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Charles Wayne Uptergrove need to sue, or at least threaten too!!

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  • Legalbear
    He was taken to Madera where they have jail that apparently is not a county facility. Al and some of you submitted writs of habeas corpus which Chuck said
    Message 1 of 1 , Jun 30, 2003
      He was taken to Madera where they have jail that apparently is not a
      "county" facility. Al and some of you submitted writs of habeas
      corpus which Chuck said really infuriated them. While sitting in solitary
      confinement in a tiny cell, someone would occasionally open the tiny slot
      enough to yell at him and call him a "paper terrorist." Right! He is
      kidnapped illegally and unlawfully and kept in a tiny room and is now a
      paper terrorist? I don't believe had any paper since he was illegally
      arrested! I guess they meant that WE are the paper terrorists but rather
      than say that to our faces they open a tiny door and cast their derogatory
      comments at the one who's liberty has been criminally eliminated. A great
      system we have here folks.

      Chuck said that it was over 30 hours before they gave him anything to eat.
      He would not identify himself or agree that he was the fiction they were
      after so they weren't going to give him any "privileges." I'm glad that
      they don't consider oxygen a privilege (yet.)

      Here's the case they blatantly violated!! Under the principles of this case
      and its' progeny many of the privileges they denied are rights, and many of
      the acts committed are indeed punishments. The suit will probably go no
      where, but, you never know. I predict if he sues before his next appearance
      it will have a dramatic effect on how he is treated in court. The judge
      will be told about the suit in ex parte communications. I think he should
      include the judge in the suit by asking for a declaration that his
      purposeful delay in allowing appearance violated due process; also, that his
      refusal to allow him to be heard violated due process; and, his refusal to
      correct the situation violated the case that follows. It's lots of fun to
      serve a judge in court. Also, state court has concurrent jurisdiction for
      civil rights suits. I think the suit should be brought in a state court of
      general jurisdiction. If he doesn't sue, or at least threaten too, they'll
      do it to him again next time. If he sues, it's not likely to happen again,
      simply because the county attorney won't let them. It makes more work for
      him.

      I think a motion needs to be framed and filed in the trial court showing
      that since he's already been punished to punish him again would violate the
      double jeapordy clauses of both state and federal constitutions. Bear

      Bell v. Wolfish, 1979.SCT.1674 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 441 U.S. 520
      (1979)

      05/14/79 BELL v. WOLFISH ET AL.

      [1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


      [2] No. 77­1829


      [3] 1979.SCT.1674 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 441 U.S. 520,
      99
      S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447


      [4] May 14, 1979


      [5] BELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.
      v.
      WOLFISH ET AL.


      [6] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

      SECOND CIRCUIT.


      [7] Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for
      petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General
      McCree,
      Assistant Attorney General Heymann, Kent L. Jones, and Sidney M.

      Glazer.


      [8] Phylis Skloot Bamberger argued the cause for
      respondents.
      With her on the brief were William E. Hellerstein, David J.
      Gottlieb, and Michael B. Mushlin.*


      [9] Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
      which
      Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, and Blackmun, JJ., joined.
      Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
      in
      part, post, p. 563. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
      post,
      p. 563. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
      Brennan,
      J., joined, post, p. 579.


      [10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Rehnquist


      [11] Respondent inmates brought this class action in Federal
      District Court challenging the constitutionality of numerous
      conditions of confinement and practices in the Metropolitan
      Correctional Center (MCC), a federally operated short­term
      custodial
      facility in New York City designed primarily to house pretrial
      detainees. The District Court, on various constitutional
      grounds,
      enjoined, inter alia, the practice of housing, primarily for
      sleeping purposes, two inmates in individual rooms originally
      intended for single occupancy ("double­bunking"); enforcement of
      the
      so­called "publisher­only" rule prohibiting inmates from
      receiving
      hard­cover books that are not mailed directly from publishers,
      book
      clubs, or bookstores; the prohibition against inmates' receipt
      of
      packages of food and personal items from outside the
      institution;
      the practice of body­cavity searches of inmates following
      contact
      visits with persons from outside the institution; and the
      requirement that pretrial detainees remain outside their rooms
      during routine inspections by MCC officials. The Court of
      Appeals
      affirmed these rulings, holding with respect to the
      "double­bunking"
      practice that the MCC had failed to make a showing of
      "compelling
      necessity" sufficient to justify such practice.


      [12] Held :


      [13] 1. The "double­bunking" practice does not deprive
      pretrial
      detainees of their liberty without due process of law in
      contravention of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 530­543.


      [14] (a) There is no source in the Constitution for the Court
      of
      Appeals' compelling­necessity standard. Neither the presumption
      of
      innocence, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, nor a
      pretrial detainee's right to be free from punishment provides
      any
      basis for such standard. Pp. 531­535.


      [15] (b) In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or

      restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the
      protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of

      law, the proper inquiry is whether those conditions or
      restrictions
      amount to punishment of the detainee. Absent a showing of an
      expressed intent to punish, if a particular condition or
      restriction
      is reasonably related to a legitimate non­punitive governmental
      objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment,"
      but,
      conversely, if a condition or restriction is arbitrary or
      purposeless, a court may permissibly infer that the purpose of
      the
      governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally
      be
      inflicted upon detainees qua detainees. In addition to ensuring
      the
      detainees' presence at trial, the effective management of the
      detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid
      objective that may justify imposition of conditions and
      restrictions
      of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such
      conditions
      and restrictions are intended as punishment. Pp. 535­540.


