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RE: [tips_and_tricks] Ticket question (California)

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  • Frog Farmer
    ... So imagine how it would go if one had no license to suspend. ... When I was in court for what seemed full time for a few years, I noticed that it seemed
    Message 1 of 9 , Feb 15, 2008
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      Pro Se wrote:

      > Here in P.A. (Pennsylvania) [local courts]
      > they like to nail people for "FAILURE TO RESPOND"
      >
      > which usually does not result in arrest but DOES
      > result in a license suspension...
      > which is done WITHOUT THE REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVE
      > HEARING in violation of title 75 of the PA vehicle code.

      So imagine how it would go if one had no license to suspend.

      > Also found the case REESE v KASAAB
      > where it was held to suspend a license without a
      > hearing in a violation of DUE PROCESS.

      When I was in court for what seemed full time for a few years, I noticed
      that it seemed that every time I'd point out a law that I thought would
      protect me and afford me due process, it was instantly violated by the
      prosecution. This really elevated my blood pressure. Soon, I decided
      that maybe one of these two reasons were an explanation:

      1. Maybe they wanted to make sure I'd win on appeal.

      2. Maybe they wanted to see how serious I was, since everyone gets the
      government they permit, maybe they wanted to see how much I'd permit.

      So, after a while, I decided not to quote any laws or cases anymore to
      them. I used all those words as if *I* was saying them for the first
      time, and then on appeal I could say, "Oh, well what do you know!? The
      Supremes and the law agree with me! Who woulda thawt? How come you
      guys had it all wrong??" That's my new way, tell them the law, but
      don't tell them it's the law, or they'll break it. Odds are they will
      do it anyway just to go against your words. But at least you have a
      better chance than if you tell them it's the law. And it makes you look
      like a genius on appeal (as long as you remember that appealable issues
      are only those supported by your strenuous objections made in the
      original hearing and evidenced clearly by the record) when your
      opponents get to see that you were right after all, in front of others!
      And it can be a great game to go into court and try not to say any words
      of your own, but only speak in Supreme Court citation and constitutional
      and statutory language. It makes it a lot of fun to see them disagree
      with you then. You can even smile when it happens, which really bothers
      them too. And it's even more fun to see them catch on to it, which they
      eventually do, especially if you use a very common citation, like
      Miranda v. Arizona or Gideon v. Wainwright that they remember from
      school or another case.

      > When people do go to court we've been hitting them
      > [the courts & DOT] with a subpoena & we ask for
      > the DOT driver record..showing there's never been the
      > required hearing - which needs a FINDING OF FACT &
      > CONCLUSION OF LAW.
      > & we OBJECT to the cop entering the info in the
      > record.
      > * as we have the right to CROSS EXAMINE the person
      > who made the report from DOT.

      If you want to add insult to injury, subpoena the person who actually
      MADE that computer entry, because computer entries themselves are not
      the "best evidence" and you have a right to question the computer
      operator.

      > And of course lets not forget the cop is NOT a lawyer,
      > so anything they say or do is
      > unauthorized practice of law without a license

      Without the proper required oath, how do you distinguish from among the
      following: judge, lawyer, cop, sheriff, administrator, paycheck
      anticipating criminally impersonating commie in-fill-traitor, lunatic
      asylum escapee (imagine the Marx brothers running around in black
      robes)?

      Are we supposed to believe any of these people just because they nod in
      approval at each other's words? They may respect each other, but that
      doesn't mean I have to! When they agree against me, I'll take that as
      further evidence of criminal conspiracy, not a clue that I have to
      accept their words at face value as if they were true. They are a class
      of professional liars, all of them! And they are usually easy to catch
      at it.

      Regards,

      FF
    • Pro Se
      In the court of Common Pleas in/for Lebanon county, Fifty-second Judicial district, Lebanon, Pennsylvania commonwealth. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, :
      Message 2 of 9 , Feb 18, 2008
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        In the court of Common Pleas in/for
        Lebanon county, Fifty-second Judicial district,
        Lebanon, Pennsylvania commonwealth.


        COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, :          Case No. CP-38-SA-73007
        Department of Transportation,
        Appellee,
        vs. :
        George Konevitch, Sui Juris, :                      TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED.
        Appellant/Aggrieved Party.
        ___________________________________ :  Amended Motion.


        Motion to Dismiss the Summary Conviction

        With Prejudice for Want of Prosecution by the Commonwealth’s Department of Transportation.
        ___________________________________

        TO THE HONORABLE, THE JUDGES OF THE SAID COURT:
        AND NOW COMES, the abovesaid Appellant/Petitioner/Movant, by pro se, submitting this Motion to Dismiss the summary conviction with prejudice for want of prosecution by the Commonwealth’s Department of Transportation, and represents:

        1. The Appellant/Aggrieved Party abovesaid is a private man living on the land who receives post at: 2130 Colebrook Road, Lebanon Post Office (17042), Lebanon, Pennsylvania, United States of America, the Republic.
        2. The appellee/accuser is a corporate entity for the de facto state also known as the COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. The corporate seal is affixed to the certified driving record in this case. Please take judicial notice: that the corporate seal is not the official state seal when inspecting the sealed document from the bureau of driver’s licensing (corporate entity). Also, see 28 U.S.C. §3002 (2) and (15)(A).
        3. The prosecuting witness, JASON CLECK (JC), in this case is a patrolman for the NORTH LONDONDERRY POLICE DEPARTMENT (NLDPD) for the TOWNSHIP OF NORTH LONDONDERRY, PENNSYLVANIA (TNLP).
        Prosecuting witness. The private person upon whom complaint or information a criminal accusation is founded and whose testimony is mainly relied on to secure a conviction at the trial; in a more particular sense, the person who was chiefly injured, in person or property, by the act constituting the alleged crime, (as in cases of robbery, assault, criminal negligence, bastardy, and the like,) and who instigates the prosecution and gives evidence. Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, West Publishing Company (1968), page 1385.


