It is already clear that Grandparents are deemed authorized to
intervene in a Juvenile Dependency Action. Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz.
68, 722 P.2d 236 (1986). It is not necessary that a intervenor be as
close as a Grandparent in order to have standing to intervene. The
factors to be considered in granting intervention do not require that
the intervenor be a blood relative. ADES v. Superior Court, (Real
Parties: Alagna), 1 CA-SA 92-0029, ___ Ariz. ___, ____ P.2d ____ App.
In Alagna, id., ADES asserted that eligibility for placement pursuant
to ARS 8-241(A)(g) did not form a basis for intervention standing.
The Court of appeals disagreed with that ADES assertion. The Alagna
Special Action Court cited Bechtel, id., as follows:
"It is well settled in Arizona that Rule 24 `is remedial and should
be liberally construed with the view of assisting parties in
obtaining justice and protecting their rights.' Mitchell v. City of
Nogales, 83 Ariz. 328, 333, 320 P.2d 955 (1958). Under this liberal
standard, the `intervenor-by-permission does not even have to be a
person who would have been a proper party at the beginning of the
suit..... ' Usery v. Brandel, 87 F.R.D. 670, 677 (W.D. Mich. 1980),
citing 7A C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
Section 1911, at 539. When determining whether permissive
intervention should be granted, the trial court must first decide
whether the statutory conditions promulgated in rule 24(b)(1) or
24(b)(2) have been satisfied, then the trial court may consider other
factors in making its decision.:
`These relevant factors include the nature and extent of the
intervenors' interest, their standing to raise relevant legal issues,
the legal position they seek to advance, and its probable relation to
the merits of the case. The court may also consider whether changes
have occurred in the litigation so that intervention that was once
denied should be reexamined, whether the intervenors' interests are
adequately represented by the other parties, whether intervention
will prolong or unduly delay the litigation, and whether parties
seeking intervention will significantly contribute to full
development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and to the
just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented."
`Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Education, 552 F.2d at 1329
(footnotes omitted)" Bechtel. v. Rose, 150 Ariz. at 72, 722 P.2d 236
(1986), cited at ADES v. Superior Court, (Real Parties: Alagna), id.,
slip opinion page 5-6.
"1. It (the Court) may award a dependent child:
(a) To the care of his parents, subject to the supervision of the
state department of economic security.
(b) To a suitable institution.
(c) To an association willing to receive him.
(d) To a reputable citizen of good moral character
(e) To an appropriate public or private agency licensed to care for
(f) To a suitable school.
(g) To maternal or paternal relatives, as guardian of the person,
provided they are physically and financially able to provide proper
(h) To the protective supervision of a probation department subject
to such conditions as the court may impose.
(i) To supervision of a probation department subject to such
conditions as the court may impose." ARS 8-241(A) (emphasis supplied)
The bonds formed in early childhood are often critical, and their
breakage is often disastrous to the child's later development.
McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F.Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa., 1988), affirmed
876 F.2d 308 (3rd. Cir. 1989), a case in which the State of
Pennsylvania removed a black child from a white foster family to
which he had become emotionally bonded, solely on the basis of race.
The child suffered substantial mental and behavioral problems as a
result. The District Court found, and the Third Circuit affirmed,
that the child had a right to be placed with the white foster family,
which long after his removal he still regarded as his true parents.
"2. Any foster parents in whose home the child resided within the
last six months or resides at present, except for those foster
parents who maintain a receiving foster home" ARS 8-515(D)(2) eff,
...... to "participate" in the following manner:
"F. A person who is listed in subsection D of this section may attend
a court review proceeding, may address the court in person or in
writing, and may review all pleadings and the caseworker's report
presented to the court for the purpose of the review proceeding. The
person may be accompanied by an attorney. The court may restrict or
expand a person's right to participate if it finds that this
restriction or expansion is in the best interests of the child." ARS
8-515(F) eff, 9/30/92.
FERPA: Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20
U.S.C.A. Sections 1232 (a,h,i); as cited in ARS 15-141(A).
Stepfather entitled to reimbursement from natural father for cost of
supporting child: Anonymous v. Anonymous, 153 Ariz. 573, 739 P.2d 794
Only the Court has the right to appoint an attorney or a GAL for a
minor child. Pintek v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 179, 277 P.2d 265
" `The Court: And Mr. Ross, will you indicate your relationship in
`Mr. Ross: I am representing the minor children of the deceased.
`The Court: The minors or the guardian for the minors?
`Mr. Ross: No. I represent the children themselves.
`The Court: By what authority?
`Mr. Ross: By authority of the guardian who has asked me to represent
`The Court: In other words, you are representing the guardian?
`Mr. Ross: No, I am not representing the guardian; I represent the
children at the request of the guardian, your Honor. It might show up
if there is anything wrong here that I am representing Mr. Pintek.
`Mr. Brown: According to the petition, the interests of the guardian
and the children might be at odds. I represent the guardian and Mr.
Ross represents the children.
`The Court: That is a novel theory. I must admit I can't understand
how you can represent to the Court, Mr. Ross, that you are
representing the children and may be opposed to the interests of the
guardian when the guardian appoints you, designates you to represent
the children. I believe it is up to the Court, if anybody, to
designate counsel for children rather than the guardian under the
circumstances of this case.'
