- In an earlier post Ron states: Pete hinges the argument for his rebuttal around the definition of the word includes found in the definition of employee inMessage 1 of 10 , May 2, 2008View SourceIn an earlier post Ron states:"Pete hinges the argument for his rebuttal around the definition of the word 'includes' found in the definition of 'employee' in section 3401. The IRS claims this term is expansive. All resonable evidence contradicts that, but the issue has not been litigated." endWe must keep in mind that even when the term "includes" is used as a term of enlargement the term still "cannot" include things that are not contextually included somewhere in the Title. (Or sometimes even in another Title). In other words, if the definition of the "term" fruit is written like this: "For the purpose of this Title, apples and oranges are fruit." Then ONLY apples and oranges are considered to be fruit for the "ENTIRE" title. If in a specific chapter and section it states: "For the purpose of this chapter the "term" fruit includes pears." Then for that chapter ONLY, apples, oranges, AND pears are all considered fruit. NOT, grapes, NOT kiwi, NOT watermellon, UNLESS, "specifically" mentioned elsewhere as part of the definition of the term fruit, and even then it would ONLY apply to the "specific" chapter or section mentioned. Section 7701 explains this when properly interpreted. Note the underlines words and hear what it says. In other words, other things which are SPECIFICALLY mentioned elsewhere would be included in the meaning. If there are NO OTHER THINGS mentioned, then there is nothing else included in the definition!§7701 “The term “includes” and “including” when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.”
Below is a list of court cases which apply to this subject matter.
“The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. The certain designation of one person, is an absolute exclusion of all others#. This doctrine decrees that where law expressly describes [a] particular situation to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.” Black’s law Dictionary, 6th Addition.
"[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another ..., it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Russello v. United States, 464 US 16, (1983)
"In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out." [Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917)]
“Keeping in mind the well-settled rule that the citizen is exempt from taxation unless the same is imposed by clear and unequivocal language, and that where the construction of a tax law is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid. Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain,192 U.S. 397, 24 S.Ct. 376, 418, U.S. 1904
“The Treasury Department cannot, by interpretive regulations, make income of that which is not income within the meaning of the revenue acts of Congress, nor can Congress, without apportionment, tax as income that which is not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.” Helvering v. Edison Bros. Stores, 133 F.2d 575 (1943)
So even when the term “includes” is used as a term of “enlargement,” it cannot include such things that are outside of its lawful scope to include.
- WHICH is WHY the promulgated, SUBSTANTIVE regulations from the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY who has been given the AUTHORITY to “collect the taxes imposed byMessage 2 of 10 , May 29, 2008View Source
WHICH is WHY the promulgated, SUBSTANTIVE regulations from the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY who has been given the AUTHORITY to “collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws” (26 USC 6301) & to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the “internal revenue laws” (26 USC 7805) contained in TITLES 26 & 27 STATES that WHAT the DEFINITIONS actually "include" is LIMITED to those things which are in the SAME GENERAL CLASS as the ENUMERATED items.
27 CFR 26.11
Director. The Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Department of the Treasury, Washington , D.C.
Director of the service center. A director of an internal revenue service center.
District director. A district director of internal revenue.
Revenue Agent. Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico.
Secretary. The Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico .
Secretary or his delegate. The Secretary or any officer or employee of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico duly authorized by the Secretary to perform the function mentioned or described in this part.
Treasury Account. The Department of the Treasury's General Account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York .
United States. The States and the District of Columbia .
When used in this part and in forms prescribed under this part, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, terms shall have the meaning ascribed in this section. Words in the plural form shall include the singular and vice versa, and words importing the masculine gender shall include the feminine. The terms ``includes'' and ``including'' do not exclude things not enumerated which are in the same general class.
(68A Stat. 917, as amended (26 U.S.C. 7805); 49 Stat. 981, as amended (27 U.S.C. 205) Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 775 (26 U.S.C. 6301); June 29, 1956, ch. 462, 70 Stat. 391 (26 U.S.C. 6301))
[T.D. ATF-48, 43 FR 13551, Mar. 31, 1978]
And that the definition of “includes” is nothing more that a RESTATEMENT of the CANONS of STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION that what is INCLUDED in who and/or what is being DEFINED can be a GENERAL CLASS of people and/or things.
EJUSDEM GENERIS. Of the same kind, class, or nature.