        4. The offense was filed by JC are under the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code (PAVC), Title 75 Pa.C.S.
        5. The offense was filed by JC under PAVC are not within JC’s purview, as they are all outside of his specific duties and powers as listed in Part V, Chapter 61 of the PAVC, specifically §6109 et seq., as a Local authority. Please take judicial notice: of 75 Pa.C.S. §6102(a) and 6102 (b) refer to legal definitions at 75 Pa.C.S. §102.
        6. The Department of Transportation (DOT) for this Commonwealth is vested with the original primary jurisdiction for the administration and enforcement of the PAVC, as per 75 Pa.C.S. §6102(a).
        7. DOT has not filed or lodged any violations of the PAVC against the abovesaid Appellant/Aggrieved Party, to date. JC is the person who subjected the private man abovesaid to the PAVC on behalf of the NLDPD, the Local authority, as set forth in 75 Pa.C.S. §6102 (b), as defined in 75 Pa.C.S. §102 with specific powers and duties set forth in 75 Pa.C.S. §6109 et seq.
        8. The PAVC is a commercial revenue scheme to protect the PUBLIC WELFARE and SAFETY of the state for those who use the public streets and highways to conduct their business as a paid driver/operator hauling freight and/or passengers for fares and fees. The Appellant/Private Man does not own a ‘motor vehicle’ by definition.
        The words of art “Motor Vehicle” as defined in 18 U.S.C. §31:
        “means every description of a carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property and or cargo;
        “Used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit; (Emphasis added).
        9. The PAVC does not pertain to the private man using and enjoying the use of his private property. (The private property/mode of conveyance for today’s travel is the family car/automobile). See, the Application of the Act (PAVC) in the Laws of Pennsylvania, 1903, Act No. 202, Section 13, to wit:
        “Section 13. This act shall not apply to…. , not for his private use or for hire.”
        In 1905, the Application of the Act (PAVC) in the Laws of Pennsylvania, 1903, Act No. 159, Section 12, to wit:
        “Section 12. This act shall not apply to…., not for hire or for his private use.”
        10. The abovesaid Appelllant/Private Man does not operate a motor vehicle on the streets and highways—traveled paths/rights of way/easements. A driver/chauffer or an operator of a motor vehicle is paid for driving, as set forth in the Laws of Pennsylvania, 1909, Act No. 174, at Section 5, to wit:
        “Section 5. Every person desiring to operate a motor-vehicle as a chauffer, or as a paid operator, shall first obtain a driver’s license.”
        Appellant/Private Man has an inviolate right to trial by jury, Article 1, Section 6, Pennsylvania Constitution and this matter exceeds twenty dollars ($20.00) Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution for these united States of America, 1787, and its proper amendments, and Federal Bill of Rights, 1789. Also see, Laws of Pennsylvania, 1909, Act No. 174, at Section 18, to wit:
        “Section 18. ……That any person, so accused, may secure the right of trial by jury, before the court of quarter sessions of the peace for the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,….”
        11. All actions arising the PAVC are civil and not criminal in nature, as set froth by the Laws of Pennsylvania, 1903, Act No. 202, Section 11, to wit:
        “Section 11. All civil actions for damages arising from the use and operation of any motor vehicle as aforesaid, shall be brought in the city or county in which the alleged damages were sustained, and service of process shall be made by the sheriff, in person or by deputy, in any part of the Commonwealth, in like manner as process may now be served in the proper county.”
        In 1905, Act No. 159, Section 9, to wit:
        “Section 11. All civil actions for damages arising from the use and operation of any motor vehicle as aforesaid, may be brought in the city or county in which the alleged damages were sustained, and service of process may be made by the sheriff, in person or by deputy, in any part of the Commonwealth, in like manner as process may now be served in the proper county.”
        Non-jailable traffic offenses under the Vehicle Code are civil in nature, see Welsh vs. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 80 L.ed.2d 732, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (1985).
        12. No civil complaints were ever filed in the case on the abovesaid Appellant/Private Man who is not the surety/guarantor for GEORGE KONEVITCH.
        13. Service of process was not conducted by the sheriff or his deputy in this case, as these commercial presentments were sent in the United States Mails.
        See the notorious landmark case, Erie R.R. vs. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which, in effect, recognized the bankruptcy of the nation, and the rule of public policy statutes in a commercial jurisdiction, over public law statutes in a common law jurisdiction.
        14. The NLDPD is not an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as per the Administrative Law and Procedures Act, set forth in Title 2 Pa.C.S. §101 et seq.
        Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius. (Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). Fazio vs. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 321 Pa. 7, 182 A.2d 696, 698; The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated—Mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
        The legal definition term ‘Strict Constructionism’ applies in this matter. See legal definition of term in Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition (1999) published by West Publishing Group on page 1434, written below for convenience:
        “Strict constructionism. The doctrinal view of judicial construction holding that judges should interpret a document or a statute (esp. one involving penal sanctions) according to its literal terms, without looking to other sources to ascertain the meaning. See strict construction, literal canon, literal rule and textualism.” (Emphasis added).
        Pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §1921 et seq, the Court is to follow the intent of the law as it is written.
        When certain persons or things are specified in law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. Little vs. Town of Conway, 171 S.C. 27, 170. S.E. 447, 448.
        Under this maxim, if a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded. People vs. One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck, Engine No. 99T370053, License No. P.8410, 159 P.2d 641, 642.
        15. it is believed and further averred, that the Lebanon County District Attorneys Office (LCDA) will be prosecuting this case on appeal of the summary conviction on behalf of the Commonwealth and DOT. Also, the Rules of Procedure for Criminal Summary Trials does not apply to the Vehicle Code. See, 10 P.L.E. 477 et seq. (1970) Summary Trial. Sections 192 et seq. Moreover, the rules of common law govern the procedures regarding Summary Offenses. See, Com. vs. Walter, 39 D. & C. 383, 29 Del. 536 (1941); Com. vs. Liller, 12 Lanc. Bar 188 (1881).
        16. The LCDA and its assistants are employees of Lebanon county, municipality/ board/local authority, and they are not officers of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, see, Schroeck vs. Pennsylvania State Police, 26 Cmwlth. Ct. 41, 362 A.2d 486 (1976).
        The Commonwealth Court held that the district attorney and his assistants are not officers of the Commonwealth.
        17. A traffic citation is an ex-parte information—commercial presentment and/or a negotiable instrument. (A commercial presentment is a demand for payment of money).
        18. Under the Pennsylvania Negotiable Instruments Law, one has to have a valid claim for damages and/or injury in his person or property, JC as the prosecuting witness has not suffered a loss or injury in his person or property, therefore, JC has no valid or bona fide claim for damages. See, Article 3 §3-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and codified in 13 Pa.C.S. §3504.
