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1167Demand for Bill of Particulars

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  • legalbear
    Feb 27, 2003
    • 0 Attachment
      In the 34th District Court of Michigan,
      in the republic state of Michigan,
      a state of the Union and party to the Constitution of the United States of
      America,
      as amended 1820

      STATE OF MICHIGAN,
      A de facto municipal corporation masquerading as a de jure government,
      Plaintiff
      v.
      Brad Lee Barnhill,
      A man, Falsely Accused, at all times by Special Visitation, and not by
      General Appearance, conferring no jurisdiction whatsoever in the Court, and,
      throughout challenging that court's jurisdiction until Plaintiff establishes
      beyond a reasonable doubt that jurisdiction exists. In Re:
      _________________________
      JUDICIAL NOTICE OF REQUIREMENT OF PLAINTIFF TO PROVIDE A BILL OF PARTICULARS

      JUDICIAL NOTICE
      All officers of this Court are hereby placed on notice under authority of
      the supremacy and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution
      and the common law authorities that non-attorney litigants are held to less
      stringent standards than bar licensed attorneys;\/ court errs if court
      dismisses the pleadings of a non-attorney litigant without instruction of
      how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings;\/ and all litigants
      have a constitutionally-secured right to have their claims adjudicated
      according to the rule of precedent.\/
      JUDICIAL NOTICE OF REQUIREMENT OF PLAINTIFF TO PROVIDE
      A BILL OF PARTICULARS
      COMES NOW, Brad Lee Barnhill, in propria persona,\/ sui juris,\/ the Falsely
      Accused, to demand that a Bill of Particulars be provided by Plaintiff prior
      to any further proceedings.
      Table of Contents
      JUDICIAL NOTICE 1
      JUDICIAL NOTICE OF REQUIREMENT OF PLAINTIFF TO PROVIDE A BILL OF PARTICULARS
      2 <>
      Table of Contents 2 <>
      Table of Authorities 4 <>
      Procedural History 9 <>
      A Rational Fear 11 <>
      MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE OF REQUIREMENT OF PLAINTIFF TO
      PROVIDE A BILL OF PARTICULARS 11 <>
      Right to be Informed of the Nature of the Accusations 11 <>
      Statutory Authority and Procedure 14 <>
      Rules of Special Appearance 17 <>
      1. Special Appearance in Michigan 17 <>
      2. Acquiescence and Estoppel 17 <>
      3. Elements of Jurisdiction 20 <>
      4. Avoiding the Merits 25 <>
      5. The Common Law Prevails in the Absence of a Statute
      28 <>
      6. Special Appearance versus General Appearance 29
      <>
      7. In Propria Persona versus Pro Se 30 <>
      8. Voluntary versus Involuntary Appearance 32 <>
      Potential Errors of the Court 38 <>
      1. The court errs in denying to the Accused a BILL OF
      PARTICULARS prior to arraignment 38 <>
      2. The court errs by proceeding to trial without the
      Accused's understanding of the nature and cause of the accusations. 43
      <>
      3. The court errs by proceeding to trial in a matter
      not ripe for trial. 45 <>
      4. The court errs by proceeding to trial and leaving
      the Accused without opportunity to ask for leave of counsel, to make
      pre-trial motions or to be able to specify a preference for a jury. 47
      <>
      5. The court errs by abdicating its responsibility to
      the Accused by allowing the prosecution to proceed without properly
      apprising the Accused of the nature and cause of the accusations in the
      particulars demanded. 48 <>
      Questions for Review 49 <>
      Proposed Findings 50 <>
      CONCLUSION 51 <>
      CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 52 <>

      Table of Authorities
      Decisions of the one supreme Court of the United States
      Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 17
      Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed. 191 12
      Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88; 55 S.Ct. 629; 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1934)
      14
      Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 315 13
      Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1786) 48,
      51
      Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 65 L. Ed. 647, 41 S. Ct. 261 (1921)
      49
      Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-421 1
      Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 437 13
      Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 202-204 13
      Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240
      (1962) 13
      Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 46, 363 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 12
      United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 13, 41
      United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1872) 13, 41
      United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 13, 41
      United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 10-11 13
      United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362 13, 41
      Other Federal Decisions
      Anastasoff v. United States, 233 F.3rd. 898 (8th Cir. 2000) 1
      Bechik v. Handv Mattress Accessories Corp., D.C.S.C., 2 F.R.D. 289, 290 42
      Bowles v. Flotill, D.C. Cal., 4 F.R.D. 499, 501 41
      Hughes v. United States, C.C.A.Tenn., 114 F.2d 285, 288 43
      Platsky v. C.I.A., 953 F.2d. 26 (2nd Cir. 1991) 1
      United States v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., D.C.N.Y., 42 F.Supp. 425,428
      41
      United States v. Smith, 776 F. 2nd, 1104, 1111 (3rd Cir. 1985) 39
      Walling v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., D.C.S.C., 2 F.R.D. 416, 419 43
      Welty v. Clute, D.C.N.Y., 1 R.R.D. 447 42
      Wetmore v. Goodwin Film & Camera Co., (D.C.) 226 F. 352,353 36
      Michigan Constitution
      Article I, § 20, Rights of accused in criminal proceedings 11, 39, 42
      Article I, § 23, Non-enumeration of rights 51
      Article III, § 7, Common law and statutes, continuance. 28
      Michigan Decisions
      Austin v. Burroughs (syllabus), 62 Mich 181 35
      Ballog v Knight Newspapers, Inc, 381 Mich 527, 533-534; 164 NW2d 19 (1969)
      29
      Boyer v. Backus, 282 Mich 701 (1937) 28
      Butcher v. Cappon & Bertsch Co., 148 Mich 552 (12 Ann. Cas. 169) 35
      Cofrode v. Wayne Circuit Judge (syllabus), 79 Mich 332 (7 L.R.A. 511) 35
      Crawford v. Vinton, 102 Mich 83, 62 N.W. 988 37
      Dyson v. City of Detroit, 333 Mich. 116, 52 N.W.2d 623 (1952) 29
      Fraser v. Collier Construction Co., 305 Mich. 1, 8 N.W.2d 889 (1943) 36
      Hansen-Snyder Co v General Motors Corporation, 371 Mich 480; 124 NW2d 286
      (1963) 29
      Holliday v. Townley, 189 Mich. App. 424, 426; 473 N.W.2d 733 (1991) 36
      Improved-Match Co. v. Michigan Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 122 Mich 256, 259 35
      In Re Estate Of Robertson Gordon v. NBD Bank, N.A., 564 N.W.2d 497, 222
      Mich. App. 148 (1997) 36
      Lenz v. Mayor of Detroit, 338 Mich. 383, 61 N.W.2d 587 (1953) 29
      Manhard v. Schott, 37 Mich 234 35
      Penny v. ABA Pharmaceutical Co (On Remand), 203 Mich. App. 178, 181; 511
      N.W.2d 896 (1993) 36
      People v. Babcock, 343 Mich 671 (1955) 28
      People v. Clark, 85 Mich App 96, 100; 270 NW2d 717 (1978) 15
      People v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad, 3 Mich. App. 242, 142 N.W.2d 54
      (1966) 28
      People v. Iaconnelli, 112 Mich. App. 725, 317 N.W.2d 540 (1982) 15
      People v. Jones, 75 Mich App 261, 268-269; 254 NW2d 863 (1977) 14, 15
      People v. Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 331; 299 NW2d 346 (1980) 14
      People v. Rosen, 136 Mich. App. 745, 358 N.W.2d 584 (1984) 14
      People v. Tenerowicz, 266 Mich. 276, 253 N.W. 296 (1934) 16
      People v. Traughber, 432 Mich. 208, 439 N.W.2d 231 (1989) 16
      Smith v. City Commissioner of Grand Rapids, 281 Mich 235 (1937) 28
      Smith v. Martin, 124 Mich 34 (1900) 28
      Sovereign v. Sovereign, 354 Mich. 65 (1958) 17
      Taylor v. Adams (syllabus), 58 Mich 187 35
      Thompson v. Thomas, 11 Mich 274 35
      Wayne Co Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 101 Mich App 772; 300 NW2d
      516 (1980) 15
      Wayne Co Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 92 Mich App 119; 284 NW2d 507
      (1979) 16
      Michigan Statutes
      MCL 257.728a Citation; delivery of copies to police chief or duly authorized
      person; deposit of original with court; mailing original to court; spoiled,
      mutilated, or voided citation; criminal complaint 10
      MCL 767.44 Indictment; forms for particular offenses; bill of particulars.
