TURMEL: MedPot Magnificent Seven Memo to Supreme Court
- JCT: Here's the Memorandum being served on the Crown with
the Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada. All the others have adopted his arguments:
File Number: #
Appeal Court No: C51187
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL)
Appellant in appeal
Her Majesty The Queen
Respondent in appeal
TERRANCE PARKER, APPLICANT
PART I - OVERVIEW
1. On Nov 7 2011, Ontario Court of Appeal Justices
Rosenberg, Sharpe, Juriansz heard the appeals by six medical
marijuana exemptees charged with various prohibition offences
before and after establishing their medical need; and by "the
Terry Parker" whose 2000 Ontario Court of Appeal decision
established his medical need and who is now seeking the return
of marijuana seized by Canada Post.
2. The MedPot Magnificent Seven Appellants were:
1) C51187 Terrance Parker, not MMAR-exempt, seeking the
return of marijuana seized by Canada Post in 2006 under S.24
of the C.D.S.A.;
2) C52007 Gary Pallister, charged but then became exempted
seeking an Order citing the Crown for contempt of the
Sfetkopoulos and Beren decisions and expunging all bogus
convictions while the MMAR exemption was defective and
possession and production offences of no force or effect;
3) C53096 Debra McIntyre, charged but then became exempted
seeking an Order citing the Crown for contempt and expunging
all bogus convictions while MMAR defective;
4) C52961 Mark MacDonald, charged then became exempted with
charges stayed by Crown seeking an Order citing the Crown for
contempt and expunging bogus convictions while MMAR exemption
5) C52549 Rob McCrady, charged but then became exempted and
appealing conviction for Possession under S.4(1);
6) C52898 Wayne Hearn, charged but then became exempted and
appealed conviction for Production under S.7(1);
7) Sean Maloney, charged but then became exempted and
appealed conviction for Possession for the Purpose of
Trafficking under S.5(2) and a 30-day jail sentence to be
served on week-ends.
3. The Crown noted the challenges to the CDSA marijuana
offences were based on arguments promulgated by John Turmel
that have been dismissed over the years. Despite Crown
opposition, the Court nevertheless allowed John Turmel to help
the Appellants argue those Turmel arguments:
1) BENO: J.P. ruled: Bad Exemption = No Offence;
2) POLCOA: Parliament Only Legislates, Courts Only Abrogate;
3) HITZIG170: Establish medical need to simply be exempt;
4) NODOCTOR! Health Canada has not yet persuaded Parker's
doctor's association to participate in the MMAR exemption
4. On Dec 22 2011, the Court of Appeal dismissed all the
5. PARKER REASONS  This appeal involves the dismissal
of an application for return of seized marihuana pursuant to
s. 24 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996,
c. 19. The appellant's s. 24 CDSA application was originally
dismissed on December 7, 2007 by Clements J. of the Ontario
Court of Justice. The appellant appealed Clements J.'s
decision to the Superior Court of Justice. Tulloch J. ruled
that he had jurisdiction under s. 40 of the Courts of Justice
Act to hear the appeal. He subsequently dismissed the appeal
on September 30, 2009. The appellant now appeals from the
decision of Tulloch J.
6. MALONEY REASONS  On May 27, 2011, the appellant
pleaded guilty to one count of possession of marihuana for the
purpose of trafficking. Bordeleau J. sentenced the appellant
to 30 days imprisonment to be served intermittently and 11
months probation. The appellant initially appealed his
conviction. At the hearing of that appeal, with the consent of
the Crown, time to appeal sentence was extended.
7. MCCRADY REASONS  These appeals involve five
appellants who have been charged and, in some cases, convicted
of marihuana related offences contrary to the Controlled Drugs
and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19. The appellants have been
frustrated by the operation of the Marihuana Medical Access
Regulations, S.O.R./2001-227 and argue that the offences with
which they have been charged have been judicially repealed.
The reasons in this appeal are being released at the same time
as the reasons in the companion cases of Parker and Maloney.
8.  The appellants McCrady and Hearn appeal from
convictions for marihuana related offences. The appellant
McCrady was convicted of possession of marihuana contrary to
s. 4(1) of the CDSA by Lalande J. of the Ontario Court of
Justice on July 19, 2010.