      [16] (c) Judged by the above analysis and on the record,
      "double­bunking" as practiced at the MCC did not, as a matter of

      law, amount to punishment and hence did not violate respondents'

      rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
      While
      "double­bunking" may have taxed some of the equipment or
      particular
      facilities in certain of the common areas in the MCC, this does
      not
      mean that the conditions at the MCC failed to meet the standards

      required by the Constitution, particularly where it appears that

      nearly all pretrial detainees are released within 60 days. Pp.
      541­543.


      [17] 2. Nor do the "publisher­only" rule, body­cavity
      searches,
      the prohibition against the receipt of packages, or the
      room­search
      rule violate any constitutional guarantees. Pp. 544­562.


      [18] (a) Simply because prison inmates retain certain
      constitutional rights does not mean that these rights are not
      subject to restrictions and limitations. There must be a "mutual

      accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the

      provisions of the Constitution that are of general application,"

      Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, and this principle
      applies
      equally to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners.
      Maintaining
      institutional security and preserving internal order and
      discipline
      are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of
      the
      retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and
      pretrial detainees. Since problems that arise in the day­to­day
      operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy
      solutions, prison administrators should be accorded wide­ranging

      deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
      practices
      that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and

      discipline and to maintain institutional security. Pp. 544­548.


      [19] (b) The "publisher­only" rule does not violate the First

      Amendment rights of MCC inmates but is a rational response by
      prison
      officials to the obvious security problem of preventing the
      smuggling of contraband in books sent from outside. Moreover,
      such
      rule operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the
      content of
      the expression, there are alternative means of obtaining reading

      material, and the rule's impact on pretrial detainees is limited
      to
      a maximum period of approximately 60 days. Pp. 548­552.


      [20] (c) The restriction against the receipt of packages from

      outside the facility does not deprive pretrial detainees of
      their
      property without due process of law in contravention of the
      Fifth
      Amendment, especially in view of the obvious fact that such
      packages
      are handy devices for the smuggling of contraband. Pp. 553­555.


      [21] (d) Assuming that a pretrial detainee retains a
      diminished
      expectation of privacy after commitment to a custodial facility,
      the
      room­search rule does not violate the Fourth Amendment but
      simply
      facilitates the safe and effective performance of the searches
      and
      thus does not render the searches "unreasonable" within the
      meaning
      of that Amendment. Pp. 555­557.


      [22] (e) Similarly, assuming that pretrial detainees retain
      some
      Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections
      facility,
      the body­cavity searches do not violate that Amendment.
      Balancing
      the significant and legitimate security interests of the
      institution
      against the inmates' privacy interests, such searches can be
      conducted on less than probable cause and are not unreasonable.
      Pp.
      558­560.


      [23] (f) None of the security restrictions and practices
      described above constitute "punishment" in violation of the
      rights
      of pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
      Amendment. These restrictions and practices were reasonable
      responses by MCC officials to legitimate security concerns, and,
      in
      any event, were of only limited duration so far as the pretrial
      detainees were concerned. Pp. 560­562.


      [24] MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
      Court.


      [25] Over the past five Terms, this Court has in several
      decisions considered constitutional challenges to prison
      conditions
      or practices by convicted prisoners. *fn1 This case requires us
      to
      examine the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees ­­ those

      persons who have been charged with a crime but who have not yet
      been
      tried on the charge. The parties concede that to ensure their
      presence at trial, these persons legitimately may be
      incarcerated by
      the Government prior to a determination of their guilt or
      innocence,
      (infra), at 533­535, and n. 15; see 18 U. S. C. ºº 3146, 3148,
      and
      it is the scope of their rights during this period of
      confinement
      prior to trial that is the primary focus of this case.


      [26] This lawsuit was brought as a class action in the United

      States District Court for the Southern District of New York to
      challenge numerous conditions of confinement and practices at
      the
      Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC), a federally operated
      short­term custodial facility in New York City designed
      primarily to
      house pretrial detainees. The District Court, in the words of
      the
      Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, "intervened broadly
      into
      almost every facet of the institution" and enjoined no fewer
      than 20
      MCC practices on constitutional and statutory grounds. The Court
      of
      Appeals largely affirmed the District Court's constitutional
      rulings
      and in the process held that under the Due Process Clause of the

      Fifth Amendment, pretrial detainees may "be subjected to only
      those
      'restrictions and privations' which 'inhere in their confinement

      itself or which are justified by compelling necessities of jail
      administration.'" Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (1978),
      quoting
      Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (CA2 1974). We granted
      certiorari
      to consider the important constitutional questions raised by
      these
      decisions and to resolve an apparent conflict among the
      Circuits.
      *fn2 439 U.S. 816 (1978). We now reverse.


