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Re: Gold & Silver Coin Issue Addressed in Colorado; hmmmm....

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  • Michael
    ... Speak for yourself, John, for those who remember the pilgrims. ... Not sure why the bias is limited to Appeals Court when any court would have sufficed,
    Message 1 of 6 , Oct 27, 2010
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      --- In tips_and_tricks@yahoogroups.com, "Barry" <bear@...> wrote:
      > This post is from Randy Hunt. Bear

      "Speak for yourself, John," for those who remember the pilgrims.

      > You may want to consider this in your thoughts as to
      > why this Appeals Court is biased.

      Not sure why the bias is limited to Appeals Court when
      any court would have sufficed, at least from my experience.

      > Per LANE COUNTY v. OREGON, 74 U.S. 71 (1868) DECEMBER TERM, 1868,
      > the US Supreme Ct. specifically held:

      > 2. The clauses in the several acts of Congress, of 1862 and 1863,
      > making United States notes a legal tender for debts, have no
      > reference to taxes imposed by State authority.

      Of course, back then United States notes were specie-backed,
      so there was no difference.

      > Further expounded in the opinion of the Court:

      > We proceed then to inquire whether, upon a sound construction
      > of the acts, taxes imposed by a State government upon the people
      > of the State, are debts within their true meaning.

      Non sequitur, if properly argued.

      > We are the more ready to adopt this view, because the [Page 80]
      > greatest of English elementary writers upon law, when treating
      > of debts in their various descriptions, gives no hint that taxes
      > come within either;while American State courts, of the highest
      > authority, have refused to treat liabilities for taxes as debts,
      > in the ordinary sense of that word, for which actions of debt
      > may be maintained.

      See above answer.

      > in the first clause[of the acts of Congress of 1862],
      > taxes are plainly distinguished, in enumeration, from
      > debts; and it is not an unreasonable inference, that
      > the word debts in the other clause was not intended to
      > include taxes.

      Handyman addresses this in the Hagar case, re "exactment."
      A levy of a tax is just one side of the coin, as it were.

      > It must be observed that the first clause, which may be
      > called the receivability and payability clause, imposes
      > no restriction whatever upon the States in the collection
      > of taxes. It makes the notes receivable for national taxes,
      > but does not make them receivable for State taxes. On the
      > contrary, the express reference to receivability by the
      > national government, and the omission of all reference to
      > receivability by the State governments, excludes the
      > hypothesis of an intention on the part of Congress to
      > compel the States to receive them as revenue.

      This is a "keep the issue muddled" paragraph.

      > the clause making the United States notes a legal tender
      > for debts has no reference to taxes imposed by State
      > authority, but relates only to debts in the ordinary
      > sense of the word, arising out of simple contracts or
      > contracts by specialty, which include judgments and
      > recognizances.

      Still on the same one side of the coin, here.

      The other side of the coin, be it gold, silver, or even
      Typically, some kind of "value" is determined and then
      expressed as an amount owed. How does your state express
      it? In dollars?

      If so, the question then becomes, "State, WHAT KIND OF
      DOLLARS are you demanding from me?"

      THAT becomes the issue. The money issue, and it opens
      so many doors, but rather than inform the STATE of the
      number of doors, the burden on proof remains on the STATE
      to define exactly what it is it is demanding to be paid
      in taxes assessed.

      This, of course, is in addition to the Hagar "exactment"
      put forth above.

      Now, here is a little tidbit about which I recently learned.
      Title 31, section 742, USED to say,

      "Except as otherwise provided by law, all stocks, bonds,
      treasury notes and OTHER OBLIGATIONS of the United States
      government shall be exempt from state, municipal, and
      local authority. [My emphasis]

      "This exemption extends to every form of taxation that
      would require either the obligations or the interest
      thereon, or both to be considered directly or indirectly
      in the computation of tax."

      The above initial paragrpaph does not contain the same
      wording in the current version of section 742. The
      government, in its unending effort to lie/deceive
      everyone, chose to eliminate certain words, perhaps
      as "unnecessary" [for the goverment's sake] or to
      eliminate "surplus" words.

      However, one can look to Memphis Bank v State of
      Tennessee at Algarn, 459 US 392.

      As I recall, the case may have even said that Title
      31 USC section 742 is the supreme law of the land,
      but that may have been an inference.
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