9. Appellant was charged on Feb 20 2009, four months
after having sent in his doctor-signed MMAR application.
Justice Lalande rued there would have been no prosecution had
there been no 6-month delay.
10. .. The appellant Hearn pleaded guilty to
production of marihuana contrary to s. 7(1) of the CDSA in the
Ontario Court of Justice on July 9, 2010.
 The appellants Pallister and McIntyre currently face
charges for production and possession for the purpose of
trafficking, and production and simple possession,
respectively. The appellant MacDonald was charged with
possession for the purpose of trafficking in December 2008.
Those charges were stayed in December 2010. Pallister,
McIntyre and MacDonald each seek... to have the Crown cited
for contempt for continuing to prosecute marihuana offences.
Finally, they seek to expunge the criminal records of all
people convicted of marihuana offences.
11.  The appellants McCrady and Hearn appeal their
convictions. They raise the following issues:
(1) Their charges should have been quashed, as marihuana is
no longer a controlled substance.
(2) Their charges should have been judicially stayed, as
marihuana no longer should be a controlled substance.
12. Their charge should have been dismissed was the third
ground relying on having established medical need by obtaining
exemptions to simply be exempt pursuant to Hitzig Par.170.
13.  The appellants raise the following issues
respecting marihuana offences:
(1) The combined effect of the decisions of the Ontario Court
of Appeal in R. v. Parker (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 481, [Parker
(2000)]; Hitzig v. Canada (2003), 177 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont.
C.A.), and R. v. J.P. (2003), 67 O.R. (3d) 321 is the repeal
of the marihuana prohibitions. This deemed repeal has never
(2) The decision in R. v. Krieger, 2000 ABQB 1012 is deemed to
have repealed the marihuana production offence in s. 7 of the
(3) The decisions in Sfetkopoulos v. Canada (A.G.), 2008 FC
33, Sfetkopoulos v. Canada (A.G.), 2008 FCA 328 and R. v.
Beren, 2009 BCSC 429 have invalidated the marihuana
prohibition retroactive to at least December 3, 2003. BENO 2
14. The court failed to note (4) reliance on Hitzig 170
after having established medical need to be simply exempt.
PART II - QUESTIONS IN ISSUE
15. A) Whether the Court erred in ruling its amendments
in the MMAR revived the prohibitions in the CDSA when S.43(a)
of the Interpretation Act states: Where an enactment is
repealed in whole or in part, [in the MMAR] the repeal does
not revive any enactment or anything not in force or existing
at the time [in the CDSA] when the repeal takes effect;" or
whether Parliament Only Legislates new penal sanctions, Courts
Only Abrogate: POLCOA?
16. B) Whether Krieger decision invalidating the S.7(1)
took effect on Mar 18 2003?
17. C) Whether the J.P. (BENO Bad Exemption means No
Offence) decision quashing the possession charge when the
Parker declaration of invalidity of the S.4 Possession Offence
was in effect while the MMAR were found to be defective
between Aug 1 2001 and Oct 7 2003 by the Hitzig Court should
apply again now that the Beren Court has ruled the MMAR have
been again flawed by the very same two defects between Dec 3
2003 and Mar 4 2010?
18. D) Whether the court erred in finding the Parker and
Krieger invalidations do not apply to McCrady's S.4(1)
Possession Offence nor Hearn's Production Offence because they
do not apply to Turmel's S.5(2) Purpose of Trafficking
19. E) Whether the MMAR was constitutional during the
suspension of the Beren decision striking down both MMAR flaws
when Applicants were charged?
20. F) Whether other non-Ontario courts not following
J.P. is reason for Ontario courts not to follow J.P. as
Taliano J. did in Mernagh?
21. G) Whether the Sfetkopoulos, Beren, Mernagh decisions
are sufficient evidence in Appellant's challenge to the MMAR?
22. H) Whether the Court should have waited for the
Mernagh decision before dismissing the appeals because Taliano
J.'s BENO ruling in Mernagh has been merely stayed?
23. I) Whether the presumption of trafficking by Maloney
to whom Health Canada has now granted an exemption sustainable
given the more likely presumption of bulk buying for
established medical need?
24. J) Whether bogus convictions while MMAR deficient
should be expunged?
