REVIEW: "Security Engineering", Ross Anderson
- BKSECENG.RVW 20080929
"Security Engineering", Ross Anderson, 2008, 978-0-470-06852-6,
%A Ross Anderson ross.anderson@... rja14@...
%C 5353 Dundas Street West, 4th Floor, Etobicoke, ON M9B 6H8
%G 978-0-470-06852-6 0-470-06852-3
%I John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
%O U$70.00 416-236-4433 fax: 416-236-4448
%O Audience i+ Tech 3 Writing 2 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P 1040 p.
%T "Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed
Systems, Second Edition"
Anything written by Gene Spafford is important. Anything written by
Bruce Schneier is readable, and, even if you disagree with it, worth
thinking about. Anything written by Ross Anderson is important,
readable, worth considering, and correct.
The preface states that this book is intended as a text for self-study
or for a one term course, a reference for professionals, an
introduction to the underlying concepts, and an original scientific
contribution in terms of the foundational principles for security
engineering. In addition, the preface to the second edition notes
that these concepts now need to be understood by legal investigators,
managers, and, in the wake of 9/11, everyone. A very tall order to
fulfill, but one which, for once, seems to have been accomplished. I
have often been asked, in regard to these reviews, whether there are,
in fact, any books that I do like. Well, I like this one. If you are
involved with security and you haven't read "Security Engineering,"
you should. And you have no excuse if you haven't. This is the
second edition to be printed, and the first edition is available
online, in its entirety.
(And, if the first edition is available online for free, why should
you buy the second? Because the second edition has more, in almost
Part one deals with the basic concepts of engineering and security.
Chapter one presents four example situations of security needs.
Protocols are not limited to the precise but limited structures with
which computer people are familiar. Security is a people problem, and
chapter two, entitled "Usability and Psychology," addresses this issue
up front, along with a set of more conceptual, but more formal,
authentication problems and protocols. It is unlikely that the models
presented exhaust the field, but some thought indicates that they are
pertinent to a wide variety of applications. Much the usual thoughts
and advice on passwords is issued in chapter three, although the
research is better documented, and some additional research
(passphrase generated passwords are as secure as randomly assigned
ones, and as memorable as naively chosen ones) is presented.
(Anderson's writing is clear enough, but he does betray a taste for
symbolic logic that might limit the audience for the book. Still,
perserverence on the part of the reader will be amply rewarded.) It
is strange not to see any mention of the work factor of passwords
overall. Chapter four reviews access control, but primarily from the
perspective of system and hardware internals. Cryptography, in
chapter five, is covered reliably and well, although the structure and
flow of the material is not always in developmental order. The
problems of distributed systems are examined; in terms of concurrency,
failure resistance, and naming; in chapter six. Economics can be used
to examine a great many aspects of security (and insecurity). Chapter
seven looks at a number, but I was disappointed to note that risk
analysis was not one of them.
Part two uses a number of applications of secure systems to introduce
particular concepts or technologies. Chapter eight discusses
multilevel security, which encompasses most of the formal security
models such as Bell-LaPadula. Medical (and census) databases are
used, in chapter nine, as examples of multilateral, or compartmented,
security: the need to deal with information of equal sensitivity, but
restricted to different groups. Controls particularly related to the
banking system and fraud are presented in chapter ten, although the
material is long on anecdotes, and contains weaker analysis than the
preceding text. A somewhat limited, but still interesting, review of
physical security has been added in chapter eleven. Chapter twelve
reviews monitoring systems, of both monitoring and metering types. In
regard to nuclear command and control systems, chapter thirteen
examines the tension between availability (the ability to fire a
missile) and confidentiality (or authentication: making sure nobody
else does). Various aspects of the technology for security printing
and seals is dealt with in chapter fourteen. Biometrics, in chapter
fifteen, gets a good, but fairly standard, treatment. Chapter sixteen
delves into tamper-resistance in cryptographic gear and smartcards
(expanding on the content of fourteen). The TEMPEST and Teapot (no,
I'm not kidding) projects on emission security are reviewed in chapter
seventeen. Chapter eighteen examines the security problems inherent
in the use of application programming interfaces (APIs). There is
good coverage of the basics of traditional electronic warfare in
chapter nineteen, although the material on information warfare is not
as thorough. Chapter twenty looks at telecommunications system
security, with some material on phone phreaking and lots on cellular
encryption. Network attack and defense, in chapter twenty-one, is
less focussed than other chapters, and adds malware. Copyright and
DRM (Digital Rights Management) systems are examined in chapter
twenty-two, with solid coverage of recent controversies. Gaming,
social networks, elections, and other complex applications are
discussed in chapter twenty-three.
Part three turns to politics, management, and assurance. Chapter
twenty-four, under the title of "Terror, Justice, and Freedom," has a
fascinating discussion of major issues in public policy. Management
issues, in chapter twenty-five, are presented in an interesting but
generic manner. The discussion of system evaluation and assurance
asks the usual question in regard to how we know our systems are
secure. In a sense, though, the subtitle of the book is wrong: much
of the material points out how *not* to build dependable systems, and
chapter twenty-six is a bit disheartening. The conclusion, in chapter
twenty-seven, is that we need more engineers and engineering.
Although the material is presented in a very formal way, the writing
is usually quite readable, and the exceptional stilted passages are
still accessible to the determined reader. On occasion, one could
hope for additional explanations of some items that are mentioned
briefly and passed over. The constant emphasis on how security
protections have failed can be depressing, but the examination of the
errors of others does provide the basis for better designs in the
copyright Robert M. Slade, 2002, 2008 BKSECENG.RVW 20080929
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