Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.


Expand Messages
  • Patrick McKEE
    This is a perfect EXAMPLE of typical “patriot” & “redemption” BS that uses SUPPOSED “references” to give it some SEMBLANCE of “credibility” to
    Message 1 of 1 , Nov 30, 2010
    • 0 Attachment

      This is a perfect EXAMPLE of typical “patriot” & “redemption” BS that uses SUPPOSED “references” to give it some SEMBLANCE of “credibility” to & make it LOOK “authoritative”.


      The Legislative Act of February 21, 1871, Forty-first Congress, Session III, Chapter 62, page 419, Congress chartered a Federal Company entitled "United States," a/k/a "US Inc.," a "Commercial Agency" originally designated as "Washington, D.C.," in accordance with the 14th Amendment which the record indicates was never ratified (see Utah Supreme Court Cases, "Dyett v Turner, (1968) 439 P2d 266, 267;  State v Phillips, (1975) 540 P 2d 936; as well as Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 448, 59 S. Ct. 972; 28 Tulane Law Review, 22; 11 South Carolina Law Quarterly 484; Congressional Record , June 13, 1967, pp. 15641-5646).  A "citizen of the United States " is a civilly dead entity operating as a co-trustee and co-beneficiary of the PCT, the private constructive, cestui que trust of US Inc. under the 14 Amendment, which upholds the debt of the USA and US Inc. in Section 4                                                                                     


      There are no Judicial courts in America and there have not been since 1789. Judges do not enforce Statutes and Codes. Executive Administrators enforce Statutes and Codes.  FRC v. GE 281 US 464, Keller v. PE 261 US 428, 1 Stat. 138-178) ­ Factoids #8


      Means: (A) a federal corporation . . . Title 28 USC Section 3002(5) Chapter 176. It is clear that the United States . . . is a corporation . . . 534 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 724.


      `It is well settled that "United States" et al is a corporation, originally incorporated February 21, 1871 under the name " District of Columbia ," 16 Stat. 419 Chapter 62. It was reorganized June 11, 1878; a bankrupt organization per House Joint Resolution 192 on June 5, 1933, Senate Report 93-549, and Executive Orders 6072, 6102, and 6246; a de facto (define de facto) government, originally the ten square mile tract ceded by Maryland and Virginia and comprising Washington D. C., plus the possessions, territories, forts, and arsenals.


      Court shall clarify: validate: verify: which jurisdiction: United States ; This term has several meanings. [1] It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in family of nations, [2] it may designate territory over which sovereignty of United States extends, or [3] it may be collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt , U.S. Ohio , 324 U.S. 652, 65 S.Ct. 870, 880, 89 L.Ed. 1252. [Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition]


      Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, definition of foreign state: The several United States3 are considered "foreign" to each other except as regards their relations as common members of the Union . ... The term "foreign nations," as used in a statement of the rule that the laws of foreign nations should be proved in a certain manner, should be construed to mean all nations and states other than that in which the action is brought; and hence one state of the Union is foreign to another, in the sense of that rule.

      (1) United States * or U.S. * (first meaning) The name of the sovereign Nation, occupying the position of other sovereigns in the family of nations.

      (2) United States ** or U.S. ** (second meaning) The federal government and the limited territory over which it exercises exclusive sovereign authority.

      (3) United States *** or U.S. *** (third meaning) The collective name for the States united by and under the Constitution for the United States of America .




      IF Jerry BOTHERED to VERIFY & RESEARCH the things that he is SUPPOSEDLY citing, he would save himself a lot of EMBARASSMENT.


      16 Stat. 419 was an “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia”, has NOTHING to do with the 14th Amendment & it did NOT charter a “Federal Company entitled "United States," a/k/a "US Inc.”  And 18 Stat. 116 merely changed the form of the Government for the District of Columbia .


      An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia



      An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia , and for other purposes



      And the U.S. SUPREME COURT long ago ruled that the Government of the District of Columbia can ONLY exercise MUNICIPAL powers.


      “It is a cardinal principle of our system of government that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities and general affairs by the central authority, and hence, while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of municipalities exercising local self-government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject, of course, to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity.


      Congress has express power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the District of Columbia , thus possessing the combined powers of a general and of a state government in all cases where legislation is possible. But, as the repository of the legislative power of the United States, Congress, in creating the District of Columbia "a body corporate for municipal purposes," could only authorize it to exercise municipal powers, and this is all that Congress attempted to do.”


      STOUTENBURGH V. HENNICK, 129 U. S. 141 (1889)




      DYETT v. TURNER was NOT about the CONSTITUTIONALITY of the 14TH AMENDMENT, it was a HABEAS CORPUS case.