25. K) Whether obtaining MMAR exemptions establishing
Applicants' medical need to simply be exempt pursuant to
Hitzig Par.170 should have been considered?
26. L) Whether the Superior Court Criminal Order of Pitt.
J. could be set aside in Superior Civil Court Justice Chapnik
as a Default Judgment?
27. M) Whether Carole Bouchard's affidavit citing 431
doctors from Ontario's 27,128 practitioners is evidence of
Parker's claim of 1 in 60 doctors in Ontario!
28. N) Whether asking his family doctor and not seeking a
new doctor was too minimal effort?
29. O) Whether Health Canada's failure to enlist Parker's
doctor to participate in the MMAR is a failure to comply with
the Order of the Court by Terry Parker Day Aug 1 2001?
30. P) Whether the death of 15,000 epileptics at a rate
of 4 fatal seizures per day from Canada's known epileptic
population of 400,000 is of sufficient importance for leave to
PART III - ARGUMENTS
A) POLCOA, Parliament Only Legislates, Courts Only Abrogate.
31. .. Rather, this court brought the MMAR into
compliance with the Charter by striking down s. 41(b) (which
prohibited a licensed producer from growing for more than one
authorized-to-possess holder) and s. 54 (which prohibited more
than three licensed producers from producing in common).
 Hitzig created a retrospective period of invalidity of
the prohibition of marihuana possession dating back to July
31, 2001 (the date that the suspension of invalidity in Parker
(2000) ran out). Going forward, Hitzig made the prohibition of
marihuana possession fully constitutional in Ontario as of
October 7, 2003 (the date of the Hitzig decision)."
32. Since Parliament has never re-enacted those offences
after they were declared of no force in Parker and Krieger and
The Interpretation Act states:
S.2.(2): "For the purposes of this Act, an enactment that has
been replaced is repealed and an enactment that has expired,
lapsed or otherwise ceased to have effect is deemed to have
S.43(a): Where an enactment is repealed in whole or in part,
the repeal does not revive any enactment or anything not in
force or existing at the time when the repeal takes effect."
33. The Court's amendments to the MMAR could not revive
the invalid possession and production offences under S.4 and 7
of the CDSA that were not in force at the time!
B) KRIEGER TOOK EFFECT MARCH 18 2003
34. Krieger does not assist the appellants
 In Krieger the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench held that
because Mr. Krieger used marihuana to alleviate his suffering
from multiple sclerosis, the production prohibition in s. 7(1)
of the CDSA infringed his s. 7 Charter rights to liberty and
security of the person. The court held that s. 7(1) was of no
force and effect with respect to marihuana production. The
declaration of invalidity was suspended for one year to give
the government time to arrange for a legal source of marihuana
for therapeutic use. The Alberta Court of Appeal extended the
suspension of the declaration "until further order of the
Court". That suspension has never been lifted. In the interim,
the Hitzig line of cases resulted in the MMAR which allow for
lawful access to marihuana for therapeutic use. The
constitutional defect identified in Krieger was thereby
remedied during the period of suspension and the declaration
of invalidity is now moot.
35. The interim suspension could not be lifted from a
closed file because it lapsed with the further Final Order
rendering the court Functus Officio on Mar 18 2003. And the
constitutional defect identified was not remedied in Hitzig
until later on Oct 7 2003 after the Acton suspension ran out
on Mar 18 2003, it was not remedied during the suspension.
36. On June 18 2003, after both the Parker and Krieger
Courts' invalidations had taken effect and before the Hitzig
decision on Oct 7 2003 rendered the MMAR constitutional again,
Real Martin was charged with S.4(1) possession and S.7(1)
production offences. He had no medical need. In 2005, Real
Martin's S.4(1) possession charge was withdrawn due to Parker
but his S.7(1) production charge was not dropped due to
Krieger. Despite his possession charge being dropped while
there was a bad MMAR exemption, his motion to similarly quash
his production charge while there was a Bad Exemption was
dismissed. Nov 19 2010, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed
Real Martin's appeal against his S.7(1) cultivation charge
being dropped due to Krieger like his S.4(1) possession charge
had been dropped due to Parker because he wasn't sick.
