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People's Redress of Grievance By Access to Grand Juries Forbidden

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  • Ron Branson
    John Wolfgram, I appreciate your below suggestion. Let us play with this a bit. You have suggested, It might be more productive to repeal the 1960 proposition
    Message 1 of 1 , Apr 9, 2012
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      John Wolfgram, I appreciate your below suggestion. Let us play with this a bit. You have suggested,  "It  might be more productive to repeal the 1960 proposition creating the Commission and specifically returning their job to the grand jury, and then writing a short form of JAIL into that specific return..."

      Okay, let's pretend that this repealing of this 1960 law has taken place, and there is no Commission on Judicial Performance, nor is their JAIL4Judges. People may now file their complaints directly to the Grand Jury. Of course, this recreation can only apply to criminal complaints, and the People shall have no civil recourse as provided within J.A.I.L.

      So, Mr. Wolf files his grievance by making out a sworn affidavit of criminal conduct by Judge Ima Tyrant, and files it with District Attorney Care Less. The Grand Jury looks at Mr. Wolf's affidavit, and agrees with it, and brings an indictment against Judge Ima Tyrant, and serves the indictment on District Attorney Care Less for prosecution.

      D.A. Care Less realizes that prosecution is within his discretionary powers as a prosecutor, and he elects to sit the indictment. The Grand Jury is not impressed at all, and seeks to bring their indictment directly to the judge on the bench, which is Judge Good O. Booy. Judge Good O. Booy realizes this is his golfing and drinking buddy.

      Now you did mention that we could write a short form of JAIL into the specific return. So, in order to do that, we have to take a look at JAIL to see how it deals with this conflict of interest problem.

      I am pasting in the entire JAIL Initiative below for us to consider what parts of JAIL will deal with this problem, and I will highlight the applicable points in Maroon. Of course, in repealing legislation, we must do it either by a benevolent legislature, or by the People's Initiative Process. Since Art. VI creating the Commission on Judicial Performance is a Constitutional Amendment, we have to repeal it by a equally enforceable Constitutional Initiative. This will cost us the same amount as passing JAIL, which is about $2.1 dollars. But in order to get it passed, we also will have to launch a publicity campaign in order to help the People understand why we must repeal this 1960 Constitutional provision, and that project is going to call for an abundance of witnesses who will publicly affirm that this is entirely necessary.

      The focus of our attack, then, is not the judges, but the Commission on Judicial Performance. The message is that it is rotten to the core with political hacks, and is useless to complainers about the judges.

      So our repeal must start out with the JAIL Preamble, with a slight modification. Since I am not going to take the time here to rewrite the Preamble, suffice it to say that we need a Preamble. So I include that. Also, we are going to have to define the terms we use, so I will also include that. It is true we might be able to shorten it, but I am going to include all of the Preamble here for purposes of our discussion.

      I will accept that we possibly can overlook 2. :Exclusions of immunity, but not 3 defining the job of the County Grand Jury. Since or overall objective is to overcome the conflicts of interest of both the Prosecutor Care Less, and Judges Good O. Booy, & Judge Ima Tyrant, Defendant, we must include paragraph 4, "Professional Counsel." And we also do need paragraph 5.
      "Establishment of Special Grand Jury Facilities," & 6. "Annual Funding." To keep it short, we can jump over paragraph 7 & 8.

      We do need a budget for these Grand Juries, so we will include that in paragraph 10. Since we are dealing with a previously established Grand Jury, we can overlook Jurisdiction in paragraph 11, and Qualifications in 12, Service of Jurors in 14, and Procedures in paragraph 15. We do need 16, Indictments, in order to get around the Prosecutor and Judge team who will oppose this, and "Criminal Procedures in 17, and "Removal," 18, and 19 & 20. These paragraphs are marked in Maroon.

      It looks as though we have eliminated approximately 1/2 of the JAIL Provision, and in exchange for cutting it in half, we have eliminated altogether all means of a civil remedy for willful violations of the Constitution and the laws that govern their conduct.

