Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.
 

Municipal Ordinance Violations are CIVIL SUITS not CRIMINAL PROCEDINGS!

Expand Messages
  • Jason Muhammad
    Many people complain about municipal ordinances and the actions that stem from accusations of violations of them. Many people falsely assume they are criminal
    Message 1 of 2 , Oct 2, 2007
      Many people complain about municipal ordinances and the actions that stem from accusations of violations of them. Many people falsely assume they are criminal proceedings and then feel they are getting railroaded by the courts. This frustration stems from the fact that actions based on Municipal ordinance violations are CIVIL SUITS and thus the standard of proof is by a "preponderance of evidence" and NOT "beyond a reasonable doubt" as it is in CRIMINAL CASES:

      A prosecution for the violation of a municipal ordinance and to recover a fine or penalty, while quasi-criminal in nature, is civil in form and is tried and reviewed as a civil proceeding. (Village of Mundelein v. Aaron (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 134, 135, 445 N.E.2d 57.) Thus, the village bears the burden of proving the violation of its municipal ordinance by a clear preponderance of the evidence. See City of Chicago v. Joyce (1967), 38 Ill.2d 368, 373, 232 N.E.2d 289; City of Chicago v. Severini (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 38, 42, 414 N.E.2d 67.
      Village of Mundelein v. Taylor, 474 N.E.2d 843, 130 Ill. App.3d 819 (Ill.App. Dist.1 01/31/1985)

      The enforcement of an ordinance by a municipality is not a criminal proceeding which falls under the criminal code and therefore the rule is that a prosecution for the violation of a municipal ordinance to recover a fine or penalty from a defendant, while quasi-criminal in nature, is civil in form and is tried and reviewed as a civil proceeding and not as a criminal prosecution. Highland Park v. Curtis (2d Dist. 1967), 83 Ill. App.2d 218, 226 N.E.2d 870.
      City of Creve Coeur v. Pelletier, 358 N.E.2d 1355, 45 Ill. App.3d 59 (Ill.App. Dist.1 01/11/1977)


      The defendant's contention that only the court may determine the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is founded on the false assumption that the action against the defendant for the violation of the ordinance is a criminal proceeding. In Village of New Athens v. Casperson, 202 Ill. App. 555 (1916), the court stated at pages 556 and 557:

      "Appellant complains in this court that the trial court erred in its instructions as to the form of verdict and that it was for the jury and not the court to fix the penalty. This was clearly a civil action governed by the rules of civil procedure, and therefore the jury alone could determine the amount of the penalty. In Hoyer v. Town of Mascoutah, 59 Ill. 137, the court stated in its opinion: `It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proceeding to collect a penalty for the violation of a town ordinance is a civil suit. Such a penalty cannot be recovered in any criminal proceeding. Town of Jacksonville v. Block, 36 Ill. 507; Graubner v. City of Jacksonville, 50 Ill. 87. The fact that the offense charged was assault and battery does not change the character of the proceedings. It is still a civil suit. The town only acquires jurisdiction because the offense is prohibited by ordinance.' See also, City of Chicago v. Knobel, 232 Ill. 112; McLain v. City of Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 489. In City of Chicago v. Kenney, 35 Ill. App. 57, it was held: `The proceeding must be in the corporate name of the city, and is a civil action in form, debt, and governed in all respects by the rules of procedure in civil cases.'

      City of Highland Park v. Curtis, 83 Ill. App.2d 218, 226 N.E.2d 870 (Ill.App. Dist.3 05/24/1967)

      Most of the issues people are dealing with in Municipal tribunals stem from the "the false assumption that the action against the defendant for the violation of the ordinance is a criminal proceeding." City of Highland Park v. Curtis Supra. That false assumption is the cause of most of the problems people have with municipalities. For a complete understanding of the issue, read City of Highland Park v. Curtis.

      There is more:

      Village had no right to file an action to prosecute defendant for violation of Illinois Vehicle Code.
      Supreme Court Rules 504, S.H.A., ch 110A, § 504; S.H.A. ch 95 ½ §§ 11-904, 16-102. Village of Hoffman Estates vs. Spychalski 337 N.E.2d 463, 33 Ill. App. 3d. 83

      Village can not prosecute in its own name for Vehicle Code violation
      Village of Hoffman Estates vs. Johnson 337 N.E.2d 467, 33 Ill. App. 3d. 88

      The State's Attorney of the county in which the violation occurs shall prosecute all violations except when the violation occurs within the corporate limits of a municipality, the municipal attorney may prosecute if written permission to do so is obtained from the State's Attorney.
      625 ILCS 5/16‑102(c)

      There are more goodies in the State statutes the LIMIT what municipalities can and can not do. Read them and add them to your stockpile of legal ammunition!


