REVIEW: "The Secured Enterprise", Paul E. Proctor/F. Christian Byrnes
- BKSEPYIA.RVW 20040719
"The Secured Enterprise", Paul E. Proctor/F. Christian Byrnes, 2002,
%A Paul E. Proctor
%A F. Christian Byrnes
%C One Lake St., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458
%I Prentice Hall
%O U$34.99/C$54.99 +1-201-236-7139 fax: +1-201-236-7131
%P 304 p.
%T "The Secured Enterprise: Protecting Your Information Assets"
The introduction states that the book is aimed at business
professionals, but that security professionals may also find it useful
as a reference.
Part one is an introduction to security. So is chapter one, which
extends the traditional CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability)
security triad to include non-repudiation. (Most security analysts
would see that function as a special case of integrity.) This muddled
thinking is echoed by the muddled structure of the chapter, which
touches tersely on roles and policies, and contains an extremely
incomplete list of security technologies. Miscellaneous threats are
mentioned in chapter two. Policies are revisited in chapter three,
although the discussion is not clear in regard to high level policy
formation, and more applicable to access privilege or procedures.
Chapter four deals specifically with access control, but in a
disorganized and incomplete fashion.
Part two deals with security technologies. Chapter five is an
incomplete definition and description of firewalls (stateful and
circuit proxy types are never mentioned). An incomplete description
of vulnerability scanners is given in chapter six. An incomplete and
very dated discussion of viruses and protection makes up chapter
seven. (Various implementations of scanning are noted, but there is
no reference to activity monitors or change detection). The limited
review of intrusion detection, in chapter eight, has a rather
misleading explanation of sensor topology, and no clear explanation at
all of engine types. Chapter nine has a simplistic outline of
asymmetric cryptography and public key infrastructure (and a very odd
example of the key management problem). Chapter ten has lots of
verbiage about virtual private networks. A strange conflation of
mobile communication and wireless LAN topics is in chapter eleven.
Chapter twelve seems to both recommend and disparage single sign-on.
A promotional piece for digital signature technology is in chapter
Part three discusses implementation. Chapter fourteen outlines the
setting up of a security program, but only if you know what should go
into the various pieces already. Security assessment, in chapter
fifteen, is limited to different types of penetration or vulnerability
testing, with a ludicrously short description of risk assessment.
There is a simplistic overview of incident response and business
continuity planning in chapter seventeen. Random bits of Web and
Internet security are listed in eighteen.
Given the scattered nature of the entire work, it is curious that part
four is entitled "Odds and Ends." Miscellaneous legal issues are
raised in chapter nineteen. Chapter twenty is supposed to help you
with "Putting It All Together," but just contains editorial advice.
OK, is it good for non-security businesspeople? Maybe, if they really
know extremely little about security, and don't need to manage the
security function. They will at least obtain some familiarity with
the terms that might be used, although it could be a case of a little
knowledge being a dangerous thing. As for security professionals: get
some decent references.
copyright Robert M. Slade, 2004 BKSEPYIA.RVW 20040719
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-- Dr. Dwight Van de Vate, Professor of Philosophy,
University of Tennessee at Knoxville
http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev or http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade