Re: Male Bovine Feces
Maybe Larry & others should consider the POSSIBILITY that in many cases THE “persons” being referred to in many instances MAY actually be a “juristic person” (a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of law” AND/OR “the United States , any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States ” AND/OR “any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity” ) AND/OR “manufacturers, industrialists, merchants, agriculturists, and others to identify their businesses, vocations, or occupations; the names or titles lawfully adopted and used by persons, firms, associations, corporations, companies, unions, and any manufacturing, industrial, commercial, agricultural, or other organizations engaged in trade or commerce and capable of suing and being sued in a court of law” using a “trade name” or a “commercial name”?
15 USC 1127 states in part:
The word “commerce” means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.
The term “person” and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic person as well as a natural person. The term “juristic person” includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of law.
The term “person” also includes the United States , any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States . The United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, and any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
The term “person” also includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
Pub. L. 100–667, § 134(2), amended par. defining “trade name” and “commercial name” generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as follows: “The terms ‘trade name’ and ‘commercial name’ include individual names and surnames, firm names and trade names used by manufacturers, industrialists, merchants, agriculturists, and others to identify their businesses, vocations, or occupations; the names or titles lawfully adopted and used by persons, firms, associations, corporations, companies, unions, and any manufacturing, industrial, commercial, agricultural, or other organizations engaged in trade or commerce and capable of suing and being sued in a court of law.”
After all, there is a HUGE DIFFERENCE in dealing with PEOPLE who have INALIENABLE RIGHTS & “persons” who have LEGISLATIVELY granted PRIVILEGES, isn’t there?
"The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to [201 U.S. 43, 75] act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation." HALE v. HENKEL, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)
For example, given the DEFINITION of “person” used in the various California CODES, DOESN’T that indicate that they were CODIFIED from PUBLIC statutes and deal with “public rights” (i.e. legislatively granted PRIVILEGES) RATHER than the People’s PRIVATE [Creator]-GIVEN RIGHTS?
VEHICLE CODE 470. "Person" includes a natural person, firm, copartnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURES 1898. Statutes are public or private. A private statute is one which concerns only certain designated individuals, and affects only their private rights. All other statutes are public, in which are included statutes creating or affecting corporations.
Given the number of both STATE & FEDERAL laws that can be demonstrated to be based on COMMERCE, COULDN’T that be a REAL POSSIBILITY?
Take the AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT for example.
"As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, empowers Congress to: (1) regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce;" and (3) regulate or prohibit "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30. "Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained." Id. at 1630 (citations omitted)." UNITED STATES' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT in Lancaster V. City of Mobile , Alamaba
Or the LICENSING & REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS of the VEHICLE CODES & many (if NOT all of their provisions).
An act to impose a license fee for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation upon public streets, roadways and highways in the State of California by motor vehicle; to provide for certain exemptions; to provide for the enforcement of the provisions thereof and for the disposition of the amounts collected on account of such licenses; to make an appropriation for the purpose of this act; and to repeal all acts or parts of acts in conflict herewith.
[ Approved b y the Governor May 28, 1925. ]
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
Section 1. The words and phrases used in this act shall for the purposes of this act, unless the same be contrary to or inconsistent with the context, be construed as follows:
69. The phrase “railroad commission certificate” shall be construed to mean a certificate of public convenience and necessity granted or issued by the railroad commission of the State of California, authorizing a common carrier by motor vehicle to operate under the conditions prescribed by said commission, and shall include all amendments to or changes in such certificate which may be made by said commission.
( b ) The wo rd “operator” shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any pu b lic highway in this state and there b y engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, but shall not include any person, firm, association or corporation who solely transports b y motor vehicle persons to and from or to or from attendance upon any pu b lic school or who solely transports his or its own property, or employees, or b oth, and who transports no persons or property for hire or compensation, b ut all persons operating freight carrying so exempted shall b e required to o b tain from the state b oa rd of equalization and to display exempt em b lems in the manner herein provided.
© The term “registration certificate” shall include any and all certificates of registration of a motor vehicle issued b y the division of motor vehicles of the department of finance of the State of California, or b y any governmental b ody within said state under which the laws of the said state may have power or authority to register and certify to the registration of a motor vehicle for operation within said state.