In statutory construction, the "ejusdem generis rule" is that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things. by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Black, Interp. Laws, 141; Cutshaw v. Denver, 19 Colo. App. 341, 75 Pac. 22; Ex parte Leland, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 462; Spalding v. People, 172 Ill. 40, 49 N. B. 993. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 2ND EDITION, pages 415.
Noscitur a sociis. It is known from its associates. 1 Vent. 225. The meaning of a word is or may be known from the accompanying words. 3 Term R. 87; Broom, Max. 588. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 2ND EDITION, pages 830.
"Plaintiff, accordingly, claims that Mrs. Ham, as the receiver of a one- third portion of Mr. Ham's estate, was not a "beneficiary" within the meaning of § 662. This contention, however, fails. For definition, 26 U.S.C. § 643(c) provides that "the term 'beneficiary' includes heir, legatee, devisee." The word "elector" (of a spouse's share) does not appear, but "includes" is not limiting. Rather, "[t]he terms 'includes' and 'including' . . . shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c). In light of this we apply the PRINCIPLE that a list of terms should be construed to include by implication those additional terms of LIKE KIND AND CLASS as the expressly included terms." BRIGHAM v US , No. 97-2436
Patrick in California
"ASSUMPTION can be very COSTLY to MANY and very PROFITABLE to a FEW."--PKM
- Below is supposedly a response from an appelate attorney name Rebecca O Dell Townsend. Basically, what she says sound to me like a bunch of bull! From whatMessage 3 of 10 , May 29, 2008View SourceBelow is supposedly a response from an appelate attorney name Rebecca O'Dell Townsend. Basically, what she says sound to me like a bunch of bull! From what she says, definitions mean nothing and the IRS can do about what they want irregardless of what their own code says. Thoughts anyone?
*From:* Rebecca O'Dell Townsend
*Sent:* Wednesday, May 28, 2008 10:02 AM
*Subject:* RE: IRC, Congress and the courts definition of "includes"
I am sorry, but this argument displays a profound misunderstanding of statutory construction, interpretation and enforcement. It also displays another example of trying to mix and match definitions and statutory provisions.
I am an appellate attorney. I deal in statutory construction day in and day out. All of the precepts upon which this person builds his or her argument are flawed. For instance, the principle of “ejusdem generis” does not apply to a provision like this. (How desperate does one have to be to resort to latin phrases?)
Even if it did, agencies and courts do/ not /employ the rules of statutory construction /unless/ the provision is found to be ambiguous. No one except those desperate to avoid income taxes find these definitions ambiguous. State means state and, by definition, D.C.
Even if a court were to employ the rules of statutory interpretation, the first rule of statutory interpretation is to give every provision its /ordinary /meaning. Again, state means state.
The second rule is to interpret statutes to give full force and effect to all of the statute’s provisions. Tax evaders try to render much of Title 26 meaningless or superfluous, /especially /26 U.S.C. s. 1. (Do you know any estates or trusts that are government workers or contractors?)
Even if this argument was logical or had merit, it is immaterial. Both the executive and the judicial branches have consistently interpreted these provisions in a manner that imposes a tax on all income derived from whatever source by individuals residing in the United States, meaning all individuals residing in all 50 states and D.C. The Legislative branch is free to clarify any provision that it feels is being applied or interpreted improperly. You and I are not.
/If the legislative, judicial and executive branches are all interpreting and enforcing a statute in the same manner – that is the law. /
Let’s work to repeal the 16^th Amendment. Let’s work to restore our federal government within the confines of our Constitution. Let’s work to stop Congress from taxing and spending on things over which it has no power under Article I, Section 8. Stop spending your time jousting at windmills! Let’s roll, Patriots.
Patrick M wrote:
WHICH is WHY the promulgated, SUBSTANTIVE regulations from the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY who has been given the AUTHORITY to “collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws” (26 USC 6301) & to “p.
-- "Where the people fear the government, you have tyranny; where the government fears the people, you have liberty." - Thomas Jefferson
- I think we have legally (and morally) correct arguments on our side, but am nonetheless inclined to agree with at least part of what Rebecca suggests. ThisMessage 4 of 10 , May 29, 2008View SourceI think we have legally (and morally) correct arguments on our side, but am nonetheless inclined to agree with at least part of what Rebecca suggests. This same point was articulated by Dr. Edwin Vieira in his article Gangster Government:
Because law is just a camouflage, or a cover story, for the gang's looting and oppression of the rest of society [audience applause]. America's gangster government operates under what it's legal mouthpieces called a "living Constitution." That is, a Constitution, the meaning of which depends on the interests of the big shots who happen to be living [audience laughter], and who pull the legislative and judicial strings.