      [27] I


      [28] The MCC was constructed in 1975 to replace the converted

      waterfront garage on West Street that had served as New York
      City's
      federal jail since 1928. It is located adjacent to the Foley
      Square
      federal courthouse and has as its primary objective the housing
      of
      persons who are being detained in custody prior to trial for
      federal
      criminal offenses in the United States District Courts for the
      Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and for the District
      of
      New Jersey. Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U. S. C. º 3146, a
      person
      in the federal system is committed to a detention facility only
      because no other less drastic means can reasonably ensure his
      presence at trial. In addition to pretrial detainees, the MCC
      also
      houses some convicted inmates who are awaiting sentencing or
      transportation to federal prison or who are serving generally
      relatively short sentences in a service capacity at the MCC,
      convicted prisoners who have been lodged at the facility under
      writs
      of ad prosequendum or ad testificandum issued to ensure their
      presence at upcoming trials, witnesses in protective custody,
      and
      persons incarcerated for contempt. *fn3


      [29] The MCC differs markedly from the familiar image of a
      jail;
      there are no barred cells, dank, colorless corridors, or
      clanging
      steel gates. It was intended to include the most advanced and
      innovative features of modern design of detention facilities. As
      the
      Court of Appeals stated: " represented the architectural
      embodiment
      of the best and most progressive penological planning." 573
      F.2d, at
      121. The key design element of the 12­story structure is the
      "modular" or "unit" concept, whereby each floor designed to
      house
      inmates has one or two largely self­contained residential units
      that
      replace the traditional cellblock jail construction. Each unit
      in
      turn has several clusters or corridors of private rooms or
      dormitories radiating from a central 2­story "multipurpose" or
      common room, to which each inmate has free access approximately
      16
      hours a day. Because our analysis does not turn on the
      particulars
      of the MCC concept or design, we need not discuss them further.


      [30] When the MCC opened in August 1975, the planned capacity
      was
      449 inmates, an increase of 50% over the former West Street
      facility. Id., at 122. Despite some dormitory accommodations,
      the
      MCC was designed primarily to house these inmates in 389 rooms,
      which originally were intended for single occupancy. While the
      MCC
      was under construction, however, the number of persons committed
      to
      pretrial detention began to rise at an "unprecedented" rate.
      Ibid.
      The Bureau of Prisons took several steps to accommodate this
      unexpected flow of persons assigned to the facility, but despite

      these efforts, the inmate population at the MCC rose above its
      planned capacity within a short time after its opening. To
      provide
      sleeping space for this increased population, the MCC replaced
      the
      single bunks in many of the individual rooms and dormitories
      with
      double bunks. *fn4 Also, each week some newly arrived inmates
      had to
      sleep on cots in the common areas until they could be
      transferred to
      residential rooms as space became available. See id., at
      127­128.


      [31] On November 28, 1975, less than four months after the
      MCC
      had opened, the named respondents initiated this action by
      filing in
      the District Court a petition for a writ of . *fn5 The District
      Court certified the case as a class action on behalf of all
      persons
      confined at the MCC, pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners
      alike. *fn6 The petition served up a veritable potpourri of
      complaints that implicated virtually every facet of the
      institution's conditions and practices. Respondents charged,
      inter
      alia, that they had been deprived of their statutory and
      constitutional rights because of overcrowded conditions, undue
      length of confinement, improper searches, inadequate
      recreational,
      educational, and employment opportunities, insufficient staff,
      and
      objectionable restrictions on the purchase and receipt of
      personal
      items and books. *fn7


      [32] In two opinions and a series of orders, the District
      Court
      enjoined numerous MCC practices and conditions. With respect to
      pretrial detainees, the court held that because they are
      "presumed
      to be innocent and held only to ensure their presence at trial,
      'any
      deprivation or restriction of . . . rights beyond those which
      are
      necessary for confinement alone, must be justified by a
      compelling
      necessity.'" United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F.Supp.
      114,
      124 (1977), quoting Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v.
      Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (CA2 1975). And while acknowledging
      that
      the rights of sentenced inmates are to be measured by the
      different
      standard of the Eighth Amendment, the court declared that to
      house
      "an inferior minority of persons . . . in ways found
      unconstitutional for the rest" would amount to cruel and unusual

      punishment. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. United States, 428
      F.Supp. 333, 339 (1977). *fn8


      [33] Applying these standards on cross­motions for partial
      summary judgment, the District Court enjoined the practice of
      housing two inmates in the individual rooms and prohibited
      enforcement of the so­called "publisher­only" rule, which at the

      time of the court's ruling prohibited the receipt of all books
      and
      magazines mailed from outside the MCC except those sent directly

      from a publisher or a book club. *fn9 After a trial on the
      remaining
      issues, the District Court enjoined, inter alia, the doubling of

      capacity in the dormitory areas, the use of the common rooms to
      provide temporary sleeping accommodations, the prohibition
      against
      inmates' receipt of packages containing food and items of
      personal
      property, and the practice of requiring inmates to expose their
      body
      cavities for visual inspection following contact visits. The
      court
      also granted relief in favor of pretrial detainees, but not
      convicted inmates, with respect to the requirement that
      detainees
      remain outside their rooms during routine inspections by MCC
      officials. *fn10


      [34] The Court of Appeals largely affirmed the District
      Court's
      rulings, although it rejected that court's Eighth Amendment
      analysis
      of conditions of confinement for convicted prisoners because the

      "parameters of judicial intervention into . . . conditions . . .
      for
      sentenced prisoners are more restrictive than in the case of
      pretrial detainees." 573 F.2d, at 125. *fn11 Accordingly, the
      court
      remanded the matter to the District Court for it to determine
      whether the housing for sentenced inmates at the MCC was
      constitutionally "adequate." But the Court of Appeals approved
      the
      due process standard employed by the District Court in enjoining
      the
      conditions of pretrial confinement. It therefore held that the
      MCC
      had failed to make a showing of "compelling necessity"
      sufficient to
      justify housing two pretrial detainees in the individual rooms.
      Id.,
      at 126­127. And for purposes of our review (since petitioners
      challenge only some of the Court of Appeals' rulings), the court

      affirmed the District Court's granting of relief against the
      "publisher­only" rule, the practice of conducting body­cavity
      searches after contact visits, the prohibition against receipt
      of
      packages of food and personal items from outside the
      institution,
      and the requirement that detainees remain outside their rooms
      during
      routine searches of the rooms by MCC officials. Id., at 129­132.

      *fn12


      [35] II


      [36] As a first step in our decision, we shall address
      "double­bunking" as it is referred to by the parties, since it
      is a
      condition of confinement that is alleged only to deprive
      pretrial
      detainees of their liberty without due process of law in
      contravention of the Fifth Amendment. We will treat in order the

      Court of Appeals' standard of review, the analysis which we
      believe
      the Court of Appeals should have employed, and the conclusions
      to
      which our analysis leads us in the case of "double­bunking."


      [37] A


      [38] The Court of Appeals did not dispute that the Government
      may
      permissibly incarcerate a person charged with a crime but not
      yet
      convicted to ensure his presence at trial. However, reasoning
      from
      the "premise that an individual is to be treated as innocent
      until
      proven guilty," the court concluded that pretrial detainees
      retain
      the "rights afforded unincarcerated individuals," and that
      therefore
      it is not sufficient that the conditions of confinement for
      pretrial
      detainees "merely comport with contemporary standards of decency

      prescribed by the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
      eighth
      amendment." 573 F.2d, at 124. Rather, the court held, the Due
      Process Clause requires that pretrial detainees "be subjected to

      only those 'restrictions and privations' which 'inhere in their
      confinement itself or which are justified by compelling
      necessities
      of jail administration.'" Ibid., quoting Rhem v. Malcolm, 507
      F.2d,
      at 336. Under the Court of Appeals' "compelling necessity"
      standard,
      "deprivation of the rights of detainees cannot be justified by
      the
      cries of fiscal necessity, . . . administrative convenience, . .
      .
      or by the cold comfort that conditions in other jails are
      worse."
      573 F.2d, at 124. The court acknowledged, however, that it could
      not
      "ignore" our admonition in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
      405
      (1974), that "courts are ill equipped to deal with the
      increasingly
      urgent problems of prison administration," and concluded that it

      would "not wise for to second­guess the expert administrators on

      matters on which they are better informed." 573 F.2d, at 124.
      *fn13


      [39] Our fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals
      is
      that we fail to find a source in the Constitution for its
      compelling­necessity standard. *fn14 Both the Court of Appeals
      and
      the District Court seem to have relied on the "presumption of
      innocence" as the source of the detainee's substantive right to
      be
      free from conditions of confinement that are not justified by
      compelling necessity. 573 F.2d, at 124; 439 F.Supp., at 124;
      accord,
      Campbell v. McGruder, 188 U. S. App. D.C. 258, 266, 580 F.2d
      521,
      529 (1978); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm,
      520
      F.2d 392, 397 (CA2 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, supra, at 336. But
      see
      Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 369 n. 4 (CA1 1978); Hampton v.

      Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1080 n. 1 (CA3
      1976).
      But the presumption of innocence provides no support for such a
      rule.


      [40] The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that
      allocates
      the burden of proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as an
      admonishment to the jury to judge an accused's guilt or
      innocence
      solely on the evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis of
      suspicions that may arise from the fact of his arrest,
      indictment,
      or custody, or from other matters not introduced as proof at
      trial.
      Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978); see Estelle v.
      Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
      (1970); 9
      J. Wigmore, Evidence º 2511 (3d ed. 1940). It is "an inaccurate,

      shorthand description of the right of the accused to 'remain
      inactive and secure, until the prosecution has taken up its
      burden
      and produced evidence and effected persuasion; . . .' an
      'assumption' that is indulged in the absence of contrary
      evidence."
      Taylor v. Kentucky, supra, at 484 n. 12. Without question, the
      presumption of innocence plays an important role in our criminal

      justice system. "The principle that there is a presumption of
      innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law,
      axiomatic
      and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of
      the
      administration of our ." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,
      453
      (1895). But it has no application to a determination of the
      rights
      of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has
      even
      begun.


      [41] The Court of Appeals also relied on what it termed the
      "indisputable rudiments of due process" in fashioning its
      compelling­necessity test. We do not doubt that the Due Process
      Clause protects a detainee from certain conditions and
      restrictions
      of pretrial detainment. See (infra), at 535­540. Nonetheless,
      that
      Clause provides no basis for application of a
      compelling­necessity
      standard to conditions of pretrial confinement that are not
      alleged
      to infringe any other, more specific guarantee of the
      Constitution.


      [42] It is important to focus on what is at issue here. We
      are
      not concerned with the initial decision to detain an accused and
      the
      curtailment of liberty that such a decision necessarily entails.
      See
      Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); United States v.
      Marion,
      404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). Neither respondents nor the courts
      below
      question that the Government may permissibly detain a person
      suspected of committing a crime prior to a formal adjudication
      of
      guilt. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 111­114. Nor do they
      doubt
      that the Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that
      persons accused of crimes are available for trials and,
      ultimately,
      for service of their sentences, or that confinement of such
      persons
      pending trial is a legitimate means of furthering that interest.
      Tr.
      of Oral Arg. 27; see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). *fn15

      Instead, what is at issue when an aspect of pretrial detention
      that
      is not alleged to violate any express guarantee of the
      Constitution
      is challenged, is the detainee's right to be free from
      punishment,
      see (infra), at 535­537, and his understandable desire to be as
      comfortable as possible during his confinement, both of which
      may
      conceivably coalesce at some point. It seems clear that the
      Court of
      Appeals did not rely on the detainee's right to be free from
      punishment, but even if it had that right does not warrant
      adoption
      of that court's compelling­necessity test. See (infra), at
      535­540.
      And to the extent the court relied on the detainee's desire to
      be
      free from discomfort, it suffices to say that this desire simply

      does not rise to the level of those fundamental liberty
      interests
      delineated in cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
      Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois,
      405
      U.S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
      Meyer
      v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).