37. All MedPot Magnificent Seven Applicants herein
charged with the S.7(1) cultivation offence have established
medical need like Parker and Krieger had though Martin had
C) IF PARKER-HITZIG BENO, WHY NOT PARKER-BEREN BENO
38.  These appeals are some of many cases that have
recently found their way to this court either as conviction
appeals or attempts at prerogative remedies. They all turn on
an argument referred to by the appellants as BENO (Bad
Exemption = No Offence). By the reasons in this appeal and in
the companion appeal in Parker it should now be apparent that
this argument cannot succeed. This court and other courts have
dealt with the so-called Bad Exemption by reading in words to
fix the constitutional infirmity or by striking down the
exemption. It was only in Hitzig that the effect of the Bad
Exemption was to retroactively render of no force and effect
the s. 4 CDSA possession prohibition as it related to
marihuana. That order gave effect to the order of this court
in Parker (2000). In Parker (2000), this court gave Parliament
a year to fix the problem identified in that case. The effect
of Hitzig was to find that Parliament had not succeeded. Hence
the order in Parker (2000) declaring s. 4 as related to
marihuana of no force and effect, took effect, but only until
October 7, 2003. Put another way, the BENO argument only
applied to the period from July 31, 2001 to October 7, 2003.
39. On Dec 8 2003, with no distinction as to medical
need, the Crown dropped the remaining 4,000 possession charges
across Canada since Aug 1 2001 Terry Parker Day to Oct 7 2003
Hitzig Day in compliance with the Parker-Hitzig rationale from
J.P. But the Crown did not expunge the 100,000 bogus
convictions registered while there was a Bad Exemption and No
Offence. And the Crown then did not drop any remaining
cultivation charges in compliance with the Krieger-Hitzig
rationale nor expunge any bogus convictions under S.7(1).
40.  Following Hitzig.. A new provision was added to
Part IV of the MMAR which enabled the Government's supply of
dried marihuana to be shipped directly to persons authorized-
to-possess. Sections 41(b) and 54 were re-enacted in their
original form as sections 41(b.1) and 54.1. As we explain in
Parker, the fact that the government re-enacted ss. 41(b) and
54, when it revised the MMAR in response to Hitzig, did not
retroactively resurrect the effect of the Parker (2000)
decision striking down the prohibition.
41. PARKER REASONS  The declaration of invalidity in
Parker (2000) does not survive indefinitely, waiting to be
invoked whenever problems are identified with the
constitutional validity of a provision of the MMAR. A finding
of invalidity would depend on a fresh finding of invalidity
with respect to the marihuana offences in the CDSA.
42. The J.P. decision did not rule there was No Offence
"absent a constitutionally adequate medical exemption once."
Regardless, absent a constitutionally adequate medical
exemption now, Applicants ask the court to so construe.
43. MCCRADY REASONS  Sfetkopoulos was a civil
application for declaratory relief in the Federal Court.
Strayer J. found that the MMAR still did not adequately
address the issue of lawful supply first canvassed in Hitzig.
He declared s. 41(b.1) of the MMAR (which prohibited the
holder of a production license from growing for more than one
ATP-holder) invalid. He did not, however, strike down any of
the prohibitions in the CDSA.
44. Crown Crown Attorney Sean Gaudet argued to the
Supreme Court of Canada in Sfetkopoulos Memorandum:
" The Court in R. v. J.P. ruled that the combined effect
of Parker and Hitzig meant there was no constitutionally valid
marijuana possession offence between July 31 2001 and Oct 7
2003, the date the MMAR were constitutionally rectified by the
decision in Hitzig. Courts may construe the Federal Court of
Appeal's decision as creating a similar period of
retrospective invalidity dating back to December 3 2003, the
date that s.41(b.1) was re-introduced into the MMAR."
45.  R. v. Beren involved a prosecution for
production and trafficking in marihuana. Koenigsberg J. of the
British Columbia Supreme Court relied on Sfetkopoulos and held
that ss. 41(b.1) and 54.1 of the MMAR infringed s. 7 of the
Charter. No provision of the CDSA was found to be invalid in
46. JCT: The courts weren't asked to construe the Bad
Exemption declared in Sfetkopoulos and Beren meant No Offence.