So, America's gangster government can function perfectly well under Constitutional Amendments that were never ratified. Because whether an amendment was ratified is far less important than whether it can be enforced. And I remind you of the wisdom ... the man was not a Sicilian, he was a Neopolitan, but he had tremendous wisdom in this area ... Alphonse Capone, one of the great political philosophers in American history [audience laughter]. He said "You can go a long way in life with a smile, but you can go a lot farther with a smile and a gun." [audience laughter]. It's what you can enforce.
And many of us (Larken Rose comes to mind) have learned the hard way that "I'm-just-doing-my-job" thugs with guns and uniforms need no legal sophistication at all.
Systems Work, People Fail -- It's That Simple
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2008 6:16 PM
Subject: Re: [tips_and_tricks] Re: The term "includes."
Below is supposedly a response from an appellate attorney name Rebecca O'Dell Townsend. Basically, what she says sound to me like a bunch of bull! From what she says, definitions mean nothing and the IRS can do about what they want irregardless of what their own code says. Thoughts anyone?
- Moderator/Bear: Paste the links in the email into your browser and make sure you paste the whole thing. If they do not work, I do not want to hear from youMessage 5 of 10 , May 29, 2008View SourceModerator/Bear: Paste the links in the email into your browser and make sure you paste the whole thing. If they do not work, I do not want to hear from you about it. I do not think Patrick does either.
I would NOT discount the FACT that COGNATIVE DISSONANCE often
plays a factor when you are presenting someone with information that
CONFLICTS with what they have been taught since accepting it would
mean that there are WRONG or have been MISLEAD.
Cognitive dissonance is a psychological state that describes the
uncomfortable feeling when a person begins to understand that something
the person believes to be true is, in fact, not true. Similar to ambivalence,
the term cognitive dissonance describes conflicting thoughts or beliefs
(cognitions) that occur at the same time, or when engaged in behaviors that
conflict with one's beliefs. In academic literature, the term refers to attempts
to reduce the discomfort of conflicting thoughts, by performing actions that
are opposite to one's beliefs.
In simple terms, it can be the filtering of information that conflicts with
what one already believes, in an effort to ignore that information and
reinforce one's beliefs. In detailed terms, it is the perception of
incompatibility between two cognitions, where "cognition" is defined as any
element of knowledge, including attitude, emotion, belief, or behavior. The
theory of cognitive dissonance states that contradicting cognitions serve as a
driving force that compels the mind to acquire or invent new thoughts or
beliefs, or to modify existing beliefs, so as to reduce the amount of
dissonance (conflict) between cognitions. Experiments have attempted to
quantify this hypothetical drive. Some of these have examined how beliefs
often change to match behavior when beliefs and behavior are in conflict.
I think we need to REALIZE that much of the information that
ATTORNEYS have been TAUGHT in law school and/or may have been led
to believe MAY NOT be ENTIRELY TRUE.
"What I found out at law school is that they teach that all land is owned by
the state. I said that I do not BELIEVE it is true from what I BELIEVE our
founding fathers left to us. I am using information NOT taught in law
school to come to this belief, but is instead taught in the writings of the
founding fathers to come to the conclusion I did." Royce M.
For example an ATTORNEY here in California recently was ARGUING
with me about his "belief" that INFRACTIONS are CRIMINAL, DESPITE
the DOCUMENTATION I had ALREADY presented him with.
"Further, infractions are not crimes and the rule forbidding successive
prosecutions of a defendant is not applicable when an infraction is one of
the offenses involved. (People v. Battle (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [123
Cal.Rptr. 636].) fn. 1 [1b] Proceedings on infractions are not attended by
the same constitutional safeguards as those attending felony or
misdemeanor prosecutions. The limitation on an accused's right to jury trial
of infractions has withstood constitutional attack upon the rationale the
Legislature did not intend to classify infractions as crimes. (See People v.
Oppenheimer (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4 [116 Cal.Rptr. 795] and People
v. Battle, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1.)" People v. Sava (1987) 190
Cal.App.3d 935 , 235 Cal.Rptr. 694
"1967 Council-sponsored legislation reclassifies minor traffic violations as
noncriminal infractions." 2001 Judicial Council Annual Report, page 6,
Published by the Administrative Office of the Courts
This is WHAT it took to FINALLY open his eyes.