        19. It is mandatory for the Court to take judicial notice, as per Article 2, Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 (d) when it is given the required necessary information. The necessary required information was sent to the district magistrate’s office, but to no avail. (Justice delayed is Justice denied!).
        20. Regarding rules of evidence, when a person makes a false statement all acts or omissions are deemed to be false, as set forth by a Maxim of Law/Principle of Law. See,
        Falsus In Uno, Falsus In Omnibus. (False in one thing, false in everything). The Santisima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 339, 5 L.Ed. 454, Dawson vs. Bertolini, 70 R.I. 325, 38
        A.2d 765, 768.
        21. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania provides services to its customers just like any other private firm or corporation. The STATE sells its registration plates/tags, licenses, handicap placards, etc. Therefore, the STATE has entered the world of commerce.
        The U.S. Supreme Court in United States vs. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 held:
        When governments enter the world of commerce, they are subject to the same burdens as any private firm or corporation.
        Governments are corporations, see Penhallow vs. Doane, 3 Dall. 55.
        Where the Commonwealth or its agencies appear in Court they are bound by all the rules of evidence, pleadings and procedure which apply to private litigants. Appeal of Clarendon V.F.W. vs. Home Ass’n, 167 Pa Super. 44 (Pa.Super. 1950).
        The government is held to the same procedural rules and standards as the Petitioner, Wilson vs. O’Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1990).
        The requisites of due process are as necessary in administrative as in judicial proceedings. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14. Com. ex rel. Chidsey vs. Mallen, 63 A.2d 49, 360 Pa. 606 (Pa. 1949).
        22. The Department of Transportation is an administrative agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and subject to the Administrative Code of 1929, and the Commonwealth must exhaust its administrative remedies just like any other private firm litigant, or corporation. 1 P.L.E. 228 et seq. (1986) Administrative Law and Procedures, Sections 1 et seq. Also see, Angelos License, 80 D. & C.49, 50-54 (1951); Administrative Agency Law, approved June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388, 71 PS 1701.1.
        Legislature may delegate or grant only those legislative powers which are constitutionally permitted, Denbow vs. Borough of Leetsdale, 729 A.2d 481, 556 Pa. 567 (1999).
        Legislature cannot constitutionally delegate power to make law to any other branch of government or to any other body or authority, Sullivan vs. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver’s Licensing, 708 A.2d 481, 550 Pa. 639 (1998).
        Legislature is constitutionally restrained from delegating their legislative power to any other branch of government or to any other body or authority. Const. Art. 2, Sec.1, Common Cause/Pennsylvania vs. Com., 710 A.2d 108.
        The legislature may delegate policymaking authority to an administrative agency, so long as the legislature makes the basic policy choices and establishes adequate standards which will guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative functions, Whitlatch vs. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 715 A.2d 387, 552 Pa. 298, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 1068,143 L.Ed.2d 71.
        Legislature may delegate policymaking authority to administrative agency, so long as the legislature makes basic policy choices and establishes adequate standards which will guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative functions, Sullivan vs. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver’s Licensing, 708 A.2d 481, 550 Pa. 639 (1998).
        The doctrine of primary jurisdiction guides a court in determining whether it should restrain its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some questions or some aspect of some question arising in the proceedings before the court, Garner vs. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776 (A.F.L.), 74 S.Ct. 161, 346 U.S. 485, 98 L.Ed. 228 (1954); Lilian v. Com., 354 A.2d 250, 467 Pa. 15 (1976).
        “Primary Jurisdiction” is in essence, doctrine of judicial restraint and provides that, where court determines administrative agency should make initial determination in case, court will not decide issues presented by the case but will defer to agency, Elizabeth Tp. vs. Power Maintenance Corp., 417 A.2d 1285, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 270 (1980).
        An important consideration in determining whether the court should defer to an administrative agency based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the statutory purpose in the creation of the agency, the powers granted by the Legislature and the powers withheld, Elkin vs. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania, 420 A.2d 371, 491 Pa. 123 (1980).
        Courts will not take original jurisdiction where statute conferring primary jurisdiction on administrative agency provides for mode of judicial review of decision of agency, as by appeal, Hogan vs. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 83 A.2d 386, 169 Pa.Super. 554 (1951).
        The power of the court is judicial only, and not administrative and investigative. Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. vs. Kalonder, 145 F.2d 316, cert. denied 65 S.Ct. 1404, 325 U.S. 867, 89 L.Ed. 1986 (1944).
        Plaintiff must exhaust all required administrative remedies before bringing claim for judicial relief. Robinson vs. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018 (C.A.3 (Pa.) 1997).
        The doctrine of “exhaustion of administrative remedies” applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone, and judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. U.S. vs. Radio Corp. of America, 79 S.Ct. 457, 358 U.S. 334, 3 L.Ed.2d 354 (U.S. Pa. 1959).
        23. The Department of Transportation is an executive agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
        24. The Department of Transportation has not done its findings of fact and conclusions of law and submitted its proposed report for judicial review in this case. Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction is squarely challenged. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania cannot proceed until it proves that this court has subject matter jurisdiction, ab initio, pursuant to 67 Pa. Code §491.10 Hearings and §491.11, Proposed Report, but only after the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ has made his decision with findings of fact, conclusions of law and issues the order/decision.
        25. The Unified Judicial System (42 Pa.C.S. §301) is a *legislative court that has trespassed subject matter jurisdiction, first instance (district magistrate level), and continues to do so, by way of appeals throughout the entire judicial system.
        *Legislative courts. Courts created by legislature not named or described by Constitution, Gorham vs. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 186 A.832.
        26. The Commonwealth’s silence can also be equated with fraud. U.S. vs. Tweel, 550 F.2d 299-301 (5th Cir. 1977). In the United States vs. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied; 400 U.S. 831, 91 S.Ct. 62, 27 L.Ed.2d 62:
        The Prudden court stated:
        “Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.
        Prudden, supra, p. 1032
        “[3] From the facts we find that the agent’s failure to apprise the appellant of obvious criminal nature of this investigation was a sneaky and deliberate deception by the agent under the above standard and a flagrant disregard for appellant’s rights. The silent misrepresentation was both intentionally misleading and material. Any findings to the contrary under the facts of this case are clearly erroneous.”
        Judgment should be granted in favor of Petitioner for want of answers. Williams vs Lucas, 376 Pa. 413, 103 A.2d 675 (1954); Kehley vs. Deitrick Hunting Club, Inc., 60 Lack. Jur. 105 (1958).

        NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT,
        NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE PRINCIPAL.

        WHEREFORE, the Appellant respectfully requests that the Honorable Court dismiss this case with prejudice for want of prosecution by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department of Transportation, as the NORTH LONDONDERY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Local Authority, acted and/or exceeded its authority. Award any other relief to the Appellant the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.
        Date: Respectfully submitted,
        “Without Prejudice”
        _______________________________
        George Konevitch, Sui Juris,
        Appellant/Petitioner.
        2130 Colebrook Road
        Lebanon Post Office (17042)
        Lebanon, Pennsylvania
        United States of America Republic
        United States of America
        Pennsylvania state  Amended
        Lebanon county SS.  AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE.
        Fifty-second Judicial district  [321 Pa. 7-11]
        Lebanon city

        I, George Konevitch, Sui Juris, being duly sworn deposes and say that I am the Appellant and Aggrieved Party in the foregoing matter, and that the facts contained herein the Petition to Show Cause Why the Summary Convictions Should Not Be Dismissed With Prejudice for Want of Prosecution by the Commonwealth’s Department of Transportation and the Statements herein are true, correct, certain and not misleading to the best of My knowledge, belief and information.
        L.S. __________________________________ Seal
        George Konevitch, Sui Juris, Affiant.
        Appellant/Aggrieved Party.
        SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this ___ day of January, A.D., 2008.
        _____________________ Seal
        Notary Public


        LEGAL COMMENTARY.

        An unrebutted Affidavit of Defense is prima facie evidence.  An affidavit not rebutted or contradicted is prima facie evidence and will remain sufficient in the judgment of the law to establish a given fact or group or chain of facts, State vs. Burlingame, 146 Mo. 207, 48 S.W. 72, 6 Pet. 632, 1 Starkie, Ev. 544. Indeed, no more than [affidavit] is necessary to make the prima facie case. United States vs. Kis, 658 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1981); certiorari denied 50 U.S.L.W. 2169; S.Ct. March 22, 1982. In Pennsylvania ex rel. Hendrickson vs. Meyers, 393 Pa. 224, 228, 144 A.2d 367, 370 (1958), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:

        “[6] The Supreme Court, adopting the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, defined “evidence” as any species of proof legally presented at the trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through the medium of witnesses, records, documents, concrete objects, etc.”

        In Lautek Corp. vs. Unemployment Board of Review, 138 Pa.Cmwlth. Ct. 547, 552 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1991) the Court held:
        “Hence, the evidence presented need not be limited to testimony of the claimant. Evidence also encompasses testimony of witnesses, introduction of records, and submitted documents.”

        CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

        The undersigned does hereby certify that he did in fact cause to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument(s) upon the person(s) named below, by depositing the same said, postage prepaid in the U.S. Postal Service, addressed as follows and/or in the manner indicated:

        VIA HAND DELIVERY:
        Lackawanna County District Attorneys Office
        200 N. Washington Avenue
        Scranton, PA 18503
        Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
        Department of Transportation
        200 State Office Building, Room B—2
        100 Lackawanna Avenue
        Scranton, PA 18503
        Date: January __, 2008 _____________________________
        Gerald Steven., Lepre, Sui Juris,
        Appellant/Aggrieved Party.


        “Section 5. Every person desiring to operate a motor-vehicle as a chauffer, or as a paid operator, shall first obtain a driver’s license.”

        Appellant/Private Man has an inviolate right to trial by jury, Article 1, Section 6, Pennsylvania Constitution and this matter exceeds twenty dollars ($20.00) Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution for these united States of America, 1787, and its proper amendments, and Federal Bill of Rights, 1789. Also see, Laws of Pennsylvania, 1909, Act No. 174, at Section 18, to wit:
        “Section 18. ……That any person, so accused, may secure the right of trial by jury, before the court of quarter sessions of the peace for the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,….”














        In the court of Common Pleas in/for
        Lackawanna county, Forty-fifth Judicial district,
        Scranton, Pennsylvania commonwealth.
        COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : Case No. 08 S. 0003
        Department of Transportation,
        Appellee,
        vs. :
        Gerald Steven., Lepre, Sui Juris, : TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED.
        Appellant/Aggrieved Party.
        ___________________________________ :


        RULE TO SHOW CAUSE.
        AND NOW, this ___ day of ______________, A.D., 200__, upon due and careful consideration of the within Petition to Show Cause Why the Summary Convictions Should Not be Dismissed With Prejudice for Want of Prosecution by the Commonwealth’s Department of Transportation, it is hereby ORDERED that a RULE TO SHOW CAUSE is issued upon the Executive Agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to appear and show cause why the appeal from all summary convictions should not be granted, as prayed for in the within Petition.
        RULE RETURNABLE AND ANSWERS ARE DUE FIVE (5) DAYS PRIOR TO THE HEARING _______________, 200__, A.D., at __:__ __.m., in Courtroom # __, Lackawanna county Courthouse, 200 N. Washington Avenue, Scranton, Pennsylvania.
        RULE RETURNABLE is due by ___________________, 200 ___, by ____:00 p.m.