      14
      Decisions of other states of the Union
      Anger v. California, 46 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1965) 25
      Beale v. Cherryhomes, Tex. Civ. App., 21 S.W. 2d 65, 66 36
      Bergin v. Temple, 111 Mont. 539, 111 P.2d 286, 289, 133 37
      Burns v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, Civ. 25684 (1961)
      25
      Commonwealth v. Chitty, 17 SCL (1 Bailey) 379 44
      Commonwealth v. Davis, 28 Mass (11 Pick) 432 44
      Commonwealth v. Davis, 470 Pa. 193, 368 A.2d 260 (1977) 39
      Commonwealth v. Giacomazza, 42N.E. 2d 506,510,311 Mass. 456 40
      Commonwealth v. Senk, 412 Pa. 184, 194 A.2d 221 39
      Dache v. Abraham & Straus, 66 N.Y.S.2d 787, 790, 187 Misc. 1001 39
      Ditmars v. Interchemical Corp., 197 A. 257, 258, 16 N.J. Misc. 81 40
      Dublin Mill & Elevator Co. v. Cornelius, Tex.Civ.App., 5 S.W.2d 1027, 1028
      37
      Dudlev v. Duval, 70 P. 68, 70, 29 Wash. 528 44
      Eckhart v. Peterson, 94 Wash. 379, 162 P 551 (1917) 44
      Ferguson v. Ashbell, 53 Tex. 245,250 41
      Fiscus v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 153 Kan. 493, 112 P.2d 83, 85 36
      Flint v. Comly, 97 Me. 251, 49 Atl. 1044 37
      Hooper v William P. Laytham & Sons Co., 6 A.2d 204, 205, 125 N. J.Eq. 454
      39
      Hopper v. Gillett, 140 A. 17, 6 N.J. Misc. 63 42
      In re Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon v. Southern Pacific Co., 268
      P2d. 605 25
      Inter-mountain Association of Credit Men v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Insurance
      Co., 258 P. 362, 363, 44 Idaho 49 39
      La Tour v. United Air Lines, 65 N.Y. S.2d 839, 840 39
      Loprieno v. Rudich, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 587,589, 172 Misc. 116. 44
      Markoff v. Kreiner, 23 A. 2d 19, 23, 180 Md. 150 42
      Nilsen v. Ebey Land Co., 90 Wash. 295, 155 P 615 (1916) 44
      Orndorff v. Howell, 25 S.E. 2d 327, 329, 181 Va 383 43
      People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890 16
      People v. Schneider, 345 Ill. 410, 178 N.E. 84 16
      Press v. Davis, Tex. Civ. App., 118 S. W.2d 982, 989, 990 36
      Roth v. Baltimore Trust Co., 158 A. 32, 34, 161 Md. 340 43
      Spokane & I. Lumber Co. v. Loy, 58 P 672,60 P 1119, 21 Wash. 501 41
      State ex rel. Cornwell v. District Court, Seventeenth Judicial Dist., Valley
      County, 200 P.2d 706, 709, 122 Mont. 266 43
      State v. Dix, 74 P. 570, 572, 33 Wash. 405 41
      State v. Wong Sun, 133 P. 2d 761,763, 114 Mont. 185 41
      Woods v. Cook, 14 Cal. App. 2d 560, 58 P.2d 965, 966 37
      Wright v. People, 91 P. 2d 499, 502, 104 Colo. 335, 123 41
      Other Authorities
      American Jurisprudence, Vol. 10, § 3, p 524, 29
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Acquiesce." 5th Ed. (1979), p. 22 18
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Acquiescence, estoppel by." 5th Ed. (1979), p. 22,
      23 19
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Acquiescence." 5th Ed. (1979), p. 22 18
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Appearance." 2nd Ed. (1910), p. 89 30, 37
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Coram non judice." 5th Ed. (1979), p. 305 35
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Estoppel." 5th Ed. (1979), p. 494 20
      Black's Law Dictionary, "In personam jurisdiction" 5th Ed. (1979), p. 711
      23
      Black's Law Dictionary, "In personam, In Rem." 2nd Ed. (1910), p. 606 33
      Black's Law Dictionary, "In personam." 5th Ed. (1979), p. 711 23
      Black's Law Dictionary, "In propria persona" 6th Edition 2
      Black's Law Dictionary, "In rem." 5th Ed. (1979), p. 713 34
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Jurisdiction in personam. " 5th Ed. (1979), p. 766
      23
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Jurisdiction over person." 5th Ed (1979), p. 767
      28
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Jurisdiction." 5th Ed. (1979), p. 766 21
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Jurisdictional Plea." 5th Ed., p. 766 25
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Leave of court." 5th Ed. (1979), p. 801 31
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Merits." 2nd Ed (1910), p. 775 26
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Pro se." 5th Ed. (1979), p. 1099 30
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Sui juris" 6th Edition 2
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Sui Juris." 2nd Ed. (1910), p. 1121 34
      Black's Law Dictionary, "Venue" 5th Ed. (1979), p. 1396 25
      Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "Acquiescence." 8th Ed. (1859), Vol. 1, p. 61 19
      Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "Arraignment." 8th E. (1859), Vol. 1 45
      Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "In Personam", 8th Ed. (1859), Vol. 1, p. 615 23
      Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "Jurisdiction.", 8th Ed. (1859), Vol. 1, p 683
      22
      Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "Maxims" Vol. 2, p. 136 37, 46
      Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "Merits." 8th Ed. (1859), Vol. 2, p. 157 27
      Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "Paranoia" Baldwin's Century Edition 11
      Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "Propria Persona" 8th Ed. (1859), Vol. 2, p. 395
      30
      Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "Venue." 8th Ed. (1859), Vol. 2, p. 621, 622 24
      Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "Propria Persona" 8th Ed. (1859), Vol. 2, p. 395
      46
      Corpus Juris Secundum, "Appearances" Vol. 6, § 5 38
      Corpus Juris Secundum, "Appearances," Vol. 6, § 4 38, 47
      Corpus Juris Secundum, "Courts of General and Courts of Special
      Jurisdiction" Vol. 21, § 2 27
      Procedural History
      On December 20th of 2002, the Accused was minding his own business
      northbound on the common easement for access and egress known as Interstate
      275 (I­275) on his way to Gramma's house for a Christmas holiday. At or
      about 10:00pm, the Accused complied with the "request" of the agent of
      Plaintiff to stop his car. The result of this act was the issuance of a
      defective instrument UNIFORM LAW CITATION S907216.
      On December 24th, the Accused properly refused for trespass of legal venue
      said instrument, denying that the Accused is a person subject to the
      jurisdiction of this particular type of service of process by affidavit, and
      returned said instrument back to the agent of Plaintiff.
      On December 27th, the Accused called the 34th District Court and spoke to
      the clerk's office, and was told that there was no record of said instrument
      (S907216).
      On January 2nd of 2003, the Accused called the 34th District court and spoke
      to the clerk's office again, and learned that there was indeed an instrument
      filed (S907216), but that there were no other matters filed at that time.
      Also on January 2nd, the Accused sent in a request for a Formal Hearing by
      facsimile transmission to the clerk of the 34th District Court with regard
      to said instrument (S907216).