".... In the instant case, the minors involved had a general
guardian of both their persons and their estates, not being sui juris
in their own persons they had no right to appear by an attorney of
their own choosing without first having obtained an order of the
court appointing a next friend or guardian ad litem to act in their
behalf. Judge Farley was therefore manifestly correct in challenging
the authority of Attorney John W. Ross to appear for said minors...."
Pintek v. Superior Court, id. at 78 Ariz. 182-184.
The more recent DR action should be merged into the earlier-filed DR
"(a) that where courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the first court
to assume jurisdiction retains it, and it is immaterial that the
parties are reversed in the two actions;
"(b) the pendency of a prior action between the same parties for the
same cause in a state court of competent jurisdiction gives grounds
for the abatement of a subsequent action either in the same court or
in another court of the state having like jurisdiction;
"(c) that the true test for determining whether parties and causes of
action are the same for purposes of abatement, by reason of pendency
of a prior action, ordinarily is, whether the two actions present a
substantial identity as to parties, subject matter, issues involved
and relief demanded."
Davies v. Russell, 84 Ariz. 144, 325 P.2d 402 (1958), cited in Allen
v. Superior Court, 86 Ariz. 205, 344 P.2d 163 (1959)
Such security contemplates only costs, not prospective attorney fees.
Sweis v. Chatwin, 120 Ariz. 249, 585 P.2d 269 (App. 1978). Compare
this to Cost Bonds on Appeal, which are nominally $500, absent
extraordinary proof of costs.
The movant made no motion for security until after one trial of this
cause in which an order was made; he should be deemed to have waived
any Rule 67(d) right to same. Miami Copper Co. v. Strohl, 14 Ariz.
410, 130 P. 605 (1913).
A parent may be Ordered to reimburse a non-parent for actual incurred
child-necessary costs. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 153 Ariz. 573, 739
P.2d 794 (1987).
The Domestic Relations court lacks jurisdiction to award custody,
visitation, or to make other orders pertaining to the minor child
because of the superior jurisdictional power of the Juvenile Court.
ARS 8-202(A,D,E). Blevins v. Superior Court, 19 Ariz. App. 314, 506
P.2d 1099 (1973); Mena v. Mena, 14 Ariz. App. 357, 483 P.2d 589
(1971); McClendon v. Superior Court, 6 Ariz. App. 497, 433 P.2d 989
(1967). Further, a Probate or Domestic Relations Court is without
jurisdiction to proceed while a Juvenile Dependency action is
pending. Charboneau v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 586, 422 P.2d 702
Re: the so-called "emergency exception" clause of the UCCJA:
"(c) the child is physically present in this state and (i) the child
has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect
the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent."
(R.C.W. 26.27.30, equivalent to ARS 8-403(A)(3)).
The "emergency" clause (R.C.W. 26.27.30, equivalent to ARS 8-
403(A)(3)) cannot be used to thwart the existing jurisdiction of a
state (Arizona) which is already exercising its exclusive
jurisdiction. At most, the Washington court could have granted
emergency temporary orders and directed Respondent herein to seek
permanent orders in the state having exclusive child custody
jurisdiction, Arizona. Iacouzze v. Iacouzze, 137 Ariz. 605, 673 P.2d.
949 (App. 1983). Ferriera v. Ferriera, 3 Cal. 3d 824, 512 P.2d 304,
109 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1973); Schlumpf v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. App. 3d
892, 145 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1978); Brock v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11
Washington State could be argued (although neither party does so) to
have had concurrent in rem jurisdiction over the marriage itself, by
virtue of Respondent/Wife's having after a time established residence
there. It never had any other jurisdiction; that is, it had no in
personam jurisdiction over Petitioner/Father herein, it had no in rem
jurisdiction over property outside the State of Washington, it had no
subject matter jurisdiction over the custody of the minor child. This
Court may, if it chooses, to avoid the inconvenience to the parties
of deeming them presently married by virtue of the defects in the
Washington decree, grant full faith and credit to only the portion of
the Washington Decree which terminates the marriage through in rem
jurisdiction. A divorce decree of a sister state does not deprive the
Arizona court of jurisdiction of matters that could not have been
properly adjudicated in the sister state. Robayo v. Robayo, 3 Ariz.
App. 519, 416 P.2d 198 (App. 1966); White v. White, 83 Ariz. 305, 320
P.2d 702 (1958).
Blush, Gordon J., and Ross, Karol: Sexual Allegations in Divorce, the
SAID Syndrome, Conciliation Courts Review Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 1-11,
Blush, Gordon J., and Ross, Karol: Sexual Abuse Validity
Discriminators in the Divorced or Divorcing Family, Issues in Child
Abuse Accusations, Inst. of Psych. Therapies Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 1-6
Besharov, D., Unfounded Allegations - a new Child Abuse problem, The
Public Interest 83, 18-33 (1986)
Coleman, L. M.D., False Allegations of child sexual abuse: Have the
experts been caught with their pants down? Forum, pp.12-21, Jan-Feb
Gardner, Richard A. M.D., The Parental Alienation Syndrome, Creative
Therapeutics, 1992 ISBN 0-933812-24-8, Lib.Cong. 91-47859
Gardner, Richard A. M.D., Sex Abuse Hysteria, Salem Witch Trials
Revisited, Creative Therapeutics, 1991 ISBN 0-933812-22-1, Lib. Cong.
Gardner, Richard A. M.D., True and False Accusations of Child Sex
Abuse: A Guide for Legal and Mental Health Professionals, Creative
Therapeutics, (September 1992)
(END OF PART C - TO BE CONTINUED IN PART D)