                            seal of court BY THE COURT:
                   
           















        In the court of Common Pleas in/for
        Lackawanna county, Forty-fifth Judicial district,
        Scranton, Pennsylvania commonwealth.


        COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : Case No. 08 S. 0003
        Department of Transportation,
        Appellee,
        vs. :
        Gerald Steven., Lepre, Sui Juris, : TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED.
        Appellant/Aggrieved Party.
        ___________________________________ :


        Petition to Show Cause Why the Summary Convictions
        Should Not be Dismissed With Prejudice for Want of Prosecution by the Commonwealth’s Department of Transportation.
        ___________________________________

        TO THE HONORABLE, THE JUDGES OF THE SAID COURT:

        AND NOW COMES, the abovesaid Appellant/Petitioner/Movant, by pro se, submitting this Petition to Show Cause why the summary convictions should not be dismissed with prejudice for want of prosecution by the Commonwealth’s Department of Transportation, and represents:
        1. The Appellant/Aggrieved Party abovesaid is a private man living on the land who receives post at: General Delivery, Harford Post Office (18823-9999), Harford, Pennsylvania Republic.
        2. The appellee/accuser is a corporate entity for the de facto state also known as the COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. The corporate seal is affixed to the certified driving record in this case. Please take judicial notice: that the corporate seal is not the official state seal when inspecting the sealed document from the bureau of driver’s licensing (corporate entity). Also, see 28 U.S.C. §3002 (2) and (15)(A).
        3. The prosecuting witness, MARK TRAVIS WATERS (MTW), in this case is a patrolman for the ARCHBALD POLICE DEPARTMENT (APD) for the BOROUGH of ARCHBALD, PENNSYLVANIA (BAP).
        Prosecuting witness. The private person upon whom complaint or information a criminal accusation is founded and whose testimony is mainly relied on to secure a conviction at the trial; in a more particular sense, the person who was chiefly injured, in person or property, by the act constituting the alleged crime, (as in cases of robbery, assault, criminal negligence, bastardy, and the like,) and who instigates the prosecution and gives evidence. Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, West Publishing Company (1968), page 1385.
        4. All offenses filed by MTW are under the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code (PAVC), Title 75 Pa.C.S.
        5. All offenses filed by MTW under PAVC are not within MTW’s purview, as they are all outside of his specific duties and powers as listed in Part V, Chapter 61 of the PAVC, specifically §6109 et seq., as a Local authority. Please take judicial notice: of 75 Pa.C.S. §6102(a) and 6102 (b) refer to legal definitions at 75 Pa.C.S. §102.
        6. The Department of Transportation (DOT) for this Commonwealth is vested with the original primary jurisdiction for the administration and enforcement of the PAVC, as per 75 Pa.C.S. §6102(a).
        7. DOT has not filed or lodged any violations of the PAVC against the abovesaid Appellant/Aggrieved Party, to date. MTW is the person who subjected the private man abovesaid to the PAVC on behalf of the APD, the Local authority, as set forth in 75 Pa.C.S. §6102 (b), as defined in 75 Pa.C.S. §102 with specific powers and duties set forth in 75 Pa.C.S. §6109 et seq.
        8. The PAVC is a commercial revenue scheme to protect the PUBLIC WELFARE and SAFETY of the state for those who use the public streets and highways to conduct their business as a paid driver/operator hauling freight and/or passengers for fares and fees. The Appellant/Private Man does not own a ‘motor vehicle’ by definition.
        The words of art “Motor Vehicle” as defined in 18 U.S.C. §31:
        “means every description of a carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property and or cargo;
        “Used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit; (Emphasis added).
        9. The PAVC does not pertain to the private man using and enjoying the use of his private property. (The private property/mode of conveyance for today’s travel is the family car/automobile). See, the Application of the Act (PAVC) in the Laws of Pennsylvania, 1903, Act No. 202, Section 13, to wit:
        “Section 13. This act shall not apply to…. , not for his private use or for hire.”
        In 1905, the Application of the Act (PAVC) in the Laws of Pennsylvania, 1903, Act No. 159, Section 12, to wit:
        “Section 12. This act shall not apply to…., not for hire or for his private use.”
        10. The abovesaid Appelllant/Private Man does not operate a motor vehicle on the streets and highways—traveled paths/rights of way/easements. A driver/chauffer or an operator of a motor vehicle is paid for driving, as set forth in the Pennsylvania Laws of 1909, at Section 5, to wit:
        “Section 5. Every person desiring to operate a motor-vehicle as a chauffer, or as a paid operator, shall first obtain a driver’s license.”
        Appellant/Private Man has an inviolate right to trial by jury, Article 1, Section 6, Pennsylvania Constitution and this matter exceeds twenty dollars ($20.00) Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution for these united States of America, 1787, and its proper amendments, and Federal Bill of Rights, 1789. Also see, Laws of Pennsylvania, 1909, Act No. 174, at Section 18, to wit:
        “Section 18. ……That any person, so accused, may secure the right of trial by jury, before the court of quarter sessions of the peace for the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,….”
        11. All actions arising the PAVC are civil and not criminal in nature, as set froth by the Laws of Pennsylvania, 1903, Act No. 202, Section 11, to wit:
        “Section 11. All civil actions for damages arising from the use and operation of any motor vehicle as aforesaid, shall be brought in the city or county in which the alleged damages were sustained, and service of process shall be made by the sheriff, in person or by deputy, in any part of the Commonwealth, in like manner as process may now be served in the proper county.”
        In 1905, Act No. 159, Section 9, to wit:
        “Section 11. All civil actions for damages arising from the use and operation of any motor vehicle as aforesaid, may be brought in the city or county in which the alleged damages were sustained, and service of process may be made by the sheriff, in person or by deputy, in any part of the Commonwealth, in like manner as process may now be served in the proper county.”
        Non-jailable traffic offenses under the Vehicle Code are civil in nature, see Welsh vs. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 80 L.ed.2d 732, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (1985).
        12. No civil complaints were ever filed in the case on the abovesaid Appellant/Private Man who is not the surety/guarantor for GERALD LEPRE.
        13. Service of process was not conducted by the sheriff or his deputy in this case, as these commercial presentments were sent in the United States Mails.
        See the notorious landmark case, Erie R.R. vs. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which, in effect, recognized the bankruptcy of the nation, and the rule of public policy statutes in a commercial jurisdiction, over public law statutes in a common law jurisdiction.
        14. The APD is not an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as per the Administrative Law and Procedures Act, set forth in Title 2 Pa.C.S. §101 et seq.
        Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius. (Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). Fazio vs. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 321 Pa. 7, 182 A.2d 696, 698; The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated—Mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
        The legal definition term ‘Strict Constructionism’ applies in this matter. See legal definition of term in Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition (1999) published by West Publishing Group on page 1434, written below for convenience:
        “Strict constructionism. The doctrinal view of judicial construction holding that judges should interpret a document or a statute (esp. one involving penal sanctions) according to its literal terms, without looking to other sources to ascertain the meaning. See strict construction, literal canon, literal rule and textualism.” (Emphasis added).
        Pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §1921 et seq, the Court is to follow the intent of the law as it is written.
        When certain persons or things are specified in law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. Little vs. Town of Conway, 171 S.C. 27, 170. S.E. 447, 448.
        Under this maxim, if a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded. People vs. One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck, Engine No. 99T370053, License No. P.8410, 159 P.2d 641, 642.
        15. it is believed and further averred, that the Lackawanna County District Attorneys Office (LCDA) will be prosecuting this case on appeal of the summary conviction on behalf of the Commonwealth and DOT. Also, the Rules of Procedure for Criminal Summary Trials does not apply to the Vehicle Code. See, 10 P.L.E. 477 et seq. (1970) Summary Trial. Sections 192 et seq. Moreover, the rules of common law govern the procedures regarding Summary Offenses. See, Com. vs. Walter, 39 D. & C. 383, 29 Del. 536 (1941); Com. vs. Liller, 12 Lanc. Bar 188 (1881).