      On January 9th, the Accused received a notice from the 34th District Court
      dated January 7th of 2003 that a default judgment had been entered in the
      matter S907502, an instrument of which the Accused was totally unaware.
      On January 15th, the Accused entered a MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
      and a MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON MATERIAL DEFECTS. The Accused has not been
      apprised by the Court as to the disposition of these motions.
      On January 21st, an acquaintance of the Accused went to the clerk of the
      34th District Court to inquire as to the disposition of these motions and
      discovered yet another citation, S907217, naming several other charges
      unknown to the Accused was received by the clerk on January 17th.
      On January 24th, based upon these actions of the Plaintiff that clearly lie
      outside of the authority delegated to them by the Michigan Legislature, the
      Accused entered a MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, upon the
      fact that Act 235 of 1966 (codified at MCL 257.728a), compiled within and
      amendment to Act 300 of 1949, requires that "at or before the completion of
      his or her tour of duty a police officer to whom a citation book has been
      issued and who has recorded the occurrence of a vehicle law violation upon a
      citation shall deliver to his or her police chief or to a person duly
      authorized by the police chief to receive citations all copies of such
      citation duly signed. The police chief or a person duly authorized by the
      police chief shall deposit the original of the citation with the court
      having jurisdiction over the offense not later than 3 days after the date of
      the citation, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays." "The
      citation shall be considered to have been deposited with the court ... if
      the original of the citation is mailed not later than 2 days after the date
      of the citation as specified under this subsection." The Accused has not
      been apprised by the Court as to the disposition of this motion.
      On February 6th, an acquaintance of the Accused called the 34th District
      Court and spoke to the clerk's office and was informed that there were
      apparently other charges that are under consideration by Plaintiff. On that
      same date, the Accused mailed to the plaintiff a Demand for a Bill of
      Particulars and an Affidavit Denying an Understanding of the Nature and
      Cause of the Accusations in the Particulars Demanded.
      On February 16th, the Accuses mailed to Plaintiff a DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE
      FROM PLAINTIFF, requiring production of documents and records that the
      Plaintiff is required to disclose prior to a preliminary hearing.
      As of this date, February 21st, the Accused has been given no notice of
      these charges (either formally or informally), has not been provided by the
      prosecutor with a Bill of Particulars as demanded, and has no understanding
      as to the expectation that he will not be piled upon by the Plaintiff
      further succeeding charges.
      A Rational Fear
      The Accused fears that he will be ambushed, kidnapped and squirreled away in
      some cubby hole, away from the resources he requires to answer to charges
      that remain, at this time, unknown to the Accused and thereby not properly
      alleged in any manner, shape or form. Such a condition would cause the
      Accused and his family great emotional and economic hardship. The Accused
      would observe that one is only paranoid\/ if there is truly nobody "out to
      get you."
      MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE OF REQUIREMENT OF PLAINTIFF TO
      PROVIDE A BILL OF PARTICULARS
      Right to be Informed of the Nature of the Accusations
      The right to know the nature and cause of the accusation is one that is
      secured by not only the national constitution, but by each and every
      constitution of the several states of the Union, Michigan included.
      § 20 Rights of accused in criminal proceedings.
      In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the
      right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, which may consist
      of less than 12 jurors in prosecutions for misdemeanors punishable by
      imprisonment for not more than 1 year; to be informed of the nature of the
      accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her; to have
      compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his or her favor; to have the
      assistance of counsel for his or her defense; to have an appeal as a matter
      of right, except as provided by law an appeal by an accused who pleads
      guilty or nolo contendere shall be by leave of the court; and as provided by
      law, when the trial court so orders, to have such reasonable assistance as
      may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal.\/
      In the instant matter, the Accused is totally without a clue as to the
      nature and cause of the accusations for which a warrant was apparently sued
      out on January 29th of 2003. He is unaware of the statutory citation(s),
      the portion of the statute(s) alleged to have been offended, the facts in
      the particulars that the plaintiff believes to bring the Accused within the
      purview of these statutes, and the jurisdiction upon which the plaintiff
      relies of the statutes themselves, of the jurisdiction of the manner of the
      service of process, of the jurisdiction of the court being invoked to hear
      this matter, nor of the type of personal jurisdiction alleged.
      The Accused cannot be held to answer to charges that he cannot understand.
      The Accused is ignorant of the presumptions relied upon by Prosecution that
      give rise to these elements, and the Accused is being deprived of an
      opportunity to rebut said presumptions in a meaningful and substantive
      manner.
      The Accused is required to make a motion to dismiss during the pre-trial
      stages. However, because the Accused is ignorant of the unstated
      presumptions relied upon the Plaintiff, this situation is tantamount to the
      legislature (or this Court) setting forth an unrebuttable presumption (which
      is contrary to the due process strictures raised by Bailey v. Alabama,\/ 219
      U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed. 191 and Tot v. United States, \/ 319 U.S.
      463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519) that the Accused is somehow a rightful
      subject of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
      the United States, and of the republic state of Michigan.
      In order to establish prima facie guilt, the plaintiff should be required to
      specify not only the facts that give rise to the statutory prohibitions, the
      plaintiff should be required to specify the constitutional provision that
      gives rise to the statute itself, the jurisdiction of the service of
      process, the jurisdiction of the manner of legal venue being invoked to
      adjudicate the matter, as well as whether the "person" in and for the
      statute is a man or a thing.
      "Where guilt depends so crucially upon such a specific
      identification of fact, our cases have uniformly held that an indictment
      must do more than simply repeat the language of the criminal statute. "It is
      an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of
      an offence, whether it be at common law or by statute, 'includes generic
      terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offence in
      the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species,
      -- it must descend to particulars.'" United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
      542, 558. An indictment not framed to apprise the defendant "with reasonable
      certainty, of the nature of the accusation against him . . . is defective,
      although it may follow the language of the statute." United States v.
      Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362. "In an indictment upon a statute, it is not
      sufficient to set forth the offence in the words of the statute, unless
      those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any
      uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute
      the offence intended to be punished; . . . " United States v. Carll, 105
      U.S. 611, 612. "Undoubtedly the language of the statute may be used in the
      general description of an offence, but it must be accompanied with such a
      statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the
      specific offence, coming under the general description, with which he is
      charged." United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487. See also Pettibone v.
      United States, 148 U.S. 197, 202-204; Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308,
      315; Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 437; Morissette v. United States,
      342 U.S. 246, 270, n. 30. Cf. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1,
      10-11.*fn12 That these basic principles of fundamental fairness retain their
      full vitality under modern concepts of pleading, and specifically under Rule
      7 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is illustrated by many
      recent federal decisions.*fn13"\/
      Moreover, it is the duty of the Plaintiff to provide the particulars as
      demanded:
      "The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
      ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligations to
      govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
      whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it should
      win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
      and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
      that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
      earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
      hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
      duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
      conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
      one."\/
      Statutory Authority and Procedure
      The statutory procedure in Michigan for a demand for a bill of particulars
      is set out at MCL 767.44:
      MCL 767.44 Indictment; forms for particular offenses; bill
      of particulars.
      The following forms may be used in the cases in which they
      are applicable but any other forms authorized by this or any other law of
      this state may also be used:
      [list of short forms omitted]
      Provided, That the prosecuting attorney, if seasonably
      requested by the respondent, shall furnish a bill of particulars setting up
      specifically the nature of the offense charged.\/
      This statutory procedure is enforced only in a limited manner, long after
      arraignment:
      "When an information is not one of the statutory short forms
      found in MCL 767.44; MSA 28.984, as is the case here, we review a denial of
      a bill of particulars for abuse of discretion. People v. Tenerowicz, 266
      Mich 276; 253 NW 296 (1934); People v. Jones, 75 Mich App 261, 268-269; 254
      NW2d 863 (1977). Denial of a bill of particulars may constitute reversible
      error if the record demonstrates prejudice arising therefrom. People v.
      Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 331; 299 NW2d 346 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 1039
      (1981)."\/
      "There are two situations in which it is error for the trial
      court to deny such a motion. First, where the defendants were charged by the
      short-form information or indictment they have a mandatory right to a
      "seasonably requested" bill of particulars. MCL 767.44; MSA 28.984, People
      v. Clark, 85 Mich App 96, 100; 270 NW2d 717 (1978), People v. Jones, 75 Mich
      App 261, 268-269; 254 NW2d 863 (1977), lv den 402 Mich 822 (1977), People v.
      Tenerowicz, 266 Mich 276, 287-288; 253 NW 296 (1934). Second, the denial of
      a motion for a bill of particulars where a long-form indictment is used is
      erroneous where it constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial Judge.
      Tenerowicz, supra, 288, Jones, supra, 269."\/
      However, this statutory procedure is not of much use to one who comes before
      a statutory court of limited subject matter jurisdiction in Michigan,
      because it would seem that the Accused must first submit himself to the
      jurisdiction of the court before he can ask how such jurisdiction was
      properly acquired in order to present a challenge to it.
      The procedure as set forth is out of order and prejudices the right of the
      Accused. First, because the Accused has a right to know the nature and
      cause of the accusation in the particulars of personal jurisdiction and
      legal venue such that he can raise a cogent jurisdictional challenge, but is
      deprived of this right because the legislature has put the cart before the
      horse. Second, because the Accused is required to supply a jurisdictional
      plea before the plaintiff is forced to supply the necessary information
      required to rebut the silent presumption that the Accused is somehow a
      creature that can be regulated by the legislature or engages in some
      activity that the legislature can properly regulate.
      In the instant matter, there is not so much as a skeletal accusatory
      instrument for the bulk of the charges against which the Accused is required
      to answer. This leaves the Accused naked before unknown and unanswerable
      charges, whereby the Accused has no means to raise even a modicum of a
      defense at a preliminary hearing.
      "The purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine
      whether a crime has been committed and, if so, whether there is probable
      cause to believe that the defendant committed it. Wayne Co Prosecutor v.
      Recorder's Court Judge, 101 Mich App 772; 300 NW2d 516 (1980). During a
      preliminary examination, the prosecution is not required to prove that a
      defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Joyner, 93 Mich
      App 554; 287 NW2d 286 (1979). However, there must be evidence to establish
      each element of the offense, or evidence from which those elements may be
      inferred. Wayne Co Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 92 Mich App 119;
      284 NW2d 507 (1979)."\/
      In Michigan, the "normal" procedure is: Complaint, warrant, (District
      Court) arraignment (no plea), preliminary hearing, bail, information (or
      indictment), (circuit court) arraignment, pre-trial, trial, allocution,
      sentencing, post-sentencing, and appeal. The statutory bill of particulars
      inserts itself after information or indictment. At this stage, it is too
      late for the Accused to have been able to properly challenge the sufficiency
      of the charges prior to the evidentiary hearing known as the Preliminary
      Hearing.
      "Where the short statutory form of charge is used, failure
      to file a bill of particulars on seasonable request is reversible error
      because the statute is mandatory and the bill becomes a part of the record,
      and is read with the indictment. People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16 (171 N.E.
      890, 69 A.L.R. 1378). The proviso is confined to the statutory forms
      outlined in section 17258 and therefore does not apply to common-law forms
      of indictment. It should be noted that the indictment in the instant case is
      not a statutory form. The common law governs when the common-law form of
      indictment is used, and ordering a bill of particulars is then discretionary
      with the court. Failure to order a bill of particulars constitutes
      reversible error only in the event of an abuse of discretion which results
      in the defendant being deprived of a fair trial. People v. Schneider, 345
      Ill. 410 (178 N.E. 84). Because the prosecuting attorney so asserted and the
      trial court so ruled, exhibit 2 was not a bill of particulars nor a legal
      substitute therefor. The court having granted defendant Tenerowicz's motion
      for a bill of particulars several months before the trial and the
      prosecution having ignored the ruling, the court should not have stood upon
      the matter of lack of notice of motion but should have granted defendants'
      motion for a bill of particulars although made after trial began."\/
      In the instant matter, the Accused has demanded a Bill of Particulars prior
      to arraignment, indeed, prior to even having seen any of the charges. As
      such, this procedural process asserted stands outside of the statutes and is
      well founded in the common law right to know not only the nature and cause
      of the subject matter, but of the personal jurisdiction and venue as well.
      Accordingly, this procedural matter is not governed by statute or by
      decisions based upon the statutory procedure. It is based upon the common
      law Rules of Special Appearance.
      Rules of Special Appearance
      1. Special Appearance in Michigan
      In quasi-criminal proceedings known in Michigan as "civil-infractions,"\/
      the Accused must request a hearing, and thereby submits himself to the
      jurisdiction of Michigan's non-judicial quasi-administrative hearing
      procedures. In "true" criminal actions, however, Michigan must follow the
      standard common-law criminal procedure: Complaint, summons, examination,
      grand-jury, indictment, trial procedure. Special appearance is thereby
      accessible.
      "A procedural point must first be settled. In response to
      the petition and summons, defendant entered what was captioned a special
      appearance. This special appearance is an anomaly, a tribute to the
      ingenuity of the common law. The defendant is an action in personam, is
      permitted to walk before the bar of justice and argue that he is not there.
      Obviously this requires some sort of magic. We find it in the utterance of
      certain words (I appear before you specially) but it is a tricky business
      because if he does certain things regarded as inconsistent with his
      incantation (such as arguing the merits) the magic is gone, the hour has
      struck, and he is legally, as well as physically, present. The devise
      serves, however, a useful purpose. It permits a litigant to test the
      validity of the legal proceedings themselves prior to shouldering the not
      inconsiderable burdens of time and money required for the litigation on the
      merits. A defendant, in other words, is entitled to challenge jurisdiction
      prior to trial on the merits. ... In the matter before us, similarly, we
      are faced with the meaning of the word jurisdiction. It is elementary that
      in an action in personam (as distinguished from an action in rem, or quasi
      in rem,) a court must have jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction
      over the subject matter. As to the former, a defendant may assert that he
      was never properly served, a problem of some complexity with respect to
      persons who exist only in the eyes of the law, such as corporations."\/
      2. Acquiescence and Estoppel
      [snip]
      "Acquiesce. To give an implied consent to a transaction, to
      the accrual of a right, or to any act, by one's mere silence, or without
      express assent or acknowledgement."\/
      "Acquiescence. Conduct recognizing the existence of a
      transaction, and intended, in some extent at least, to carry the
      transaction, or permit it to be carried, into effect. It is some act, not
      deliberately intended to ratify a former transaction known to be voidable,
      but recognizing the transaction as existing, and intended, in some extent at
      least, to carry it into effect, and to obtain or claim the benefits
      resulting from it, and thus differs from "confirmation," which implies a
      deliberate act, intended to renew and ratify a transaction known to be
      voidable. De Boe v. Prentice Packing & Storage Co., 172 Wash. 514, 2 P.2d
      1107, 1110. Passive compliance or satisfaction; distinguished from avowed
      consent on the one hand, and, on the other, from opposition or open
      discontent. Paul v. Western Distributing Co., 142 Kan. 816, 52 P.2d 379,
      387. Acquiescence from which assent may be reasonably inferred. Frank v.
      Wilson & Co., 24 Del.Ch., 237, 9 A.2d 82, 86. Equivalent to assent
      inferred from silence with knowledge or from encouragement and presupposes
      knowledge and assent. Imports tacit consent, concurrence, acceptance or
      assent. Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, Cal. App., 132
      P.2d 553, 563. A silent appearance of consent. Failure to make any
      objections. Submission to an act of which one had knowledge.
      "It is to be distinguished from avowed consent, on the one
      hand, and from open discontent or opposition, on the other.