(d) The wo rd “motor vehicle” shall mean and include all vehicles, automo b iles, trucks or trailers operated upon or over pu b lic highways of this state whether the same b e propelled or operated b y steam or electricity, or propelled or operated b y com b ustion of gasoline, distillate or other volatile and inflamma b le fuels.
STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1925, CHAPTER 412, pages 833-834
“An act to esta b lish a Vehicle Code, there b y consolidating and revising the law relating to vehicles and vehicular traffic, and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts specified herein.” STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1935, VEHICLE CODE, Chapter 27, page 93.
2. Continuation of Existing Law. The provisions of this code, in so far as they are su b stantially the same as the existing provisions relating to the same su b ject matter, shall b e construed as restatements and continuations thereof and not as new enactments. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1935, VEHICLE CODE, Chapter 27, page 94.
34. “Commercial Vehicle”. A “commercial vehicle” is a vehicle of a type required to be registered hereunder designed, used or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation or profit or designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1935, VEHICLE CODE, Chapter 27, page 94.
70. “Operator.” “Operator” is a person, other than a chauffeur, who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1935, VEHICLE CODE, Chapter 27, page 98.
71. “Chauffeur.” “Chauffeur” is a person who is employed b y another for the principal purpose of driving a motor vehicle on the highways and receives compensation herefore. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1935, VEHICLE CODE, Chapter 27, page 98.
9603. “Operator” includes:
(a) Any person engaging in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation b y or upon a motor vehicle upon any pu b lic highway in this State, either directly or indirectly.
( b ) Any person who furnishes any motor vehicle for the transportation of persons or property under a lease or rental agreement when pursuant to the terms thereof the person operates the motor vehicle furnished or exercises any control of, or assumes any responsi b ility for, or engages either in whole or in part in, the transportation of persons or property in the motor vehicle furnished.
“Operator” does not include any of the following:
(a) Any person transporting his own property in a motor vehicle owned or operated b y him unless he makes a specific charge for the transportation. This su b division does not in any way limit any other exemption granted b y this section.
( b ) Any farmer . . .
(c) Any nonprofit . . .
(d) Any person . . transports . . school . .
(e) Any person . . . hearse . . .
(f) Any registered owner of a pleasure vehicle who, while operating the vehicle, transports persons to his work, or to a place through which he passes on the way to his work, whether for or without compensation, if he is not in the b usiness of furnishing such transportation. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1941, REVENUE & TAXATION CODE, Chapter 39, pg 590
9605. “Motor vehicle” includes any automo b ile, truck, tractor, or other self-propelled vehicle used for the transportation of persons or property upon the pu b lic highways, otherwise than upon fixed rails or tracks, and any trailer, semi-trailer, dolly, or other vehicle drawn there b y, not exempt from registration fees under the laws of this State. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1941, REVENUE & TAXATION CODE, Chapter 39, pg 591
9726. After o b taining the required license the operator shall o b tain from the department num b er plates or em b lems for each motor vehicle operated b y him indicating, in such manner as the department may determine, that the license has b een o b tained. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1941, REVENUE & TAXATION CODE, Chapter 39, pg 593.
69. The number plates or emblems shall be attached to and conspicuously displayed upon each of the motor vehicles authorized to be operated by the license in such manner as the department may require. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1941, REVENUE & TAXATION CODE, Chapter 39, pg 593.
10751. A license fee is here b y imposed for the privilege of operating upon the pu b lic highways in this State any vehicle of a type su b ject to registration under the Vehicle Code. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1941, REVENUE & TAXATION CODE, Chapter 40, pg. 605
69.1. “Driver’s License.” “Driver’s License” includes both an operator’s license and a chauffeur’s license. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1956 AND 1957, VEHICLE CODE, Chapter 482, Page 1514.