      I will stop here, and await your response to what has been initially be proposed, but I underscore that what we have considered thus far, will cost precisely what it would cost to get the full J.A.I.L Initiate passed. So we must ask ourselves, will the People understand better in attacking corruption in the Commission on Judicial Performance rather than corruption dished out by with impunity, and cannot be touched because of Judicial Immunity. 

      Ron Branson


      Preamble. We, the People of California, find that the doctrine of judicial immunity has been greatly abused; that when judges abuse their power, the People are obliged - it is their duty - to correct that injury, for the benefit of themselves and their posterity. In order to ensure judicial accountability and domestic tranquility, we hereby amend our Constitution by adding the following provisions as Sec. 32 to Article I, which shall be known as "The J.A.I.L. Amendment."

      1. Definitions. To avoid absurd results, words shall be given their plain, ordinary and literal meanings; and where appropriate, the singular shall include the plural and vice-versa. For purposes of this Amendment, the following terms shall mean:

      1. Judge: A judicial officer hearing and adjudicating legal actions and proceedings within the judicial branch of government (to include arbitrator, mediator, or a private judge, any of whom is assigned by a court to hear involuntary proceedings). This definition shall not be construed to mean trial juror, prosecutor, or any administrative official.
      2. Material allegations: Statements essential to the claim or defense presented in a pleading filed in court.
      3. Blocking: Any unlawful act that impedes the lawful conclusion of a case, to include unreasonable delay and willful rendering of an unlawful or void judgment or order.
      4. Corporate litigant: A party holding a corporate charter, as distinguished from a business license.
      5. Juror: A Special Grand Juror.
      6. Strike: An adverse immunity decision or a criminal conviction against a judge.

      2. Exclusions of immunity. Notwithstanding common law or any other provision to the contrary, no immunities shielding a judge from frivolous and harassing actions shall be construed to extend to any deliberate violation of law, fraud or conspiracy, intentional violation of due process of law, deliberate disregard of material allegations, judicial acts without jurisdiction, blocking of a lawful conclusion of a case, or any deliberate violation of the Constitutions of California or the United States. The foregoing judicial misconduct shall not be construed to mean court decisions made within the authorized capacity of a judge.

      3. Special Grand Juries. For the purpose of returning power to the People and ensuring the integrity of the judiciary, there are hereby created within this State three twenty-five member Special Grand Juries with statewide jurisdiction having inherent power to judge both law and fact. This body shall exist independent of statutes governing county Grand Juries. Their responsibility shall be limited to determining, based on the evidence shown on the record, whether any civil lawsuit against a judge would be frivolous or harassing, or fall within the exclusions of immunity as set forth in paragraph 2, or whether there is probable cause of criminal conduct by the judge against whom a petition/complaint is brought before the Special Grand Jury.

      4. Professional Counsel. Each Special Grand Jury shall have exclusive power to retain non-governmental advisors, special prosecutors, and investigators, as needed, who shall serve no longer than one year, and thereafter shall be ineligible to serve; except a special prosecutor may be retained to prosecute to conclusion ongoing cases through all appeals and any complaints to the Special Grand Jury. Each Special Grand Jury may hire clerical staff, as needed, without time limitation.

      5. Establishment of Special Grand Jury Facilities. Within ninety days following the passage of this Amendment, the Legislature shall provide a suitable facility for each Special Grand Jury. Each facility shall be reasonably placed proportionately according to population throughout the State, but no facility shall be located within a mile of any judicial body.

      6. Annual Funding. The Legislature shall cause to be deducted two and nine-tenths percent from the gross judicial salaries of all judges, which amount shall be deposited regularly into an exclusive trust account created by this Amendment in paragraph 10 for its operational expenses, together with filing fees under paragraph 7, surcharges under paragraph 8, forfeited benefits of disciplined judges under paragraph 18, and fines, if any, imposed by sentencing under paragraph 16.