      [43] B


      [44] In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or
      restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the
      protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of

      law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those
      conditions
      amount to punishment of the detainee. *fn16 For under the Due
      Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an
      adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.
      *fn17
      See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671­672 n. 40, 674 (1977);

      Kennedy v. Mendoza­Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165­167, 186 (1963);
      Wong
      Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896). A person
      lawfully
      committed to pretrial detention has not been adjudged guilty of
      any
      crime. He has had only a "judicial determination of probable
      cause
      as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following
      arrest." Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 114; see Virginia v. Paul,
      148
      U.S. 107, 119 (1893). And, if he is detained for a suspected
      violation of a federal law, he also has had a bail hearing. See
      18
      U. S. C. ºº 3146, 3148. *fn18 Under such circumstances, the
      Government concededly may detain him to ensure his presence at
      trial
      and may subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the
      detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions
      do
      not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.


      [45] Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention
      amounts to "punishment" in the constitutional sense, however.
      Once
      the Government has exercised its conceded authority to detain a
      person pending trial, it obviously is entitled to employ devices

      that are calculated to effectuate this detention. Traditionally,

      this has meant confinement in a facility which, no matter how
      modern
      or how antiquated, results in restricting the movement of a
      detainee
      in a manner in which he would not be restricted if he simply
      were
      free to walk the streets pending trial. Whether it be called a
      jail,
      a prison, or a custodial center, the purpose of the facility is
      to
      detain. Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent
      incidents
      of confinement in such a facility. And the fact that such
      detention
      interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as
      comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible

      during confinement does not convert the conditions or
      restrictions
      of detention into "punishment."


      [46] This Court has recognized a distinction between punitive

      measures that may not constitutionally be imposed prior to a
      determination of guilt and regulatory restraints that may. See,
      e.
      g., Kennedy v. Mendoza­Martinez, supra, at 168; Flemming v.
      Nestor,
      363 U.S. 603, 613­614 (1960); cf. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S.
      144,
      160 (1960). In Kennedy v. Mendoza­Martinez, supra, the Court
      examined the automatic forfeiture­of­citizenship provisions of
      the
      immigration laws to determine whether that sanction amounted to
      punishment or a mere regulatory restraint. While it is all but
      impossible to compress the distinction into a sentence or a
      paragraph, the Court there described the tests traditionally
      applied
      to determine whether a governmental act is punitive in nature:


      [47] "Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
      or
      restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
      punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
      scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
      aims of
      punishment ­­ retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior
      to
      which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative
      purpose
      to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
      and
      whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
      purpose
      assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in

      differing directions." 372 U.S., at 168­169 (footnotes omitted).


      [48] Because forfeiture of citizenship traditionally had been

      considered punishment and the legislative history of the
      forfeiture
      provisions "conclusively" showed that the measure was intended
      to be
      punitive, the Court held that forfeiture of citizenship in such
      circumstances constituted punishment that could not
      constitutionally
      be imposed without due process of law. Id., at 167­170, 186.


      [49] The factors identified in Mendoza­Martinez provide
      useful
      guideposts in determining whether particular restrictions and
      conditions accompanying pretrial detention amount to punishment
      in
      the constitutional sense of that word. A court must decide
      whether
      the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or
      whether
      it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental
      purpose.
      See Flemming v. Nestor, supra, at 613­617. *fn19 Absent a
      showing of
      an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility
      officials, that determination generally will turn on "whether an

      alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be

      connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive
      in
      relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]." Kennedy
      v.
      Mendoza­Martinez, supra, at 168­169; see Flemming v. Nestor,
      supra,
      at 617. Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of
      pretrial
      detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
      objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment."
      *fn20
      Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably
      related
      to a legitimate goal ­­ if it is arbitrary or purposeless ­­ a
      court
      permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental
      action is
      punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon
      detainees
      qua detainees. See ibid. *fn21 Courts must be mindful that these

      inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that
      judicial
      answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a court's
      idea of
      how best to operate a detention facility. Cf. United States v.
      Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977); United States v. Russell, 411

      U.S. 423, 435 (1973).