“We conclude that the lower court’s construction of Vehicle Code section 260 more reasonably conforms to the legislative intent and that the term “for hire” modifies the word “transportation,” so that a commercial vehicle is one in which persons or property are transported for hire. Thus, “commercial vehicles” are of two types: (1) those put to the use of transporting persons for hire, and (2) those designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property. In other words, vehicles used for the traditional purposes of public livery or conveyance, such as buses, taxicabs or other vehicles functioning as common carriers or otherwise, operate for a profit.” Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Carrier Ins. Co. (1975), 45 Cal.App.3d 223
“§ 104. Power of the state to license and tax use of automobiles. The state has the power to license as a means of regulation all business and employments which impose a burden on the public, or when the public interests or welfare require that the business or occupation should be regulated.24
The licensing of automobiles is a valid exercise of the police power,25 and is unaffected by the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution.26 Such law is not in violation of the Federal constitution because it “infringes on the constitutional rights of a class of citizens by denying to the owners of automobiles within the state the equal protection of the law.”27
“That a reasonable fee may be imposed as an incident to the exercise of the police power of regulation is too well settled to require citation of authorities.”28
On the other hand, it has been held that an ordinance which requires one who uses his automobile for his private business and pleasure to submit to an examination and to take out a license (if the examining board see fit to grant it) is imposing a burden on one class of citizens in the use of the streets not imposed upon, others, and is invalid.29” Berry Automobiles, Sixth edition (1929), page 86.
As Commerce secretary, Hoover also hosted two national conferences on street traffic, in 1924 and 1926 (a third convened in 1930, during Hoover ’s presidency). Collectively the meetings were called the National Conference on Street and Highway Safety. Hoover ’s chief objective was to address the growing casualty toll of traffic accidents, but the scope grew and soon embraced motor vehicle standards, rules of the road, and urban traffic control. He left the invited interest groups to negotiate agreements among themselves, which were then presented for adoption by states and localities. Because automotive trade associations were the best organized, many of the positions taken by the conferences reflected their interests. The conferences issued a model Uniform Vehicle Code for adoption by the states, and a Model Municipal Municipal Traffic Ordinance for adoption by cities. Both were widely influential, promoting greater uniformity between jurisdictions and tending to promote the automobile’s priority in city streets.
§ 201.904. SPEED SIGNS. The department shall erect and maintain on the highways and roads of this state appropriate signs that show the maximum lawful speed for commercial motor vehicles, truck tractors, truck trailers, truck semitrailers, and motor vehicles engaged in the business of transporting passengers for compensation or hire (buses). Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.
"The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves. Their success depends on good roads, the construction and maintenance of which are exceedingly expensive; and in recent years insistent demands have been made upon the states for better facilities, especially by the ever-increasing number of those who own such vehicles. As is well known, in order to meet this demand and accommodate the growing traffic the state of Maryland has built and is maintaining a system of improved roadways. Primarily for the enforcement of good order and the protection of those within its own jurisdiction the state put into effect the above described general regulations, including requirements for registration and licenses. A further evident purpose was to secure some compensation for the use of facilities provided at great cost from the class for whose needs they are essential, and whose operations over them are peculiarly injurious.
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles,-those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers, charging therefor reasonable fees graduated according to the horse-power of the engines,-a practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of control. This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens; and it does not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate commerce. The reasonableness of the state's action is always subject to [235 U.S. 610, 623] inquiry in so far as it affects interstate commerce, and in that regard it is likewise subordinate to the will of Congress. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30 , 31 S., 28 L. ed. 923-925, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Smith v. Alabama , 124 U.S. 465, 480 , 31 S. L. ed. 508, 513, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 , 38 S. L. ed. 385, 388, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York , 165 U.S. 628, 631 , 41 S. L. ed. 853, 854, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 392 , 42 S. L. ed. 780, 791, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio , 173 U.S. 285, 298 , 43 S. L. ed. 702, 707, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 568 , 55 S. L. ed. 328, 338, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia , 234 U.S. 280, 291 , 58 S. L. ed. 1312, 1317, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829.
In Smith v. Alabama , 124 U.S. 465, 480 , 31 S. L. ed. 508, 513, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564, consideration was given to the validity of an Alabama statute forbidding any engineer to operate a railroad train, without first undergoing an examination touching his fitness, and obtaining a license, for which a fee was charged. The language of the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Matthews, in reply to the suggestion that the statute unduly burdened interstate commerce and was therefore void, aptly declares the doctrine which is applicable here. He said:
'But the provisions on the subject contained in the statute of Alabama under consideration are not regulations of interstate commerce. It is a misnomer to call them such. Considered in themselves, they are parts of that body of the local law which, as we have already seen, properly governs the relation between carriers of passengers and merchandise and the public who employ them, which are not displaced until they come in conflict with express enactments of Congress in the exercise of its power over commerce, and which, until so displaced, according to the evident intention of Congress, remain as the law governing carriers in the discharge of their obligations, whether engaged in the purely internal commerce of the state or in commerce among the states.'