      7. Filing Fees. Attorneys representing a party filing a civil petition or response before the Special Grand Jury shall, at the time of filing, pay a fee equal to the filing fee due in a civil appeal to the State Supreme Court. Individuals filing a civil petition or response on their own behalf before the Special Grand Jury as a matter of right shall, at the time of filing, post a fee of fifty dollars, or file a declaration, which shall remain confidential, stating that they are impoverished and unable to pay and/or object to such fee, pursuant to First Amendment right of redress.

      8. Surcharges. Should this Amendment lack sufficient funding through its fines, fees, and forfeitures (including deductions in paragraph 6), the Legislature shall impose appropriate surcharges upon the civil court filing fees of corporate litigants as necessary to supplement the funding of this Amendment so as not to be chargeable to the public.

      9. Compensation of Jurors. Each Juror shall receive a salary commensurate to that of a Superior Court judge, prorated according to the number of days actually served by the Juror.

      10. Annual Budget. The Special Grand Juries shall have an annual operational budget commensurate to double the combined salaries of the seventy-five Jurors serving full time, which sum shall be initially deposited by the Legislature into an exclusive trust account to be annually administered by the State Treasurer. Should the trust balance, within any budget year, drop to less than an amount equivalent to the annual gross salaries of fifty Superior Court judges, the State Treasurer shall so notify the Legislature which shall replenish the account, prorated based on the actual average expenditures during the budget year. Should the trust balance in any subsequent year exceed the annual operational budget at the beginning of a new budget year, the State Treasurer shall transfer such excess to the state treasury. Except for the initial year, no expenses in paragraphs 6, 7, 9 and 10 of this Amendment shall be chargeable to the public.

      11. Jurisdiction. Each Special Grand Jury shall have exclusive power to appoint a foreperson, establish rules assuring their attendance, to provide internal discipline, and to remove any of its members on grounds of misconduct. The Special Grand Jury shall immediately assign a docket number to each petition/complaint brought before it, unless such case is transferred to another Special Grand Jury to achieve caseload balance. A transfer shall not prejudice a docketing deadline. The Special Grand Jury first docketing a complaint shall have sole jurisdiction of the case. Except as provided in paragraphs 17 and 22, no petition of misconduct shall be considered by any Special Grand Jury unless the petitioner shall have first attempted to exhaust all judicial remedies available in this State within the immediately preceding six-month period. (Such six-month period, however, shall not commence in petitions of prior fraud or blocking of a lawful conclusion until after the date the Special Grand Juries become functional. This provision applies remedially and retroactively.) Should the petitioner opt to proceed to the United States Supreme Court, such six-month period shall commence upon the disposition by that Court.

      12. Qualifications of Jurors. A Juror shall have attained to the age of thirty years, and have been nine years a citizen of the United States, and have been an inhabitant of California for two years immediately prior to having his/her name drawn. Those not eligible for Special Grand Jury service shall include elected and appointed officials, members of the State Bar, judges (active or retired), judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement personnel, without other exclusion except previous adjudication of mental incapacity, imprisonment, or parole from a conviction of a felonious act.

      13. Selection of Jurors. The Jurors shall serve without compulsion and their names shall be publicly drawn at random by the Secretary of State from the list of registered voters and any citizen submitting his/her name to the Secretary of State for such drawing. The initial Special Grand Juries shall be established within thirty days after the fulfillment of the requirements of paragraph 5.

      14. Service of Jurors. Excluding the establishment of the initial Special Grand Juries, each Juror shall serve one year. No Juror shall serve more than once. On the first day of each month, two Jurors shall be rotated off each Special Grand Jury and two new Jurors seated, except in January it shall be three. Vacancies shall be filled on the first of the following month in addition to the Jurors regularly rotated, and the Juror drawn to fill a vacancy shall complete only the remainder of the term of the Juror replaced.

