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Re: A flashcard representation of Stolic practice

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  • Dave
    Hadot (pg. 129) thinks that the practice of the philosophical life can be summed up in the two disciplines of desire and the active will (Marcus Aurelius XI,
    Message 1 of 101 , Jun 21, 2013
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      Hadot (pg. 129) thinks that "the practice of the philosophical life can be summed up in the two disciplines of desire and the active will (Marcus Aurelius XI, 13, 4):

      What evil can there be for you if you _do_ that which, in this present moment, is appropriate to your_nature;

      and if you _accept_ that which, in this present moment, comes at the moment which is opportune for the Nature_of_the_All?"

      Best wishes,
      Dave


      --- In stoics@yahoogroups.com, Dave Kelly <ptypes@...> wrote:
      >
      > The way that I understand Epictetus and Keith, here, is that the Three
      > Topoi are askesis (exercise(s)), or disciplines, in which the Stoic trainee
      > _applies_the_core_Stoic_principles_. What is required is of course more
      > than just an intellectual understanding of those principles. And the
      > trainee does not just act from those principles, but seeks to embody them.
      >
      > "The three *topoi* (fields of study) establish activities in which the *
      > prokoptôn* (Stoic student) applies their Stoic principles; they are
      > practical exercises or disciplines that when successfully followed are
      > constitutive of the *eudaimôn* (`happy') life which all rational beings are
      > capable of attaining.
      >
      > There are three areas of study, in which a person who is going to be good
      > and noble must be trained. That concerning desires and aversions, so that
      > he may never fail to get what he desires nor fall into what he would avoid.
      > That concerning the impulse to act and not to act, and, in general,
      > appropriate behaviour; so that he may act in an orderly manner and after
      > due consideration, and not carelessly. The third is concerned with freedom
      > from deception and hasty judgement, and, in general, whatever is connected
      > with assent. (*Discourses* 3.2.1–2, trans. Hard)
      >
      > "Our capacity to employ these disciplines in the course of daily life is *eph'
      > hêmin* (`in our power' or `up to us') because they depend on our opinions,
      > judgements, intentions and desires which concern the way we regard things
      > over which our *prohairesis* (moral character) has complete control."
      >
      > Best wishes,
      >
      > Dave
      >
      >
      > On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 11:47 AM, Dave <ptypes@...> wrote:
      >
      > > **
      > >
      > >
      > > The purpose of the practice of the three disciplines, or of any Stoic
      > > practice or 'therapy', is the rectification of our vicious dispositions.
      > >
      > > from Keith's (pp. 40-41) Epictetus' Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes:
      > >
      > > "Are the passions alone in the category of 'those things contrary to
      > > nature amongst the things that are in our power'? Probably not. Stoics
      > > describe the disposition of the non-virtuous person as kakos, bad or
      > > vicious. All of us â€" excepting only the Stoic sophos â€" are susceptible
      > > to assenting to false judgments about what is good and bad, and what truly
      > > benefits us (virtue), and these assents are, or give rise to, the passions
      > > which are impulses to act in ways that are non-virtuous and contrary to our
      > > own interests (and thus contrary to nature â€" that is, contrary to our own
      > > human nature, obviously, but also contrary to cosmic nature, since it is
      > > our failure to accept the way the world goes that makes us prone to
      > > assenting to false judgements). Thus someone who is prey to the passions
      > > must necessarily be vicious, and someone who is vicious has got into that
      > > state by falling victim to the passions. This gives us reason to place the
      > > vices, alongside the passions, in the category of what is contrary to
      > > nature amongst the things that are in our power. Although it is not really
      > > the vices and being vicious that are directly in our power (though vicious
      > > behaviour, to be sure, is contrary to nature), but the judgements to which
      > > we assent that either are themselves passions, or give rise to passions
      > > (and it is the passions, conceived of as impulses, that motivate vicious
      > > actions) â€" it is assuredly the case that if we can master our faculty of
      > > assent we will at one and the same time master our vicious behaviour."
      > >
      > > Best wishes,
      > > Dave
      > >
      > >
      > > --- In stoics@yahoogroups.com, "Dave" <ptypes@> wrote:
      > > >
      > > > Here is a discussion of the Three Disciplines in the _Discourses_,
      > > 3.12.6-15, trans. George Long, which is particularly useful for the study
      > > and therapy of desire and vice.
      > > >
      > > > For, since it is not possible to have your desire not disappointed and
      > > your aversion free from falling into that which you would avoid without
      > > great and constant practice, you must know that if you allow your desire
      > > and aversion to turn to things which are not within the power of the will,
      > > you will neither have your desire capable of attaining your object, nor
      > > your aversion free from the power of avoiding that which you would avoid.
      > > And since strong habit leads, and we are accustomed to employ desire and
      > > aversion only to things which are not within the power of our will, we
      > > ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and where there is great
      > > slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise.
      > > >
      > > > I am rather inclined to pleasure: I will incline to the contrary side
      > > above measure for the sake of exercise. I am averse to pain: I will rub and
      > > exercise against this the appearances which are presented to me for the
      > > purpose of withdrawing my aversion from every such thing. For who is a
      > > practitioner in exercise? He who practices not using his desire, and
      > > applies his aversion only to things which are within the power of his will,
      > > and practices most in the things which are difficult to conquer. For this
      > > reason one man must practice himself more against one thing and another
      > > against another thing. What, then, is it to the purpose to set up a palm
      > > tree, or to carry about a tent of skins, or a mortar and a pestle?
      > > Practice, man, if you are irritable, to endure if you are abused, not to be
      > > vexed if you are treated with dishonour. Then you will make so much
      > > progress that, even if a man strikes you, you will say to yourself,
      > > "Imagine that you have embraced a statue": then also exercise yourself to
      > > use wine properly so as not to drink much, for in this also there are men
      > > who foolishly practice themselves; but first of all you should abstain from
      > > it, and abstain from a young girl and dainty cakes. Then at last, if
      > > occasion presents itself, for the purpose of trying yourself at a proper
      > > time, you will descend into the arena to know if appearances overpower you
      > > as they did formerly. But at first fly far from that which is stronger than
      > > yourself: the contest is unequal between a charming young girl and a
      > > beginner in philosophy. "The earthen pitcher," as the saying is, "and the
      > > rock do not agree."
      > > >
      > > > After the desire and the aversion comes the second topic of the
      > > movements toward action and the withdrawals from it; that you may be
      > > obedient to reason, that you do nothing out of season or place, or contrary
      > > to any propriety of the kind. The third topic concerns the assents, which
      > > is related to the things which are persuasive and attractive. For as
      > > Socrates said, "we ought not to live a life without examination," so we
      > > ought not to accept an appearance without examination, but we should say,
      > > "Wait, let me see what you are and whence you come"; like the watch at
      > > night, "Show me the pass." "Have you the signal from nature which the
      > > appearance that may be accepted ought to have?"
      > > >
      > > > Best wishes,
      > > > Dave
      > > >
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > --- In stoics@yahoogroups.com, Dave Kelly <ptypes@> wrote:
      > >
      > > > >
      > > > > On Sat, Feb 16, 2013 at 7:26 AM, dymaxion oxy <oxydymaxion@> wrote:
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > > You must be referring to the ancient Greek words "orexis", "horme",
      > > and
      > > > > > "sygkatathesis", when you speak about desire, action and assent.
      > > > > > This quote taken from "Discourses as reported by Arrian with an
      > > English
      > > > > > translation by W.A. Oldfather, (pp.22-23)" might be of help to you.
      > > > > > Oxy
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > Thanks. I may have first read this passage in Keith Seddon's article
      > > > > on Epictetus.
      > > > > http://www.iep.utm.edu/epictetu/#SH4e
      > > > >
      > > > > If you are a new member, or perhaps this is just your first post,
      > > welcome.
      > > > >
      > > > > Best wishes,
      > > > > Dave
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > > DISERTATIONES EPICTETI (DIATRIBAI)
      > > > > >
      > > > > > BOOK III.2
      > > > > >
      > > > > > There are three fields of study in which the man who is going to be
      > > good
      > > > > > and excellent must first have been trained.
      > > > > > The first has to do with desires and aversions, that he may never
      > > fail to
      > > > > > get what he desires, nor fall into what he avoids; (orexis)
      > > > > > the second with cases of choice and of refusal, and in general, with
      > > > > > duty, that he may act in an orderly fashion, upon good reasons, and
      > > not
      > > > > > carelessly; (hormE)
      > > > > > the third with the avoidance of error and rushness in judgement,
      > > and, in
      > > > > > general, about cases of assent.(sygkatathesis)
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Among these the most important and especially pressing is that which
      > > has
      > > > > > to do with the stronger emotions; for a strong emotion does not
      > > arise except
      > > > > > a desire fails to attain its object, or an aversion falls into what
      > > it would
      > > > > > avoid. This is the field of study which introduces to us confusions,
      > > > > > tumults, misfortunes and calamities; and sorrows, lamentations,
      > > envies; and
      > > > > > make us envious and jealous � passions which make it impossible
      > > for us to
      > >
      > > > > > listen to reason.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > The second field of study deals with duty; for I ought not to be
      > > unfeeling
      > > > > > like a statue, but should maintain my relations, both natural and
      > > acquired,
      > > > > > as a religious man, as a son, a brother, a father, a citizen.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > The third belongs only to those who are already making progress;
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Discourses as reported by Arrian with an English translation by W.A.
