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Ohio remedy for certified-mailer presentments ...look for similar in other states as they are all similar

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  • dave
    Folks: Here’s a remedy for those in Ohio who inadvertently sign for certified mailers. Slap this on back as a stick-on label and send back: DELIVERY
    Message 1 of 1 , Sep 3, 2009




      Here’s a remedy for those in Ohio who inadvertently sign for certified mailers. Slap this on back as a stick-on label and send back:



      Not a jurisdictional-defendant’s address.

      Mitchell v. Mitchell, 64 Ohio St. 2d 49, 51, 413 N.E.2d 1182, 18 003d 254 (1980).

      Cook dissenting ¶20 State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833








      1.       Government courts in Ohio mistake proof of delivery for service--justified of course by their courts. [aka It matters not to these smucks if Cousin Billy signs and throws it away.]

      2.       Ohio Civ rules say service is ok as long as it is not returned with a delivery endorsement.

      3.       Might as well state what is true per Rivera’s material….not within jurisdiction.


      This is what courts cite to support and NOTICE the presumptions:


      "Certified mail service ... is valid where the envelope containing the documents to be served is delivered to a person other than the defendant at the defendant's address."Mitchell v. Mitchell, 64 Ohio St. 2d 49, 51, 413 N.E.2d 1182, 18 003d 254 (1980).


       Notice the [rebuttable] presumptions these “lawyers” make thru the courts:

      ·         That delivery equals service.

      ·         That you are a defendant.

      ·         That to be a defendant you must have been in all 3 aspects of jurisdiction.

      ·         That it is an address of a defendant.

      ·         That you granted agency for someone to sign for you.


      Now combine with this…and you can see why the label says VOID:


      [Cite as State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833.]

      [Cite as Cook dissenting ¶20 State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833.]


      COOK, J., dissenting.
      {¶20} Today's majority concludes that "[t]he three-judge-panel
      requirement of R.C. 2945.06 is a jurisdictional matter that cannot be waived." In
      so holding, the majority has necessarily decided that the trial court lacked subject
      matter jurisdiction over Parker's trial. See, e.g., Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35
      Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941, paragraph three of the syllabus ("A judgment
      rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void ab initio"); State v.
      Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 46, 652 N.E.2d 196 (noting that subject matter
      jurisdiction "cannot be waived"). Because the majority confuses the want of
      subject matter jurisdiction (which is never waived) with defects in the court's
      exercise of jurisdiction (which are waivable), I respectfully dissent.
      {¶21} Of the various appellate cases that have analyzed the three-judge-
      panel requirement, I find the Ninth District Court of Appeals' discussion in State
      v. Swiger (1998), 125 Ohio App.3d 456, 708 N.E.2d 1033, to be the most
      instructive. In that case, Michael Swiger, who was tried for capital offenses

      before a single judge but ultimately convicted of noncapital crimes, sought
      postconviction relief asserting that his convictions were void. Like Parker in this
      case, Swiger waived his right to a jury trial and also waived his statutory
      entitlement to a three-judge panel. Nevertheless, Swiger argued that R.C. 2945.06
      divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to try him absent the three-
      judge panel.
      {¶22} In rejecting Swiger's challenge, the court of appeals refused to
      equate the lack of a three-judge panel with a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
      Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Dickinson correctly recognized that the
      term "jurisdiction" encompasses at least three distinct concepts: (1) subject matter
      jurisdiction, (2) jurisdiction over the person, and (3) jurisdiction over the
      particular case. Id. at 462, 708 N.E.2d 1033. "The third category of jurisdiction
      encompasses the trial court's authority to determine a specific case within that
      class of cases that is within its subject matter jurisdiction. It is only when the trial
      court lacks subject matter jurisdiction that its judgment is void; lack of
      jurisdiction over the particular case merely renders the judgment voidable."
      (Citation omitted.) Id. See, also, Browning v. Walters (Ind.App.1993), 620
      N.E.2d 28, 31; In re Waite (1991), 188 Mich.App. 189, 199-200, 468 N.W.2d
      912; Morrison v. Bestler (1990), 239 Va. 166, 169, 387 S.E.2d 753.
      {¶23} With these distinctions in mind, the Swiger court carefully
      analyzed which category of jurisdiction encompassed R.C. 2945.06's requirement
      that a three-judge panel preside over cases involving capital offenses. As a
      fundamental matter, an Ohio court of common pleas "has original jurisdiction
      over all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive
      jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas."
      R.C. 2931.03. Given this unquestioned and unambiguous statutory grant of
      subject matter jurisdiction over serious offenses, Judge Dickinson reasoned that
      the three-judge panel required by R.C. 2945.06 could be nothing other than "a

      January Term, 2002
      procedural protection that, even if arguably `jurisdictional,' falls within [the] third
      category of jurisdiction." Swiger, 125 Ohio App.3d at 463, 708 N.E.2d 1033.
      Thus, the Swiger court concluded that the "[d]efendant's conviction may have
      been voidable, but it was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at
      465, 708 N.E.2d 1033; cf. Commonwealth v. Smith (1985), 230 Va. 354, 361, 337
      S.E.2d 278 (holding that the court of appeals was not divested of subject matter
      jurisdiction when a single judge, instead of the three-judge panel required by
      statute, decided the merits of a cause).
      {¶24} Swiger's persuasive analysis should dictate the outcome of this
      case. Not only does it accurately differentiate between the different jurisdictional
      categories, it is also consistent with this court's implicit recognition that the term
      "jurisdictional" does not always mean subject matter jurisdiction. See State v.
      Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 333, 658 N.E.2d 766. In Pless, this court reversed a
      capital conviction based on the absence in the record of a written jury-trial waiver
      as required by R.C. 2945.05. The Pless majority held that "a trial court lacks
      jurisdiction to try the defendant without a jury" absent strict compliance with R.C.
      2945.05. (Emphasis added.) Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. In the very
      same case, however, the majority also held that "[t]he failure to comply with R.C.
      2945.05 may be remedied only in a direct appeal from a criminal conviction."
      (Emphasis added.) Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. As Judge Dickinson
      keenly observed in Swiger, these two paragraphs are subject to only one
      {¶25} "If the `jurisdiction' to which the [Pless] court referred were
      subject matter jurisdiction, by its very nature, it would be open to challenge at any
      time. By holding that this defect in the trial court's `jurisdiction' can be waived if
      not timely raised, the Supreme Court was apparently referring to something other
      than subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, it recognized this type of
      `jurisdiction' in a situation [i.e., written waiver of a jury trial] analogous to

      defendant's waiver of a three-judge panel." Swiger, 125 Ohio App.3d at 465, 708
      N.E.2d 1033.
      {¶26} In light of the foregoing, I would hold that the trial court's failure
      to convene a three-judge panel in this case was not a defect that deprived the court
      of subject matter jurisdiction. Parker was charged with criminal offenses over
      which the court of common pleas had unquestioned subject matter jurisdiction;
      thus, "[a]ny subsequent error in the proceedings [was] only error in the `exercise


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