Re: Administrative Hearing
- ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES are part of the EXECUTIVE department of
government and have LIMITED JURISDICTION,
" It is settled principle that administrative agencies have only
such powers as have been conferred on them, expressly or by
implication, by constitution or statute. (United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Superior Court (1931) 214 Cal. 468, 471 [6 P.2d 243]; Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. French (1931) 212 Cal. 139, 141-142 [298 P.
23]; Grigsby v. King (1927) 202 Cal. 299, 304 [260 P. 789]; Garvin
v. Chambers (1924) 195 Cal. 212, 220- 223 [232 P. 696]; Motor
Transit Co. v. Railroad Com. (1922) 189 Cal. 573, 577 [209 P. 586];
see Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1950) 34
Cal.2d 822 [215 [71 Cal.2d 104] P.2d 441]; State Comp. Ins. Fund v.
Industrial Acc. Com. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 264, 266 [125 P.2d 42]; Allen
v. McKinley (1941) 18 Cal.2d 697, 705 [117 P.2d 342]; 1 Am.Jur.2d
Administrative Law, § 70, p. 866.) An administrative agency,
therefore, must act within the powers conferred upon it by law and
may not validly act in excess of such powers. (See cases cited
immediately above; see 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 188, pp.
21-22.) [3b] In accordance with these principles, it has been held
in this state, in matters pertaining to civil service and in other
contexts, that when an administrative agency acts in excess of, or
in violation, of the powers conferred upon it, its action thus taken
is void. (See Aylward v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners
(1948) 31 Cal.2d 833, 839 [192 P.2d 929]; Patten v. California State
Personnel Board (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 168, 172-175 [234 P.2d 987];
Pinion v. State Personnel Board (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 314, 319 [84
P.2d 185]; Campbell v. City of Los Angeles (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 310,
313 [117 P.2d 901].)
Ferdig v. State Personnel Bd. , 71 Cal.2d 96
Most are ALPHABET SOUP agencies such as DMV, BAR, ABC, ATF, IRS, and
In most if not all cases, I think people will find that they deal
with matters of COMMERCE.
COURTS OF LAW are SUPPOSED to be part of the JUDICIAL department and
when requested, are SUPPOSED to provide JUDICIAL REVIEW of the
AGENCY'S FINAL DECISION.
"It has long been the law in this state that "where an
administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought
from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the
courts will act." (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17
Cal.2d 280, 292; Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 56; Sierra
Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th
489, 495.) This exhaustion requirement "is a jurisdictional
prerequisite, not a matter of judicial discretion." (Yamaha Motor
Corp. v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1240; Abelleira,
at p. 293.)
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to judicial review of an administrative decision "even
though the administrative remedy is couched in permissive language;
an aggrieved party is not required to file a grievance or protest if
he does not wish to do so, but if he does wish to seek relief, he
must first pursue an available administrative remedy before he may
resort to the judicial process. [Citation.]" (Yamaha Motor Corp. v.
Superior Court, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 1240.)
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the
objectors had failed to request reconsideration before the LAFCO as
provided in Government Code section 56857, subdivision (a), and the
Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id. at pp. 494-495.) The Supreme Court
reversed, noting that subdivision (a) of Government Code section
56857 merely provides that an adverse party "may" request
reconsideration of an adverse LAFCO decision, and that "[n]othing in
the statutory scheme explicitly states that an aggrieved party must
seek rehearing prior to filing a court action." (Id. at p. 495.) The
court reasoned that "[a]t the most basic level, when a party has
been given ostensibly permissive statutory authorization to seek
reconsideration of a final decision, that he or she is affirmatively
required to do so in order to obtain recourse to the courts is not
intuitively obvious. Even to attorneys, the word 'may' ordinarily
means just that. It does not mean 'must' or 'shall.'" (Id. at p.
499.) The court further reasoned that reconsideration by the
administrative body would not further the purpose of the exhaustion
requirement because "the administrative record has been created, the
claims have been sifted, the evidence has been unearthed, and the
agency has already applied its expertise and made its decision as to
whether relief is appropriate. The likelihood that an administrative
body will reverse itself when presented only with the same facts and
repetitive legal arguments is small." (Id. at p. 501.) In so
holding, the court overruled Alexander v. State Personnel Bd. (1943)
22 Cal.2d 198, to the extent it held that a party aggrieved by an
administrative decision must always pursue available procedures for
rehearing or reconsideration before the administrative body prior to
seeking judicial review. (Id. at p. 510.)
Under the circumstances, the general exhaustion requirement bars him
from seeking judicial review of the administrative decision.
(Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, "17 Cal.2d at p. 292;
Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 21
Cal.4th at p. 495.)
But, as he recognizes, finality does not equal exhaustion: "'. . .
The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is
conceptually distinct . . . from the question whether an
administrative action must be final before it is judicially
reviewable. . . . [T]he finality requirement is concerned with
whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive
position on the issue . . . [, while] the exhaustion requirement
generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which
an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision . . . .'"
(Action Apartment Assn. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (2001) 94
Cal.App.4th 587, 609-610.)" Marquez v. Gourley (2002) , Cal.App.4th
[No. B156151. Second Dist., Div. Six. Sept. 30, 2002.]
"In some cases, although exhaustion is not required, the doctrine
of "primary jurisdiction" of administrative agencies should be
invoked to require resort to an administrative agency to resolve
issues within its particular area of expertise. Exhaustion and
primary jurisdiction are two closely related concepts. Both are
essentially doctrines of comity between courts and agencies. They
are two sides of the timing coin: Each determines whether an action
may be brought in a court or whether an agency proceeding, or
further agency proceeding, is necessary. "Exhaustion" applies where
a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative
agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the
administrative process has run its course. "Primary jurisdiction,"
on the other hand, applies where a claim is originally cognizable in
the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views."
Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc. v. Jones, 94 P.3d 1055, 33 Cal.4th
917, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 849 (Supreme Court of California 08/05/2004)
Patrick in California
"Half a truth is often a great lie"--Benjamin Franklin
--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "mn_chicago"
> Somewhere, on topic, FF said:
> > If you ask me, this is why most people who lose against an agency
> > lose. Most people have no idea what the very first fact is to
> > into evidence in ANY adminstrative hearing...
> It must not be oath of office.