      15. Procedures. The Special Grand Jury shall serve a copy of the filed petition upon the subject judge and notice to the petitioner of such service. The judge shall have twenty days to serve and file a response. The petitioner shall have fifteen days to reply to the judge's response. (Upon timely request, the Special Grand Jury may provide for extensions of time upon the showing of good cause.) In criminal matters, the Special Grand Jury shall have power to subpoena witnesses, documents, and other tangible evidence, and to examine witnesses under oath. Each Special Grand Jury shall determine the causes properly before it with their reasoned findings in writing within one hundred twenty calendar days, serving on all parties their determination as to whether or not immunity shall apply as a defense to any civil action that may thereafter be pursued against the judge. A rehearing may be requested of the Special Grand Jury within fifteen days with service upon the opposition. Fifteen days shall be allowed to reply thereto. Thereafter, the Special Grand Jury shall render final determination in writing within thirty days. All allegations in the petition shall be liberally construed. The Jurors shall keep in mind, in making their determinations, that they are entrusted by the People of this State with the duty of restoring judicial accountability and the perception of justice. The standard of authority by which the Jurors shall be guided in making their determinations shall not be opinions of courts, but shall be the Constitutions of California and of the United States and laws made in pursuance thereof. The Jurors shall avoid all influence by judicial and government entities. The statute of limitations on any civil suit brought pursuant to this Amendment against a judge shall not commence until a final determination by the Special Grand Jury. Special Grand Jury files shall always remain public record following their final determination. A majority of thirteen Jurors shall determine any matter.

      16. Indictment. Should the Special Grand Jury also find probable cause of criminal conduct on the part of any judge against whom a petition is docketed, it shall have the power to indict such judge. The Special Grand Jury shall, without voir dire beyond personal impartiality, relationship, or lack of fluency in English, cause to be impaneled twelve special trial jurors, plus alternates, which trial jurors shall be instructed that they have power to judge both law and fact. The Special Grand Jury shall also select a non-governmental special prosecutor and a judge with no more than four years on the bench from a county other than that of the defendant judge, having jurisdiction solely to maintain a fair and orderly proceeding. The trial jury shall be selected from the same pool of jury candidates as any regular jury. The special prosecutor shall thereafter prosecute the cause to a conclusion, having all the powers of any other prosecutor within this State. Upon conviction, sentencing shall be the province of the special trial jury, and not that of the selected judge. Such term of sentence shall conform to statutory provisions.

      17. Criminal Procedures. In addition to any other provisions of this Amendment, a complaint for criminal conduct against a judge may be brought directly to the Special Grand Jury, when all of the following conditions have been met: (1) an affidavit or declaration of criminal conduct has been lodged with the appropriate prosecutorial entity within ninety days of the commission of the alleged crime; (2) the prosecutor declines to prosecute, or one hundred twenty days have passed following the lodging of such affidavit or declaration, and prosecution has not commenced; (3) an indictment, if sought, has not been specifically declined on the merits by a county Grand Jury; and (4) the criminal statute of limitations has not run. Any criminal conviction (including a plea bargain) under any judicial process shall constitute a strike.

      18. Removal. Whenever any judge has received three strikes, the judge shall be permanently removed from office, and thereafter shall not serve in any State judicial office. Judicial retirement for such removed judge shall not exceed one-half of the benefits to which such judge would have otherwise been entitled. Retirement shall not avert third-strike penalties.

      19. Public Indemnification. No judge against whom a petition/complaint is brought, or sued civilly by a complainant pursuant to this Amendment, shall be defended at public expense or by any elected or appointed public counsel, nor shall any judge be reimbursed from public funds for any losses sustained under this Amendment.

      20. Enforcement. No person exercising strict enforcement of the findings of a Special Grand Jury shall be held liable civilly, criminally, or in contempt.

      21. Redress. The provisions of this Amendment are in addition to other redress that may exist and are not mutually exclusive.

