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Re: [steiner] Philosphy of Freedom Ch 3

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  • DRStarman2001@aol.com
    Thinking in the Service of Apprehending the World When I see how a billiard ball, when struck, communicates its motion to another ball, I remain entirely
    Message 1 of 1 , Dec 26, 2001
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      Thinking in the Service of Apprehending the World

      When I see how a billiard ball, when struck, communicates its motion to
      another ball, I remain entirely without influence on the course of this event
      which I observe. The direction and velocity of the second ball is determined
      by the direction and velocity of the first. As long as I do no more than
      observe, I cannot say anything about the motion of the second ball until it
      actually moves. The situation alters if I begin to reflect on the content of
      my observation. The purpose of my reflection is to form concepts of the
      event. I bring the concept of an elastic ball into connection with certain
      other concepts of mechanics, and take into consideration the special
      circumstances prevailing in this particular instance. In other words, to the
      action taking place without my doing, I try to add a second action which
      unfolds in the conceptual sphere. The latter is dependent on me. This is
      shown by the fact that I could rest content with the observation and forgo
      all search for concepts if I had no need of them. If, however, this need is
      present, then I am not satisfied until I have brought the concepts ball,
      elasticity, motion, impact, velocity, etc., into a certain connection, to
      which the observed process is related in a definite way. As certain as it is
      that the event takes place independently of me, so certain is it also that
      the conceptual process cannot take place without my doing it.
      We shall consider later whether this activity of mine is really a product of
      my own independent being or whether the modern physiologists are right who
      say that we cannot think as we will, but that we must think exactly as the
      thoughts and thought-connections present in our consciousness determine. For
      the time being we wish merely to establish the fact that we constantly feel
      compelled to seek for concepts and connections of concepts standing in a
      certain relation to objects and events given independently of us. Whether
      this activity is really ours, or whether we accomplish it according to an
      unalterable necessity, we shall leave aside for the moment. That at first
      sight it appears to be our activity is beyond doubt. We know with absolute
      certainty that we are not given the concepts together with the objects. That
      I myself am the doer may be illusion, but to immediate observation this
      certainly appears to be the case. The question here is: What do we gain by
      finding a conceptual counterpart to an event?
      There is a profound difference between the ways in which, for me, the parts
      of an event are related to one another before and after the discovery of the
      corresponding concepts. Mere observation can follow the parts of a given
      event as they occur, but their connection remains obscure without the help of
      concepts. I see the first billiard ball move toward the second in a certain
      direction and with a definite velocity. I must wait for what will happen
      after the impact, and again 1 can follow what happens only with my eyes. Let
      us assume that at the moment the impact occurs someone obstructs my view of
      the field where the event takes place: then, as mere onlooker, I have no
      knowledge of what happens afterward. The situation is different if before my
      view was obstructed I had discovered the concepts corresponding to the nexus
      of events. In that case I can estimate what occurs, even when I am no longer
      able to observe. An object or event which has only been observed does not of
      itself reveal anything about its connection with other objects or events.
      This connection comes to light only when observation combines with thinking.
      Observation and thinking are the two points of departure for all spiritual
      striving of man insofar as he is conscious of such striving. What is
      accomplished by ordinary human reason as well as by the most complicated
      scientific investigations rests on these two fundamental pillars of our
      spirit. Philosophers have started from various primary antitheses: idea and
      reality, subject and object, appearance and thing-in-itself, ego and non-ego,
      idea and will, concept and matter, force and substance, the conscious and the
      unconscious. It is easy to show, however, that all these antitheses must be
      preceded by that of observation and thinking, as the one the most important
      for man.
