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RE: [tips_and_tricks] It's A-OK for the IRS to summarily take your stuff! Yeah, right...thanks a lot S.Ct.

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  • dave
    It s very very easy to steal your funds from direct deposit banks but even non direct deposit just takes one more step..so not really a big advantage. An
    Message 1 of 7 , Jan 18, 2011
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      It’s very very easy to steal your funds from direct deposit banks but even non direct deposit just takes one more step….so not really a big advantage. An employer is contacted and told to keep quiet and forward over direct deposit information. They will comply. Your account is secretly levied….and THEN you are notified. The bank these days will NOT notify you and your first encounter is “bounced checks.” Sometime later you will receive a notice from whomever levied it….supposed to be 21 days….but often its only 5 days. It really doesn’t matter….it’s gone.

       

      Correct…never trust banks. All banks are partners of big brother in one way or another. On the one side they have FDIC and Fed Reserve….on the other they have Fannie and Fredie. The death of freedom was elimination of privacy in banking. In exchange for being the “front men” in the extortion scheme, banks are allowed to fleece a small portion of the slave-depositor’s money. You will see “processing fees” on levy actions can amount to $100—this is the “wet your beak” aspect of the plundering. The Anti Injunction Act protects them from suit for no district court will entertain your suit….so….kiss anything in a bank goodbye. The legal department won’t even acknowledge what you send them anymore of paperwork.

       

      From:

       

        No wonder THEY are so eager to have all checks 'directly deposited'....makes it that much easier to just take YOUR money and let you fight to get it back!

       



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    • Balsaman
      For those who do not know of the internet. 283 U.S. 589 - Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
      Message 2 of 7 , Jan 18, 2011
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        For those who do not know of the internet.

        283 U.S. 589 - Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

        http://openjurist.org/283/us/589/phillips-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue

        http://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla%3Aen-US%3Aofficial&channel=s&hl=en&source=hp&biw=1024&bih=637&q=PHILLIPS+ET+AL.+v.+COMMISSIONER+INTERNAL+REVENUE%2C+51+S.+Ct.+608%2C+283+U.S.+589+&btnG=Google+Search

        283 U.S. 589

        51 S.Ct. 608

        75 L.Ed. 1289

        PHILLIPS et al.
        v.
        COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

        No. 455.

        Argued April 23, 1931.

        Decided May 25, 1931.

        [Syllabus from pages 589-591 intentionally omitted]

        Mr. Elkan Turk, of New York City , for petitioners.

        The Attorney General and Mr. G. A. Youngquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

        Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

        1

        In 1919, the Coombe Garment Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, distributed all of its assets among its stockholders, and then dissolved. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue made deficiency assessments against it for income and profits taxes for the years 1918 and 1919. A small part of these assessments was collected, leaving an unpaid balance of $9,306.36. I. L. Phillips, of New York City , had owned one-fourth of the company's stock and had received $17,139.61 as his distributive dividend. Pursuant to section 280(a) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 61, 26 USCA § 1069(a)(1), the Commissioner sent due notice that he proposed to assess against, and collect from, Phillips the entre r emaining amount of the deficiencies. No notice of such deficiencies was sent to any of the other transferees, and no suit or proceedings for collection was instituted against them. Upon petition by Phillips' executors for a redetermination, the Board of Tax Appeals held that the estate was liable for the full amount. 15 B. T. A. 1218. Its order was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 42 F.(2d) 177. Because of conflict in the decisions of the lower courts1 a writ of certiorari was granted. 282 U. S. 828, 51 S. Ct. 82, 75 L. Ed. —.