Could it be that you are not aware that MANY jurisdictions OPENLY
ADMIT that an "infraction" is a CIVIL OFFENSE, including those in
Arizona, Indiana, Florida, Michigan, Montana, Oregon?
And the California Code of Civil Procedure does state that actions are
EITHER civil or criminal doesn't it?
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24. Actions are of two kinds: 1. Civil; and,
2. Criminal. http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=ccp
So if infractions are NON-CRIMINAL, doesn't that mean that they are
And the California Penal Code does state that CRIMES are misdemeanors
and felonies, doesn't it?
PENAL CODE 31. All persons concerned in the commission of a crime,
whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the
act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being
present, have advised and encouraged its commission, and all persons
counseling, advising, or encouraging children under the age of fourteen
years, or persons who are mentally incapacitated, to commit any crime, or
who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the drunkenness of another
for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or who, by threats,
menaces, command, or coercion, compel another to commit any crime, are
principals in any crime so committed.
And at one time, even the moderator of Law-Discuss himself at one time
"believed" that the ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT had NO
APPLICATION to TRAFFIC TICKETS and proclaimed that anyone WHO
BELIEVED it did was "promoting stupidity".
He had to research things for himself to change that belief, DESPITE the
EVIDENCE he had ALREADY been presented with.
So I am NOT SURPRISED at Rebeccas reaction.
Maybe you should ask her some QUESTIONS.
Such as WHY she did NOT comment on the IDENTITY of the
SECRETARY in those SUSTANTIVE regulations which I cited which have
the force & effect of law?
And IF my INTERPRETATION was so WRONG, then WHY do the
REGULATIONS promulgated by the SECRETARY say more than once that
the terms ``includes'' and ``including'' do not exclude things not
enumerated which are in the same general class?
And if the principle of ejusdem generis does not apply to THAT
provision, THEN WHY did the DISTRICT COURT in the case I cited
SPECIFICALLY APPLY it in regards to the DEFINITION of 26 USC
"Plaintiff, accordingly, claims that Mrs. Ham, as the receiver of a one- third
portion of Mr. Ham's estate, was not a "beneficiary" within the meaning of §
662. This contention, however, fails. For definition, 26 U.S.C. § 643(c)
provides that "the term 'beneficiary' includes heir, legatee, devisee." The
word "elector" (of a spouse's share) does not appear, but "includes" is not
limiting. Rather, "[t]he terms 'includes' and 'including' . . . shall not be
deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term
defined." 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c). In light of this we apply the PRINCIPLE that
a list of terms should be construed to include by implication those
additional terms of LIKE KIND AND CLASS as the expressly included
terms." BRIGHAM v US , No. 97-2436
And if you think about it, ARENT most estates or trusts or even
corporations in the SAME GENERAL CLASS as government workers or
contractors SINCE they are CREATURES of the STATE & their
AUTHORITY & POWERS are DEFINED by LAW?
"The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is
entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to
contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to
divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it
may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he
receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property.
His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the
organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of
law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal
to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from
arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the
public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is
presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain
special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the
state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can
make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to [201 U.S. 43, 75]
act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of
its creation." HALE v. HENKEL, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)
And ISNT there is a DIFFERENCE between the EARNINGS of a average
man WHICH are the COMPENSATION for their LABOR & income as it
is DEFINED in LAW?
"Nevertheless, even the court in Oliver stated, "compensation from labor is
not profit." Oliver, 86 S.E.2d 859. The court in Oliver went further to say
that "[t]here is a clear distinction between `profit' and `wages' or
compensation for labor." Id. The court then quotes League Association of
America v. The People ex rel. Thomas B. Needles, Auditor, 90 Ill. 166-- an
Illinois Supreme Court Case--which held that "[c]ompensation for labor can
not be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law. The word `profit',
as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or investment --
a different thing altogether from mere compensation for labor."
This case presents the question whether, by virtue of the Sixteenth
Amendment, Congress has the power to tax, as income of the stockholder
and without apportionment, a stock dividend made lawfully and in good
faith against profits accumulated by the corporation since March 1, 1913.