      "It arises where a person who knows that he is entitled to
      impeach a transaction or enforce a right neglects to do so for such a length
      of time that, under the circumstances of the case, the other party may
      fairly infer that he has waived or abandoned his right. Schmitt v. Wright,
      317 Ill. App. 384, 46 N.E.2d 184, 192.
      "Acquiescence and laches are cognate but not equivalent
      terms. The former is a submission to, or resting satisfied with, an
      existing state of things, while laches implies a neglect to do that which
      the party ought to do for his own benefit or protection. Hence laches may
      be evidence of acquiescence. Laches imports a merely passive assent, while
      acquiescence implies active assent. In re Wilbur's Estate, 334 Pa. 45, 5
      A.2d 325, 331. "Acquiescence" relates to inaction during performance of an
      act while "laches" relates to delay after act is done."\/
      "Acquiescence, contracts. The consent which is impliedly
      given by one or both parties, to a proposition, a clause, a condition, a
      judgment, or to any act whatever. * * * *
      "4. Acquiescence in acts of an agent, or one, who has
      assumed that character, will be equivalent to an express authority. 2 Bouv.
      Inst. n. 1309; Kent, Com. 478; Story on Eq. S 255; 4 W.C.C.R. 559; 6
      Mass. R. 193; 1 John. Cas. 110; 2 John. Cas. 424; Liv. on Ag. 45;
      Paley on Ag. by Lloyd, 41; 3 Pet. R. 69, 81; 12 John. R. 300; 3 Cowen's
      R. 281; 3 Pick. R. 495, 505; 4 Mason's R. 296. Acquiescence differs
      from assent. (q.v.)"\/
      [snip]
      "Acquiescence, estoppel by * * * * * Injury accruing from
      one's acquiescence in another's action to his prejudice creates 'estoppel'.
      Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., C.C.A. Ill, 125 F 2d 369, 375. Passive conduct
      on the part of one who has knowledge of the facts may be basis of estoppel.
      Winslow v. Burns, 47 N.M. 29, 132 P 2d 1048, 1050."\/
      [snip]
      "Estoppel. Estoppel means that party is prevented by his
      own acts from claiming a right to detriment of other party who was entitled
      to rely on such conduct and has acted accordingly. Graham v. Asbury, 112
      Ariz. 184, 540 P. 2d 656, 658. * * * Estoppel is a bar or impediment which
      precludes allegation or denial of a certain fact or state of facts, in
      consequence of a final adjudication of the matter in a court of law. It
      operates to put a party entitled to its benefits in same position as if the
      thing represented were true. May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb 475, 17 N.W.
      2d 448, 458."\/
      [snip]
      3. Elements of Jurisdiction
      [snip]
      "Jurisdiction. The word is a term of large and
      comprehensive import, and embraces every kind of judicial action. Federal
      Land Bank of Louisville, Ky. v. Crombie, 258 Ky. 383, 80 S.W.2d 39, 40. It
      is the authority by which courts and judicial officers take cognizance of
      and decide cases. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund of
      City of Marietta v. Brooks, 179 Okl. 600, 67 P.2d 4, 6; State v. True, Me.,
      330 A.2d 787. The legal right by which judges exercise their authority.
      Max Ams, Inc. v. Barker, 293 Ky. 698, 170 S.W.2d 45, 48. It exists when
      court has cognizance of class of cases involved, proper parties are present,
      and point to be decided is within powers of court. United Cemeteries Co.
      v. Strother, 342 Mo. 1155, 119 S.W.2d 762, 765; Harder v. Johnson, 147 Kan.
      440, 76 P.2d 763, 764. Power and authority of a court to hear and determine
      a judicial proceeding. In re De Camillis' Estate, 66 Misc.2d 882, 322
      N.Y.S.2d 551, 556. the right and power of a court to adjudicate concerning
      the subject matter in a given case. Biddinger v. Fletcher, 224 Ga. 501,
      162 S.E.2d 414, 416.
      "Areas of authority; the geographic area in which a court
      has power or types of cases it has power to hear."\/
      [snip]
      "Jurisdiction, practice. A power constitutionally
      conferred upon a judge or magistrate, to take cognizance of, and decide
      cases according to law, and to carry his sentence into execution. 6 Pet.
      591; 9 John. 239. The tract of land or district within which a judge or
      magistrate has jurisdiction, is called his territory, and his power in
      relation to his territory is called his territorial jurisdiction.
      "2. Every act of jurisdiction exercised by a judge without
      his territory, either by execution, is null. An inferior court has no
      jurisdiction beyond what is expressly delegated. 1 Salk. 404, n.; Gilb.
      C. P. 188; 1 Saund. 73; 2 Lord Raym. 1311; and see Bac. Ab. Courts, &
      c., C, et seq.; Bac. Ab. Pleas, E 2.
      "3. Jurisdiction is original, when it is conferred on the
      court in the first instance, which is called original jurisdiction; (q.v.)
      or it is appellate, which is when an appeal is given from the judgment of
      another court. Jurisdiction is also civil, where the subject-matter to be
      tried is not of a criminal nature; or criminal, where the court is to punish
      crimes. Some courts and magistrates have both civil and criminal
      jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is also concurrent, exclusive, or assistant.
      Concurrent jurisdiction is that which may be entertained by several courts.
      It is a rule that in cases of concurrent jurisdictions, that which first
      seized of the case shall try it to the exclusion of the other. Exclusive
      jurisdiction is that which has alone the power to try or determine the suit,
      action, or matter in dispute. Assistant jurisdiction is that which is
      afforded by a court of chancery, in aid of a court of law; as, for example,
      by a bill of discovery, by the examination of witnesses de bene esse, or out
      of the jurisdiction of the court; by the perpetuation of the testimony of
      witnesses, and the like.
      "4. It is the law which gives jurisdiction; the consent of
      parties, cannot, therefore, confer it, in a matter which the law excludes 1
      N. 7 M. 192; 3 M'Cord, 280; 1 Call. 55; 1 J.J. Mash. 476; 1 Bibb, 263;
      Cooke, 27; Minor, 65; 3 Litt. 332; 6 Litt. 303; Kirby, 111; 1 Breese, 32;
      2 Yerg 441; 1 Const. R. 478. But where the court has jurisdiction of the
      matter, and the defendant has some privilege which exempts him from the
      jurisdiction, he may waive the privilege. 5 Cranch, 288; 1 Pet. 449; 8
      Wheat. 699; 4 W.C.C.R. 84; 4 M'Cord, 79; 4 Mass. 593; Wright 484. See
      Hardin, 448; 2 Wash. 213.
      "5. Courts of inferior jurisdiction must act within their
      jurisdiction, and so it must appear upon the record. 5 Cranch, 172; Pet.
      C.C.R. 36; 4 Dall. 11; 2 Mass. 213; 4 Mass. 122; 8 Mass. 86; 11 Mass.
      513; Pr. Dec. 380; 2 Verm. 329; 3 Verm. 114; 10 Conn. 514; 4 John 292;
      3 Yerg. 355; Walker, 75; 9 Cowen, 227; 5 Har. & John. 36; 1 Bailey, 459;
      2 Bailey, 267. But the legislature may, by a general or special law,
      provide otherwise. Pet. C.C.R. 36. Vide 1 Salk. 414; Bac. Ab. Courts,
      & c.,C,D; Id. Prerogative, E 5; Merline Rep. h. t.; Ayl. Par. 317, and
      the art. Competency. As to the force of municipal laws beyond the
      territorial jurisdiction of the state, see Wheat, Intern. Law, part 2, c.2,
      S 7 et seq.; Story, Confl. of Laws. c. 2; Huberus, lib. 1, t. 3; 13
      Mass. R. 4; Pard. Dr. Com. part. 6, t. 7, c. 2, S 1; and the
      articles Conflict of Laws; Courts of the United States. See, generally,
      Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t.\/
      [snip]
      "In Personam. Against the person. Action seeking judgment
      against a person involving his personal rights and based on jurisdiction of
      his person, as distinguished from a judgment against property (i.e. in rem)
      type of jurisdiction or power which a court may acquire over the defendant
      himself in contrast to jurisdiction over his property."\/
      "IN PERSONAM, remedies. A remedy in personam is one where
      the proceedings are against the person, in contradistinction to those which
      are against specific things, or in rem (q.v.) 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 2646."\/
      [snip]
      "IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION. Power which a court has over
      the defendant himself in contrast to the courts power over the defendant's
      interest in property (quasi in rem) or power over property itself (in rem).