        2

        Stockholders who have received the assets of a dissolved corporation may confessedly be compelled, in an appropriate proceeding, to discharge unpaid corporate taxes. Compare Pierce v. United States , 255 U. S. 398, 41 S. Ct. 365, 65 L. Ed. 697. Before the enactment of section 280(a)(1), such payment by the stockholders could be enforced only by bill in equity or action at law.2 Section 280(a)(1) provides that the liability of the transferee for such taxes may be enforced in the same manner as that of any delinquent taxpayer.3

        3

        The procedure prescribed for collection of the tax from a stockholder is thus the same as that now followed when payment is sought directly from the corporate taxpayer. This procedure is now generally known, and some parts of it will later be considered in detail. As applied directly to the taxpayer, its constitutionality is not now assailed. Compare Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 49 S. Ct. 499, 73 L. Ed. 918. But it is contended that to apply it to stockholder transferees violates several constitutional guaranties; that additional obstacles are encountered if it is applied to transfers made before the enactment of section 280(a)(1); that the specific liability here sought to be enforced is governed by the law of Pennsylvania and barred by its statute of limitations; and that, in no event, can the stockholder be held liable for more than his pro rata share of the unpaid corporate tax.

        4

        First. The contention mainly urged is that the summary procedure permitted by the section violates the Constitution because it does not provide for a judicial determination of the transferee's liability at the outset. The argument is that such liability (except where a lien had attached before the transfer) is dependent upon questions of law and fact which have heretofore been adjudicated by courts; that to confer upon the Commissioner power to determine these questions in the first instance offends against the principle of the separation of the powers; and that the inherent denial of due process is not saved by the provisions for deferred review in a suit to recover taxes paid, or, in the alternative, for an immediate appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals with the right to review its determination in the courts, because there are limitations and conditions in either method of judicial review.

        5

        Section 280(a)(1) provides the United States with a new remedy for enforcing the existing 'liability, at law or in equity.' The quoted words are employed in the statute to describe the kind of liability to which the new remedy is to be applied and to define the extent of such liability. The obligation to be enforced is the liability for the tax. Russell v. United States , 278 U. S. 181, 186, 49 S. Ct. 121, 73 L. Ed. 225; United States v. Updike, 281 U. S. 489, 493, 494, 50 S. Ct. 367, 74 L. Ed. 984. The proceeding is one to collect the revenue. That Congress deemed the section necessary in order to make the tax-collecting system more effective is established, not only by the fact of enactment, but also by the reports of the committees.4

        6

        The right of the United States to collect its internal revenue by summary administrative proceedings has long been settled.5 Where, as here, adequate opportunity is afforded for a later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings to secure prompt performance of ecun iary obligations to the government have been consistently sustained. Compare Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S. 85, 88-89, 23 L. Ed. 561; Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 594, 26 L. Ed. 253; Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 708-709, 4 S. Ct. 663, 28 L. Ed. 569. Property rights must yield provisionally to governmental need. Thus, while protection of life and liberty from administrative action alleged to be illegal may be obtained promptly by the writ of habeas corpus, United States v. Woo Jan, 245 U. S. 552, 38 S. Ct. 207, 62 L. Ed. 466; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 42 S. Ct. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938, the statutory prohibition of any 'suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax' postpones redress for the alleged invasion of property rights if the exaction is made under color of their offices by revenue officers charged with the general authority to assess and collect the revenue.6 Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 189, 3 S. Ct. 157, 27 L. Ed. 901; Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 36 S. Ct. 275, 60 L. Ed. 557; Graham v. Du Pont, 262 U. S. 234, 43 S. Ct. 567, 67 L. Ed. 965. This prohibition of injunctive relief is applicable in the case of summary proceedings against a transferee. Act of May 29, 1928, c. 852, § 604, 45 Stat. 791, 873 (26 USCA § 2604). Proceedings more summary in character than that provided in section 280, and involving less directly the obligation of the taxpayer, were sustained in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 15 L. Ed. 372. It is urged that the decision in the Murray Case was based upon the peculiar relationship of a collector of revenue to his government. The underlying principle in that case was not such relation, but the need of the government promptly to secure its revenues.

