Re: Cracking-the-Code's Peter Hendrickson indicted
In the following I will present excerpts from our Complaint, Motion to Unseal and Disclosure Statement in my attempt to try to explain how others such as Peter Hendrickson can also benefit from our suit which is brought in part against the IRS for exceeding it's authority in accordance with Congress' Article 4 § 3(2) legislative jurisdiction. All of the Court Documents are now online at http://www.greenes.us/civildocket.html and we are praying that other will Please Donate to help us as we attempt to move this case forward.
That being said, myself (William M. Greene) and my wife (Karen M. Greene) have filed our Qui Tam Action (CASE NO. 08-cv-0280_LEK/DRH) Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1001, 1031, 1341, 1344(2), 1346, 1581, 1621, 1622, 2113 & 3231, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1994. And further, I would hope that others such as Peter Hendrickson will choose to sign onto our suit in the near future and seek the provisions of Injunctive Relief we have built into the suit. For example, paragraph #15, a and e of our Complaint, Paragraph # 9 from our Motion to Unseal, and Paragraphs #14, #15 and #17 of our Disclosure Statement are provided herewith to help explain my statement herein.
Paragraph #15, a and e of our Complaint reads as follows:
15. Due to the on-going nature and extent of the irreparable harm to Plaintiffs caused by the IRS's intentional obstruction of justice and unlawful abridgement of certain Inalienable Rights, including the ongoing siege, harassment, and intimidating activities, involved with recent Summons served on Plaintiffs Employer, Notice of Levies unlawfully served on two of the Plaintiffs Banks, and Notice of Levies served on Plaintiffs Employer and other interferences with Plaintiffs' Constitutional Right of Contract (which has effectively put them out of work) and Freedoms of Association and Religion, Injunctive Relief to protect against the irreparable harm is being respectfully requested, granting Plaintiffs the temporary relief requested in their Complaint, or alternatively move this Honorable Court for an entry of an Order:
a) temporarily and preliminarily enjoining all ultra vires (without bona fide authority) administrative actions, and prohibiting the IRS from acting under color of the IRC in attempting to force Plaintiffs as ordinary Americans to file and pay an un-apportioned, direct tax on their salaries, wages and compensation; and
e) temporarily and preliminarily enjoining and prohibiting the IRS and any other real agency of the United States that arguably may act in this matter under color of the IRC, from advancing any and all administrative, civil and criminal proceedings against Plaintiffs, including the sharing of information and/or cooperation with state taxing authorities, until the underlying questions of Fraud and alleged violations of Plaintiffs Constitutional rights, including Plaintiffs' Christian Religious Belief Systems, now before this Court are finally determined; and [more].
Paragraph # 9 from our Motion to Unseal reads as follows:
9. The main purpose of the motion to unseal is to allow for joiners, because although we as the initial Plaintiffs have claimed the status of "representatives of the public interest" in addition to our status as Plaintiffs, the suit itself is also written with the expectation that other People will sign on to it as additional Plaintiffs, and by common consent, the Plaintiffs may be expected to choose a "private attorney general" from among themselves or act individually as "private attorney generals" such that, We, The People, have standing in this action if the US Attorney(s) and Department of Justice does not have the inclination or time to prosecute the Named Accused "Government Contractor (the IRS)."
Also, Paragraphs #14, #15 and #17 read this way:
14. The history of Qui Tam Actions expressly authorizing suits can be understood as being rooted in America's history of informer statutes either providing financial incentive or a combination of financial incentive and an express cause of action, leaves no room for doubt that those who bring a Qui Tam Action under the False Claims Act, 31 USC § 3729 et seq. have Article III standing, especially when the question of whether the underlying factors in whole or in part giving rise to this Qui Tam Action are not taken to a level in which the question of a violation of Article II of the Constitution (in particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and the "take care" and "commission" Clauses of § 3) are not being presented by the qui tam Plaintiffs, because, in this particular instance, although there are no implementing regulations for 26 USC 7621 which authorizes the President to establish revenue districts within the States of the Union whereby one might thereafter understand such revenue districts within the 50 States of the Union, this suit is not brought against the US Government nor any Federal Government Employee who may or may not be appointed but rather it is that because the Act of July 1, 1862 was repealed by the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1873, the taxing authority of the Trust listed at 31 USC § 1321(a)(2) is and has always been limited in terms of and in accordance with Congress' Article 4 § 3(2) legislative jurisdiction; that is, the nation's federal district(s) relative to the insular possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia.