      22. Challenges. No judge under the jurisdiction of the Special Grand Jury, or potentially affected by the outcome of a challenge hereto, shall have any jurisdiction to sit in judgment of such challenge. Such pretended adjudication shall be null and void for all purposes and a complaint for such misconduct may be brought at any time, without charge, before the Special Grand Jury by class action, or by any adversely affected person.

      23. Preeminence. Preeminence shall be given to this Amendment in any case of conflicts with statute, case law, common law, or constitutional provision. The foreperson of each Special Grand Jury shall read, or cause to be read, this Amendment to the respective Jurors semi-annually during the first week of business in January and July. Should any part of this Amendment be determined unconstitutional, the remainder shall remain in full force and effect as though no challenge thereto existed.


      From: johnwolfgram@...
      To: beholdtheman@...; art2pat35@...
      CC: victoryusa@...
      Subject: RE: People's Redress of Grievance By Access to Grand Juries Forbidden
      Date: Sun, 8 Apr 2012 06:50:49 -0700

      You know Ron, perhaps it might be more productive to repel the 1960 proposition createing the Commission and specifically returning their job to the grand jury, and then writing a short form of JAIL into that specific return, just with respect to judges.


      Dear Sharon Rondeau:
      As perhaps you already know, I am in California. In 1960 the Legislature of California proposed and passed a law creating the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, now called Commission on Judicial Performance. This legislation removed the power of County Grand Juries to investigate judges to the commission created by this legislation. While people were then unaware of the implication thereof, it no longer allowed the People, in the forum of their Grand Juries, to have power over the judges. Instead, the power shifted to this commission, which majority was made up of judges whose job was to judge judges. Eventually, the People woke up to what happened, and placed an Initiative on the California that required a shift from a majority of judges to one less than a majority to judge judges. However, this still did not solve the problem, as the "non-judge" majority was political hacks. For instance, the Chief Justice got to select one member, the Attorney General, who is defense counsel for the judges, got to select one, the governor, who gets to appoint judges to the bench, gets to select one, the California Bar Association, of which all judges must initially be a member of, gets to appoint one member, etc. You get the idea. All the rest of the members must be judges. So much for a non-majority of judges on the CJP.
      If you are familiar with JAIL4Judges, I have written the Initiative to cure this problem. All that needs be done is get it on the ballot. It's full wording is found on www.jail4judges.org. The establishment knows the power of what they have done in deceiving the People out of their inherient power to oversee the judicial system. I somewhat dealt with this in a recent senario placed in humor, entitled, "The Initiative Process, Why So High?" I am pasting it in below for your education and humor;

