Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

RE: [tips_and_tricks] Open Fields & No Trespassing Signs

Expand Messages
  • Frog Farmer
    ... We agree that reason, logic, and common sense can overturn even bad supreme court decisions. Most figure it s over when the Fat Ladies sing. So, what do
    Message 1 of 2 , Nov 25, 2010
      Legalbear wrote:

      > I�m looking for where this crazy case gets overturned on the basis of
      > the dissenting opinion at the end.

      We agree that reason, logic, and common sense can overturn even bad
      supreme court decisions. Most figure it's over when the Fat Ladies
      sing. So, what do you think of Paul Andrew Mitchell's evidence that the
      court is not properly set due to massive failure to comply with required
      documentations? I figure it makes all "decisions" not even void, but
      fake, sham, for the audience.

      > If you want privacy in your field,
      > you better figure out a way to turn it into a cartilage <sic> (enclosed
      > area)

      That's curtilage. The other thing is what I need more of in my hip
      joint where I landed on my ass on cement from the garage roof. My back
      broke before the bounce.

      > because no trespassing signs alone didn�t work in this case. The
      > cops went right by even though doing so was a crime in both states.

      Everything now happens whether it's a crime or not. Nobody is doing the
      job anywhere. It is all fake. The real game is and has been OVER, and
      I called it at least three years ago when it became true. The only
      issues now are, what are we pretending, and why? I'm not pretending
      anything for anyone.

      > Frog Farmer would be demanding the cops were prosecuted for criminal
      > trespassing and so would I. Bear

      Yes, but to whom? I would have prosecuted them as they were passing. I
      might then not be here now. We all go sometime, and I'm on multiple
      roll-overs of borrowed time myself. Actually, the last time multiple
      cops showed up here and trespassed, I disqualified them all and told
      them to leave and lived to tell about it. I believe that the IMOC
      (initial moment of confrontation) is where one MUST prosecute his full
      case as if he were going to the supreme court. He must set that court,
      and issue orders to control that court, or he relinquishes it to his
      adversaries. It begins then. If it goes further, then each incident
      makes record as a hearing of one sort or another. People invariably
      waive these hearings by not calling them into existence, as if they need
      prompting or education from their adversaries, or as if they should have
      been offered a menu of possible actions. That menu should be a part of
      normal education, but no law is, so people only learn what their own
      curiosity causes them to learn, and when addled by fluoride and other
      genetic harms, the curiosity level has become painfully low.

      > OLIVER v. UNITED STATES, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 466 U.S. 170 (U.S.
      > 04/17/1984)

      > [44] The first ground on which the Court rests its decision is
      > that the Fourth Amendment "indicates with some precision the places
      > and things encompassed by its protections," and that real property is
      > not included in the list of protected spaces and possessions. Ante, at
      > 176. This line of argument has several flaws. Most obviously, it is
      > inconsistent with the results of many of our previous decisions, none
      > of which the Court purports to overrule.

      But nobody else pointed it out, especially the one who failed initially
      to stop the further advances by the cops without demanding a warrant.

      > For example, neither a public
      > telephone booth nor a conversation conducted therein can fairly be
      > described as a person, house, paper, or effect;*fn1 yet we have held
      > that the Fourth Amendment forbids the police without a warrant to
      > eavesdrop on such a conversation. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
      > (1967). Nor can it plausibly
      > be argued that an office or commercial establishment
      > is covered by the plain language of the Amendment; yet we have held
      > that such premises are entitled to constitutional protection if they
      > are marked in a fashion that alerts the public to the fact that they
      > are private. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978); G.
      > M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358-359 (1977).*fn2

      This guy's alerts should have been verbal, in the IMOC.

      > [45] Indeed, the Court's reading of the plain language of the
      > Fourth Amendment is incapable of explaining even its own holding in
      > this case. The Court rules that the curtilage, a zone of real property
      > surrounding a dwelling, is entitled to constitutional protection.
      > Ante, at 180. We are not told, however, whether the curtilage is a
      > "house" or an "effect" -- or why, if the curtilage can be incorporated
      > into the list of things and spaces shielded by the Amendment, a field
      > cannot.

      People really should study this curtilage issue, because they do allow
      trash collectors and others onto property without individual
      permissions. The curtilage doesn't always include what one might think
      it does.

      > [46] The Court's inability to reconcile its parsimonious
      > reading of the phrase "persons, houses, papers, and effects" with our
      > prior decisions or even its own holding is a symptom of a more
      > fundamental infirmity in the Court's reasoning.

      It's broken, no doubt.

