowardly
        > lot who chose to execute incompetent civilian orders rather than
        > resign in protest. Indeed, the only thing that might endear Clark to
        > his critics at this point would be his resignation.
        >
        > Fortunately, Clark is not about to throw his stars on the table in a
        > fit of pique. That would amount to ratifying a steady and dangerous
        > trend in civilian-military relations over the past decade--namely, the
        > loss of civilian control. It is true that Clark is taking orders from
        > a civilian leadership--both in the United States and in Europe--that
        > remains maddeningly equivocal. But it is just as relevant that Clark
        > is contending with an increasingly independent military brass whose
        > obsession with avoiding another Vietnam has helped trap the Clinton
        > administration into avoiding ground troops, thereby rendering defeat
        > more likely. Clark's impressive record suggests that, given the right
        > tools, he is one of the few military leaders--or perhaps the only
        > one--who could make a go of it in the Balkans. And yet, for all the
        > talk of Clark being Clinton's pet, the irony is that Clinton's own
        > inept strategy may end up delivering Clark into the hands of his
        > Pentagon enemies.
        >
        > (Copyright 1999, The New Republic)
        >


        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]


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        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • __________guruoo
        You re splitting hairs. The call may not have been made from White House property, but the evidence still does support the assertion that the contact s request
        Message 3 of 3 , Oct 1, 2003
        • 0 Attachment
          You're splitting hairs.
          The call may not have been made from White House property,
          but the evidence still does support the assertion that
          the contact's request was in line with White House policy
          towards Iraq. The Bush administration has been looking for
          an excuse to take Iraq ever since they moved into the White House.
          As a matter of fact, this policy actually predates the 2000 election.

          Here's the organization that promoted the policy.
          It's founding members include Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz,
          Donald Rumsfeld, and Richard Perle.....
          The Project for the New American Century:
          http://www.newamericancentury.org

          Here's a few sites that will point you towards the revelant documents
          that are still maintained on the PNAC site:
          Information Clearinghouse : About PNAC:
          http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1665.htm
          ABCNEWS.com : Were 1998 Memos a Blueprint for War?
          http://abcnews.go.com/sections/nightline/DailyNews/pnac_030310.html
          PNAC.info - Exposing the Project for the New American Century
          http://pnac.info

          Hope you find this helpful.


          "ATTBI" <educationproject@...> wrote:

          >Kind of like Clark owing a complete explanation for lying about the White
          >House contacting him over getting him to support the invasion of Iraq, you
          >mean?
          >
          >K.J. in Battle Ground
          > -----Original Message-----
          > From: __________guruoo [mailto:guruoo2@...]
          > Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 6:27 PM
          > To: veterans@yahoogroups.com
          > Subject: [veterans] Re: Gen. Shelton shocks Celebrity Forum,
          >
          >
          > I'm not sure what led to the Clark - Shelton rift, or the subsequent
          > petty sniping, but Gen. Shelton at the very least now owes General
          > Clark, and the American public a more detailed explanation of what he's
          > refering to.
          > Shelton should either back up this vague assertion with facts, or issue
          > a complete retraction.
          >
          > >
          > > The New Republic
          > >
          > > From
          > >
          http://www.thenewrepublic.com/magazines/tnr/current/heilbrunn053199.html
          > >
          ><http://www.thenewrepublic.com/magazines/tnr/current/heilbrunn053199.html%22
          >>
          > >


          [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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