        7

        Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate. Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 593, 26 L. Ed. 253; Scottish Union & National Insurance Co. v. Bowland, 196 U. S. 611, 631, 25 S. Ct. 345, 49 L. Ed. 619. Delay in the judicial determination of property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that governmental needs be immediately satisfied. For the protection of public health, a state may order the summary destruction of property by administrative authorities without antecedent notice of hearing. Compare North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 29 S. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195, 15 Ann. Cas. 276; Hutchinson v. Valdosta , 227 U. S. 303, 33 S. Ct. 290, 57 L. Ed. 520; Adams v. Milwaukee , 228 U. S. 572, 584, 33 S. Ct. 610, 57 L. Ed. 971. Because of the public necessity, the property of citizens may be summarily seized in war-time. Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 566, 41 S. Ct. 214, 65 L. Ed. 403; Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 245, 41 S. Ct. 293, 65 L. Ed. 604; United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547, 553, 41 S. Ct. 569, 65 L. Ed. 1084. Compare Miller v. United States , 11 Wall. 268, 296, 20 L. Ed. 135; International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 399, 51 S. Ct. 176, 75 L. Ed. 410; Russian Volunteer Fleet Corporation v. United States, 282 U. S. 481, 51 S. Ct. 229, 75 L. Ed. 473. And at any time, the United States may acquire property by eminent domain, without paying, or determining the amount of the compensation before the taking. Compare Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 375, 23 L. Ed. 449; United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 518, 3 S. Ct. 346, 27 L. Ed. 1015; Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U. S. 290, 306, 32 S. Ct. 488, 56 L. Ed. 771.7

        8

        The procedure provided in section 280(a)(1) satisfies the requirements of due process because two alternative methods of eventual judicial review are available to the transferee. He may contest his liability by bringing an action, either against the United States or the collector, to recover the amount paid. This remedy is available where the transferee does not appeal from the determination of the Commissioner, and the latter makes an assessment and enforces payment by distraint; or where the transferee voluntarily pays the tax and is thereafter denied administrative relief. Compare United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28, 31; Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U. S. 101, 105, 48 S. Ct. 43, 72 L. Ed. 184; Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551, 560, 48 S. Ct. 587, 72 L. Ed. 985. Or the transferee may avail himself of the provisions for immediate redetermination of the liability by the Board of Tax Appeals, since all provisions governing this mode of review are made applicable by section 280. Compare Routzahn v. Tyroler (C. C. A.) 36 F.(2d) 208, 209. Thus within sixty days after the Commissioner determines that the transferee is liable for an unpaid deficiency, and gives due notice thereof, the latter may file a petition with the Board o Tax Appeals. Act of February 26, 1926, c. 27, § 274(a), 44 Stat. 9, 55 (26 USCA § 1048); Act of May 29, 1928, c. 852, § 272(a), 45 Stat. 791, 852 (26 USCA § 2272(a). Formal notice of the tax liability is thus given; the Commissioner is required to answer; and there is a complete hearing de novo according to the rules of evidence applicable in courts of equity of the District of Columbia . Act of May 29, 1928, c. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 791, 872 (26 USCA §§ 1217-1219). Compare International Banding Machine Co. v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 37 F.(2d) 660. This remedy may be had before payment, without giving bond (unless the Commissioner in his discretion deems a jeopardy assessment necessary). The transferee has the right to a preliminary examination of books, papers, and other evidence of the taxpayer; and the burden of proof is on the Commissioner to show that the appellant is liable as a transferee of property, though not to show that the taxpayer was liable for the tax. Act of May 29, 1928, c. 852, § 602, 45 Stat. 791, 873 (26 USCA §§ 1229, 1230).8 A review by the Circuit Court of Appeals of an adverse determination may be had; and assessment and collection meanwhile may be stayed by giving a bond to secure payment. Act of February 26, 1926, c. 27, § 1001, 44 Stat. 9, 109 (26 USCA § 1224 and note); Act of May 29, 1928, c. 852, § 603, 45 Stat. 791, 873 (26 USCA § 1224). There may be a further review by this court on certiorari. These provisions amply protect the transferee against improper administrative action. Compare Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40, 46 S. Ct. 384, 70 L. Ed. 818.