The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing
clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before
the amendment was adopted. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158
U.S. 601 , 15 Sup. Ct. 912, under the Act of August 27, 1894 (28 Stat. 509,
553, c. 349, 27), it was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real estate
and upon returns from investments of personal property were in effect
direct taxes upon the property from which such income arose, imposed by
reason of ownership; and that Congress could not impose such taxes
without apportioning them among the states according to population, as
required by article 1, 2, cl. 3, and section 9, cl. 4, of the original
Afterwards, and evidently in recognition of the limitation upon the taxing
power of Congress thus determined, the Sixteenth Amendment was
adopted, in words lucidly expressing the object to be accomplished:
'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among [252 U.S. 189, 206]
the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.'
As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but
merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an
apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income. Brushaber v.
Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 , 17-19, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, Ann. Cas.
1917B, 713, L. R. A. 1917D, 414; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103
, 112 et seq., 36 Sup. Ct. 278; Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172 , 173
S., 38 Sup. Ct. 432.
A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, requires
also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose construction, so as
to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the
Constitution that require an apportionment according to population for
direct taxes upon property, real and personal. This limitation still has an
appropriate and important function, and is not to be overridden by
Congress or disregarded by the courts.
In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article 1 of the Constitution
may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the amendment,
and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential to
distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,' as the term is there
used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and
substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may
adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the
Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within
whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.
The fundamental relation of 'capital' to 'income' has been much discussed by
economists, the former being likened to the tree or the land, the latter to the
fruit or the crop; the former depicted as a reservoir supplied from springs,
the latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow during a period of
time. For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term
'income,' [252 U.S. 189, 207] as used in common speech, in order to
determine its meaning in the amendment, and, having formed also a correct
judgment as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide
the matter at issue.
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard Dict.;
Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to add to the succinct
definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of
1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 , 34 S. Sup.
Ct. 136, 140 [58 L. Ed. 285]; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 ,
38 S. Sup. Ct. 467, 469 [62 L. Ed. 1054]), 'Income may be defined as the
gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it
be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of
capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case, 247 U.S. 183, 185 ,
38 S. Sup. Ct. 467, 469 (62 L. Ed. 1054).
Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of
income essential for a correct solution of the present controversy. The
government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted,
placed chief emphasis upon the word 'gain,' which was extended to include
a variety of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was
either overlooked or misconceived. 'Derived-from- capital'; 'the
gain-derived-from-capital,' etc. Here we have the essential matter: not a gain
accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value in the investment;
but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the
property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and
coming in, being 'derived'-that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the
taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal- that is income derived
from property. Nothing else answers the description.
The same fundamental conception is clearly set forth in the Sixteenth
Amendment-'incomes, from whatever source derived'-the essential thought
being expressed [252 U.S. 189, 208] with a conciseness and lucidity entirely
in harmony with the form and style of the Constitution.
Throughout the argument of the government, in a variety of forms, runs the
fundamental error already mentioned-a failure to appraise correctly the
force of the term 'income' as used in the Sixteenth Amendment, or at least to
give practical effect to it. EISNER v. MACOMBER , 252 U.S. 189 (1920)
INCOME. The gain which proceeds from property, labor, or business; it is
applied particularly to individuals; the income of the government is usually
called revenue. 2. It has been holden that a devise of the income of land, is
in effect the same as a devise of the land itself. 9 Mass. 372; 1 Ashm. 136.
BOUVIERS LAW DICTIONARY, REVISED SIXTH EDITION, 1856
INCOME. The return in money from one's business, labor, or capital
invested; gains, profit, or private revenue. Braun's Appeal, 105 Pa. 415;
People V. Davenport, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 177 ; In re Slocum, 169 N. Y. 153, 62
N. E. 130 ; Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga. 99.
"Income" means that which comes in or is received from any business or
investment of capital, without reference to the outgoing expenditures; while.
"profits" generally means the gain which is made upon any business or
investment when both receipts and payments are taken into account.
"Income," when applied to the affairs of individuals, expresses the same
idea that "revenue" does when applied to the affairs of a state or nation.
People v. Niagara County, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 20; Bates v. Porter, 74 Cal. 224, 15
Pac. 732. Income tax. A tax on the yearly profits arising from property,
professions, trades, and offices. 2 Steph. Comm. 573. Levi v. Louisville, 97
Ky. 394, 30 S. W. 973, 28 L. A. 480; Parker v. Insurance Co., 42 La. Ann.