      The Initiative Process, Why So High?
      Rashid, you have asked me why the the price for getting a Constitutional
      Initiative on the ballot in California is so high. It used to be about $1.2
      million, but since the Legislature pretty much captured the entire
      Initiative market using our own tax dollars, we find ourselves competing
      with our own tax dollars.
      Suppose the People among ourselves had the entire Oaks Market competitively
      locked up. But then the government entered into the Oats Market by proposing
      and collecting an Oat Farmer's Tax. With that Oats Farmer's Tax, they
      captured 2/3rds of the Oat Market Industry. What would be the effect? All
      Oat Farmers would have to raise the prices on their Oats to over twice what
      it used to be.
      I have pointed out that for government to use the People's  exclusive
      constitutionally protected Initiative Process, is not only unfair, but very
      unconstitutional. Art. II, Sec. 1 of the California Constitution, which is
      the Initiative Provision, states, "All political power is inherent in the
      people. ...they have the right to alter or reform [government] when the
      public good may require."
      So, if ALL political power is inherent in the People, how much is inherent
      in government? The Initiative Process is exclusively preserved for the
      People to alter or reform their government, not for government to reform the
      People. Horses are for horseback riders, not peopleback riders for horses to
      Have you ever noticed that in excess of 2/3rds of all Initiatives placed on
      the ballot are placed there by our government, using our tax dollars,
      seeking to reform us? Where do they get this power? Certainly not from the
      Initiative Process.
      If 2/3rds of the Initiatives are placed on the ballot by our own tax
      dollars, we, the other 1/3rd remaining, are competing with ourselves in the
      other 2/3rds market, running the price tag to over twice what passing an
      Initiative would otherwise cost the People.
      If you think about it, all powers in the hands of the People, have been
      taken over by government. The Constitution recognizes our right to keep and
      bear arms. Government says, "Yes, but we will dictate to you how many, when,
      and where you can exercise that right. And by the way, you must surrender
      all the information we ask, so we may keep track of how you exercise that
      Grand Juries are the Power of the People against an arbitrary government.
      But who manages the Grand Jury? Sorry to say, but the People have
      surrendered the power of the Grand Jury to the government. The judges select
      the Grand Jurors. The Prosecution advises the Grand Jury, and the
      legislators have mandated that Grand Jurors are precluded from investigating
      judges. Instead, the powers of the People in the Grand Jury, has been
      transferred to judicial commissions under the influence and authority of
      We recognized our own power in creating the Initiative Process within our
      Constitution so we can alter and reform our government for our benefit. But,
      then we have allowed the government to sweet talk us out of that exclusive
      power to allow them to take over our Initiative Process, and drive the
      prices up so that we, the People, can no longer afford the Initiative
      Process to initiative change. In other words, we, the People, willingly are
      financing a government of the government, by the government, and for the
      government, and if we, the People, do not approve, we, the People, must have
      the government's permission, to alter that.
      We have allowed the horses to convince us that we must carry them on our
      backs to wherever they want us to go. The People are their own worst enemy,
      as Pogo once stated, "We have met the enemy, and he is us."
      Now, as to your question, where can you find the professional Initiative
      companies? I suggest you do a search engine on the Internet for California
      Initiative Signature Gatherers.
      Ron Branson
      P.S. - Monkeys are not a smart as men, as evidenced by the fact that People
      have learned how to blow their brains out. Monkeys are not so smart, as they
      have not yet attained unto this intelligence as yet.
      So, to answer your question, "Have you found an instance in which a citizen with a complaint
      has been able to access one without a prosecutor as a gatekeeper?" The answer is "No!"
      However, not to contridict my answer above, I did get in before the Los Angeles County Grand
      Jury back in 1981 because I had the distinguished prevelidge of have a secant other who worked
      for the Los Angeles County Prosecutor's Office as the Head Secretary in one of their Offices,
      and got to know some of the Chief Prosecutors that ran the operations thereof. In other words,
      I had an inside advantage with open access to the D.A.'s Office.
      The government knows that they must guard their absolute control over the judicial system, or
      their system will collapse. This is why JAIL4Judges is such a feared proposal to them of which
      must absolutely see gets defeated. Hopefully, what I have stated answers your concern.
      If I may say, without sounding like I am bragging, I am one of the most informed individuals
      in this country regarding the inside workings of the judicial system, now having brought cases
      up to the Supreme Court fifteen times, and personally knowing one of the judges on the Ninth
      Circuit who have twice disqualified himself because of my personal knowledge and relationship,
      having sat at his desk and educating him of the foundational American principles of our Founding
      Ron Branson

      From: beholdtheman@...
      To: victoryusa@...
      Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 23:15:02 -0700

      D.O.J's argument opposing Montgomery Sibly Blair's contention that
      citizens should have direct access to the Federal Grand Jury
      Civil Action No. 12-cv-00001 (JDB)
      Third Argument

      III. The remaining counts of Plaintiff’s complaint fail to describe a cognizable

      deprivation of constitutional rights.