      Windows Live Hotmail and Microsoft Office Outlook – together at last. Get it now!
    • Frog Farmer
      ... That becomes the truth when these same falsely assuming people initially waive their right to lawful process and accept quasi-criminal process in the
      Message 2 of 2 , Oct 2, 2007
        Jason Muhammad posted:

        > Many people complain about municipal ordinances and the actions that
        > stem from accusations of violations of them. Many people falsely
        > assume they are criminal proceedings and then feel they are getting
        > railroaded by the courts. This frustration stems from the fact that
        > actions based on Municipal ordinance violations are CIVIL SUITS and
        > thus the standard of proof is by a "preponderance of evidence" and NOT
        > "beyond a reasonable doubt" as it is in CRIMINAL CASES:

        That becomes the truth when these same "falsely assuming" people initially
        waive their right to lawful process and accept "quasi-criminal" process in
        the initial moment of confrontation. This action of waiver is usually
        always evidenced for the record under the falsely assuming person's own
        signature (not to mention admissions and confessions out of his own mouth
        even without torture being administered)! A good game for students for
        between law classes might be to examine a case and award a prize to the
        first student to accurately identify the correct moment of initial choice
        for waiver on the part of the falsely assuming one.

        > A prosecution for the violation of a municipal ordinance and to
        > recover a fine or penalty, while quasi-criminal in nature, is civil in
        > form and is tried and reviewed as a civil proceeding. (Village of
        > Mundelein v. Aaron (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 134, 135, 445 N.E.2d 57.)

        There's your "nature and form" for all you folks who think they won't tell
        you what it is. "Nature and cause" would be the above, coupled with the
        complaint, which would disclose the "cause of action", or would if you
        were demanding of rights plainly listed in the constitutions and statutes.

        > Thus, the village bears the burden of proving the violation of its
        > municipal ordinance by a clear preponderance of the evidence. See City
        > of Chicago v. Joyce (1967), 38 Ill.2d 368, 373, 232 N.E.2d 289; City
        > of Chicago v. Severini (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 38, 42, 414 N.E.2d 67.
        > Village of Mundelein v. Taylor, 474 N.E.2d 843, 130 Ill. App.3d 819
        > (Ill.App. Dist.1 01/31/1985)

        I used to ride my motorcycles all over those places, a long time before
        those cases occurred. It's good that little fiefdoms are regulated and
        that most of their weird but unique qualities are purely voluntary in
        nature and participation is a matter of choices being made, and
        consequences being experienced.

        > The enforcement of an ordinance by a municipality is not a criminal
        > proceeding which falls under the criminal code and therefore the rule
        > is that a prosecution for the violation of a municipal ordinance to
        > recover a fine or penalty from a defendant, while quasi-criminal in
        > nature, is civil in form and is tried and reviewed as a civil
        > proceeding and not as a criminal prosecution. Highland Park v. Curtis
        > (2d Dist. 1967), 83 Ill. App.2d 218, 226 N.E.2d 870.
        > City of Creve Coeur v. Pelletier, 358 N.E.2d 1355, 45 Ill. App.3d 59
        > (Ill.App. Dist.1 01/11/1977)

        Form over substance, the nature of the equity jurisdiction! What starts
        out as a common law case of rights and substance becomes a case of
        equitable privilege when the man with rights waives the first one and
        consents to what follows, probably joining the ranks of the "falsely
        assuming" along the way.

        > The defendant's contention that only the court may determine the
        > penalty for the violation of the ordinance is founded on the false
        > assumption that the action against the defendant for the violation of
        > the ordinance is a criminal proceeding. In Village of New Athens v.
        > Casperson, 202 Ill. App. 555 (1916), the court stated at pages 556 and
        > 557:
        >
        > "Appellant complains in this court that the trial court erred in its
        > instructions as to the form of verdict and that it was for the jury
        > and not the court to fix the penalty. This was clearly a civil action
        > governed by the rules of civil procedure, and therefore the jury alone
        > could determine the amount of the penalty. In Hoyer v. Town of
        > Mascoutah, 59 Ill. 137, the court stated in its opinion: `It has been
        > repeatedly held by this court that a proceeding to collect a penalty
        > for the violation of a town ordinance is a civil suit. Such a penalty
        > cannot be recovered in any criminal proceeding. Town of Jacksonville
        > v. Block, 36 Ill. 507; Graubner v. City of Jacksonville, 50 Ill. 87.
        > The fact that the offense charged was assault and battery does not
        > change the character of the proceedings. It is still a civil suit. The
        > town only acquires jurisdiction because the offense is prohibited by
        > ordinance.' See also, City of Chicago v. Knobel, 232 Ill. 112; McLain
        > v. City of Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 489. In City of Chicago v. Kenney,
        > 35 Ill. App. 57, it was held: `The proceeding must be in the corporate
        > name of the city, and is a civil action in form, debt, and governed in
        > all respects by the rules of procedure in civil cases.'
        > City of Highland Park v. Curtis, 83 Ill. App.2d 218, 226 N.E.2d 870
        > (Ill.App. Dist.3 05/24/1967)