      > > > > > Oldfather, pp.22-23
      > > > > >
      > > > > > ________________________________
      > > > > > De : Dave Kelly <ptypes@>
      > > > > > � : stoics@yahoogroups.com
      > > > > > Envoy� le : Mardi 12 f�vrier 2013 19h02
      > >
      > > > > > Objet : Re: [stoics] A flashcard representation of Stolic practice
      > > > > >
      > > > > > On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 2:51 PM, Dave <ptypes@> wrote:
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > from flashcardmachine.com
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > What are the three topoi of Epictetus?
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > Discipline of Desire - a truly virtuous person only desires
      > > goodness,
      > > > > > > virtue and actions motivated by virtue.
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > Discipline of Action - our actions should be motivated by virtue.
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > Discipline of Assent - evaluate a situation before reacting to it.
      > > > > > >
      > > > > > > Best wishes,
      > > > > > > Dave
      > > > > >
      > > > > > The "flashcard" of the three topoi may have been derived from this:
      > > > > >
      > > > > > http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Epictetus#The_Three_Topics
      > > > > >
      > > > > > The Three Topics
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Epictetus concentrated on teaching his students how to lead an ideal
      > > > > > Stoic life. His teachings on logic, natural philosophy and ethics did
      > > > > > not vary greatly from the original ideas set out almost four hundred
      > > > > > years earlier by Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus, the founders of the
      > > > > > Stoic school, but Epictetus developed a new system for teaching the
      > > > > > practice of Stoicism. Like all the Hellenistic philosophers, he
      > > > > > regarded moral philosophy as a means of teaching people to lead
      > > better
      > > > > > lives and achieve eudaimonia ('happiness' or 'a flourishing life').
      > > > > > For the Stoics this meant a life motivated by virtue.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > To this end, Epictetus identified three topoi (topics) on which a
      > > > > > Stoic should focus in order to achieve happiness. The first,
      > > > > > Discipline of Desire, was an examination of desire, and the
      > > > > > realization that a truly rational being only desires goodness,
      > > virtue,
      > > > > > and actions motivated by virtue. A person who limits his desire to
      > > > > > virtue can never be thwarted, disappointed or discouraged.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > The second topic, Discipline of Action, involved performing the
      > > > > > actions appropriate to one's position in the family, society and
      > > > > > world, in order to fulfill the role of a rational, sociable being.
      > > Our
      > > > > > actions, said Epictetus, should be motivated by the specific
      > > > > > obligations that we have in virtue of who we are, our natural
      > > > > > relations to others, and what roles we have adopted in our dealings
      > > > > > with the wider community. We should not perform actions that are
      > > > > > destructive or damaging to these roles; in other words we should not
      > > > > > act carelessly or give way to impulses of violence, anger or
      > > jealousy.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > The third topic, Discipline of Assent, involved learning to evaluate
      > > a
      > > > > > situation before reacting to it, and choosing an appropriate
      > > response.
      > > > > > The Stoics taught that in every situation we receive an initial
      > > > > > "impression" of what is happening around us, and that we must then
      > > > > > apply judgment and interpretation to truly understand its meaning.
      > > > > > Epictetus emphasized that we must first understand a circumstance
      > > > > > before we can judge whether it is desirable or not and decide on an
      > > > > > appropriate action.
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Best wishes,
      > > > > > Dave
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > > ------------------------------------
      > > > > >
      > > > > > Yahoo! Groups Links
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > >
      > > > > --
      > > > > PTypes Personality Types
      > > > > http://www.ptypes.com/
      > > > >
      > > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      >
      >
      >
      > --
      > PTypes Personality Types
      > http://www.ptypes.com/
      >
    • ptypes
      Epictetus most often and predominently describes the good as a prohairesis in accordance with nature or as making proper use of impressions. Goods are things
      Message 101 of 101 , Apr 9
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        Epictetus most often and predominently describes the good as a prohairesis in accordance with nature or as making proper use of impressions.

         

        Goods are things in our power.

         

        So, making proper use of impressions is in our power.

        In our power are judgment, intention, desire and aversion, in a word, every that is our own doing.

         

        Judgment, intention, desire and aversion are the capacities, or powers, we exercise  to make proper use of impressions.

         

        So, making proper use of impressions is in our power. Everything else is not in our power.

         

        An awareness of this dichotomy is the attitude to have for making proper use of impressions.

         

        Regards,

        Dave

         

         

         

         

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