In both instances, there was no companion charge like there
had been when the J.P. appeal asked for No Offence when Hitzig
declared a Bad Exemption. These Applicants are asking now. If
the J.P. decision that a Bad Exemption means No Offence
resulted in J.P.'s quashed charge during the first Bad
Exemption, the courts should construe the Beren decision
creating another period of retrospective invalidity dating
back to December 3 2003, the date that s.41(b.1) 54(1) were
re-introduced into the MMAR, to Mar 4, 2011, the date the MMAR
were constitutionally rectified by the decision in Beren.
D) PARKER & KRIEGER APPLY TO MCCRADY & HEARN
47.  The appellants argue that, by analogy to Hitzig
and J.P., Sfetkopolous and Beren have the effect of
invalidating all marihuana offences retroactively dating back
to December 3, 2003. This argument fails for several reasons.
 First, Hitzig and J.P. only affected the
constitutionality of the offence of simple possession of
marihuana, not the offences of production or possession for
the purpose of trafficking. The foundational declaration of
invalidity in Parker (2000) simply declares that the reference
to marihuana in Schedule II is of no force and effect for the
purposes of the possession charge in s. 4 of the CDSA. The
declaration does not extend to any other section of the CDSA
(Turmel, (2003) at para. 6). Thus, if the appellant's argument
had merit it could only apply to the simple possession charges
against the appellants McCrady, Pallister and McIntyre.
48. Applicant McCrady was convicted under only S.4(1)
Possession and not S.5(2) "Purpose of Trafficking."
49.  The appellants argue that, in combination,
Parker (2000), Hitzig and J.P. have the effect of completely
repealing all of the marihuana offences set out in the CDSA.
50. Not all. Just Possession.
51. .. That is incorrect. In R. v. Turmel (2003)..
The declaration does not extend to any other section of the
CDSA. In particular, it does not diminish the effect of the
listing of marihuana in Schedule II for the purposes of s.
5(2) of the CDSA.
52. Parker and Krieger invalidations do apply to
McCrady's S.4(1) Possession Offence nor Hearn's Production
Offence even if they do not apply to Turmel's S.5(2) Purpose
of Trafficking Offence! No appellant is arguing the Parker or
Krieger declaration applies to Section 5(2) Purpose of
Trafficking offence once Turmel did and lost! Only Sean
Maloney is now challenging his "Purpose of Trafficking" 1
pound upon the new ground that possession of less than his
current exemption must be presumed to be bulk buying and not
for trafficking! No other Applicant is arguing that "all"
prohibitions have been invalidated by Parker or Krieger, only
Possession and Production.
E) WHETHER MMAR CONSTITUTIONAL DURING BEREN SUSPENSION
53.  Second, the period of retroactive invalidity
that the appellants argue for would not apply to any of them:
(a) Retroactive invalidity would only work backward from the
date of Sfetkopoulos. The offence dates in the cases of
MacDonald, McCrady and Hearn (December 8, 2008, February 20,
2009 and April 22, 2009, respectively) are after January 10,
2008 when the Sfetkopoulos declaration remedied the
(b) The offence dates in the cases of Pallister and McIntyre
(October 2, 2009 and January 7, 2010, respectively) are after
paragraph 41(b.1) of the MMAR was amended in response to
Sfetkopoulos on May 14, 2009. No court has found the amended
 Third, the offence dates in the cases of McCrady, Hearn,
Pallister and McIntyre (February 20, 2009, April 22, 2009,
October 2, 2009, and January 7, 2010, respectively) are during
the one-year Beren suspension of invalidity, which began on
February 2, 2009. Maloney's offence date (June 6, 2010) is
after the MMAR were amended in response to Beren, on March 11,
54. Applicants claim retrospective invalidity backward
from the date of the Beren ruling fixing both the S.41 and
S.54 defects, and not backward from the earlier Sfetkopoulos
fixing only the first flaw. Being charged during the
suspension before the Beren decision took effect to fix the
problem means it does help all those charged while there was a
Bad Exemption which had not yet been fixed!
F) WHETHER NON-ONTARIO COURTS NOT FOLLOWING J.P. MATTERS
55.  Fourth, although the trial judge in Beren
declared ss. 41(b.1) and 54.1 of the MMAR invalid, she made
findings of guilt under the CDSA (at para. 136). Thus, Beren
upheld the production and trafficking offences as they relate
to persons who do not have ATPs under the MMAR.