15. The Named Accused "Government Contractor (the IRS)" is the Trust listed at 31 USC § 1321(a)(2) which thereinafter went by the name of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and which was later changed to the Internal Revenue Service by President Eisenhower in 1953 which was reflected in Treasury Order 150-06, July 9, 1953, as the only authoritative document under which the pure Trust listed at 31 USC § 1321(a)(2) and thereinafter called the Bureau of Internal Revenue was changed to the Internal Revenue Service, thereby creating the illusion of the IRS being an actual agency of the Department of the Treasury with all regulations, mimeographs, forms, and other Internal Revenue and Treasury documents amended to conform to Treasury Order 150-06, the fact still remains that the authority for the Trust listed at 31 USC § 1321(a)(2) and the Office of the Commissioner (and associated acts) was repealed by the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1873 and research on Title 31 of the US Code, as currently published by the US Government, reflecting the laws passed by Congress as of January 2, 2006, for the codification and "classification" to corresponding US Code sections contained in Subchapter I-Organization, from Jananuary 2, 2006 to the most recent entry on Tuesday, February 19, 2008, shows that although 31 USC § 301(f)(2) is a reference authorizing the President to appoint an Assistant General Counsel in the U.S. Department of the Treasury to be the Chief Counsel for the IRS, the IRS itself is not even listed as an organization within meaning of Title 31 > Subtitle I > Chapter 3 > Subchapter I-Organization which explicitly lists the organizational structure of the United States Department of the Treasury, such that qui tam Plaintiffs are not only inclined to believe that consideration of the legal basis of a judgment is not necessarily at odds with the statement that these " kind[s] of proceeding[s] are reserved for those who actually and in good faith have contributed something to the enforcement of the law and the protection of the United States" (United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, (1943)) but also believe that it is the duty of U.S. Attorney and the Justice Department to intervene in this Qui Tam Action which the qui tam Plaintiffs have brought to the District Court, because even if the District Courts are but Article II Courts authorized to hear claims that arise under Article III of the Constitution, the fact remains that under the Constitution this is all we have in terms of the original plan to utilize all three aspects of our Government function (e.g., with Article III Courts) by keeping the other two in check when a significant fraud upon our own Government and We, the People is identified.
17. The Trust listed at 31 USC § 1321(a)(2) does not qualify as either an instrumentality (as defined in 28 USC § 3002(c)) nor Agency (as defined in 28 USC § 451) of the Government as required by Article I § 8(18) of the Constitution of the United States, and the fact that Title 31 of the US Code, as currently published by the US Government, which reflects the laws passed by Congress as of January 2, 2006, for the codification and "classification" to corresponding US Code sections contained in SUBCHAPTER IORGANIZATION, from January 2, 2006 to the most recent entry on Tuesday, February 19, 2008, shows that the IRS itself is not even listed as an organization within the meaning of Title 31 > Subtitle I > Chapter 3 > Subchapter I--Organization which explicitly lists the organizational structure of the United States Department of the Treasury, and revels that the subject of the Internal Revenue Service as a Department of the Treasury is notably absent, excepting of course that § 301(f)(2) provides information as to the authority of the President to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, an Assistant General Counsel who shall be the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service, as well as that 26 USC (US Code) itself is merely prima facie (meaning that unless rebutted would be sufficient to prove a particular proposition or fact) evidence of the laws contained in that Title, may well be a part of the reason(s) why the Government Contractor (the IRS) has failed to address 26 USC § 331 (a) in terms of the fact that the commencement of an action for a lien and levy under 26 USC § 6320 (c) and § 6330 (d) is supposed to begin in the process of filing a petition with the Court, but the fact that the authority to establish the United States Tax Court as an Article I Court is derived from the amendment made by section § 951 addressing the Tax liability of Controlled Foreign Corporations in terms of the Amounts included in gross income of United States shareholders itself is again offset by the fact 26 USC (US Code) is merely prima facie (meaning that unless rebutted would be sufficient to prove a particular proposition or fact) evidence of the laws contained in that Title is offset by the fact that, as indicated within the context 28 USC § 451 of Reference Notes (See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559) indicates that all of the provisions of Section 451 which related to the Tax Court were eliminated by Senate amendment:
Senate Revision Amendment
Those provisions of this section which related to the Tax Court were eliminated by Senate amendment. See 80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559
 See, Act for the Restraining and Punishing of Privateers and Pirates, 1st Assembly, 4th Sess. (N. Y. 1692), reprinted in 1 Colonial Laws of New York 279, 281 (1894).