        16. The LCDA and its assistants are employees of Lackawanna county, municipality/ board/local authority, and they are not officers of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, see, Schroeck vs. Pennsylvania State Police, 26 Cmwlth. Ct. 41, 362 A.2d 486 (1976).
        The Commonwealth Court held that the district attorney and his assistants are not officers of the Commonwealth.
        17. A traffic citation is an ex-parte information—commercial presentment and/or a negotiable instrument. (A commercial presentment is a demand for payment of money).
        18. Under the Pennsylvania Negotiable Instruments Law, one has to have a valid claim for damages and/or injury in his person or property, MTW as the prosecuting witness has not suffered a loss or injury in his person or property, therefore, MTW has no valid or bona fide claim for damages. See, Article 3 §3-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and codified in 13 Pa.C.S. §3504.
        19. It is mandatory for the Court to take judicial notice, as per Article 2, Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 (d) when it is given the required necessary information. The necessary required information was sent to the district magistrate’s office, but to no avail. (Justice delayed is Justice denied!).
        20. Regarding rules of evidence, when a person makes a false statement all acts or omissions are deemed to be false, as set forth by a Maxim of Law/Principle of Law. See,
        Falsus In Uno, Falsus In Omnibus. (False in one thing, false in everything). The Santisima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 339, 5 L.Ed. 454, Dawson vs. Bertolini, 70 R.I. 325, 38
        A.2d 765, 768.
        21. MTW knew that the registration on the private owned automobile was current but filed an unsworn falsification to authorities by way of traffic citation, anyways. When a person makes application for registration in Pennsylvania that person has to provide the Automobile Insurance Company name, policy number, NICC number, mileage, expiration date before the registration card is mailed back to the person. Again, MTW made another unsworn falsification to authorities by way of traffic citation. In deliberate and willful direct violation of 18 Pa. Criminal Code §4904.
        The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania provides services to its customers just like any other private firm or corporation. The STATE sells its registration plates/tags, licenses, handicap placards, etc. Therefore, the STATE has entered the world of commerce.
        The U.S. Supreme Court in United States vs. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 held:
        When governments enter the world of commerce, they are subject to the same burdens as any private firm or corporation.
        Governments are corporations, see Penhallow vs. Doane, 3 Dall. 55.
        Where the Commonwealth or its agencies appear in Court they are bound by all the rules of evidence, pleadings and procedure which apply to private litigants. Appeal of Clarendon V.F.W. vs. Home Ass’n, 167 Pa Super. 44 (Pa.Super. 1950).
        The government is held to the same procedural rules and standards as the Petitioner, Wilson vs. O’Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1990).
        The requisites of due process are as necessary in administrative as in judicial proceedings. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14. Com. ex rel. Chidsey vs. Mallen, 63 A.2d 49, 360 Pa. 606 (Pa. 1949).
        22. The Department of Transportation is an administrative agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and subject to the Administrative Code of 1929, and the Commonwealth must exhaust its administrative remedies just like any other private firm litigant, or corporation. 1 P.L.E. 228 et seq. (1986) Administrative Law and Procedures, Sections 1 et seq. Also see, Angelos License, 80 D. & C.49, 50-54 (1951); Administrative Agency Law, approved June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388, 71 PS 1701.1.
        Legislature may delegate or grant only those legislative powers which are constitutionally permitted, Denbow vs. Borough of Leetsdale, 729 A.2d 481, 556 Pa. 567 (1999).
        Legislature cannot constitutionally delegate power to make law to any other branch of government or to any other body or authority, Sullivan vs. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver’s Licensing, 708 A.2d 481, 550 Pa. 639 (1998).
        Legislature is constitutionally restrained from delegating their legislative power to any other branch of government or to any other body or authority. Const. Art. 2, Sec.1, Common Cause/Pennsylvania vs. Com., 710 A.2d 108.
        The legislature may delegate policymaking authority to an administrative agency, so long as the legislature makes the basic policy choices and establishes adequate standards which will guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative functions, Whitlatch vs. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 715 A.2d 387, 552 Pa. 298, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 1068,143 L.Ed.2d 71.
        Legislature may delegate policymaking authority to administrative agency, so long as the legislature makes basic policy choices and establishes adequate standards which will guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative functions, Sullivan vs. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver’s Licensing, 708 A.2d 481, 550 Pa. 639 (1998).
        The doctrine of primary jurisdiction guides a court in determining whether it should restrain its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some questions or some aspect of some question arising in the proceedings before the court, Garner vs. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776 (A.F.L.), 74 S.Ct. 161, 346 U.S. 485, 98 L.Ed. 228 (1954); Lilian v. Com., 354 A.2d 250, 467 Pa. 15 (1976).
        “Primary Jurisdiction” is in essence, doctrine of judicial restraint and provides that, where court determines administrative agency should make initial determination in case, court will not decide issues presented by the case but will defer to agency, Elizabeth Tp. vs. Power Maintenance Corp., 417 A.2d 1285, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 270 (1980).
        An important consideration in determining whether the court should defer to an administrative agency based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the statutory purpose in the creation of the agency, the powers granted by the Legislature and the powers withheld, Elkin vs. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania, 420 A.2d 371, 491 Pa. 123 (1980).
        Courts will not take original jurisdiction where statute conferring primary jurisdiction on administrative agency provides for mode of judicial review of decision of agency, as by appeal, Hogan vs. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 83 A.2d 386, 169 Pa.Super. 554 (1951).
        The power of the court is judicial only, and not administrative and investigative. Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. vs. Kalonder, 145 F.2d 316, cert. denied 65 S.Ct. 1404, 325 U.S. 867, 89 L.Ed. 1986 (1944).
        Plaintiff must exhaust all required administrative remedies before bringing claim for judicial relief. Robinson vs. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018 (C.A.3 (Pa.) 1997).
        The doctrine of “exhaustion of administrative remedies” applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone, and judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. U.S. vs. Radio Corp. of America, 79 S.Ct. 457, 358 U.S. 334, 3 L.Ed.2d 354 (U.S. Pa. 1959).
        23. The Department of Transportation is an executive agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
        24. The Department of Transportation has not done its findings of fact and conclusions of law and submitted its proposed report for judicial review in this case. Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction is squarely challenged. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania cannot proceed until it proves that this court has subject matter jurisdiction, ab initio, pursuant to 67 Pa. Code §491.10 Hearings and §491.11, Proposed Report, but only after the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ has made his decision with findings of fact, conclusions of law and issues the order/decision.
        25. The Unified Judicial System (42 Pa.C.S. §301) is a *legislative court that has trespassed subject matter jurisdiction, first instance (district magistrate level), and continues to do so, by way of appeals throughout the entire judicial system.
        *Legislative courts. Courts created by legislature not named or described by Constitution, Gorham vs. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 186 A.832.
        26. The Commonwealth’s silence can also be equated with fraud. U.S. vs. Tweel, 550 F.2d 299-301 (5th Cir. 1977). In the United States vs. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied; 400 U.S. 831, 91 S.Ct. 62, 27 L.Ed.2d 62:
        The Prudden court stated:
        “Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.
        Prudden, supra, p. 1032
        “[3] From the facts we find that the agent’s failure to apprise the appellant of obvious criminal nature of this investigation was a sneaky and deliberate deception by the agent under the above standard and a flagrant disregard for appellant’s rights. The silent misrepresentation was both intentionally misleading and material. Any findings to the contrary under the facts of this case are clearly erroneous.”
        Judgment should be granted in favor of Petitioner for want of answers. Williams vs Lucas, 376 Pa. 413, 103 A.2d 675 (1954); Kehley vs. Deitrick Hunting Club, Inc., 60 Lack. Jur. 105 (1958).




        NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT,
        NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE PRINCIPAL.

        WHEREFORE, the Appellant respectfully requests that the Honorable Court dismiss this case with prejudice for want of prosecution by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department of Transportation, as the ARCHBALD POLICE DEPARTMENT, Local Authority, acted and/or exceeded its authority. Award any other relief to the Appellant the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.
        Date: Respectfully submitted,
        “Without Prejudice”
        _______________________________
        Gerald Steven., Lepre, Sui Juris,
        Appellant/Petitioner.
        General Delivery
        Harford Post Office (18823-9999)
        Harford, Pennsylvania Republic
        United States of America
        United States of America
        Pennsylvania state
        Lackawanna county SS.  AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE.
        Forty-fifth Judicial district  [321 Pa. 7-11]
        Scranton city

        I, Gerald Steven., Lepre, Sui Juris, being duly sworn deposes and say that I am the Appellant and Aggrieved Party in the foregoing matter, and that the facts contained herein the Petition to Show Cause Why the Summary Convictions Should Not Be Dismissed With Prejudice for Want of Prosecution by the Commonwealth’s Department of Transportation and the Statements herein are true, correct, certain and not misleading to the best of My knowledge, belief and information.
        L.S. __________________________________ Seal
        Gerald Steven., Lepre, Sui Juris, Affiant.
        Appellant/Aggrieved Party.
        SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this ___ day of January, A.D., 2008.
        _____________________ Seal
        Notary Public
        LEGAL COMMENTARY.

        An unrebutted Affidavit of Defense is prima facie evidence.  An affidavit not rebutted or contradicted is prima facie evidence and will remain sufficient in the judgment of the law to establish a given fact or group or chain of facts, State vs. Burlingame, 146 Mo. 207, 48 S.W. 72, 6 Pet. 632, 1 Starkie, Ev. 544. Indeed, no more than [affidavit] is necessary to make the prima facie case. United States vs. Kis, 658 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1981); certiorari denied 50 U.S.L.W. 2169; S.Ct. March 22, 1982. In Pennsylvania ex rel. Hendrickson vs. Meyers, 393 Pa. 224, 228, 144 A.2d 367, 370 (1958), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:

        “[6] The Supreme Court, adopting the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, defined “evidence” as any species of proof legally presented at the trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through the medium of witnesses, records, documents, concrete objects, etc.”



