Re: Is Connecticut still in the union?
- -As far as I know the common law "grand jury" cannot be abrogated
(replaced) unless specifically stated in the statute.There is no way
the legislators would sign off on doing away with a grand jury,
especially in a criminal matter.In the administrative realm an
information is used most if not all the time.
In firstname.lastname@example.org, "ursam0" <baer@g...> wrote:
> Does anyone have any experience with criminal procedure in Connecticut
> -- some of what I have been learning recently seems to suggest that as
> a practice, the state has moved entirely away from virtually any
> standard of law predicated upon due process or equal protection
> requirements or constitutional protections of any kind.
> Even attorneys there seem to find the superior court in that state as
> laughable as it is innocuous. State prosecutors are routinely credited
> with running the entire show as they see fit, it would seem. When I
> tried to dismiss what I was hearing as preposterous, my attention was
> called to grand jury indictments as long since having been formally
> abandoned by statute in Connecticut in favor of informations,
> Have I missed something?
- Maybe people should make a few DISTINCTIONS and consider that there are actually two DIFFERENT legals systems.PUBLIC LAW - "A law or statute that applies to the PEOPLE generally of the nation or state adopting or enacting it, is denominated a public law, as contra distinguished from PRIVATE law, affecting only an INDIVIDUAL or small number of PERSONS." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition
PRIVATE LAW - was that portion of the law which defines regulates, enforces, and administers relationships among INDIVIDUALS, associations, and corporations. As used in contradistinction to public law,...." Black'sPUBLIC LAW is based on the Common Law of England (which incorporates the MAGNA CARTA (1215), the PETITION OF RIGHTS (1628) and the BILL OF RIGHTS (1689)) as amended by the DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, the CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA & the STATE
CONSTITUTIONS."In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light
of the common law, the principles and history of which were
familiarly known to the framers of the constitution. Minor v.
Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422 , 5 S.
Sup. Ct. 935; Boyd v. U. S., 116 U.S. 616, 624 , 625 S., 6 Sup. Ct.
524; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 , 8 Sup. Ct. 564. The language
of the constitution, as has been well said, could not be understood
without reference to the common law. 1 Kent, Comm. 336; Bradley, J.,
in Moore v. U. S., 91 U.S. 270 , 274. [169 U.S. 649, 655].
The interpretation of the constitution of the United States is
necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in
the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the
light of its history.' 124 U.S. 478 , 8 Sup. Ct. 569. U.S. v. WONG
KIM ARK, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/169/649.htmlIt recognizes the UNALIENABLE RIGHTS of the SOVEREIGN people."Under the power to regulate, the state cannot deprive the citizen of the lawful use of his property, if itdoes not injuriously affect or endanger others. Lake View v. Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191. Nor can it, in theexercise of the police power, enact laws that are unnecessary, and that will be oppressive to the citizen. Railway Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37-40; Tenement-House Cigar Cases, 98 N. Y. 98; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377; Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 765, ( opinion of Judge BREWER;) Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 135; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 146, (per BRONSON, J.;) Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 225, (per HOSMER, J.) " MUGLER v. KANSAS, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/123/623.htmlPRIVATE LAW is COMMERCIAL in nature (which I believe includes almost ALL STATUTORY LAW today) and is used to TAX & REGULATE us under the FICTION OF LAW that we are STATUTORY ENITITES and/or involved in some kind of COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY/PRIVILEGE.26 USC 7701 (a)(1) Person
The term "person" shall be construed to mean and include an
individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or
corporation.They use a principle is known as EJUSDEM GENERIS which in Latin means "of
the same kind."
"The wording of §1 calls for the application of the maxim ejusdem
generis, the statutory canon that "[w]here general words follow
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects
enumerated by the preceding specific words. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland
on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.17 (1991); see also
Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117, 129
(1991)." Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 US 105, 114-115 (2001)
"Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows
a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference
to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration. See Arcadia
v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 84 -85 (1990)." Norfolk & Western R.
Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 US 117 (1991)
One should ask themselves if they are of the SAME KIND as
a "corporation, organization, government or governmental subdivision
or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association
or other legal entity."This is WHY almost all laws have been REWRITTEN.CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE 12.5. The Legislature hereby declares
its intent that the terms "man" or "men" where appropriate shall be
deemed "person" or "persons" and any references to the terms "man"
or "men" in sections of this code be changed to "person"
or "persons" when such code sections are being amended for any
purpose. This act is declaratory and not amendatory of existing law."ab initio un excluso." It is a RULE of STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION that what is NOT INCLUDED is EXCLUDED.You know, like Men & Women which are collectively known as PEOPLE, and not as PERSONS.This is EVIDENCED by the FACT that 26 USC 7701(n) Cross references states(1) Singular as including plural, section 1.(2) Plural as including singular, section 1.(3) Masculine as including feminine, section 1."inclusio unis est esclusio alterius." This DOCTRINE decrees that where law EXPRESSLY describes the PARTICULAR situation to which it shall apply, an IRREFUTABLE INFERENCE MUST be drawn that what is OMITTED or EXCLUDED was INTENDED to be OMITTED or EXCLUDED."Since in common usage the term `person' does not include the
sovereign, statutes employing that term are ordinarily construed to
exclude it." U.S. v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600 (1941)MAXIM OF LAWSThe power which is derived cannot be greater than that from which it is derived.Whose right it is to institute, his right it is to abrogate.People have UNALIENABLE RIGHTS & PERSONS have legislatively granted PRIVILEGES."The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a
citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own
way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the
state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his
doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him.
He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing
therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His
rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to
the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due
process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his
rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of
himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a
warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does
not trespass upon their rights.
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It
is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It
receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them
subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter.
Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not
authorized by its charter. Its rights to [201 U.S. 43, 75] act as a
corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of
its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to
investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its
powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having
chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could
not, in the exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these
franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and
demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that
purpose.The defense amounts to this: That an officer of a
corporation which is charged with a criminal violation of the
statute, may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal
to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it.
While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating
questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not
follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and
franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse
of such privileges." HALE v. HENKEL, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)It is so much easier to TAX & REGULATE people under a FICTION OF LAW."The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but the individuals' Right to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed." Corn v. Fort, 95 S.W.2d 620 (1936).Patrick in California
"You DO NOT REGULATE people, you REGULATE currency, property, motor
vehicles, persons and other instruments of COMMERCE."-PKM
- This might explain how we have all been referred to the private commission decreed by the legislature, which looks and feels like a private law ystem run by the State bar.
As a matter of fact, the only bail I have ever been required to post in a civil action was a bond for $1 after I obtained a TRO.
As a matter of law, special bail is required in civil actions.
The conclusion is that someone else is putting in the special bail.
And that someone is this State or an agency of this State like the State bar.
It is putting in this special bail for our benefit.
It might be doing this as the universal trustee of parens patriae.
If your purpose were to refer all law merchant cases in common law to a referee designated by the legislature, as part of a general scheme of social insurance, something like the State bar would be required to enforce uniformity of conviction on counsel. Likewise, prepaid special bail would be required to enable the court to compel those who chose their own counsel into the jurisdiction. Having accepted the benefit of the prepaid special bail, they are bound to its terms. The responsible person then is surety to the court for the special bail. The responible person is you in your natural character or capacity.
But, the bottom line is either special bail has been abolished, for which someone could find a statute if it's true, or special bail has been put in silently.
If this is so, a notice of rejection of the benefit of special bail, on the ground of the maxim of law that no one may be compelled to accept a benefit, filed in the action would either cause your arrest or dismissal from the court for want of jurisdiction.
Perhaps the best criterion of the maritime character of a contract is the system of law from which it arises and by which it is governed. And it is well known that the contract of insurance sprang from the law maritime, and derives all its material rules and incidents therefrom. It was unknown to the common law; and the common law remedies, when applied to it, were so inadequate and clumsy that disputes arising out of the contract were generally left to arbitration, until the year A. D. 1601, when the statute of 43 Elizabeth was passed creating a special court, or commission, for hearing and determining causes arising on policies of insurance. The preamble to that act, after mentioning the great benefit arising to commerce by the use of policies of insurance, has this singular statement: 'And whereas, heretofore such assurers have used to stand so justly and precisely upon their credits as few or no controversies have arisen thereupon, and if any have grown the same have, from time to time, been ended and ordered by certain grave and discreet merchants appointed by the lord mayor of the city of London, as men, by reason of their experience, fittest to understand and speedily to decide those causes, until of late years that divers persons have withdrawn themselves from that arbitrary course, and have sought to draw the parties assured to seek their moneys of every several assurer by suits commenced in her majesty's courts, to their great charges and delays.' The commission created by this act was to be directed to the judge of the admiralty for the time being, the recorder of London, two doctors of the civil law, and two common lawyers, and eight grave and discreet merchants. The act was thus an acknowledgment of the jurisdiction to which the case properly belonged. Had it not been for the jealousy exhibited by the common law courts against the court of admiralty, in prohibiting its cognizance of policies of insurance half a century before,70 the
70 4 Institutes, 139.