      Whatever principle we wish to advance, we must prove that somewhere we have
      observed it, or express it in the form of a clear thought which can be
      re-thought by others. Every philosopher who begins to speak about his
      fundamental principles must make use of the conceptual form, and thereby
      makes use of thinking. He therefore indirectly admits that for his activity
      he presupposes thinking. Whether thinking or something else is the main
      element in the evolution of the world, we shall not decide as yet. But that
      without thinking the philosopher can gain no knowledge of the evolution of
      the world, is immediately clear. Thinking may play a minor part in the coming
      into being of world phenomena, but thinking certainly plays a major part in
      the coming into being of a view about them.
      As regards observation, it is due to our organization that we need it. For
      us, our thinking about a horse and the object horse are two separate things.
      But we have access to the object only through observation. As little as we
      can form a concept of a horse by merely staring at it, just as little are we
      able to produce a corresponding object by mere thinking.
      In sequence of time, observation even precedes thinking. For even thinking we
      learn to know first by means of observation. It was essentially a description
      of an observation when, at the opening of this chapter, we gave an account of
      how thinking is kindled by an event and of how it goes beyond what is given
      without its activity. Whatever enters the circle of our experiences we first
      become aware of through observation. The contents of sensation, of
      perception, of contemplation, of feelings, of acts of will, of the pictures
      of dreams and fantasy, of representations, of concepts and ideas, of all
      illusions and hallucinations are given us through observation.
      However, as object of observation, thinking differs essentially from all
      other objects. The observation of a table or a tree occurs in me as soon as
      these objects appear within the range of my experience. But my thinking that
      goes on about these things, I do not observe at the same time. I observe the
      table; the thinking about the table I carry out, but I do not observe it at
      the same moment. I would first have to transport myself to a place outside my
      own activity if, besides observing the table, I wanted also to observe my
      thinking about the table. Whereas observation of things and events, and
      thinking about them, are but ordinary occurrences filling daily life, the
      observation of thinking itself is a sort of exceptional situation. This fact
      must be taken into account sufficiently when we come to determine the
      relation of thinking to all other contents of observation. It is essential to
      be clear about the fact that when thinking is observed the same procedure is
      applied to it as the one we normally apply to the rest of the world-content,
      only in ordinary life we do not apply it to thinking.
      Someone might object that what I have said here about thinking also holds
      good for feeling and for all other soul activities. When, for example, we
      feel pleasure, the feeling is also kindled by an object, and it is this
      object I observe, and not the feeling of pleasure. This objection, however,
      is based upon an error. Pleasure does not have at all the same relationship
      to its object has has the concept which thinking builds up. I am absolutely
      conscious of the fact that the concept of a thing is built up by my activity,
      whereas pleasure is produced in me by an object in the same way as, for
      instance, a change is caused in an object by a stone which falls upon it. For
      observation, a pleasure is given in exactly the same way as that is given
      which causes it. The same is not true of concepts. I can ask: Why does a
      particular event arouse in me a feeling of pleasure? But it is never possible
      to ask: Why does an event produce in me a certain number of concepts? That
      simply has no sense. When I reflect about an event there is no question of an
      effect on me. I learn nothing about myself by knowing the concepts which
      correspond to the change observed in a pane of glass when a stone is thrown
      against it. But I very definitely do learn something about my personality
      when I know the feeling which a certain event arouses in me. When I say of an
      observed object: This is a rose, I say absolutely nothing about myself; but
      when I say of the same thing: It gives me a feeling of pleasure, I
      characterize not only the rose but also myself in my relation to the rose.
      There can, therefore, be no question of comparing thinking and feeling as
      objects of observation. And the same could easily be shown concerning other
      activities of the human soul. Unlike thinking, they belong in the same sphere
      as other observed objects and events. It is characteristic of the nature of
      thinking that it is an activity directed solely upon the observed object and
      not upon the thinking personality. This can already be seen from the way we
      express our thoughts, as distinct from the way we express our feelings or
      acts of will in relation to objects. When I see an object and recognize it as
      a table, generally I would not say: I am thinking of a table, but: This is a
      table. But I would say: I am pleased with the table. In the first instance I
      am not at all interested in pointing out that I have entered into any
      relationship with the table, whereas in the second it is just this
      relationship that matters. In saying: I am thinking of a table, I already
      enter the exceptional situation characterized above, where something is made
      an object of observation which is always contained within our soul's
      activity, only normally it is not made an object of observation.