      A court which lacks personal jurisdiction is without power to issue an in
      personam judgment. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565."\/
      "JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM. Power which a court has over the
      defendant's person and which is required before a court can enter a personal
      or in personam judgment. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565. It
      may be acquired by an act of the defendant within a jurisdiction under a law
      by which the defendant impliedly consents to the personal jurisdiction of
      the court, e.g. operation of a motor vehicle on the highways of state
      confers jurisdiction of operator and owner on courts of state. Hess v.
      Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091. A judgment in
      personam brings about a merger of the original cause of action into the
      judgment and thereafter the action is upon the judgment and not on the
      original cause of action. See also In personam."\/
      [snip]
      "VENUE, pleading, The venue is the county from which the
      jury are to come, who are to try the issue. Gould, Pl. c. 3, S 102;
      Archb. Civ. Pl. 86.
      "2. As it is a general rule, that the place of every
      traversable fact stated in the pleading must be distinctly alleged, for that
      same certain place must be alleged for ever such fact, it follows that a
      venue must be stated in every declaration.
      "3. In local actions, in which the subject or thing to be
      recovered is local, the true venue must be laid; that is, the action must be
      brought in that county where the cause of action arose; among these are all
      real actions; and actions which arise out of some local subject, or the
      violation of some local rights or interest; as the common law action of
      waste, trespass quare clausum fregit, trespass of nuisances to house or
      lands, disturbance of right of way, obstruction or diversion of ancient
      watercourse, & c. Com. Dig. Action, N 4; Bac. Abr. Actions, Local, A a.

      "4. In a transitory action, the plaintiff may lay the venue
      in any county he pleases; that is, he may bring suit wherever he may find
      the defendant, and lay his cause of action to have arisen there, even though
      the cause of action arose in a foreign jurisdiction. Cowp. 161; Cro. Car.
      444; 9 Johns. R. 67; Steph. Pl. 306; 1 Chitty, Pl. 273; Archib. Civ.
      Pl. 86; Vide, generally, Chit. Pl. Idx. h. t.; Steph. Pl. Index, h.
      t.; Tidd's Pr. Index, h. t.; Graham's Practice, Index h. t.; Com. Dig.
      Abatement, H 13; Id. Action, N 13; Id. Amendment, H 1; Id. Pleader, S 9;
      21 Vin. Ab. 85 to 169; 1 Vern. 178; Yelv. 12 a; Bac. Ab. Actions, Local
      and Transitory, B; Local Actions; Transitory Actions."\/
      [snip]
      "JURISDICTIONAL PLEA. Form of answer addressed to the
      issue of whether the court has the power over the defendant or over the
      subject matter of the litigation; e.g. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (2)."\/
      4. Avoiding the Merits
      [snip]
      "MERITS. In practice. Matter of substance in law, as
      distinguished from matter of mere form; a substantial ground of defense in
      law. A defendant is said 'to swear to merits' or 'to make affidavit of
      merits' when he makes affidavit that he has a good and sufficient or
      substantial defense to the action on the merits. 3 Chit. Gen. Pr. 513, 511.
      'Merits,' in this application of it, has the technical sense of merits in
      law, and is not continued to a strictly moral and conscientious defense.
      Id. 545; 1 Burrill, Pr. 214; Rahn v. Gunnison, 12 Wis. 529; Bolton v.
      Donavan, 9 N.D. 575, 84 N.W. 357; Ordway v. Boston & M.R. Co., 69 N.H. 429,
      45 Atl. 243; Blakely v. Frazier, 11 S.C. 134; Rogers v. Rogers, 37 W. Va.
      407, 16 S.E. 633; Oatman v. Bond, 15 Wis. 26.
      "As used in the New York Code of Procedure, S 349, it has
      been held to mean 'the strict legal rights of the parties, as
      contradistinguished from those mere questions of practice which every court
      regulates for itself, and from all matters which depend upon the discretion
      or favor of the court.' St. Johns v. West, 4 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 332.
      "A 'defense upon the merits' is one which depends upon the
      inherent justice of the defendant's contention, as shown by the substantial
      facts of the case, as distinguished from one which rests upon technical
      objections or some collateral matter. Thus there may be a good defense
      growing out of an error in the plaintiff's pleadings, but there is not a
      defense upon the merits unless the real nature of the transaction in
      controversy shows the defendant to be in the right."\/
      "MERITS. This word is used principally in matters of
      defence.
      "2. A defence upon the merits, is one that rests upon the
      justice of the cause, and not upon technical grounds only; there is,
      therefore, a difference between a good defence, which may be technical or
      not, and a defence on the merits. 5 B. & Ald. 703; 1 Ashm. R. 4; 5 John. R.
      536; Id. 360; 3 John R. 245; Id. 449; 6 John R. 131; 4 John R. 486; 2 Cowen,
      R. 281; 7 Cowen, R. 514; 6 Wend. R. 511; 6 Cowen, R. 395."\/
      [snip]
      Courts of general jurisdiction are courts which take
      cognizance of all causes, civil or criminal, of a particular nature, or
      courts whose judgment is conclusive until modified or reversed on direct
      attack, and who are competent to decide on their of jurisdiction. Courts of
      limited or special jurisdiction are those which can take cognizance of a few
      specified matters only; those which have only a special jurisdiction for a
      particular purpose, or are clothed with special powers for the performance
      of specified duties, beyond which they have no authority of any kind.
      Courts of original and general jurisdiction are competent by their
      constitution to decide upon their own jurisdiction and to exercise it to a
      final judgment without setting forth in their proceedings the jurisdictional
      facts and evidence upon which it is rendered; their records import absolute
      verity, and cannot be impugned by averment or proof to the contrary, and
      there can be no judicial inspection behind the judgment save by appellate
      power; whereas on the other hand courts of special and limited jurisdiction
      are so constituted that their judgments may be looked through for the facts
      and evidence necessary to sustain them, their decisions do not furnish
      evidence of themselves to show jurisdiction and its lawful exercise, and
      every requisite for either must appear upon the face of their proceedings or
      they are nullities. The distinction between courts of general and courts of
      limited jurisdiction is to be found largely in the laws which establish
      them, and the line of demarcation is not always definite. When a court of
      general jurisdiction proceeds under a special statute it becomes a court of
      limited jurisdiction for the purpose of such proceeding.\/
      The common law rule is that a nisi prius court does not have the
      jurisdiction to determine if it even has jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
      statutory tribunals are well known for entering a plea of not guilty on
      behalf of one Accused when they should not in hopes establishing their
      authority by acquiescence (failure to object) to the plea.
      [snip]
      "JURISDICTION OVER PERSON. The legal power of the court to
      render a personal judgment against a party to an action or a proceeding.
      Imperial v. Hardy, La., 302 So.2d 5, 7. See Jurisdiction in personam."\/
      [snip]
      5. The Common Law Prevails in the Absence of a Statute
      In Michigan, the common law is the rule of decision. Where there is no
      statute, the common law prevails.
      "The common law prevails in this state as a general rule,
      except as abrogated by the Constitution, the Legislature, or the Supreme
      Court."\/
      "If circumstances do exist causing such a conflict, then the
      statute must prevail, for the common law may be changed or modified by
      statute." Smith v. Martin, 124 Mich 34 (1900); Boyer v. Backus, 282 Mich 701
      (1937).