        There's a lot there to digest but look at this: when a case is civil,
        there has to be an ordinance prohibiting the behavior AND the proceeding
        must be in the name of the city, which (hahahahaha!) means an attorney
        with all required credentials must be given power of attorney, and the job
        to practice law for the city. There's MY way out! But I have a better
        way out. It doesn't look like a way out to anyone I've met. It looks
        like a way in. We'll see it in this post.

        > Most of the issues people are dealing with in Municipal tribunals stem
        > from the "the false assumption that the action against the defendant
        > for the violation of the ordinance is a criminal proceeding." City of
        > Highland Park v. Curtis Supra. That false assumption is the cause of
        > most of the problems people have with municipalities. For a complete
        > understanding of the issue, read City of Highland Park v. Curtis.

        I'll have to read it later. I had a girlfriend in Highland Park, and use
        to lead detectives who used to tail me to Highland Park to lose them
        before going to my real destinations. They loved it.

        > There is more:
        >
        > Village had no right to file an action to prosecute defendant for
        > violation of Illinois Vehicle Code.
        > Supreme Court Rules 504, S.H.A., ch 110A, � 504; S.H.A. ch 95 � �� 11-
        > 904, 16-102. Village of Hoffman Estates vs. Spychalski 337 N.E.2d 463,
        > 33 Ill. App. 3d. 83

        I remember the land they built Hoffman Estates on, prairie in the middle
        of nowhere back then. Isn't this great, how you can deny these little
        fiefdoms their power trips that they obviously attempt on people? You
        might wonder how these questions get to court before a community thinks it
        has an answer to what I see as obvious. It proves nobody knows anything
        anymore and there is no consensus in the community for preserving the
        country formed by the founders.

        > The State's Attorney of the county in which the violation occurs shall
        > prosecute all violations except when the violation occurs within the
        > corporate limits of a municipality, the municipal attorney may
        > prosecute if written permission to do so is obtained from the State's
        > Attorney.
        > 625 ILCS 5/16-102(c)

        There's the "Walled City" of Olden Days in today's form. People seldom
        realize that they leave their rights going inside at the city gate. I
        avoid cities and when I venture into one, it's a definite thrill to emerge
        unscathed! Cities were originally built around places used by merchants
        who transacted business under their own "Law Merchant" (today's Uniform
        Commercial Code) and were generally outside the laws of the surrounding
        countryside (in equity as opposed to the common law). This special
        privilege existed inside the city walls as long as they stayed inside it.
        Inside it, they could enact whatever crazy laws they desired. Nobody was
        forced to enter the City. All who did could not look to the King to save
        them from the Merchants!

        > There are more goodies in the State statutes the LIMIT what
        > municipalities can and can not do. Read them and add them to your
        > stockpile of legal ammunition!

        I was just saying to someone yesterday, if you are new to law, and you
        haven't read any to speak of, it might be a great idea to start at the
        beginning with the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation,
        Constitution for the united States of America and your own state's
        constitution, and your local statutes and codes applicable to your own
        situation. As you read, use a yellow highlighter to highlight ANY "right"
        you encounter there. Soon you will have a big big list. I get asked for
        a list of rights all the time. I've never seen one and the only one I
        ever made on paper was of the ones between the making of the accusation
        against me and my prospective win at the supreme court. There were about
        100 or more on that list alone. Anyway, making a list of rights when you
        first come across them would be a great way to maximize the value of your
        time spent reading all this crap we need to know just to get by and live
        our lives from day to day!