      It is characteristic of thinking that the thinker forgets thinking while
      doing it. What occupies him is not thinking, but the object of thinking which
      he observes.
      The first thing then, that we observe about thinking is that it is the
      unobserved element in our ordinary life of thought.
      The reason we do not observe thinking in our daily life of thought is because
      it depends upon our own activity. What I myself do not bring about, enters my
      field of observation as something objective. I find myself confronted by it
      as by something that has come about independently of me; it comes to meet me;
      I must take it as the presupposition of my thinking process. While I reflect
      on the object, I am occupied with it, my attention is turned to it. This
      activity is, in fact, thinking contemplation. My attention is directed not to
      my activity but to the object of this activity. In other words: while I
      think, I do not look at my thinking which I produce, but at the object of
      thinking which I do not produce.
      I am even in the same position when I let the exceptional situation come
      about and think about my own thinking. I can never observe my present
      thinking, but only afterward can I make into an object of thinking the
      experience I have had of my thinking-process. If I wanted to observe my
      present thinking, I would have to split myself into two persons: one to do
      the thinking, the other to observe this thinking. This I cannot do. I can
      only accomplish it in two separate acts. The thinking to be observed is never
      the one actually being produced, but another one. Whether for this purpose I
      observe my own earlier thinking, or follow the thinking process of another
      person, or else, as in the above example of the movements of the billiard
      balls, presuppose an imaginary thinking process, makes no difference.
      Two things that do not go together are actively producing something and
      confronting this in contemplation. This is already shown in the First Book of
      Moses. The latter represents God as creating the world in the first six days,
      and only when the world is there is the possibility of contemplating it also
      present: "And God saw everything that he had made and, behold, it was very
      good." So it is also with our thinking. It must first be present before we
      can observe it.
      The reason it is impossible for us to observe thinking when it is actually
      taking place, is also the reason it is possible for us to know it more
      directly and more intimately than any other process in the world. It is just
      because we ourselves bring it forth that we know the characteristic features
      of its course, the manner in which the process takes place. What in the other
      spheres of observation can be found only indirectly: the relevant context and
      the connection between the individual objects-in the case of thinking is
      known to us in an absolutely direct way. Off-hand, I do not know why, for my
      observation, thunder follows lightning, but from the content of the two
      concepts I know immediately why my thinking connects the concept of thunder
      with the concept of lightning. Naturally here it does not matter whether I
      have correct concepts of thunder and lightning. The connection between those
      concepts I have is clear to me, and indeed this is the case through the
      concepts themselves.
      This transparent clarity of the process of thinking is quite independent of
      our knowledge of the physiological basis of thinking. I speak here of
      thinking insofar as it presents itself to observation of our spiritual
      activity. How one material process in my brain causes or influences another
      while I carry out a line of thought, does not come into consideration at all.
      What I see when I observe thinking is not what process in my brain connects
      the concept of lightning with the concept of thunder, but I see what
      motivates me to bring the two concepts into a particular relationship. My
      observation of thinking shows me that there is nothing that directs me in my
      connecting one thought with another, except the content of my thoughts; I am
      not directed by the material processes in my brain. In a less materialistic
      age than ours this remark would of course be entirely superfluous. Today
      however, when there are people who believe: When we know what matter is, we
      shall also know how matter thinks,-it has to be said that it is possible to
      speak about thinking without entering the domain of brain physiology at the
      same time. Today many people find it difficult to grasp the concept of
      thinking in its purity. Anyone who wants to contrast the representation of
      thinking I have here developed, with Cabanis statement, "The brain secretes
      thoughts as the liver does gall or the spittle-glands spittle, etc.," simply
      does not know what I am talking about. He tries to find thinking by means of
      a mere process of observation such as we apply to other objects that make up
      the content of the world. He cannot find it in this manner because as I have
      shown, it eludes normal observation. Whoever cannot overcome materialism
      lacks the ability to bring about in himself the exceptional situation
      described above, which brings to his consciousness what remains unconscious
      in all other spiritual activities. If a person does not have the good will to
      place himself in this situation, then one can no more speak to him about
      thinking than one can speak about color to a person who is blind. However, he
      must not believe that we consider physiological processes to be thinking. He
      cannot explain thinking because he simply does not see it.