423, 7 South. 599. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 2ND EDITION, page
And WOULDNT a TAX on the PEOPLES EARNINGS, which are the
FRUIT of our LABOR & OUR PROPERTY by RIGHT, ONLY be able to
be CONSTITUTIONALY taxed through a DIRECT TAX?
"It has been well said that 'the property which every man has in his own
labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most
sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength
and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength
and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his
neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest
encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who
might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at
what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom they
think proper.' Smith, Wealth Nat. bk. 1, c. 10. " BUTCHERS' UNION CO. v.
CRESCENT CITY CO., 111 U.S. 746 (1884)
'Direct taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon the possession and
enjoyments of rights; indirect taxes are levied upon the happening of an
event or an exchange.' KNOWLTON v. MOORE, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)
"The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere
privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its
existence and charter powers to the state; but the individuals' Right to live
and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise
cannot be imposed." Corn v. Fort, 95 S.W.2d 620 (1936).
UNLIKE "doing business in a corporate form" or working as an "officer,
employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political
subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing" or being an "officer of
a corporation" or performing "the functions of a public office, ALL of
WHICH are PRIVILEGES which could be CONSTITUTIONALLY be taxed
through an EXCISE TAX, couldnt they?
Duties and imposts are terms commonly applied to levies made by
governments on the importation or exportation of commodities. Excises are
'taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities
within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, and upon
corporate privileges.' Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. 680.
The tax under consideration, as we have construed the statute, may be
described as an excise upon the particular privilege of doing business in a
corporate capacity, i. e., with the advantages which arise from corporate or
quasi corporate organization; or, when applied to insurance companies, for
doing the business of such companies. As was said in the Thomas Case, 192
U. S. supra, the requirement to pay such taxes involves the exercise of [220
U.S. 107, 152] privileges, and the element of absolute and unavoidable
demand is lacking. If business is not done in the manner described in the
statute, no tax is payable." FLINT v. STONE TRACY CO., 220 U.S. 107
And I thought that it was CONGRESS who MADE the LAW SUBJECT to
the federal constitution & that the IRS could ONLY EXPOUND on that
"Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since
it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its
power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be
lawfully exercised. EISNER v. MACOMBER , 252 U.S. 189 (1920)
"The Treasury Department cannot, by interpretive regulations, make income
out of that which is not income within the meaning of the revenue acts of
Congress, nor can Congress, without apportionment, tax as income that
which is not income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment." Helvering
v. Edison Bros. Stores, 133 F.2D 575
And I would ask her WHAT the courts would have to do with ANYTHING
IF the matter had ALREADY ADMINSITRATIVELY dealt with the IRS?
Patrick in California
"It ain't what ya don't know that hurts ya. What really puts a hurtin' on ya is
what ya knows for sure, that just ain't so." -- Uncle Remus
--- In email@example.com, Steve <svanos2@...> wrote:
Below is supposedly a response from an appelate attorney name Rebecca
O'Dell Townsend. Basically, what she says sound to me like a bunch of
bull! From what she says, definitions mean nothing and the IRS can do
about what they want irregardless of what their own code says. Thoughts
- Coming from the mouth of a Sophist , She is protecting her legal profession, of practice and procedure, which by fraud alters or modifies Substantive law.Message 6 of 10 , May 30, 2008View SourceComing from the mouth of a "Sophist", She is protecting her "legal" profession, of practice and procedure, which by fraud alters or modifies Substantive law. In case one doesn't know the meaning of the word "Sophist", it means one that uses deception. If one doesn't understand this statement, look up the term "matter in substance" in Ballentines Law Dictionary.She doesn't want the people to know that The Laws have to be interpreted and "context" use to know what The Law pertains to. No Truth or human involved!!! That is why Louisiana Revised Statutes, title 37 explicitly states that they, the men or women personating the legal private Bar Association can only "Practice" Secular Law, which excludes moral or Yahw-h's Law.-------Original Message-------From: SteveDate: 5/29/2008 6:51:01 PMSubject: Re: [tips_and_tricks] Re: The term "includes."
Below is supposedly a response from an appelate attorney name Rebecca O'Dell Townsend. Basically, what she says sound to me like a bunch of bull! From what she says, definitions mean nothing and the IRS can do about what they want irregardless of what their own code says. Thoughts anyone?