      “The plaintiff, Mr. Dyett, is confined in the state prison of the State of Utah as a result of a plea of guilty entered to a charge of issuing a check against insufficient funds with intent to defraud. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court here, which was denied. Thereafter he filed an amended petition in the same court. At the time of denying this amended petition the judge wrote a memorandum decision in which he indicated a disposition to release the petitioner from prison but thought he could do so only after all state remedies had been exhausted.

      In regard to the Fourteenth Amendment, which the present Supreme Court of the United States has by decision chosen as the basis for invading the rights and prerogatives of the sovereign states, it is appropriate to look at the means and methods by which that amendment was foisted upon the Nation in times of emotional stress. We have no desire at this time to have the Fourteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In fact, we are not asked to do that.”


      DYETT v. TURNER, 439 P.2d 266 (1968)




      The U.S. SUPREME COURT said in COLEMAN v. MILLER that CONGRESS has the ULTIMATE AUTHORITY in deciding whether or not an AMENDMENT had been adopted & therefore the 14th Amendment was RATIFIED.


      “The legislatures of Georgia , North Carolina and South Carolina had rejected the amendment in November and December, 1866.16 New governments were erected in those States (and in others) under the direction of Congress. 17 The new legislatures ratified the amendment, that of North Carolina on July 4, 1868, that of South Carolina on July 9, 1868, and that of Georgia on July 21, 1868.18 Ohio and New Jersey first ratified and then passed resolutions withdrawing their consent. 19 As there were then thirty-seven States, twenty-eight were needed to constitute the requisite three-fourths. On July 9, 1868, the Congress adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary of State to communicate 'a list of the States of the Union whose legislatures have ratified the fourteenth article of amendment',20 and in Secretary Seward's report attention was called to the action of Ohio and New Jersey . 21 On July 20th Secretary Seward issued a proclamation reciting the ratification by twenty-eight States, including North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio and New Jersey, and stating that it appeared that Ohio and New Jersey had since passed resolutions withdrawing their consent and that 'it is [307 U.S. 433, 449]   deemed a matter of doubt and uncertainty whether such resolutions are not irregular, invalid and therefore ineffectual'. The Secretary certified that if the ratifying resolutions of Ohio and New Jersey were still in full force and effect, notwithstanding the attempted withdrawal, the amendment had become a part of the Constitution. 22 On the following day the Congress adopted a concurrent resolution which, reciting that three- fourths of the States having ratified (the list including North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio and New Jersey),23 declared the Fourteenth Amendment to be a part of the Constitution and that it should be duly promulgated as such by the Secretary of State. Accordingly, Secretary Seward, on July 28th, issued his proclamation embracing the States mentioned in the congressional resolution and adding Georgia . 24  


      Thus the political departments of the Government dealt with the effect both of previous rejection and of attempted withdrawal and determined that both were ineffectual in the presence of an actual ratification. 25 While there were special circumstances, because of the action of the Congress in relation to the governments of the rejecting States (North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia), these circumstances were not recited in proclaiming ratification and the previous action taken in these States was set forth in the proclamation as actual previous rejections by the respective legislatures. This [307 U.S. 433, 450] decision by the political departments of the Government as to the validity of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment has been accepted.


      We think that in accordance with this historic precedent the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.


      Article V, speaking solely of ratification, contains no provision as to rejection. 26 Nor has the Congress enacted a statute relating to rejections. The statutory provision with respect to constitutional amendments is as follows:


      'Whenever official notice is received at the Department of State that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause the amendment to be published, with his certificate, specifying the States by which the same may have been adopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United States'.27 [307 U.S. 433, 451]   The statute presupposes official notice to the Secretary of State when a state legislature has adopted a resolution of ratification. We see no warrant for judicial interference with the performance of that duty. See Leser v. Garnett, supra, 258 U.S. at page 137, 42 S.Ct. at page 217.”


      COLEMAN v. MILLER, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)




      The simple FACT is that the citizens of the several states have been citizens of the United States from the founding of the nation & the 14th Amendment did NOT create a new type of citizenship.


      “It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else. And the personal rights and privileges guarantied to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were then members of the several State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright or otherwise become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on which it was founded. It was the union of those who were at that time members of distinct and separate political communities into one political family, whose power, for certain specified purposes, was to extend over the whole territory of the United States . And it gave to each citizen rights and privileges outside of his State [60 U.S. 393, 407]   which he did not before possess, and placed him in every other State upon a perfect equality with its own citizens as to rights of person and rights of property; it made him a citizen of the United States.