      [50] One further point requires discussion. The petitioners
      assert, and respondents concede, that the "essential objective
      of
      pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees' presence at
      trial."
      Brief for Petitioners 43; see Brief for Respondents 33. While
      this
      interest undoubtedly justifies the original decision to confine
      an
      individual in some manner, we do not accept respondents'
      argument
      that the Government's interest in ensuring a detainee's presence
      at
      trial is the only objective that may justify restraints and
      conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a
      person.
      "If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the
      liberty
      of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their
      presence
      at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only
      constitutionally
      justified form of detention." Campbell v. McGruder, 188 U. S.
      App.
      D.C., at 266, 580 F.2d, at 529. The Government also has
      legitimate
      interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in
      which
      the individual is detained. These legitimate operational
      concerns
      may require administrative measures that go beyond those that
      are,
      strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows
      up at
      trial. For example, the Government must be able to take steps to

      maintain security and order at the institution and make certain
      no
      weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. *fn22 Restraints that
      are
      reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining
      jail
      security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional
      punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions
      that
      the detainee would not have experienced had he been released
      while
      awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise
      extent of the legitimate governmental interests that may justify

      conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough
      simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees'
      presence at trial, the effective management of the detention
      facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective
      that
      may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of
      pretrial
      detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are
      intended as punishment. *fn23


      [51] C


      [52] Judged by this analysis, respondents' claim that
      "double­bunking" violated their due process rights fails.
      Neither
      the District Court nor the Court of Appeals intimated that it
      considered "double­bunking" to constitute punishment; instead,
      they
      found that it contravened the compelling­necessity test, which
      today
      we reject. On this record, we are convinced as a matter of law
      that
      "double­bunking" as practiced at the MCC did not amount to
      punishment and did not, therefore, violate respondents' rights
      under
      the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. *fn24


      [53] Each of the rooms at the MCC that house pretrial
      detainees
      has a total floor space of approximately 75 square feet. Each of

      them designated for "double­bunking," see n. 4, (supra) ,
      contains a
      double bunkbed, certain other items of furniture, a wash basin,
      and
      an uncovered toilet. Inmates generally are locked into their
      rooms
      from 11 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. and for brief periods during the
      afternoon
      and evening head counts. During the rest of the day, they may
      move
      about freely between their rooms and the common areas.


      [54] Based on affidavits and a personal visit to the
      facility,
      the District Court concluded that the practice of
      "double­bunking"
      was unconstitutional. The court relied on two factors for its
      conclusion: (1) the fact that the rooms were designed to house
      only
      one inmate, 428 F.Supp., at 336­337; and (2) its judgment that
      confining two persons in one room or cell of this size
      constituted a
      "fundamental of decency, privacy, personal security, and,
      simply,
      civilized humanity. . . ." Id., at 339. The Court of Appeals
      agreed
      with the District Court. In response to petitioners' arguments
      that
      the rooms at the MCC were larger and more pleasant than the
      cells
      involved in the cases relied on by the District Court, the Court
      of
      Appeals stated:


      [55] " find the lack of privacy inherent in double­celling in

      rooms intended for one individual a far more compelling
      consideration than a comparison of square footage or the
      substitution of doors for bars, carpet for concrete, or windows
      for
      walls. The government has simply failed to show any substantial
      justification for double­celling." 573 F.2d, at 127.


      [56] We disagree with both the District Court and the Court
      of
      Appeals that there is some sort of "one man, one cell" principle

      lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. While
      confining a given number of people in a given amount of space in

      such a manner as to cause them to endure genuine privations and
      hardship over an extended period of time might raise serious
      questions under the Due Process Clause as to whether those
      conditions amounted to punishment, nothing even approaching such

      hardship is shown by this record. *fn25


      [57] Detainees are required to spend only seven or eight
      hours
      each day in their rooms, during most or all of which they
      presumably
      are sleeping. The rooms provide more than adequate space for
      sleeping. *fn26 During the remainder of the time, the detainees
      are
      free to move between their rooms and the common area. While
      "double­bunking" may have taxed some of the equipment or
      particular
      facilities in certain of the common areas, United States ex rel.

      Wolfish v. United States, 428 F.Supp., at 337, this does not
      mean
      that the conditions at the MCC failed to meet the standards
      required
      by the Constitution. Our conclusion in this regard is further
      buttressed by the detainees' length of stay at the MCC. See
      Hutto v.
      Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686­687 (1978). Nearly all of the
      detainees
      are released within 60 days. See n. 3, (supra) . We simply do
      not
      believe that requiring a detainee to share toilet facilities and

      this admittedly rather small sleeping place with another person
      for
      generally a maximum period of 60 days violates the Constitution.

      *fn27


      [58] III


      [59] Respondents also challenged certain MCC restrictions and

      practices that were designed to promote security and order at
      the
      facility on the ground that these restrictions violated the Due
      Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and certain other
      constitutional guarantees, such as the First and Fourth
      Amendments.
      The Court of Appeals seemed to approach the challenges to
      security
      restrictions in a fashion different from the other contested
      conditions and restrictions. It stated that "once it has been
      determined that the mere fact of confinement of the detainee
      justifies the restrictions, the institution must be permitted to
      use
      reasonable means to insure that its legitimate interests in
      security
      are safeguarded." 573 F.2d, at 124. The court might disagree
      with
      the choice of means to effectuate those interests, but it should
      not
      "second­guess the expert administrators on matters on which they
      are
      better informed . . . . Concern with minutiae of prison
      administration can only distract the court from detached
      consideration of the one overriding question presented to it:
      does
      the practice or condition violate the Constitution?" Id., at
      124­125. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the District Court's
      injunction against several security restrictions. The court
      rejected
      the arguments of petitioners that these practices served the
      MCC's
      interest in security and order and held that the practices were
      unjustified interferences with the retained constitutional
      rights of
      both detainees and convicted inmates. Id., at 129­132. In our
      view,
      the Court of Appeals failed to heed its own admonition not to
      "second­guess" prison administrators.