      "The common law may be changed or modified by statute, and
      in case of conflict between a common-law duty and a statute, the statute
      must prevail." People v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad, 3 Mich. App. 242, 142
      N.W.2d 54 (1966)
      "It is a common principle of statutory interpretation that a
      statute and all its amendments are to be treated as one and every part given
      effect in determining legislative intent." Smith v. City Commissioner of
      Grand Rapids, 281 Mich 235 (1937); People v. Babcock, 343 Mich 671 (1955).
      "Statutes related to remedies or modes of procedure which do
      not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
      of a remedy or confirmation of rights already existing will, in the absence
      of language clearly showing a contrary intention, be held to operate
      retrospectively and apply to all actions accrued, pending or future, there
      being no vested right to keep a statutory procedural law unchanged and free
      from amendment." Hansen-Snyder Co v General Motors Corporation, 371 Mich
      480; 124 NW2d 286 (1963) (syllabus 1), quoted in Ballog v Knight Newspapers,
      Inc, 381 Mich 527, 533-534; 164 NW2d 19 (1969).
      "The office of the common-law writ of certiorari is to bring
      before the court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior
      tribunal in order that the superior court may determine from the face of the
      record whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not
      proceeded according to the essential requirements of the law." 10 American
      Jurisprudence, p 524, § 3.\/
      Accordingly, the Accused submits that the manner in which he has demanded a
      Bill of Particulars stands apart from the statutory procedure.
      6. Special Appearance versus General Appearance
      [snip]
      "APPEARANCE. In practice. A coming into court as party to
      a suit, whether as plaintiff or defendant.
      "The formal proceeding by which a defendant submits himself
      to the jurisdiction of the court. Flint v. Comly, 97 Me. 251, 49 Atl.
      1044; Crawford v. Vinton, 102 Mich. 83, 62 N.W. 988.
      "Classification. An appearance may be either general or
      special; the former is a simple unqualified or unrestricted submission to
      the jurisdiction of the court, the latter a submission to the jurisdiction
      for some specific purpose only, not for all the purposes of the suit.
      National Furnace Co. v. Moline Mallebale Iron Work, (cc.) 18 Fed. 864."\/
      [snip]
      7. In Propria Persona versus Pro Se
      [snip]
      "PROPRIA PERSONA. In his own person. It is a rule in
      pleading that pleas to the jurisdiction of the court must be pleaded in
      propria persona, because, if pleaded by attorney, they admit the
      jurisdiction, as an attorney is an officer of the court, and he is presumed
      to plead after obtaining leave, which admits the jurisdiction. Lawes on Pl.
      91.
      "An appearance may be in propria persona, and need not be by
      attorney."\/
      "In propria persona. In one's own proper person. It was
      formerly a rule in pleading that pleas to the jurisdiction of the court must
      be plead in propria persona, because if pleaded by attorney they admit the
      jurisdiction, as a attorney is an officer of the court, and he is presumed
      to plead after having obtained leave, which admits the jurisdiction. See
      Pro se"\/
      [snip]
      "Pro se. For himself; in his own behalf; in person.
      Appearing for oneself, as in the case of one who does not retain a lawyer
      and appears for himself in court."\/
      [snip]
      "LEAVE OF COURT. Permission obtained from a court to take
      some action which, without such permission, would not be allowable; as, to
      receive an extension of time to answer complaint. Fed.R.Civil P. 6."\/
      [snip]
      8. Voluntary versus Involuntary Appearance
      [snip]
      "IN PERSONAM, IN REM. In the Roman law, from which they
      are taken, the expressions 'in rem' and 'in personam' were always opposed to
      one another, an act or proceeding in personam being one done or directed
      against or with reference to a specific person, while an act or proceeding
      in rem was one done or directed with reference to no specific person, and
      consequently against or with reference to all whom it might concern, or "all
      the world". The phrases were especially applied to actions; an action in
      personam being the remedy where a claim against a specific person arose out
      of an obligation, whether ex contractu or ex maleficio, while an action in
      rem was one brought for the assertion of a right of property, easement,
      status, etc., against one who denied or infringed it. See Inst. 4, 6, 1;
      Gaius, 4, 1, 1-10; 5 Sav. Syst. 13, et seq.; Dig. 2, 4, 7, 8; Id. 4, 2,
      9, 1.
      "From this use of the terms, they have come to be applied to
      signify the antithesis of "available against a particular person," and
      "available against the world at large." Thus, jura in personam are rights
      primarily available against specific persons; jura in rem, rights only
      available against the world at large.
      "So a judgment or decree is said to be in rem when it binds
      third persons. Such is the sentence of a court of admiralty on a question
      of prize, or a decree of nullity or dissolution of marriage, or a decree of
      a court in a foreign country as to the status of a person domiciled there.

      "Lastly, the terms are sometimes used to signify that a
      judicial proceeding operates on a thing or a person. Thus, it is said of
      the court of chancery that it acts in personam, and not in rem, meaning that
      its decrees operate by compelling defendants to do what they are ordered to
      do, and not by producing the effect directly. Sweet. See Cross v.
      Armstrong, 44 Ohio St. 613, 10 N. E. 160; Cunningham v. Shanklin, 660 Cal.
      125; Hill v. Henry, 66 N.J. Eq. 150, 57 Atl. 555."\/
      [snip]
      "IN REM. A technical term used to designate proceedings or
      actions instituted against the thing, in contradistinction to personal
      actions, which are said to be in personam.
      "An 'action in rem' is a proceeding that takes no cognizance
      of owner but determines right in specific property against all of the world,
      equally binding on everyone. Flesch v. Circle City Excavating & Rental
      Corp., 137 Ind.App. 695, 210 N.E.2d 865, 868. It is true that, in a strict
      sense, a proceeding in rem is one taken directly against property, and has
      for its object the disposition of property, without reference to the title
      of individual claimants; but, in a larger and more general sense, the terms
      are applied to actions between parties, where the direct object is to reach
      and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein. Such
      are cases commenced by attachment against the property of debtors, or
      instituted to partition real estate, foreclose a mortgage, or enforce a
      lien. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565. In the strict sense
      of the term, a proceeding 'in rem' is one which is taken directly against
      property or one which is brought to enforce a right in the thing itself.

      "Actions in which the court is required to have control of
      the thing or object and in which an adjudication is made as to the object
      which binds the whole world and not simply the interests of the parties to
      the proceeding. Flesch v. Circle City Excavating & Rental Corp., 137
      Ind.App. 695, 210 N.E.2d 865."\/
      [snip]
      "SUI JURIS. Lat. Of his own right; possessing full social
      and civil rights; not under any legal disability, or the power of another,
      or guardianship.
      "Having capacity to manage one's own affairs; not under
      legal disability to act for one's self. Story, Ag. S 2."\/
      [snip]
      "CORAM NON JUDICE. In presence of a person not a judge.
      When a suit is brought and determined in a court which has no jurisdiction
      in the matter, then it is said to be coram non judice, and the judgment is
      void."\/
      In Michigan, there are various ways that a party to an action can
      unwittingly traverse and convert a special appearance into a general
      appearance.