      DRED SCOTT v. SANDFORD, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)




      “By the civil rights act of 1866, 'all persons born in the United States , and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed,' were declared to be citizens of the United States . In the light of the law as previously established, and of the history of the times, it can hardly be doubted that the words of that act, 'not subject to any foreign power,' were not intended to exclude any children born in this country from the citizenship which would theretofore have been their birthright; or, for instance, for the first time in our history, to deny the right of citizenship to native-born children or foreign white parents not in the diplomatic service of their own country, nor in hostile occupation of part of our territory. But any possible doubt in this regard was removed when the negative words of the civil rights act, 'not subject to any foreign power,' gave way, in the fourteenth amendment of the constitution, to the affirmative words, 'subject to the jurisdiction of the United States .'


      This sentence of the fourteenth amendment is declaratory of existing rights, and affirmative of existing law, as to each of the qualifications therein expressed,-'born in the United States,' 'naturalized in the United States,' and 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof'; in short, as to everything relating to the acquisition of citizenship by facts occurring within the limits of the United States.”


      U.S. v. WONG KIM ARK , 169 U.S. 649 (1898)




      And the “claim” about a "citizen of the United States " SUPPOSEDLY being “a civilly dead entity” is obviously COMPLETE & UTTER BS since someone that suffer CIVIL DEATH has NO CIVIL RIGHTS & can NOT vote or hold office.  [Kind of sounds like WHAT happens to “believers” of PATRIOT MYTHOLOGY, DOESN’T it?]


      The forfeiture of rights and privileges of an individual who has been convicted of a serious crime.


      Civil death is provided for by statute in some states. Most civil death statutes apply only to offenders who have been sentenced to a life term.


      Civil death involves the imposition of numerous disabilities, including the denial of the privilege to vote, to hold public office, and to obtain many job and occupational licenses. In addition, an offender cannot enter into judicially enforceable agreements, such as contracts, and may not obtain insurance and pension benefits. The offender may also be deprived of any right to commence certain lawsuits in court.


      Successive marriages can also be affected by civil death laws. The issue is whether or not the spouse of a person declared civilly dead may enter into a subsequent marriage. The state courts are in disagreement on the matter, although, in most instances, where a felony is a ground for divorce, the spouse of the convicted person may end the marriage.




      NOR is there any EVIDENCE of the EXISTANCE of any ALLEGEDprivate constructive, cestui que trust”.


      CESTUI QUE TRUST, A barbarous phrase, to signify the beneficiary of an estate held in trust. He for whose benefit another person is enfeoffed or seised of land or tenements, or is possessed of personal property. The cestui que trust is entitled to receive the rents and profits of the land; he may direct such conveyances, consistent with the trust, deed or will, as he shall choose, and the trustee (q. v.) is bound to execute them: he may defend his title in the name of the trustee. 1 Cruise, Dig. tit. 12, c. 4, s. 4; vide Vin. Ab. Trust, U, W, X, and Y 1 Vern. 14; Dane's Ab. Index, h. t.: 1 Story, Eq. Jur. 321, note 1; Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t.  BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1856 Edition



      Treasury Bills, Notes, Bonds, TIPS, United States Savings Bonds, and State and Local Government Series securities are all PUBLIC DEBTS & Section 4 of the 14th AMENDMENT affirms the GOVERNMENT’S DUTY to REDEEM them when they become DUE.


      You haven't heard of the Bureau of the Public Debt before? We're a small agency within the Department of the Treasury. Our customers are your neighbors, co-workers, and most likely you, too. You're our customer if you've ever bought any type of Treasury security for yourself or, as millions have done in the case of savings bonds, as a gift for someone else.


      Our job is to borrow the money needed to operate the federal government and to account for the resulting debt. In a nutshell, we borrow by selling Treasury bills, notes, and bonds, as well as U.S. Savings Bonds; we pay interest to investors; and, when the time comes to pay back the loans, we redeem investors' securities. Every time we borrow or pay back money, it affects the outstanding debt of the United States .





      What is the Debt Held by the Public?


      The Debt Held by the Public is all federal debt held by individuals, corporations, state or local governments, foreign governments, and other entities outside the United States Government less Federal Financing Bank securities. Types of securities held by the public include, but are not limited to, Treasury Bills, Notes, Bonds, TIPS, United States Savings Bonds, and State and Local Government Series securities.