56. Though many have found a "Bad Exemption" and not
followed J.P. to declare "No Offence," they weren't asked and
weren't in Ontario subject to the Ontario Court of Appeal's
J.P. ruling! These Applicants are in Ontario and would expect
to be treated according to J.P.'s treatment.
G) WHETHER SFETKOPOULOS, BEREN, MERNAGH SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
57. The charges against McCrady and Hearn not be stayed
 The appellants McCrady and Hearn, submit that the charges
against them should be stayed as marihuana no longer should be
a controlled substance. The record does not support this
position. The appellants submit a list of 25 complaints
related to the MMAR. The complaints are not grounded in
evidence in the record placed before the trial courts or this
court. In so far as the complaints reference Sfetkopoulos and
Beren, the appellant's argument is addressed above...
.. If they wish to now challenge the validity of any part
of the CDSA or the MMAR they can do so as part of the defence
to their charges or by an application in the Superior Court of
Justice. However, that defence and any application must be
based upon proper material that clearly demonstrates the
constitutional infirmity of the MMAR and the link between the
CDSA offences and the alleged infirmity in the MMAR.
58. Appellants did adopt the same arguments as in Beren
in relation to the re-imposition of the old limits "plus one"
being just as uneconomically unconstitutional as the old
limits, and adopted the arguments in Mernagh with respect to
the lack of doctors.
H) DISMISS BEFORE MERNAGH BENO DECISION
59. .. The appellants also make reference to the
trial decision in R. v. Mernagh, 2011 ONSC 2121. In that case,
Taliano J. declared that the prohibitions against possession
and production of marihuana in ss. 4 and 7 of the CDSA are
invalid. However, this court has already extended the Mernagh
suspension of invalidity pending appeal.
.. since October 7, 2003, with the exception of the 2011
decision Mernagh, no court has held that the marihuana
prohibitions are invalid.. The order made by Taliano J. in
Mernagh holding the possession and production marihuana
offences of the CDSA and the MMAR to be of no force and effect
cannot assist the appellants at this point because that order
has been stayed.
60. Justice Taliano is the first to follow the J.P. BENO
decision finding a Bad Exemption means No Offence for Mernagh
and Court should have waited to see if the appeal of Mernagh
is dismissed to the benefit of Appellants.
I) WHETHER MEDICAL NEED PRESUMES BULK BUYING NOT TRAFFICKING
61. Appellant Maloney was convicted of Possession for the
Purpose of Trafficking one pound and he is now exempted to
possess even more. An exemptee who has established medical
need should be presumed to have have possessed his medicine
for the economic purpose of bulk buying and not trafficking.
J) MUST BOGUS CONVICTIONS BE EXPUNGED?
62. Because the last 4,000 remaining Possession charges
from the Parker-Hitzig BENO period declared in J.P. were
withdrawn by the Crown on Dec 8 2003, the Court erred in not
expunging the 100,000 bogus convictions for Possession
registered while the MMAR were deficient. As well as the
convictions registered during the next Parker-Beren BENO
period when the MMAR were deficient.
K) HITZIG 170 NOT CONSIDERED
63. In claiming to have revived the CDSA prohibitions by
their amendments in the MMAR in Paragragh 170, the Hitzig
court added those charged need only "establish medical need to
simply be exempt."
64. On Dec 15 2004, though Health Canada had rejected his
doctor's application for medical use, Quebec Court Justice
Pierre Chevalier stayed the charges in R. v. Johnny Dupuis
after he entered his medical file and doctor's testimony into
evidence to establish medical need and reasoned Dupuis was
simply exempt with no reason to doubt he was not also in need
when he was charged. Despite not establishing medical need to
the satisfaction of Health Canada, he established medical need
to the satisfaction of the court to simply be exempt.
L) PARKER PITT EXEMPTION EXTENSION
65.  On March 15, 2002, Pitt J. of the Superior Court
of Justice ordered that the constitutional exemption granted
to the appellant following Parker (2000) be extended "until
such time as the government has complied with the Court's
ruling." The appellant argues that this order entitles him to
lawfully possess marihuana. However, Chapnik J. set aside Pitt
J.'s order on April 19, 2002(see  O.J. No. 1503). The
appellant appealed Chapnik J.'s decision and this court found
that she made no error when she set aside the order of Pitt J
(see  O.J. No. 3874). Thus, the March 15, 2002 order of
Pitt J. is of no assistance to the appellant.