 See, Act of May 31, 1790 , ch. 15, §2, 1 Stat. 124125; cf. Act of Mar. 1, 1790 , ch. 2, §6, 1 Stat. 103; Act of July 5, 1790 , ch. 25, §1, 1 Stat. 129.
 See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §29, 1 Stat. 4445; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §55, 1 Stat. 173; Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §38, 1 Stat. 48 (giving informer quarter of penalties, fines, and forfeitures authorized under a customs law); Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, §21, 1 Stat. 60 (same under a maritime law); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §69, 1 Stat. 177 (same under another customs law); Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, §8, 1 Stat. 67 (providing informer half of penalty upon conviction for violation of conflict-of-interest and bribery provisions in Act establishing Treasury Department); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 8, §1, 1 Stat. 215 (extending same to additional Treasury employees); Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, §§8, 9, 1 Stat. 195196 (providing informer half or fifth of fines resulting from improper trading or lending by agents of Bank of United States); cf. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §4, 1 Stat. 153 (apportioning half of penalty for failing to deposit ship manifest to official who should have received manifest, and half to collector in port of destination).
 See Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, §3, 1 Stat. 102 (allowing informer to sue for, and receive half of fine for, failure to file census return); Act of July 5, 1790, ch. 25, §1, 1 Stat. 129 (extending same to Rhode Island); Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, §§1, 4, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (allowing private individual to sue for, and receive half of fine for, carriage of seamen without contract or illegal harboring of runaway seamen); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, §3, 1 Stat. 137138 (allowing private individual to sue for, and receive half of goods forfeited for, unlicensed trading with Indian tribes); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §44, 1 Stat. 209 (allowing person who discovers violation of spirits duties, or officer who seizes contraband spirits, to sue for and receive half of penalty and forfeiture, along with costs, in action of debt); cf. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§16, 17, 1 Stat. 116 (allowing informer to conduct prosecution, and receive half of fine, for criminal larceny or receipt of stolen goods).
 The same would be true if qui tam Plaintiffs had mistakenly brought suit against the similar Trust (Internal Revenue) listed at 31 USC § 1321(a)(62) which is simply extension of existing Taxing Powers to Puerto Rico as another of the United States' possessions since 1898, becoming a commonwealth in 1952.
 In addition to references to Congress having created another Supreme Court in DC on March 3, 1863 (1877 Bouvier's Law Dictionary), Plaintiffs have gone to a considerable effort to understand the reference to the Article III Court, and the provision of the Constitution applying to it, Plaintiffs have looked to both phrases (i.e., "United States District Court" and "District Court of the United States") which for all intents and purposes appears to Plaintiffs, not having been formally trained in law, as interchangeable (see 7 USC §7468), as well as to having looked to the U.S. Supreme Court Case, American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511 (1828) (in which Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: "These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States. Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the states in those Courts, only, which are established in pursuance of the 3d article of the Constitution; the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government."), yet, being untrained in law Plaintiffs believe this initial research to lack any real substance because after all is said and done things are as they are, except as it might relate to the initial outcomes and a furtherance of this case in terms of additional documentation and substantive due process or should the case go into appeal.