      “In the United States , sovereignty resides in the people who act through the organs established by the Constitution. Chisholm v. Georgia , 2 Dall. 419, 471; Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 Dall. 54, 93; McCulloch v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 404, 405; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 , 6 S.Ct. 1064. The Congress as the instrumentality of sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared. The powers conferred upon the Congress are harmonious. The Constitution gives to the Congress the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States , an unqualified power, a power vital to the government, upon which in an extremity its very life may depend. The binding quality of the promise of the United States is of the essence of the credit which is so pledged. Having this power to authorize the issue of definite obligations for the payment of money borrowed, the Congress has not been vested with authority to alter or destroy those obli- [294 U.S. 330, 354]   gations. The fact that the United States may not be sued without its consent is a matter of procedure which does not affect the legal and binding character of its contracts. While the Congress is under no duty to provide remedies through the courts, the contractual obligation still exists, and, despite infirmities of procedure, remains binding upon the conscience of the sovereign. Lynch v. United States, supra, pages 580, 582, of 292 U.S. 54 S.Ct. 840.


      The Fourteenth Amendment, in its fourth section, explicitly declares: 'The validity of the public debt of the United States , authorized by law , ... shall not be questioned.' While this provision was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the government issued during the Civil War, its language indicates a broader connotation. We regard it as confirmatory of a fundamental principle which applies as well to the government bonds in question, and to others duly authorized by the Congress, as to those issued before the amendment was adopted. Nor can we perceive any reason for not considering the expression 'the validity of the public debt' as embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the public obligations.”


      PERRY v. UNITED STATES, 294 U.S. 330 (1935)




      Neither KELLER V. POTOMAC ELEC. POWER CO. NOR FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. say anything about “Executive Administrators” or there SUPPOSEDLY being “no Judicial courts in America ”.  In FACT, BOTH cases address the DIFFERENCES between ADMINISTRATIVE/LEGISLATIVE courts & JUDICIAL courts such as the U.S. SUPREME COURT.


      "Such legislative or administrative jurisdiction, it is well settled, cannot be conferred on this Court either directly or by appeal. The latest and fullest authority upon this point is to be found in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE Day, speaking for the court in Muskrat v. United States , 219 U. S. 346. The principle there recognized and enforced on reason and authority is that the jurisdiction of this Court and of the inferior courts of the United States ordained and established by Congress under and by virtue of the third article of the Constitution is limited to cases and controversies in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and does not extend to an issue of constitutional law framed by Congress for the purpose of invoking the advice of this Court without real parties or a real case, or to administrative or legislative issues or controversies. 2 U. S. 52; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 100 U. S. 398; Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,@ 215 U. S. 216." KELLER V. POTOMAC ELEC. POWER CO., 261 U. S. 428 (1923)




      "In the cases just cited, as also in others, it is recognized that the courts of the District of Columbia are not created under the judiciary article of the Constitution but are legislative courts, and therefore that Congress may invest them with jurisdiction of appeals and proceedings such as have been just described. [281 U.S. 464, 469]   But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only, and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra, page 444, of 261 U. S., 43 S. Ct. 445, and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Company, supra, pages 700-701 of 272 U.S. 47 S. Ct. 284; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74 , 47 S. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U.S. 274, 289 , 48 S. Ct. 507; Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438, 449 , 49 S. Ct. 411."  FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., 281 U.S. 464 (1930)



      1 Stat. 138 was an act to pay debts of the United States & has NOTHING to do with judges.


      An Act making provision for the [payment of the] Debt of the United States .



      That DEFINITION is from the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act & it CLEARLY states that it is for purposes of that act ONLY.




      28 USC 3002. Definitions


      As used in this chapter:


      (15) “ United States ” means—

      (A) a Federal corporation;

      (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States ; or

      (C) an instrumentality of the United States .




      House Joint Resolution 192 had NOTHING to do with any ALLEGED “bankruptcy”, it abolished “gold clauses” & made all COINS & CURRENCY of the United States LEGAL TENDER for the PAYMENT of ALL DEBTS.


      JOINT RESOLUTION To assure uniform value to the coins and currencies of the United States



      Senate Report 93-549 was entitled "War and Emergency Powers Acts" & was a 1973 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TERMINATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY of the UNITED STATES SENATE & as a RESULT the NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT (50 U.S.C. 1601-1651) was enacted in 1976 to end open-ended states of national emergency & limits any such declared emergencies to two years.


      "Since March 9, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national emergency. In fact, there are now in effect four presidentially-proclaimed states of national emergency: In addition to the national emergency declared by President Roosevelt in 1933, there are also the national emergency proclaimed by President Truman on December 16, 1950, during the Korean conflict, and the states of national emergency declared by President Nixon on March 23, 1970, and August 15, 1971.


      These proclamations give force to 470 provisions of Federal law. These hundreds of statutes delegate to the President extraordinary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Congress, which affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing manners. This vast range of powers, taken together, confer enough authority to rule the country without reference to normal Constitutional processes.


      Under the powers delegated by

      (Message over 64 KB, truncated)

    Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.