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Re: [stoics] Fw: [theologyislanguage] Revised first three paragraphs of "Reverberations of an (Umberto) Eco"

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  • Kevin
     I follow Peirce in that the logics used by philosopher should merge with higher mathematics to properly handle the logic of relatives. But in fact this
    Message 1 of 3 , Apr 2 8:32 AM
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     I follow Peirce in that the logics used by philosopher should merge with higher mathematics to properly handle the logic of relatives. But in fact this hasn’t happened and so metaphysics has degenerated into nihilism. Postmodern metaphysics is now only good for sponsoring terrorism IMO.
     
    I despise the philosophy of the German philosophers (noy very Stoic I know) and I do have faith philosophy will once again merge with science as it did with Aristotle but it may be a long and bloody road before it happens and that is why I post occasionally to do my small part to head-off those outcomes. 
     
    In this regard I follow Hicks.


    From: Gary Moore <gottlos752004@...>
    To: "stoics@yahoogroups.com" <stoics@yahoogroups.com>
    Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2012 7:09 AM
    Subject: [stoics] Fw: [theologyislanguage] Revised first three paragraphs of "Reverberations of an (Umberto) Eco"

     


    ----- Forwarded Message -----
    From: Gary <gottlos752004@...>
    To: theologyislanguage@yahoogroups.com
    Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2012 6:07 AM
    Subject: [theologyislanguage] Revised first three paragraphs of "Reverberations of an (Umberto) Eco"

     
    REVERBERATIONS OF AN ECO 29 January 2012 -17 March 2012
    First and always remember "Being has many meanings."
    Philosophers deliberately set aside `ordinary discourse' in order to do what they think is `important'. Yet, in trying to put it aside in order `to get down to business', `ordinary discourse' still never actually becomes a side issue, but remains visible yet ignored in that background till the philosopher is forced to return to `ordinary discourse' after indulging in philosophizing. If we classify according to winners and losers, then, `ordinary discourse' always wins absolutely. Philosophy is not a necessity, not even whole or part of a `necessary' distinction of being human. For then one would `always already' be fully aware while, somehow, still "within" ordinary discourse; rather, it is the opposite. `Philosophical discourse' is constantly being invaded by `ordinary discourse' even when pursued with the greatest deliberation. You cannot live in the ordinary world and purely philosophize at the same time. Why? Philosophy is episodic within the constant, never-disconnected, continuity of ordinary discourse like a philosophical blister on the ordinary skin. The skin is continuous even while the blister forms., The blister eventually and necessarily pops while the skin remains as skin. The blister may `seem' to change the skin but that is only perceived from the viewpoint of judgment. The philosopher assumes there are broad rules of thinking and conduct carried over from philosophy that cover ordinary life whereas in fact ordinary life always `covers over' philosophy. But philosophy, as it is episodic even in a full-episodic occurrence, at best is only carried over into ordinary discourse piece-meal, divided up and parceled out according to circumstances which are always `ordinary' which is applied happenstance at best according to philosophy's judgment as both interrupting ordinary discourse and being interrupted at the same time by ordinary discourse. ¶
    The philosopher also assumes he is more rational than ordinary discourse because he seems to be `in control', while concentrating intently on his effort. But this only `seems' true from a playful point of view (der Spielraum) insofar as he is controlling his own discourse from an artificially isolated, `pretend', point of view until he tries to interrupt ordinary discourse. [Eco, pages 2, 3] It has to be taken up as `special' and purposefully, even if never successfully, alien to ordinary discourse precisely because the only possibleobject of examination is ordinary discourse, both to understand it and supposedly to `correct' it. To do so, he must pretend to stand outside of and in contrast to it, establishing self-consciously specific premises as `proper', but `on his own' as `without the consent of others', presuppositions of philosophy that define the `correct' way to proceed. Ordinary discourse, though, seemingly `observed' within its own nature, even from an `outside' viewpoint, operates by unexamined axioms that are only, and quickly, bypassing the problem `to get on down the road' to real business, are examined only if they cease `to work right' within the process, `the rules of the game', that is, if conflict in supposedly `mutual' assumptions arises. When this is resolved, the examination stops completely, and ordinary discourse proceeds on as usual.¶
    In fact, the ordinary world keeps on going during the philosophic episode as if the philosophic episode was not happening at all. Philosophical discourse, as truly `episodic' and `parceled out' is only held together by ordinary discourse. Ordinary discourse does not need to pay attention to philosophic discourse unless it interrupts. But philosophic discourse can only interrupt by imposing a value from within ordinary discourse in opposition to another value within ordinary discourse. This is the only way to get its attention. It can only interrupt ordinary discourse by pretending to play by the rules of ordinary discourse on its own turf, though pretending otherwise, in the game field of the ordinary world. And yet the ordinary world, for philosophy to interrupt it, already imposes its rules and space upon philosophy. Philosophy then must become `ordinary discourse' in order to interrupt ordinary discourse.¶





  • Kevin
    Malcolm I retract my reference to nominal-ism this isn t right. Kevin ... Malcolm I retract my reference to nominal-ism this isn t right. Kevin
    Message 2 of 3 , Apr 7 6:20 AM
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      Malcolm I retract my reference to nominal-ism this isn't right.

      Kevin




      ------------------------------
      On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 4:31 PM EDT Kevin wrote:

      >Well I am of the mind that Realism is probably correct. Probability and Continuity are mathematical concepts which help to support inference as a valid mode of reasoning. Once the German philosophers decided that reality was inconsequential to philosophy, rationality soon was also jettisoned. Passions and negative ones at that became a perfectly acceptable means to base acts on and reason is just a mirage.  A mixture ripe for human suffering which the evidence bears out in the 20th century.

      >I've just finished reviewing Nietzsche and the Nazis by S. Hicks and it concerned me greatly.

      >As for Peirce he probably found the Stoics too nominalistic and he wasn't a determinist.

      >Sorry for getting off topic again.

      >Kevin
      >
      >________________________________
      >From: Malcolm Schosha <malcolmschosha@...>
      >To: stoics@yahoogroups.com
      >Sent: Tuesday, April 3, 2012 11:29 AM
      >Subject: Re: [stoics] Fw: [theologyislanguage] Revised first three paragraphs of "Reverberations of an (Umberto) Eco"
      >
      >

      >Kevin wrote:
      >     
      >I follow Peirce in that the logics used by philosopher should merge with higher mathematics to properly handle the logic of relatives. But in fact this hasn’t happened and so metaphysics has degenerated into nihilism. Postmodern metaphysics is now only good for sponsoring terrorism IMO.
      >
      >.............................
      >
      >Salve Kevin,
      >
      >Your conclusion is probably substantially correct, but it is unclear to me the steps you followed in getting from
      >
      >A. "the logics used by philosopher should merge with higher mathematics"
      >
      >to
      >
      >B. "metaphysics has degenerated into nihilism."
      >
      >.............................
      >
      >I do think terrorism is nihilistic, and that acts of terrorism have no goal other than spilling blood and guts, and death.
      >
      >By the way, I do not have impression that Peirce was particularly fond of Stoic philosophy.
      >
      >Malcolm
      >
      >

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