        9

        It is argued that such review by the Board of Tax Appeals and Circuit Court of Appeals is constitutionally inadequate because of the conditions and limitations imposed. Specific objection is made to the provision that collection will not be stayed while the case is pending before the Circuit Court of Appeals, unless a bond is filed; and also to the rule under which the Board's findings of fact are treated by that court as final if there is any evidence to support them.9 As to the first of these objections, it has already been shown that the right of the United States to exact immediate payment and to relegate the taxpayer to a suit for recovery is paramount. The privilege of delaying payment pending immediate judicial review, by filing a bond, was granted by the sovereign as a matter of grace solely for the convenience of the taxpayer.10 Nor is the second objection of weight. It has long been settled that determinations of fact for ordinary administrative purposes are not subject to review. Johnson v. Drew, 171 U. S. 93, 99, 18 S. Ct. 800, 43 L. Ed. 88; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 508, 24 S. Ct. 789, 48 L. Ed. 1092; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263, 25 S. Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed. 1040; Red 'C' Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380, 394, 32 S. Ct. 152, 56 L. Ed. 240; Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 230, 246, 35 S. Ct. 387, 59 L. Ed. 552. Compare Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States , 277 U. S. 551, 560, 48 S. Ct. 587, 72 L. Ed. 985. Save as there may be an exception for issues presenting claims of constitutional right, such administrative findings on issues of fact are accepted by the court as conclusive if the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain them and there was no irregularity in the proceedings. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 507, 23 S. Ct. 390, 47 L. Ed. 563; Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552, 562, 26 S. Ct. 144, 50 L. Ed. 305; Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, 167, 43 S. Ct. 303, 67 L. Ed. 590; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 443, 50 S. Ct. 220,74 L . Ed. 524.11 The adequacy of the scope of review offered by the Revenue Act of 1926 in the case of a deficiency determined directly against the taxpayer was assumed in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 49 S. Ct. 499, 73 L. Ed. 918; and this procedure is now thoroughly established.12 Questions of fact involved in proceedings against transferees are no different or more complex than those often encountered in determining the direct liability of a taxpayer.13 The alternative judicial review provided is adequate in both cases.

        10

        Second. It is urged by amici curize that the method of assessment and collection permitted by section 280(a)(1) cannot be applied where, as in the case at bar, the transfer of assets, upon which the transferee's liability is based, occurred prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1926; and, moreover, that if applied retroactively to such transfer, the section would be unconstitutional. The power of Congress to provide an additional remedy for the enforcement of existing liabilities is clear. Compare Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U. S. 409, 427, 51 S. Ct. 186, 75 L. Ed. 415. It is clear also that Congress intended that the section should be available for enforcing the liability of a transferee in respect to taxes 'imposed * * * by any prior income, excess-profits, or War-Profits Tax Act,' irrespective of the time at which the transfer was made. The need for a more effective and expedient remedy was not limited to liabilities of transferees thereafter arising. To have so limited the operation of the section would, at least as to earlier acts, have seriously impaired the value of the new remedy.14

        11

        Third. It is contended that section 280(a)(1) is invalid because the liability at law or in equity of a transferee is dependent upon the law of the state of incorporation, and that thus the section improperly delegates the federal taxing power to the state Legislatures; and, further, that the tax liability of the transferee, as thus assessed and collected, violates the constitutional requirement of uniformity because differences in state laws may affect such liability. The extent and incidence of federal taxes not infrequently are affected by differences in state laws; but such variations do not infringe the constitutional prohibitions against delegation of the taxing power or the requirement of geographical uniformity. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 17, 47 S. Ct. 265, 71 L. Ed. 511; Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55, 51 S. Ct. 49, 75 L. Ed. 156; Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 117, 51 S. Ct. 58, 75 L. Ed. 239. Compare Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 594, 5 S. Ct. 247, 28 L. Ed. 798; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 242 U. S. 311, 327, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326, L. R. A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B 845. We have, therefore, no occasion to decide whether the right of the United States to follow transferred assets is limited by any state laws.