      However, one possessing the ability to observe thinking, and with goodwill
      every normally organized person has this ability, this observation is the
      most important he can make. For he observes something which he himself brings
      to existence; he finds himself confronted not by a foreign object, to begin
      with, but by his own activity. He knows how what he observes comes to be. He
      sees through the connections and relations. A firm point is attained from
      which, with well-founded hope, one can seek for the explanation of the rest
      of the world's phenomena.
      The feeling of possessing such a firm point caused the founder of modern
      philosophy, Renatus Cartesius, to base the whole of human knowledge on the
      principle, I think, therefore I am. All other things, all other events are
      present independent of me. Whether they are there as truth or illusion or
      dream I know not. Only one thing do I know with absolute certainty, for I
      myself bring it to its sure existence: my thinking. Perhaps it also has some
      other origin as well, perhaps it comes from God or from elsewhere, but that
      it is present in the sense that I myself bring it forth, of that I am
      certain. Cartesius had, to begin with, no justification for giving his
      statement any other meaning. He could maintain only that within the whole
      world content it is in my thinking that I grasp myself within that activity
      which is most essentially my own. What is meant by the attached therefore I
      am, has been much debated. It can have a meaning in one sense only. The
      simplest assertion I can make about something is that it is, that it exists.
      How this existence can be further defined I cannot say straight away about
      anything that comes to meet me. Each thing must first be studied in its
      relation to others before it can be determined in what sense it can be said
      to exist. An event that comes to meet me may be a set of perceptions, but it
      could also be a dream, a hallucination, and so forth. In short, I am unable
      to say in what sense it exists. I cannot gather this from the event in
      itself, but I shall learn it when I consider the event in its relation to
      other things. From this, however, I can, again, learn no more than how it is
      related to these other things. My search only reaches solid ground if I find
      an object which exists in a sense which I can derive from the object itself.
      As thinker I am such an object, for I give my existence the definite,
      self-dependent content of the activity of thinking. Having reached this, I
      can go on from here and ask: Do the other objects exist in the same or in
      some other sense?
      When thinking is made the object of observation, to the rest of the elements
      to be observed is added something which usually escapes attention; but the
      manner in which the other things are approached by man is not altered. One
      increases the number of observed objects, but not the number of methods of
      observation. While we are observing the other things, there mingles in the
      universal process, in which I now include observation, one process which is
      overlooked. Something different from all other processes is present, but is
      not noticed. But when I observe my thinking, no such unnoticed element is
      present. For what now hovers in the background is, again, nothing but
      thinking. The observed object is qualitatively the same as the activity
      directed upon it. And that is another characteristic feature of thinking.
      When we observe it, we do not find ourselves compelled to do so with the help
      of something qualitatively different, but can remain within the same element.