latter court, as the natural and proper tribunal for determining all maritime causes, would have furnished a remedy at once easy, expeditious, and adequate. It was only after the common law, under the influence of Lord Mansfield and other judges of enlightened views, had imported into itself the various provisions of the law maritime relating to insurance, that the courts at Westminster Hall began to furnish satisfactory relief to suitors. And even then, as remarked by Sir W. D. Evans, 'the inadequacy of the existing law to settle, proprio vigore, complicated questions of average and contribution, is very manifest and notorious. Such questions are, by consent, as matter of course, and from conviction of counsel that justice cannot be attained in any other way, referred to private examination; but a law can hardly be considered as perfect which is not possessed of adequate powers within itself to complete its purpose, and which requires the extrinsic aid of personal consent.'71 The contrivances to which Lord Mansfield resorted to remedy in a measure these difficulties are stated by Mr. Justice Parke in the introduction to his work on insurance.
New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham
BAIL, practice, contracts. By bail is understood sureties, given according
to law, to insure the appearance of a party in court. The persons who become
surety are called bail. Sometimes the term is applied, with a want of
exactness, to the security given by a defendant, in order to obtain a stay
of execution, after judgment, in civil cases., Bail is either civil or
2.- 1. Civil bail is that which is entered in civil cases, and is
common or special bail below or bail above.
3. Common bail is a formal entry of fictitious sureties in the proper
office of the court, which is called filing common bail to the action. It
is in the same form as special bail, but differs from it in this, that the
sureties are merely fictitious, as John Doe and Richard Roe: it has,
consequently, none of, the incidents of special bail. It is allowed to the
defendant only when he has been discharged from arrest without bail, and it
is necessary in such cases to perfect the appearance of the defendant.
Steph. Pl. 56, 7; Grah. Pr. 155; Highm. on Bail 13.
4. Special bail is an undertaking by one or more persons for another,
before some officer or court properly authorized for that purpose, that he
shall appear at a certain time and place, to answer a certain charge to be
exhibited against him. The essential qualification to enable a person to
become bail, are that he must be, 1. a freeholder or housekeeper; 2. liable
to the ordinary process of the court 3. capable of entering into a contract;
and 4. able to pay the amount for which he becomes responsible.
1. He must be a freeholder or housekeeper. (q. v.) 2 Chit. R. 96; 5
Taunt. 174; Lofft, 148 3 Petersd. Ab. 104.
2. He must be subject to the ordinary process of the court; and a
person privileged from arrest, either permanently or temporarily, will not
be taken. 4 Taunt. 249; 1 D. & R. 127; 2 Marsh. 232.
3. He must be competent to enter into a contract; a feme covert, an
infant, or a person non compos mentis, cannot therefore become bail.
4. He must be able to pay the amount for which he becomes responsible.
But it is immaterial whether his property consists of real or personal
estate, provided it be his own, in his own right; 3 Peterd. Ab. 196; 2 Chit.
Rep. 97; 11 Price, 158; and be liable to the ordinary process of the law; 4
Burr. 2526; though this rule is not invariably adhered to, for when part of
the property consisted of a ship, shortly expected, bail was permitted to
justify in respect of such property. 1 Chit. R. 286, n. As to the persons
who cannot be received because they are not responsible, see 1 Chit. R. 9,
116; 2 Chit. R. 77, 8; Lofft, 72, 184; 3 Petersd. Ab. 112; 1 Chit. R. 309,
5. Bail below. This is bail given to the sheriff in civil cases, when
the defendant is arrested on bailable process; which is done by giving him a
bail bond; it is so called to distinguish it from bail above. (q. v.) The
sheriff is bound to admit a man to bail, provided good and sufficient
sureties be tendered, but not otherwise. Stat. 23 H. VI. C. 9, A. D. 1444; 4
Anne, c. 16, Sec. 20; B. N. P. 224; 2 Term Rep., 560. The sheriff, is not,
however, bound-to demand bail, and may, at his risk, permit the defendant to
be at liberty, provided he will appear, that is, enter bail above, or
surrender himself in proper time. 1 Sell. Pr. 126, et seq. The undertaking
of bail below is, that the defendant will appear or put in bail to the
action on the return day of the writ.
6. Bail above, is putting in bail to the action, which is an appearance
of the defendant. Bail above are bound either to satisfy the plaintiff his
debt and costs, or to surrender the defendant into custody, provided
judgment should be against him and he should fail to do so. Sell. Pr. 137.
7. It is a general rule that the defendant having been held to bail, in
civil cases, cannot be held a second time for the same cause of action.
Tidd' s Pr. 184 Grah. Pr. 98; Troub. & Hal. 44; 1 Yeates, 206 8 Ves. Jur.
594. See Auter action Pendent; Lis pendens.