        In Lautek Corp. vs. Unemployment Board of Review, 138 Pa.Cmwlth. Ct. 547, 552 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1991) the Court held:
        “Hence, the evidence presented need not be limited to testimony of the claimant. Evidence also encompasses testimony of witnesses, introduction of records, and submitted documents.”

        CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

        The undersigned does hereby certify that he did in fact cause to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument(s) upon the person(s) named below, by depositing the same said, postage prepaid in the U.S. Postal Service, addressed as follows and/or in the manner indicated:

        VIA HAND DELIVERY:
        Lackawanna County District Attorneys Office
        200 N. Washington Avenue
        Scranton, PA 18503
        Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
        Department of Transportation
        200 State Office Building, Room B—2
        100 Lackawanna Avenue
        Scranton, PA 18503
        Date: January __, 20______
        _____________________________
        Gerald Steven., Lepre, Sui Juris,
        Appellant/Aggrieved Party.



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      • Michael Noonan
        ... I cannot comment on what you are trying to do because it is too much to read without understanding, simply, what you are trying to do. However, either you
        Message 3 of 9 , Feb 19, 2008
        • 0 Attachment
          --- Pro Se <proseinpa3@...> wrote:

          > George Konevitch, Sui Juris, :

          and then wrote:

          > AND NOW COMES, the abovesaid
          > Appellant/Petitioner/Movant, by pro se,

          I cannot comment on what you are trying to do because
          it is too much to read without understanding, simply,
          what you are trying to do.

          However, either you are sui juris, or pro se, the
          latter being a very poor choice.

          mn


          ____________________________________________________________________________________
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        • Pro Se
          This is not my appeal nor motion but a friend s... this has been evolving We did get a REPLY [yesterday] for the D.A. from that county We ll post soon. Any
          Message 4 of 9 , Feb 19, 2008
          • 0 Attachment
            This is not my appeal nor motion
            but a friend's...
            this has been evolving

            We did  get a  REPLY [yesterday] for the D.A.
            from that county

            We'll post soon. Any suggestion on rd. 2 or 3
            we welcome.


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          • Frog Farmer
            ... In all that paperwork, there sure were a lot of facts and court case citations. I think I ve mentioned before my idea of making a set of trading cards
            Message 5 of 9 , Feb 21, 2008
            • 0 Attachment
              Pro Se posted:

              > COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, :
              > Case No. CP-38-SA-73007
              > Motion to Dismiss the Summary Conviction
              > With Prejudice for Want of Prosecution by the Commonwealth's
              > Department of Transportation.

              In all that paperwork, there sure were a lot of facts and court case
              citations. I think I've mentioned before my idea of making a set of
              trading cards with only one of these legal facts per card, for example,
              "Indeed, no more than [affidavit] is necessary to make the prima facie
              case." United States vs. Kis, 658 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1981); certiorari
              denied 50 U.S.L.W. 2169; S.Ct. March 22, 1982

              I can't tell you how many times I've seen people told that they were
              being prosecuted and asked for a plea, but there was never an affidavit
              signed as a complaint. They don't know any better and waive it. So
              they end up convicted and either fined or imprisoned, all for nothing,
              because they didn't ever read that an affidavit is a requirement that
              can be waived. Too bad.

              One could easily compile a deck of over 52 cards out of that paperwork
              alone, and I am recommending that those new to court and new to fighting
              for their rights as others try to disparage them treat legal facts like
              single building blocks for their defenses. As I was reading that
              paperwork, I thought, "Hmmm...legal principles seem to be almost
              universal at some level - many of these facts apply and remain true in
              California as well even though these cases and statutes were obtained in
              Pennsylvania." I recognized many points that I myself had used in my
              driver's license cases, but there were new elements in this stuff too.
              This was better at putting "first things first" than I was 30 years ago.
              Back then I wasn't knowledgeable enough to recognize the "primary
              jurisdiction" issue in those words. I used the same fact, that agencies
              had to have exhausted their administrative remedies, but not those
              words, "primary jurisdiction" and those words would have helped me a lot
              back then. As it turns out I didn't need them, which leads me to
              another thought on treating these factoids like trading cards ("Collect
              a set today!!"):
              You never need all of them to win your case. You only need enough to
              make your opponents realize they look like fools and idiots, which as
              you could see, might not be very hard to do.

              If everyone could absorb the gist of that paperwork and apply it to
              every legal case they are compelled into today, including the
              disqualification of players (like the cop who had no authority to
              represent the state agency in Pennsylvania) and the refusal to permit
              violations of due process (evidenced by the effort expended to produce
              and file that paperwork, as opposed to other people who might just write
              a check for whatever fine was requested of them) I think most would win
              their cases, because the same pattern of racketeering activity is
              showing up everywhere. Everything is "all about the money". Don't look
              now, but the bovine excrement is already making contact with the
              rotating blades of the air circulation device. The hyperinflation is
              upon those who are dependent upon the hyper-inflating medium, namely the
              imaginary credits evidenced in the physical world by FRNs. Those able
              to distance themselves from that commercial fraud will be less badly
              affected by the fall-out that is coming from it. We are living in
              historic times. Fiat currencies don't always fail during the lifetimes
              of their victims. Things will be new and different for sure!

              Anyway, collect those trading cards and have fun putting them together
              in ever more new and beautiful arrangements, because when the empire
              falls, you will have as much "primary jurisdiction" to be free and
              independent as any approaching would-be tyrant. You will get the
              government you deserve, and in the absence and vacuum of anything
              legitimate, you can actually BE the sovereign entity "on the ground".

              Regards,

              FF
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