        Okay, here's the point that got me to reply to this post about how it's
        civil and not criminal. What if you wanted to make it hard on them by
        keeping it criminal? It is YOUR CHOICE in the initial moment of
        confrontation. You FEEL like it's criminal when the cop has you lit up in
        front of all your passing neighbors, possibly with his hand on his taser
        or gun. But you turn it civil when you sign that "ticket" instead of
        saying, "My good man, I'm on a very important mission and you are
        interfering with my travels, not to mention other rights secured to me by
        the law of the land! If this matter is so important, I demand that you
        take me before the closest magistrate that he might inform you properly
        and I might be on my way!" I'd claim ignorance of having wandered into
        the city limits which were NOT delineated by a wall as they used to be to
        protect travelers from making the same mistake. My presence in the city
        is a mistake, and the magistrate will quickly recognize me as not being a
        merchant because when searched I will not be in possession of indicia of
        the commercial venue such as FRNS or licenses.

        Here's the California Penal Codes they enacted to let people waive their
        rights and change a criminal case into a civil quasi-criminal one:

        15. A crime or public offense is an act committed or omitted in
        violation of a law forbidding or commanding it, and to which is
        annexed, upon conviction, either of the following punishments:
        1. Death;
        2. Imprisonment;
        3. Fine;
        4. Removal from office; or,
        5. Disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust,
        or profit in this State.

        16. Crimes and public offenses include:
        1. Felonies;
        2. Misdemeanors; and
        3. Infractions.

        17. (a) A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by
        imprisonment in the state prison. Every other crime or public
        offense is a misdemeanor except those offenses that are classified as
        infractions.
        (b) When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by
        imprisonment in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the
        county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following
        circumstances:
        (1) After a judgment imposing a punishment other than imprisonment
        in the state prison.
        (2) When the court, upon committing the defendant to the Youth
        Authority, designates the offense to be a misdemeanor.
        (3) When the court grants probation to a defendant without
        imposition of sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on
        application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the
        court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor.
        (4) When the prosecuting attorney files in a court having
        jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses a complaint specifying that
        the offense is a misdemeanor, unless the defendant at the time of his
        or her arraignment or plea objects to the offense being made a
        misdemeanor, in which event the complaint shall be amended to charge
        the felony and the case shall proceed on the felony complaint.
        (5) When, at or before the preliminary examination or prior to
        filing an order pursuant to Section 872, the magistrate determines
        that the offense is a misdemeanor, in which event the case shall
        proceed as if the defendant had been arraigned on a misdemeanor
        complaint.
        (c) When a defendant is committed to the Youth Authority for a
        crime punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in
        the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, the
        offense shall, upon the discharge of the defendant from the Youth
        Authority, thereafter be deemed a misdemeanor for all purposes.
        (d) A violation of any code section listed in Section 19.8 is an
        infraction subject to the procedures described in Sections 19.6 and
        19.7 when:
        (1) The prosecutor files a complaint charging the offense as an
        infraction unless the defendant, at the time he or she is arraigned,
        after being informed of his or her rights, elects to have the case
        proceed as a misdemeanor, or;
        (2) The court, with the consent of the defendant, determines that
        the offense is an infraction in which event the case shall proceed as
        if the defendant had been arraigned on an infraction complaint.

        19.6. An infraction is not punishable by imprisonment. A person
        charged with an infraction shall not be entitled to a trial by jury.
        A person charged with an infraction shall not be entitled to have
        the public defender or other counsel appointed at public expense to
        represent him or her unless he or she is arrested and not released on
        his or her written promise to appear, his or her own recognizance,
        or a deposit of bail.

        19.7. Except as otherwise provided by law, all provisions of law
        relating to misdemeanors shall apply to infractions including, but
        not limited to, powers of peace officers, jurisdiction of courts,
        periods for commencing action and for bringing a case to trial and
        burden of proof.


        So, did everyone notice it?

        (1) The prosecutor files a complaint charging the offense as an
        infraction unless the defendant, at the time he or she is arraigned,
        after being informed of his or her rights, elects to have the case
        proceed as a misdemeanor, [that's what FF does!] or;
        (2) The court, with the consent of the defendant, determines that
        the offense is an infraction in which event the case shall proceed as
        if the defendant had been arraigned on an infraction complaint.


        In my own experience, no prosecutor has ever filed a formal verified
        complaint and only I have elected to have an infraction offense tried as a
        misdemeanor, and I will never give my consent to be tried on an
        infraction. End of story, case dismissed (but no case really exists
        anyway!). Infractions are for those to whom the pizza temperature upon
        arrival home is more important that claiming and exercising rights.

        Regards,

        FF
      Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.