      When I weave an object, given independently of me, into my thinking, then I
      go beyond my observation, and the question is: Have I any right to do so? Why
      do I not simply let the object act upon me? In what way is it possible that
      my thinking could be related to the object? These are questions which
      everyone who reflects on his own thought processes must put to himself. They
      cease to exist when one thinks about thinking. We do not add anything foreign
      to thinking, and consequently do not have to justify such an foreign to
      thinking, and consequently do not have to justify such an
      Schelling says: "To gain knowledge of nature means to create nature." If
      these words of the bold nature-philosopher are taken literally, we should
      have to renounce forever all knowledge of nature. For after all, nature is
      there already, and in order to create it a second time, one must know the
      principles according to which it originated. From the nature already in
      existence one would have to learn the conditions of its existence in order to
      apply them to the nature one wanted to create. But this learning, which would
      have to precede the creating, would, however, be knowing nature, and would
      remain this even if, after the learning, no creation took place. Only a
      nature not yet in existence could be created without knowing it beforehand.
      What is impossible with regard to nature: creating before knowing, we achieve
      in the case of thinking. If we wanted to wait and not think until we had
      first learned to know thinking, then we would never think at all. We have to
      plunge straight into thinking in order to be able, afterward, to know
      thinking by observing what we ourselves have done. We ourselves first create
      an object when we observe thinking. All other objects have been created
      without our help.
      Against my sentence, We must think before we can contemplate thinking,
      someone might easily set another sentence as being equally valid: We cannot
      wait with digesting, either, until we have observed the process of digestion.
      This objection would be similar to the one made by Pascal against Cartesius,
      when he maintained that one could also say: I go for a walk, therefore I am.
      Certainly I must resolutely get on with digesting before I have studied the
      physiological process of digestion. But this could only be compared with the
      contemplation of thinking if, after having digested, I were not to
      contemplate it with thinking, but were to eat and digest it. It is, after
      all, not without significance that whereas digestion cannot become the object
      of digestion, thinking can very well become the object of thinking.
      This, then, is beyond doubt: In thinking we are grasping a corner of the
      universal process, where our presence is required if anything is to come
      about. And, after all, this is just the point. The reason things are so
      enigmatical to me is that I do not participate in their creation. I simply
      find them there, whereas in the case of thinking I know how it is made. This
      is why a more basic starting point than thinking, from which to consider all
      else in the world, does not exist.
      Here I should mention another widely current error which prevails with regard
      to thinking. It consists in this, that it is said: Thinking, as it is in
      itself, we never encounter. That thinking which connects the observations we
      make of our experiences and weaves them into a network of concepts, is not at
      all the same as that thinking which later we extract from the objects we have
      observed and then make the object of our consideration. What we first
      unconsciously weave into things is something quite different from what we
      consciously extract from them afterward. To draw such conclusions is not to
      see that in this way it is impossible to escape from thinking. It is
      absolutely impossible to come out of thinking if one wants to consider it.
      When one distinguishes an unconscious thinking from a later conscious
      thinking, then one must not forget that this distinction is quite external
      and has nothing to do with thinking as such. I do not in the least alter a
      thing by considering it with my thinking. I can well imagine that a being
      with quite differently organized sense organs and with a differently
      functioning intelligence would have a quite different representation of a
      horse from mine, but I cannot imagine that my own thinking becomes something
      different because I observe it. What I observe is what I myself bring about.
      What my thinking looks like to an intelligence different from mine is not
      what we are speaking about now; we are speaking about what it looks like to
      me. In any case, the picture of my thinking in another intelligence cannot be
      truer than my own picture of it. Only if I were not myself the thinking
      being, but thinking confronted me as the activity of a being foreign to me,
      could I say that my picture of thinking appeared in quite a definite way, and
      that I could not know what in itself the thinking of the being was like.
      So far there is not the slightest reason to view my own thinking from a
      standpoint different from the one applied to other things. After all, I
      consider the rest of the world by means of thinking. How should I make of my
      thinking an exception?