      1. Plaintiff has no right to communicate directly with a federal grand jury.

      Plaintiff is fully aware that his claim of a right to present allegations of wrongdoing

      directly to the grand jury is foreclosed by controlling precedent as well as by the laws he

      challenges as unconstitutional. See Amend. Compl. at ¶ 34 (observing that “in this Circuit by

      judicial fiat, ‘presentments’ have been abolished,” and citing Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d

      1061, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). To Plaintiff’s citation, Defendants add only that the rule that “an

      individual cannot bring accusations before a grand jury unless invited to do so by the prosecutor

      or the grand jury,” In re Application of Wood, 833 F.2d 113, 116 (8th Cir. 1987), is well established

      in the other judicial circuits as well. See, e.g., In re New Haven Grand Jury, 604 F.

      Supp. 453, 460 (D. Conn. 1985) (“[T]he commencement of a federal criminal case by

      submission of evidence to a grand jury is ‘an executive function within the exclusive prerogative

      of the Attorney General.’”) (citing In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1975); United

      States v. Kilpatrick, 16 F. 765, 769, 771 (W.D.N.C. 1883) (“no right to communicate private

      information to a grand jury for the purpose of obtaining a presentment”); Confiscation Cases, 74

      U.S. 454, 457 (1868) (exclusive control of criminal litigation by appropriate federal officers is
      the “settled rule”); Baranoski v. United States Att’y Office, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2240 at *9

      (D.N.J. 2006) (“Federal courts have consistently held that private individuals do not maintain a

      constitutional, statutory or common law right to communicate with a federal grand jury without

      the approval or participation of a prosecutor or judge.”).


      In rejecting a recent First and Fifth Amendment challenge to the prohibitions on

      individual communications with a federal grand jury, the United States District Court for the

      District of New Jersey explored the justification for the prohibition, explaining that the grand

      jury’s independence:

      is designed to "afford a safeguard against oppressive actions of the

      prosecutor or court,” not to allow individuals to present to a grand jury

      independently of the government prosecutor. Gaither v. United States, 413

      F.2d 1061, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The constitutional role of the grand jury

      is to serve as "a check on prosecutorial power, not a substitute for the

      prosecutor." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Special Grand Jury 89-2, 813

      F.Supp. 1451, 1462 (D.Colo. 1992)….


      While the grand jury serves a dual purpose, acting as “both a sword and a

      shield of justice - a sword because it is the terror of criminals, [and] a shield

      because it is the protection of the innocent against unjust prosecution,” the

      grand jury “earned its place in the Bill of Rights by its shield, not by its

      sword.” Cox, 342 F.2d. at 186 (Wisdom, J., concurring); see also Brenner &

      Lockhart, 2 Fed. Grand Jury: A Guide to Law and Practice, §2.2 (“The

      clause [(of the Fifth Amendment)] was intended to preserve a shield against

      unwarranted prosecution.”) Under the Fifth Amendment, the grand jury

      affords constitutional protections to preserve the rights of the accused. There

      is, however, no corresponding constitutional right for individuals to use the

      power of a grand jury to levy criminal accusations. See United States v. Cox,

      342 F.2d 167, 186 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (noting that

      when the role of a grand jury "goes beyond inquiry and report and becomes

      accusatorial, no aura of traditional or constitutional sanctity surrounds the

      grand jury"). Accordingly, the Petitioners cannot claim a constitutional

      prerogative that would allow them to independently bring criminal charges

      and accusations before a federal grand jury.

      In re Appearance of Carl J. Mayer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228 (Jan. 4,

      2006) (internal citations and quotations simplified).
      The Mayer court also explained:

      Giving individuals direct access to the grand jury and removing the

      governmental prosecuting authorities from the process would undermine the

      prosecutor's screening authority and almost certainly increase the likelihood

      that wrongful indictments would be returned, thereby undermining the very

      rights of the accused that the Fifth Amendment seeks to protect.

      Id. at n.3 (internal citations and quotations omitted).


      For these reasons, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to bring allegations of

      wrongdoing before the grand jury.


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