      [60] Our cases have established several general principles
      that
      inform our evaluation of the constitutionality of the
      restrictions
      at issue. First, we have held that convicted prisoners do not
      forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their
      conviction
      and confinement in prison. See Jones v. North Carolina
      Prisoners'
      Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.

      215, 225 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555­556
      (1974);
      Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). "There is no iron
      curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this
      country." Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 555­556. So, for
      example,
      our cases have held that sentenced prisoners enjoy freedom of
      speech
      and religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, see Pell
      v.
      Procunier, supra; Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cooper v.
      Pate,
      378 U.S. 546 (1964); that they are protected against invidious
      discrimination on the basis of race under the Equal Protection
      Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lee v. Washington, 390
      U.S.
      333 (1968); and that they may claim the protection of the Due
      Process Clause to prevent additional deprivation of life,
      liberty,
      or property without due process of law, see Meachum v. Fano,
      supra;
      Wolff v. McDonnell, supra. A fortiori, pretrial detainees, who
      have
      not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those
      constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted

      prisoners.


      [61] But our cases also have insisted on a second
      proposition:
      simply because prison inmates retain certain constitutional
      rights
      does not mean that these rights are not subject to restrictions
      and
      limitations. "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary
      withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a
      retraction
      justified by the considerations underlying our penal system."
      Price
      v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948); see Jones v. North
      Carolina
      Prisoners' Labor Union, supra, at 125; Wolff v. McDonnell,
      supra, at
      555; Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822. The fact of confinement
      as
      well as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal
      institution
      limits these retained constitutional rights. Jones v. North
      Carolina
      Prisoners' Labor Union, (supra) , at 125; Pell v. Procunier,
      supra,
      at 822. There must be a "mutual accommodation between
      institutional
      needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that
      are
      of general application." Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 556. This

      principle applies equally to pretrial detainees and convicted
      prisoners. A detainee simply does not possess the full range of
      freedoms of an unincarcerated individual.


      [62] Third, maintaining institutional security and preserving

      internal order and discipline are essential goals that may
      require
      limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights
      of
      both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees. *fn28 " to all
      other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of
      internal security within the corrections facilities themselves."

      Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 823; see Jones v. North Carolina
      Prisoners' Labor Union, supra, at 129; Procunier v. Martinez,
      416
      U.S. 396, 412 (1974). Prison officials must be free to take
      appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and
      corrections
      personnel and to prevent escape or unauthorized entry.
      Accordingly,
      we have held that even when an institutional restriction
      infringes a
      specific constitutional guarantee, such as the First Amendment,
      the
      practice must be evaluated in the light of the central objective
      of
      prison administration, safeguarding institutional security.
      Jones v.
      North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, supra, at 129; Pell v.
      Procunier, supra, at 822, 826; Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at
      412­414.


      [63] Finally, as the Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged,
      the
      problems that arise in the day­to­day operation of a corrections

      facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison
      administrators therefore should be accorded wide­ranging
      deference
      in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in
      their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
      discipline
      and to maintain institutional security. Jones v. North Carolina
      Prisoners' Labor Union, supra, at 128; Procunier v. Martinez,
      supra,
      at 404­405; Cruz v. Beto, supra, at 321; see Meachum v. Fano,
      427
      U.S., at 228­229. *fn29 "Such considerations are peculiarly
      within
      the province and professional expertise of corrections
      officials,
      and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to
      indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to
      these
      considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert
      judgment in such matters." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S., at 827.
      *fn30 We further observe that, on occasion, prison
      administrators
      may be "experts" only by Act of Congress or of a state
      legislature.
      But judicial deference is accorded not merely because the
      administrator ordinarily will, as a matter of fact in a
      particular
      case, have a better grasp of his domain than the reviewing
      judge,
      but also because the operation of our correctional facilities is

      peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive
      Branches of
      our Government, not the Judicial. Procunier v. Martinez, supra,
      at
      405; cf. Meachum v. Fano, supra, at 229. With these teachings of
      our
      cases in mind, we turn to an examination of the MCC security
      practices that are alleged to violate the Constitution.


      [64] A


      [65] At the time of the lower courts' decisions, the Bureau
      of
      Prisons' "publisher­only" rule, which applies to all Bureau
      facilities, permitted inmates to receive books and magazines
      from
      outside the institution only if the materials were mailed
      directly
      from the publisher or a book club. 573 F.2d, at 129­130. The
      warden
      of the MCC stated in an affidavit that "serious" security and
      administrative problems were caused when bound items were
      received
      by inmates from unidentified sources outside the facility. App.
      24.
      He noted that in order to make a "proper and thorough"
      inspection of
      such items, prison officials would have to remove the covers of
      hardback books and to leaf through every page of all books and
      magazines to ensure that drugs, money, weapons, or other
      contraband
      were not secreted in the material. "This search process would
      take a
      substantial and inordinate amount of available staff time."
      Ibid.
      However, "there is relatively little risk that material received

      directly from a publisher or book club would contain contraband,
      and
      therefore, the security problems are significantly reduced
      without a
      drastic drain on staff resources." Ibid.


      [66] The Court of Appeals rejected these security and
      administrative justifications and affirmed the District Court's
      order enjoining enforcement of the "publisher­only" rule at the
      MCC.
      The Court of Appeals held that the rule "severely and
      impermissibly
      restricts the reading material available to inmates" and
      therefore
      violates their First Amendment and due process rights. 573 F.2d,
      at
      130.