The prescribed regulations upon their face do not appear to be either unnecessary or unreasonable.
In view of the many decisions of this court there can be [235 U.S. 610, 624] no serious doubt that where a state at its own expense furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may exact compensation therefor. The amount of the charges and the method of collection are primarily for determination by the state itself; and so long as they are reasonable and are fixed according to some uniform, fair, and practical standard, they constitute no burden on interstate commerce. Parkersburg & O. River Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg , 107 U.S. 691, 699 , 27 S. L. ed. 584, 587, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 548 , 549 S., 30 L. ed. 487, 490, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 313; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States , 148 U.S. 312, 329 , 330 S., 37 L. ed. 463, 469, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U.S. 352, 405 , 57 S. L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, and authorities cited. The action of the state must be treated as correct unless the contrary is made to appear. In the instant case there is no evidence concerning the value of the facilities supplied by the state, the cost of maintaining them, or the fairness of the methods adopted for collecting the charges imposed; and we cannot say from a mere inspection of the statute that its provisions are arbitrary or unreasonable.” HENDRICK v. STATE OF MARYLAND , 235 U.S. 610 (1915)
Or LICENSING under the state’s POLICE POWER.
LICENSE. A personal privilege to do some particular act or series of acts on land without possessing any estate or interest thereon, and is ordinarily revocable at the will of the licenser... The permission by competent authority to do an act which, without such permission, would be illegal, a trespass, a tort, or otherwise not allowable. Leave to do thing which licenser could prevent. Permission to do a particular thing, to exercise a certain privilege or carry on a particular business or to pursue a certain occupation.
A permit granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for a consideration, to a person, firm or corporation to pursue some occupation or to carry on some business subject to regulation under the police power. A license is not a contract between the state and the licensee, but is a mere personal permit.
A permit to use the streets is a mere permit revocable at pleasure. The privilege of using the streets and highways by the operation thereon by motor carriers for hire can be acquired only by permission or license from the state or its political subdivisions. (Emphasis added) BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 4th EDITION
"Nor is there a distinction for equal protection purposes between the obtaining of a professional license and the maintaining of that license. [Citation.] 'No person can acquire a vested right to continue, when once licensed, in a business, trade or occupation which is subject to legislative control under the police powers.' [Citation.] '[T]o the extent the license is subject to the state's police power, it is not vested.' [Citations.]" (Kenneally v. Medical Board, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.)
"States are granted the power to regulate professions. [Citation.] The state may regulate different professions differently. It may resolve identical problems with respect to different professions at the same time and in the same manner, or determine to regulate different professions differently. [Citation.] In evaluating professional disciplinary systems an appellate court does not sit as a super-legislature. [Citation.] Great deference to legislative judgment should be accorded. [Citation.]." (Kenneally v. Medical Board, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 489, 499.)” Landau v. Superior Court (Medical Bd. of Cal .) (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 191 , 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 54
Or the FEDERAL FIREARMS laws.
Section 901 of title IV of Pub. L. 90–351 provided that:
“(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares—
“(1) that there is a widespread traffic in firearms moving in or otherwise affecting interstate or foreign commerce, and that the existing Federal controls over such traffic do not adequately enable the States to control this traffic within their own borders through the exercise of their police power;
“(2) that the ease with which any person can acquire firearms other than a rifle or shotgun (including criminals, juveniles without the knowledge or consent of their parents or guardians, narcotics addicts, mental defectives, armed groups who would supplant the functions of duly constituted public authorities, and others whose possession of such weapon is similarly contrary to the public interest) is a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States;
“(3) that only through adequate Federal control over interstate and foreign commerce in these weapons, and over all persons engaging in the businesses of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in them, can this grave problem be properly dealt with, and effective State and local regulation of this traffic be made possible;
“(4) that the acquisition on a mail-order basis of firearms other than a rifle or shotgun by nonlicensed individuals, from a place other than their State of residence, has materially tended to thwart the effectiveness of State laws and regulations, and local ordinances;
“(5) that the
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