        12

        Fourth. It is contended that summary proceeding by the United States to enforce the liability for the tax is barred by the six months' statute of limitations on suits against stockholders provided by the Pennsylvania statute. Laws 1874, c. 32, p. 80, § 15 (Penn. Stat. 1920, § 5728 (15 PS § 352)). The United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation unless Congress provides that it shall be. United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co., 118 U. S. 120, 6 S. Ct. 1006, 30 L. Ed. 81; Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co., 250 U. S. 123, 125, 39 S. Ct. 407, 63 L. Ed. 889; E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456, 462, 44 S. Ct. 364, 68 L. Ed. 788. The detailed limitation periods specified in section 280 evidence the intention that they alone shall be applicable to the proceedings therein authorized.

        13

      • Patrick McKEE
        The PRINCIPLE kind of sounds like WITHHOLDING, DOESN T it? In 1939 only about five percent of American workers paid income tax. The United States entrance
        Message 3 of 7 , Jan 20, 2011
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          The PRINCIPLE kind of sounds like WITHHOLDING, DOESN'T it?

           

          In 1939 only about five percent of American workers paid income tax. The United States ' entrance into World War II changed that figure. The demands of war production put almost every American back to work, but the expense of the war still exceeded tax-generated revenue. President Roosevelt's proposed Revenue Act of 1942 introduced the broadest and most progressive tax in American history, the Victory Tax. Now, about 75 percent of American workers would pay income taxes. Because so many citizens paid the tax, it was considered a mass tax. To ease workers' burden of paying a large sum once a year, and to create a regular flow of revenue into the U.S. Treasury, the government required employers to withhold money from employees' paychecks. Additional taxes were put in place in 1943. By war's end in 1945, about 90 percent of American workers submitted income tax forms, and 60 percent paid taxes on their income. The federal government covered more than half its expenses with new income tax revenue."

          http://www.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes/jsp/whys/lp/IWT2L5lp.jsp

           

          Of course with WITHHOLDING people may be TELLING their employer to WITHHOLD a tax from their paychecks that they may NOT even be LIABLE for.

           

          Purpose. Complete Form W-4 so that your employer can withhold the correct federal income tax from your pay. Consider completing a new Form W-4 each year and when your personal or financial situation changes.

           

          Exemption from withholding. If you are exempt, complete only lines 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 and sign the form to validate it. Your exemption for 2010 expires February 16, 2011. See Pub. 505, Tax Withholding and Estimated Tax.

          ...

          Basic instructions. If you are not exempt, complete the Personal Allowances Worksheet below.

          ...

          Privacy Act and Paperwork Reduction Act Notice. We ask for the information on this form to carry out the Internal Revenue laws of the United States . Internal Revenue Code sections 3402(f)(2) and 6109 and their regulations require you to provide this information; your employer uses it to determine your federal income tax withholding. Failure to provide a properly completed form will result in your being treated as a single person who claims no withholding allowances; providing fraudulent information may subject you to penalties.

           

          http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw4.pdf

           

           

          26 USC 3402. Income tax collected at source

          (a) Requirement of withholding

          (1) In general

          Except as otherwise provided in this section, every employer making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax determined in accordance with tables or computational procedures prescribed by the Secretary. [REST OMITTED]

          n) Employees incurring no income tax liability

          Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an employer shall not be required to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter upon a payment of wages to an employee if there is in effect with respect to such payment a withholding exemption certificate (in such form and containing such other information as the Secretary may prescribe) furnished to the employer by the employee certifying that the employee—

          (1) incurred no liability for income tax imposed under subtitle A for his preceding taxable year, and

          (2) anticipates that he will incur no liability for income tax imposed under subtitle A for his current taxable year.