*From:* Rebecca O'Dell Townsend
- ... One of the clues for the status of infractions is if you are asked for a guilty or not guilty plea. Civil cases don t use those terms. Moderator/Bear: InMessage 7 of 10 , May 30, 2008View SourcePatrick M wrote:
> "Further, infractions are not crimes and the rule forbidding...
> prosecutions of a defendant is not applicable when an infraction is
> one of
> the offenses involved. (People v. Battle (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1
> Cal.Rptr. 636].) fn. 1 [1b] Proceedings on infractions are not
> attended by
> the same constitutional safeguards as those attending felony or
> misdemeanor prosecutions. The limitation on an accused's right to jury
> of infractions has withstood constitutional attack upon the rationale
> Legislature did not intend to classify infractions as crimes. (See
> People v.
> Oppenheimer (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4 [116 Cal.Rptr. 795] and
> v. Battle, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1.)" People v. Sava (1987) 190
> Cal.App.3d 935 , 235 Cal.Rptr. 694
> And the California Code of Civil Procedure does state that actions areOne of the clues for the status of infractions is if you are asked for a
> EITHER civil or criminal doesn't it?
> CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24. Actions are of two kinds: 1. Civil; and,
> 2. Criminal. http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=ccp
> &file=2-33> &group=00001-01000&file=2-33
> So if infractions are NON-CRIMINAL, doesn't that mean that they are
> And the California Penal Code does state that CRIMES are misdemeanors
> and felonies, doesn't it?
guilty or not guilty plea. Civil cases don't use those terms.
Moderator/Bear: In Colorado, on an infraction, I was asked by a judge at arraignment, "Do you admit or deny that you were speeding?"
From what I've seen in California, infractions are treated as criminal
with certain privileges offered for the subject to waive rights and go
along with the program. I myself elect to have any infractions
prosecuted as misdemeanors so that I can have all of my rights at all
times never waiving any for any cause or reason.
Cal. Penal code:
16. Crimes and public offenses include:
2. Misdemeanors; and
17. (d) A violation of any code section listed in Section 19.8 is an
infraction subject to the procedures described in Sections 19.6 and
(1) The prosecutor files a complaint charging the offense as an
infraction unless the defendant, at the time he or she is arraigned,
after being informed of his or her rights, elects to have the case
proceed as a misdemeanor, or;
(2) The court, with the consent of the defendant, determines that
the offense is an infraction in which event the case shall proceed as
if the defendant had been arraigned on an infraction complaint.
So there you see the choice is offered, to accept the limited rights
under the special infraction procedures with your consent (mainly the
guarantee of no jail time) or to demand all rights by forcing the
prosecution to adhere to all due process rights by electing to have the
case proceed as a misdemeanor. I think the latter presents me with
better opportunities for a win. They do not seem to invest any effort
in fighting infractions. They do not even file real complaints for
misdemeanors (and many felonies, because most of today's idiots don't
know enough to demand one!)!
> PENAL CODE 31. All persons concerned in the commission of a crime,This would seem to implicate anyone standing up for a proven criminal
> whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit
> act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or,
> not being
> present, have advised and encouraged its commission, and all persons
> counseling, advising, or encouraging children under the age of
> years, or persons who are mentally incapacitated, to commit any crime,
> who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the drunkenness of
> for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or who, by
> menaces, command, or coercion, compel another to commit any crime, are
> principals in any crime so committed.
impersonator, such as everyone calling the drunk in the black robe "your
honor" after I've proven he doesn't have the required oath of office on
That's being advised of its existence yet continuing to encourage the
- ... I stood in front of a judge last week on a traffic violation. He demanded that I plead guilty or not guilty, to which I replied, I do not waive any of myMessage 8 of 10 , May 31, 2008View Source--- Frog Farmer <frogfrmr@...> wrote:
> One of the clues for the status of infractions is ifI stood in front of a judge last week on a traffic
> you are asked for a guilty or not guilty plea.
> Civil cases don't use those terms.
violation. He demanded that I plead guilty or not
guilty, to which I replied, "I do not waive any of
my rights and demand a verified complaint."
I made four more objections in response to his
aggressive demands to plea. No witness from the one
who wrote out the notice, and never even a peep from
the state's attorney from the time I went in front of
Did I disqualify the judge, as the first move?
