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OT FWD: [SLF] STOA report released by European Parliament

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  • Frits Westra
    From: IPTV Ltd Subject: Communications interception and ECHELON : 1999 STOA report for European Parliament released6 May 1999 (for
    Message 1 of 1 , May 7, 1999
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      From: IPTV Ltd <iptv@...>
      Subject: Communications interception and ECHELON :
      1999 STOA report for European Parliament released

      6 May 1999 (for release 7 May 1999)

      Interception Capabilities 2000 ("IC2000")

      The IC2000 report on communications interception and ECHELON was
      approved as a working document by the Science and Technology Options
      Assessment Panel of the European Parliament (STOA) at their meeting in
      Strasbourg on 6 May 1999.

      The report is therefore available for public distribution from the
      European Parliament office in Luxembourg. A web version has been
      prepared and will be placed on the on the EP web site. Until that
      version is loaded, specialist groups and media writers can obtain the
      report from the temporary web site listed at the end. Key findings of
      the IC2000 report � Comprehensive systems exist to access, intercept
      and process every important modern form of communications, with few
      exceptions (section 2, technical annexe);

      � The report provides original new documentary and other
      evidence about the ECHELON system and its role in the interception of
      communication satellites (section 3). In excess of 120 satellite based
      systems are currently in simultaneous operation collecting
      intelligence (section 2). Submarines are routinely used to access and
      intercept undersea communications systems.

      � There is wide-ranging evidence indicating that major governments
      are routinely utilising communications intelligence to provide
      commercial advantage to companies and trade.

      � Although "word spotting" search systems to automatically
      select telephone calls of intelligence interest are not thought to be
      effective, speaker recognition systems in effect, "voiceprints" have
      been developed and are deployed to recognise the speech of targeted
      individuals making international telephone calls;

      � Recent diplomatic initiatives by the United States government
      seeking European agreement to the "key escrow" system of cryptography
      masked intelligence collection requirements, forming part of a
      long-term program which has undermined and continues to undermine the
      communications privacy European companies and citizens;

      � Interception for legally authorised domestic interception and
      interception for clandestine intelligence purposes must be sharply
      distinguished. A clear boundary between law enforcement and "national
      security" interception activity is essential to the protection of
      human rights and fundamental freedoms.

      � Providing the measures called for in the 1998 Parliamentary
      resolution on "Transatlantic relations/ECHELON measures may be
      facilitated by developing an in-depth understanding of present and
      future Comint capabilities. Protective measures may best be focused on
      defeating hostile Comint activity by denying access or, where this is
      impractical or impossible, preventing processing of message content
      and associated traffic information by general use of cryptography.

      � In relation to the manner in which Internet browsers and other
      software is deliberately weakened for use by other than US citizens,
      consideration could be given to a countermeasure whereby, if systems
      with disabled cryptographic systems are sold outside the United
      States, they should be required to conform to an "open standard" such
      that third parties and other nations may provide additional
      applications which restore the level of security to at least that
      enjoyed by domestic US customers.

      � It should be possible to define and enforce a shared interest in
      implementing measures to defeat future external Sigint activities
      directed against European states, citizens and commercial activities.

      The report is available at


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