      > [49] The second ground for the Court's decision is its
      > contention that any interest a landowner might have in the privacy of
      > his woods and fields is not one that "society is prepared to recognize
      > as 'reasonable.'" Ante, at 177 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
      > U.S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

      Unless the landowner is Monsanto Corporation, that is.

      > Indeed, the Court has suggested that, insofar as
      > "[one] of the main rights attaching to property is the right to
      > exclude others, . . . one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls
      > property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of
      > privacy by virtue of this right to exclude." Id., at 144, n. 12
      > (opinion of the Court).*fn11

      But when he fails to challenge people in a live IMOC and doesn't act to
      defend his property from intrusion, and instead runs away or hides, he
      waives a right to deal with those people he had a right to treat as
      trespassers, but he made the decision not to do so.

      > [53] It is undisputed that Oliver and Thornton each owned the
      > land into which the police intruded. That fact alone provides
      > considerable support for their assertion of legitimate privacy
      > interests in their woods and fields.

      But he didn't assert it. He waived it in the instant case.

      > But even more telling is the
      > nature of the sanctions that Oliver and Thornton could invoke, under
      > local law, for violation of their property rights.

      Didn't do that either, did they?

      > In Kentucky, a
      > knowing entry upon fenced or otherwise enclosed land, or upon
      > unenclosed land conspicuously posted with signs excluding the public,
      > constitutes criminal trespass. Ky. Rev. Stat. �� 511.070(1), 511.080,
      > 511.090(4) (1975). The law in Maine is similar. An intrusion into "any
      > place from
      > which [the intruder] may lawfully be excluded and
      > which is posted in a manner prescribed by law or in a manner
      > reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or which is
      > fenced or otherwise enclosed" is a crime. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit.
      > 17A, � 402(1)(C) (1964).*fn12 Thus, positive law not only recognizes
      > the legitimacy of Oliver's and Thornton's insistence that strangers
      > keep off their land, but subjects those who refuse to respect their
      > wishes to the most severe of penalties -- criminal liability. Under
      > these circumstances, it is hard to credit the Court's assertion that
      > Oliver's and Thornton's expectations of privacy were not of a sort
      > that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

      Except that he only verbally objected to hunting, and seemed to permit
      them to pass when they assured him they were only police officers and
      not hunters.

      > Privately owned woods and fields that are not exposed
      > to public view regularly are employed in a variety of ways that
      > society acknowledges deserve privacy. Many landowners like to take
      > solitary walks on their property, confident that they will not be
      > confronted in their rambles by strangers or policemen. Others conduct
      > agricultural businesses on their property.*fn14 Some landowners use
      > their secluded spaces to meet lovers, others to gather together with
      > fellow worshippers, still others to engage in sustained creative
      > endeavor. Private land is sometimes used as a refuge for wildlife,
      > where flora and fauna are protected from human intervention of any
      > kind.*fn15 Our respect for the freedom of landowners to use
      > their posted "open fields" in ways such as these
      > partially explains the seriousness with which the positive law regards
      > deliberate invasions of such spaces, see supra, at 190-191, and
      > substantially reinforces the landowners' contention that their
      > expectations of privacy are "reasonable."

      It was admitted that he permitted them to pass and that his signs were
      not posted further on away from the curtilage.

      > [61] In sum, examination of the three principal criteria we
      > have traditionally used for assessing the reasonableness of a person's
      > expectation that a given space would remain private indicates that
      > interests of the sort asserted by Oliver and Thornton are entitled to
      > constitutional protection. An owner's right to insist that others stay
      > off his posted land is firmly grounded in positive law. Many of the
      > uses to which such land may be put deserve privacy. And, by marking
      > the boundaries of the land with warnings that the public should not
      > intrude, the owner has dispelled any ambiguity as to his desires.

      But their warnings were not there, and in the IMOC they let the cops
      pass. The right that would have been protected was waived in real time.

      > [104] *fn19 Indeed, important practical considerations suggest
      > that the police should not be empowered to invade land closed to the
      > public. In many parts of the country, landowners feel entitled to use
      > self-help in expelling trespassers from their posted property. There
      > is thus a serious risk that police officers, making unannounced,
      > warrantless searches of "open fields," will become involved in violent
      > confrontations with irate landowners, with potentially tragic results.
      > Cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460-461 (1948) (Jackson,
      > J., concurring).

      The landowners in this case decided NOT to use self-help in expelling
      the trespassers, not even to the point of making a verbal demand to



      Google: Crash JPMorgan buy silver
    Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.