Illinois judges like to flaunt their presumed diety
status and immunity from anything a non-attorney may
say. Illinois law is not written as clearly as Cal
law, and I spent a lot of time loaded with Ill S Ct
Rules, and the Illinois Attorney Act trying to
disqualify a lawyer. Judge refused, even with a
subpoena ducus tecum for a license.
I stood my ground with this judge while he huffed and
puffed. He continued the matter to "give me time to
reconsider my position." This happened quickly, back
and forth, and when he said it would be continued, I
did not recover quickly enough to contest subject
matter jurisdiction, which the court lacks without a
verfied complaint, once it is not waived and demanded.
> From what I've seen in California, infractions areWell, I do not have all my legal ducks on a row to be
> treated as criminal with certain privileges offered
> for the subject to waive rights and go along with
> the program. I myself elect to have any infractions
> prosecuted as misdemeanors so that I can have all of
> my rights at all times never waiving any for any
> or reason.
able to know how to have infractions prosecuted as
misdemeanors, but I certainly refused to waive any of
my rights and persisted on demanding the verified
complaint before proceeding with anything else.
There is a statute that says once a verified complaint
is demanded, by objection and before proceeding to
trial, it must be provided. At worst, I have enough
objections to appeal and show how the judge ignored
the statutes and trampled on my due process rights.
Round two in three weeks.
- ... So since you didn t ask for a continuance, and the judge needed one to come up with the paperwork, the next moment you see him you will remind him that heMessage 9 of 10 , May 31, 2008View SourceMichael Noonan wrote:
> I stood my ground with this judge while he huffed andSo since you didn't ask for a continuance, and the judge needed one to
> puffed. He continued the matter to "give me time to
> reconsider my position." This happened quickly, back
> and forth, and when he said it would be continued, I
> did not recover quickly enough to contest subject
> matter jurisdiction, which the court lacks without a
> verfied complaint, once it is not waived and demanded.
come up with the paperwork, the next moment you see him you will remind
him that he has now had all the time necessary to do it right and whose
idea is it to move forward without it and how do they justify that
> Well, I do not have all my legal ducks on a row to beDucks in a row? Just do it. Just ignore the infraction process (don't
> able to know how to have infractions prosecuted as
> misdemeanors, but I certainly refused to waive any of
> my rights and persisted on demanding the verified
> complaint before proceeding with anything else.
ASK for any of its parts) and demand the misdemeanor process that has
all the rights with it.
> There is a statute that says once a verified complaintHelp them out by providing it, when you next see them trying to snooker
> is demanded, by objection and before proceeding to
> trial, it must be provided.
you like you were an ordinary fool.
> At worst, I have enoughYou know, they may need the workload to support a raised budget next
> objections to appeal and show how the judge ignored
> the statutes and trampled on my due process rights.
> Round two in three weeks.
year, so you might want to ask them how they want you to go, as a foil
on whom to test their newbie trainees, or as a resource waster to raise
the costs for the budget, or would they like to cut their losses?
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) considerations vary so much
depending upon relative levels of corruption, waste, fraud and abuse
that naturally varies from one jurisdiction to another. It's hard to
tell at a glance which way we can most aid and better society - do we
cost the most we can, or the least, when dealing with taxpayer supported
enterprises? I personally try to cost the most and run up the largest
list of possible defendants and others for whom I may affect their
- ... For anyone going up against the system, never go unprepared. I did identify the statute that says once a verified complaint is demanded, by objection andMessage 10 of 10 , Jun 2, 2008View Source--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "Frog Farmer" <frogfrmr@...>
> > There is a statute that says once a verified complaintFor anyone going up against the system, never go unprepared.
> > is demanded, by objection and before proceeding to
> > trial, it must be provided.
> Help them out by providing it, when you next see them trying to
> snooker you like you were an ordinary fool.
I did identify the statute that says once a verified complaint
is demanded, by objection and before proceeding to trial, [note
that there is a procedure to follow, and know what that
procedure is before a right gets waived], but like everything
else I said, the judge ignored it and kept aggressively going
after me, probably thinking I would be cowered into submission,
which is why it is so important to be prepared.
Was I nervous? Absolutely, but I never waivered from my
objective. I reluctantly gave the statute, mentioned above,
on the 4th or 5th objection because I was unsure if citing it
would put me automatically into jurisdiction and a trial would
then be underway, but I wanted a record established for any
appeal. There was a court recorder present.
Stand up and be counted!