          The Secretary shall by regulations provide for the coordination of the provisions of this subsection with the provisions of subsection (f).

          http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode26/usc_sec_26_00003402----000-.html

           

           

          Exemption from federal income tax withholding. Generally, an employee may claim exemption from federal income tax withholding because he or she had no income tax liability last year and expects none this year. See the Form W-4 instructions for more information. However, the wages are still subject to social security and Medicare taxes. See also Invalid Forms W-4 on page 17.  IRS Publication 15, (Circular E), Employer’s Tax Guide, page 15

          http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15.pdf

           

          Patrick in California

           

          Founder, ALLIANCE for PEACE & PROSPERITY

          http://groups.yahoo.com/group/alliancepeaceprosperity/

           

          "It ain't what ya don't know that hurts ya. What really puts a hurtin' on ya is what ya knows for sure, that just ain't so." -- Uncle Remus

           

           

          --- In tips_and_tricks@yahoogroups.com , "joalaska" <joalaska@...> wrote:

          >  

          >   No wonder THEY are so eager to have all checks 'directly deposited'....makes it that much easier to just take YOUR money and let you fight to get it back!

        • BOB GREGORY
          *BUT...do a careful study to learn what WAGES, EMPLOYEES and EMPLOYERS are. See 26 USC 3401 and 26 USC 7701. They are LEGAL TERMS or TERMS of ART and do not
          Message 4 of 7 , Jan 20, 2011
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            BUT...do a careful study to learn what WAGES, EMPLOYEES and EMPLOYERS are.  See 26 USC 3401 and 26 USC 7701.  They are LEGAL TERMS or TERMS of ART and do not have the ordinary, everyday meanings they sound like they have.

            On Thu, Jan 20, 2011 at 1:17 PM, Patrick McKEE <paradoxmagnus@...> wrote:
             

            The PRINCIPLE kind of sounds like WITHHOLDING, DOESN'T it?

             

            In 1939 only about five percent of American workers paid income tax. The United States' entrance into World War II changed that figure. The demands of war production put almost every American back to work, but the expense of the war still exceeded tax-generated revenue. President Roosevelt's proposed Revenue Act of 1942 introduced the broadest and most progressive tax in American history, the Victory Tax. Now, about 75 percent of American workers would pay income taxes. Because so many citizens paid the tax, it was considered a mass tax. To ease workers' burden of paying a large sum once a year, and to create a regular flow of revenue into the U.S. Treasury, the government required employers to withhold money from employees' paychecks. Additional taxes were put in place in 1943. By war's end in 1945, about 90 percent of American workers submitted income tax forms, and 60 percent paid taxes on their income. The federal government covered more than half its expenses with new income tax revenue."

            http://www.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes/jsp/whys/lp/IWT2L5lp.jsp

             

            Of course with WITHHOLDING people may be TELLING their employer to WITHHOLD a tax from their paychecks that they may NOT even be LIABLE for.



          • dave
            Witholding was proposed by economist Milton Freidman who also instructed the govt. that it was only to be used for the 2nd world war effort..otherwise it would
            Message 5 of 7 , Feb 10, 2011
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              Witholding was proposed by economist Milton Freidman who also instructed the govt. that it was only to be used for the 2nd world war effort….otherwise it would screw up the economy.

               

              People hold up the Al Capone case as the ultimate tax evader …but such was NOT the case. As Patrick revealed the income tax was largely UNHEARD of. Very few people arose to the level to require payment. According to sources, Al Capone was heard to remark paraphrased, “A tax payable to the federal government? Huh? Well pay them….I pay off all the other government officials and there is no law on that…what’s 3%...big deal…cheap protection money…pay em!’”

               

              The AL Capone case was mock-tried at a law school around 1990….Al was acquitted.

               

               

               

              The PRINCIPLE kind of sounds like WITHHOLDING, DOESN'T it?

               

              In 1939 only about five percent of American workers paid income tax.



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