      "After pleading and going to trial in an action begun by
      capias, defendant cannot insist on objections to the sufficiency of the
      affidavit for the writ." Taylor v. Adams (syllabus), 58 Mich 187. "By
      pleading and going to trial on the merits, after an adverse decision of a
      motion to quash a writ of attachment for defective service, defendant waives
      such defects, and cannot thereafter object to the manner in which he was
      brought into court." Austin v. Burroughs (syllabus), 62 Mich 181. "By filing
      a declaration, as commencement of suit, the plaintiff submits himself to the
      jurisdiction of the court, as does the defendant by appearing and pleading,
      without the required statutory service of the declaration. "So held, where
      nonresident plaintiffs filed a declaration against nonresident defendants,
      as commencement of suit upon a contract for building a railroad in this
      State, and the defendants, through attorneys of this State, voluntarily
      appeared, and pleaded to the declaration." Cofrode v. Wayne Circuit Judge
      (syllabus), 79 Mich 332 (7 L.R.A. 511). "It is now contended by counsel for
      plaintiff that by thus pleading to the merits, and going to trial
      thereunder, the defendant waived the question of due personal service of the
      writ by which the cause was commenced. That question is expressly ruled by
      Manhard v. Schott, 37 Mich 234, and the cases there cited, in which it was
      held that pleading to the merits brings one into court, whether lawfully
      served with process or not, and that he cannot afterwards object to the
      manner in which he was brought in." Improved-Match Co. v. Michigan Mutual
      Fire Ins. Co., 122 Mich 256, 259. Butcher v. Cappon & Bertsch Co., 148 Mich
      552 (12 Ann. Cas. 169), was an attachment case, started by filing an
      affidavit which failed to state that the defendant was indebted to the
      plaintiff, but stated that the defendant was indebted to "deponent," and
      there were two plaintiffs. This court held that the affidavit was
      jurisdictionally defective, and not subject to amendment, citing cases. It
      was conceded that no general appearance had been entered by the defendant.
      However, the defendant had filed the statutory bond to pay the judgment,
      dissolving the attachment. This court held: "A circuit court writ of
      attachment 'is a summons with a clause authorizing a seizure of property.'
      Thompson v. Thomas, 11 Mich 274. The dissolution of the attachment by giving
      the statutory bond, to pay any judgment which may be recovered in the suit
      commenced by said writ of attachment, operated as an appearance and
      converted the suit from an action in rem into an action in personam."\/
      The personal representative alternatively maintains that
      petitioner's pleading should have been dismissed because she failed to serve
      a summons with a complaint in the manner prescribed by MCR 2.105. Generally,
      defective service of process will not warrant dismissal of a party's
      pleading unless the service failed to notify the defendant of the action
      "within the time prescribed for service." MCR 2.105(J)(3). However, a
      complete failure of service, e.g., failure to serve the summons with the
      complaint within the time for service, warrants dismissal for improper
      service of process. Holliday v Townley, 189 Mich. App. 424, 426; 473 N.W.2d
      733 (1991). Still, a party who enters a general appearance and contests a
      cause of action on the merits submits to the court's jurisdiction and waives
      service of process objections. Penny v ABA Pharmaceutical Co (On Remand),
      203 Mich. App. 178, 181; 511 N.W.2d 896 (1993).\/
      [snip]
      This Court should take notice that part of the procedure being utilized by
      the Accused to Demand a Bill of Particulars has commenced prior to
      arraignment. This is to allow the Accused to make a demand that addresses
      only the jurisdictional elements of the charges such that a cogent pre-trial
      challenge to the jurisdiction can be made. The movement of this part of the
      criminal procedure from pre-arraignment to post arraignment and the merging
      with this procedure with equitable discovery rules prejudices this
      substantive Right, and is thereby unconstitutional.
      Bill of Particulars: "It is designed to aid the defendant
      in interposing the proper answer and in preparing for trial, by giving him
      detailed information regarding the cause of action stated in the complaint"
      Wetmore v. Goodwin Film & Camera Co., (D.C.) 226 F. 352,353.
      Cause of Action: "act causing injury" Fiscus v. Kansas City
      Public Service Co., 153 Kan. 493, 112 P.2d 83, 85. "Breach of contract or
      agreement" Press v. Davis, Tex. Civ. App., 118 S. W.2d 982, 989, 990.
      "every fact which is necessary to establish to support right or obtain
      judgement" Beale v. Cherryhomes, Tex. Civ. App., 21 S.W. 2d 65, 66; Dublin
      Mill & Elevator Co. v. Cornelius, Tex.Civ.App., 5 S.W.2d 1027, 1028. "power
      to enforce obligation" Woods v. Cook, 14 Cal. App. 2d 560, 58 P.2d 965, 966.
      "A suit, litigation, or action. Any question, civil or criminal, litigated
      or contested before a court of justice." "As used in venue statute, "cause"
      means "cause of action", which means the right which a party has to
      institute a judicial proceeding." Bergin v. Temple, 111 Mont. 539, 111 P.2d
      286, 289, 133. A.L.R. 1115.
      [snip]
      "Appearance. In practice. A coming into court as a party
      to a suit, whether as Plaintiff or defendant.
      The formal proceeding by which a defendant submits himself
      to the jurisdiction of the court. Flint v. Comly, 97 Me. 251, 49 Atl. 1044;
      Crawford v. Vinton, 102 Mich 83, 62 N.W. 988
      Classification. An appearance may be either general or
      special; the former is a simple unqualified or unrestricted submission to
      the jurisdiction of the court, the latter a submission to the jurisdiction
      for some special purpose only, not for all the purposes of the suit.
      National Furnace Co. v. Moline Mallebale Iron Work (cc.) 18 Fed 864." \/
      "Propria Persona. In his own person. It is a rule in
      pleading that pleas to the jurisdiction of the court must be pleaded in
      propria persona, because if pleaded by an attorney, they admit the
      jurisdiction, as an attorney is an officer of the court, and he is presumed
      to plead after obtaining leave, which admits the jurisdiction. Lawes on Pl.
      91.
      An appearance may be in propria persona, and need not be by
      attorney."\/
      "General or Special Appearance. A general appearance is one
      whereby the party appears and submits to the court's jurisdiction for all
      purposes, while a special appearance is made for the sole purpose of
      questioning the court's jurisdiction; by virtue of some statutes or rules
      such distinction has in effect been abolished."\/
      The Legislature of Michigan and the Supreme Court of Michigan are silent on
      this matter, showing that special appearance has not been abolished in the
      state.
      "Where there is no statute to the contrary, the right of a
      party to appear specially to object to the jurisdiction of the court over
      his person, and have that question determined in limine, is generally
      recognized."\/
      Potential Errors of the Court
      1. The court errs in denying to the Accused a
      BILL OF PARTICULARS prior to arraignment
      This DEMAND for a Bill of Particulars is not made as a motion to the court.
      The Accused issued directly upon the prosecution the demand for
      clarification of the nature and cause of the accusations. It is a duty
      incumbent upon the prosecution to completely state the nature and cause of
      the accusations to the Accused in a criminal case. "In every criminal
      prosecution, the accused shall have the right ... to be informed of the
      nature of the accusation" as prescribed by the Constitution of the republic
      state of Michigan at Article I, Section 20. Nowhere in Article I, Section
      20 is there any exception to this noted, rather it is the will of the People
      of the state that the Accused hath such a right in every criminal
      prosecutions, no matter how small. The prosecution has failed to inform the
      Accused in the particulars of personal jurisdiction and venue, as demanded.
      The prosecution has treated the Accused's DEMAND of Substantive Right, made
      directly upon the prosecution, as a triviality. It would be an abuse of
      discretion for any judge to speciously deny this DEMAND of Right by the
      Accused.
      [snip]
      Bill of Particulars IS NOT Discovery:
      "A bill of particulars is not a substitute for discovery and
      the Commonwealth's evidence is not a proper subject to which a petition for
      a bill may be directed". Commonwealth v. Davis, 470 Pa. 193, 368 A.2d 260
      (1977)
      "It is not designed to perform the function of a discovery
      device and the Commonwealth's evidence is not a proper subject to which a
      petition for a bill may be directed." Commonwealth v. Senk, 412 Pa. 184, 194
      A.2d 221; vacated on other grounds, 378 U.S. 562, 84 S. Ct. 1928 (1963)
      "'Bill of particulars' may not be employed as a means of
      compelling disclosure of <br/><br/>(Message over 64 KB, truncated)