      [67] It is desirable at this point to place in focus the
      precise
      question that now is before this Court. Subsequent to the
      decision
      of the Court of Appeals, the Bureau of Prisons amended its
      "publisher­only" rule to permit the receipt of books and
      magazines
      from bookstores as well as publishers and book clubs. 43 Fed.
      Reg.
      30576 (1978) (to be codified in 28 CFR º 540.71). In addition,
      petitioners have informed the Court that the Bureau proposes to
      amend the rule further to allow receipt of paperback books,
      magazines, and other soft­covered materials from any source.
      Brief
      for Petitioners 66 n. 49, 69, and n. 51. The Bureau regards
      hardback
      books as the "more dangerous source of risk to institutional
      security," however, and intends to retain the prohibition
      against
      receipt of hardback books unless they are mailed directly from
      publishers, book clubs, or bookstores. Id., at 69 n. 51.
      Accordingly, petitioners request this Court to review the
      District
      Court's injunction only to the extent it enjoins petitioners
      from
      prohibiting receipt of hard­cover books that are not mailed
      directly
      from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores. Id., at 69; Tr. of
      Oral
      Arg. 59­60. *fn31


      [68] We conclude that a prohibition against receipt of
      hardback
      books unless mailed directly from publishers, book clubs, or
      bookstores does not violate the First Amendment rights of MCC
      inmates. That limited restriction is a rational response by
      prison
      officials to an obvious security problem. It hardly needs to be
      emphasized that hardback books are especially serviceable for
      smuggling contraband into an institution; money, drugs, and
      weapons
      easily may be secreted in the bindings. E. g., Woods v. Daggett,
      541
      F.2d 237 (CA10 1976). *fn32 They also are difficult to search
      effectively. There is simply no evidence in the record to
      indicate
      that MCC officials have exaggerated their response to this
      security
      problem and to the administrative difficulties posed by the
      necessity of carefully inspecting each book mailed from
      unidentified
      sources. Therefore, the considered judgment of these experts
      must
      control in the absence of prohibitions far more sweeping than
      those
      involved here. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
      Union,
      433 U.S., at 128; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S., at 827.


      [69] Our conclusion that this limited restriction on receipt
      of
      hardback books does not infringe the First Amendment rights of
      MCC
      inmates is influenced by several other factors. The rule
      operates in
      a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the
      expression.
      Id., at 828. And there are alternative means of obtaining
      reading
      material that have not been shown to be burdensome or
      insufficient.
      " regard the available 'alternative means of [communication as]
      a
      relevant factor' in a case such as this where 'we called upon to

      balance First Amendment rights against governmental . . .
      interests.'" Id., at 824, quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
      U.S.
      753, 765 (1972); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S., at 321, 322 n. 2.
      The
      restriction, as it is now before us, allows soft­bound books and

      magazines to be received from any source and hardback books to
      be
      received from publishers, bookstores, and book clubs. In
      addition,
      the MCC has a "relatively large" library for use by inmates.
      United
      States ex rel. Wolfish v. United States, 428 F.Supp., at 340.
      *fn33
      To the limited extent the rule might possibly increase the cost
      of
      obtaining published materials, this Court has held that where
      "other
      avenues" remain available for the receipt of materials by
      inmates,
      the loss of "cost advantages does not fundamentally implicate
      free
      speech values." See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
      Union,
      supra, at 130­131. We are also influenced in our decision by the

      fact that the rule's impact on pretrial detainees is limited to
      a
      maximum period of approximately 60 days. See n. 3, (supra) . In
      sum,
      considering all the circumstances, we view the rule, as we now
      find
      it, to be a "reasonable 'time, place and manner' [regulation
      that
      is] necessary to further significant governmental interests . .
      . ."
      Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); see Cox
      v.
      New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575­576 (1941); Cox v. Louisiana,
      379
      U.S. 536, 554­555 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,
      46­48
      (1966).


      [70] B


      [71] Inmates at the MCC were not permitted to receive
      packages
      from outside the facility containing items of food or personal
      property, except for one package of food at Christmas. This rule
      was
      justified by MCC officials on three grounds. First, officials
      testified to "serious" security problems that arise from the
      introduction of such packages into the institution, the
      "traditional
      file in the cake kind of situation" as well as the concealment
      of
      drugs "in heels of shoes seams of clothing." App. 80; see id.,
      at
      24, 84­85. As in the case of the "publisher­only" rule, the
      warden
      testified that if such packages were allowed, the inspection
      process
      necessary to ensure the security of the institution would
      require a
      "substantial and inordinate amount of available staff time."
      Id., at
      24. Second, officials were concerned that the introduction of
      personal property into the facility would increase the risk of
      thefts, gambling, and inmate conflicts, the "age­old problem of
      you
      have it and I don't." Id., at 80; see id., at 85. Finally, they
      noted storage and sanitary problems that would result from
      inmates'
      receipt of food packages. Id., at 67, 80. Inmates are permitted,

      however, to purchase certain items of food and personal property

      from the MCC commissary. *fn34


      [72] The District Court dismissed these justifications as
      "dire
      predictions." It was unconvinced by the asserted security
      problems
      because other institutions allow greater ownership of personal
      property and receipt of packages than does the MCC. And because
      the
      MCC permitted inmates to purchase items in the commissary, the
      court
      could not accept official fears of increased theft, gambling, or

      conflicts if packages were allowed. Finally, it believed that
      sanitation c<br/><br/>(Message over 64 KB, truncated)
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