66. Yes, the Court of Appeal did rule that Civil Court
could set aside a criminal ruling as a default judgment. It
didn't make it right.
M) INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF LACK OF 1/60 DOCTORS
67.  The appellant asserts that only one in 60
Ontario doctors participate in the medical marihuana regime,
making the possibility of obtaining an exemption under the
MMAR illusory... Clements J. dismissed the argument on the
grounds that there was no evidentiary record before him to
support the appellant's claim.
 No court can determine whether or not this argument has
merit in the absence of relevant information. Clements J. was
correct to refuse to consider the appellant's constitutional
challenge in the absence of a proper evidentiary record. We
note that this issue was decided by Taliano J. in R. v.
Mernagh, 2011 ONSC 2121, on an extensive factual record, but
his order has been stayed pending appeal.
68. The Court failed to note that in the Affidavit of
Health Canada's Carole Bouchard Para 8, Jan 16 2007 Appeal
Book Vol 1 Tab 13 says: "As of Nov 3 2006, 705 (1,603) persons
in Ontario (Canada) have an authorization to possess marihuana
for medical purposes supported by 431 practitioners." The
Ontario College of Physicians had 27,128 licensed doctors
2007. 27,128/431 = 62.9. 1 in 63 doctors. And Judge Taliano
condemned the lack of doctors in Mernagh even though there are
N) MINIMAL EFFORTS TO SEEK NEW DOCTOR
69. .. Parker had made minimal efforts to comply with
the MMAR... he refused to seek a doctor to sign his ATP
70. Parker had asked his family doctor, not too minimal
effort to comply, and refused to seek a "new" doctor to sign
his ATP. When Health Canada could not persuade his family
doctor to participate in the MMAR, asking Parker to seek a new
doctor with only 431 out of Ontario's 27,000 doctors
participating, 1 in 63, made the search unconscionably
O) FAILURE TO ENLIST PARKER'S DOCTOR
71. The 2000 Parker decision ordered Health Canada to set
up a MMAR regime to exempt Terrance Parker. After 12 years,
his doctor's professional association has still not endorsed
Health Canada's MMAR regime. How can it be said that the MMAR
have complied with the Parker Court's Order when Parker ends
up not exempted? Failure to set up a regime acceptable to the
medical community is no move evident in the fact the poster
boy for the medical marijuana movement still isn't' exempted!
P) 15,000 DEAD EPILEPTICS SINCE REGIME
72. At a rate of 4 fatal seizures per day from Canada's
known epileptic population of 400,000, 15,000 epileptic deaths
due to faulty exemption regime ordered set up by the Parker
court is of sufficient importance for leave to be granted.
PART IV - COSTS
Applicant seeks no order as to costs.
PART V - ORDER SOUGHT
Applicant seeks an Order granting leave to appeal.
Dated at Toronto on Mar 22 2012.
For the Applicant:
2209-55 Triller Ave.
Toronto, Ontario, M6R-2H6
TO: Registrar of this Court
AND TO: James Gorham
Department of Justice,
3400-130 King St. W.
Box 36 Toronto M5X 1K6
PART VI - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Beren BCSC Par: 45, 46, 47, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62.
Dupuis Par: 64.
Hitzig v. Canada (2003): Par: 31, 40, 44, 46, 47, 49, 62, 63.
J.P. (2003), Par 42, 44, 46, 47, 49, 56.
Krieger, 2000 ABQB: Par 32, 34, 36, 37, 52.
Parker (2000) Par: 32, 37, 38, 41, 44, 47, 49, 52, 62, 71, 72.
Parker (2002) Par: 65.
Martin (2010), Par: 36.
Mernagh, 2011 ONSC Par: 59, 60, 67, 68.
Sfetkopoulos (2008) FCA Par: 43, 44, 47, 53, 54, 57.
Turmel  Par: 51, 52.
Jct: Then on to file them in Ottawa on Friday.
John C. "The Banking Systems Engineer" Turmel, KingofthePaupers, Great Canadian Gambler, TajProfessor, Author of the UNILETS interest-free time-based currency United Nations Millennium Declaration C6 in the http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration.htm See http://johnturmel.com
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