      With this I consider that I have sufficiently justified making thinking my
      starting point in my approach to an understanding of the world. When
      Archimedes had discovered the lever, he thought that with its help he could
      lift the whole cosmos from its hinges if only he could find a point upon
      which he could support his instrument. He needed something that was supported
      by itself, that was not carried by anything else. In thinking we have a
      principle which exists by means of itself. From this principle let us attempt
      to understand the world. Thinking we can understand through itself. So the
      question is only whether we can also understand other things through it. I
      have so far spoken of thinking without considering its vehicle, man's
      consciousness. Most present-day philosophers would object: Before there can
      be thinking, there must be consciousness. Therefore, one should begin, not
      from thinking, but from consciousness. No thinking can exist without
      consciousness. To them I must reply: If I want to have an explanation of what
      relation exists between thinking and consciousness, I must think about it. In
      doing so I presuppose thinking. To this could be said: When the philosopher
      wants to understand consciousness he makes use of thinking, and to that
      extent presupposes it, but in the ordinary course of life thinking does arise
      within consciousness and, therefore, presupposes this. If this answer were
      given to the World Creator who wished to create thinking, it would no doubt
      be justified. One naturally cannot let thinking arise without first having
      brought about consciousness. However, the philosopher is not concerned with
      the creation of the world, but with the understanding of it. Therefore he has
      to find the starting point, not for the creation, but for the understanding
      of the world. I consider it most extraordinary that a philosopher should be
      reproached for being concerned first and foremost about the correctness of
      his principles, rather than turning straight to the objects he wants to
      understand. The World Creator had to know, above all, how to find a vehicle
      for thinking; the philosopher has to find a secure foundation for his
      understanding of what already exists. How can it help us to start from
      consciousness and apply thinking to it, if first we do not know whether it is
      possible to reach any explanation of things by means of Thinking?
      We must first consider thinking quite impartially, without reference to a
      thinking subject or a thought object. For in subject and object we already
      have concepts formed by thinking. There is no denying: Before anything else
      can be understood, thinking must be understood. To deny this is to fail to
      realize that man is not a first link in creation, but the last. Therefore,
      for an explanation of the world by means of concepts, one cannot start from
      the first elements of existence, but must begin with what is nearest to us
      and is most intimately ours. We cannot at one bound transport ourselves to
      the beginning of the world, in order to begin our investigations there; we
      must start from the present moment and see whether we cannot ascend from the
      later to the earlier. As long as geology spoke in terms of assumed
      revolutions in order to explain the present condition of the earth, it groped
      in darkness. It was only when it made its beginnings from the investigations
      of those processes at present at work on the earth, and from these drew
      conclusions about the past, that it gained a secure foundation. As long as
      philosophy assumes all sorts of principles such as atom, motion, matter,
      will, the unconscious, it will get nowhere. Only when the philosopher
      recognizes as his absolute first that which came as the absolute last, can he
      reach his goal. But this absolute last in world evolution is Thinking.
      There are people who say: Whether or not our thinking is right in itself
      cannot be established with certainty, after all. And to this extent the point
      of departure is still a doubtful one. It would be just as sensible to raise
      doubts as to whether in itself a tree is right or wrong. Thinking is a fact,
      and to speak of the rightness or wrongness of a fact has no sense. At most, I
      can have doubts as to whether thinking is being rightly applied, just as I
      can doubt whether a certain tree supplies a wood suitable for making tools
      for a particular purpose. To show to what extent the application of thinking
      to the world is right or wrong, is just the task of this book. I can
      understand anyone doubting whether we can ascertain anything about the world
      by means of thinking, but it is incomprehensible to me how anyone can doubt
      the rightness of thinking in itself.
      Addition to the Revised Edition (1918): In the preceding discussion, the
      significant difference between thinking and all other activities of the soul
      has been referred to as a fact which reveals itself to a really unprejudiced
      observation. Unless this unprejudiced observation is achieved, against this
      discussion one is tempted to raise objections such as these: When I think
      about a rose, then ., after all, this also is only an expression of a
      relation of my "I" to the rose, just as when I feel the beauty of the rose.
      In the case of thinking, a relation between "I" and object exists in the same
      way as in the case of feeling or perceiving. To make this objection is to
      fail to realize that it is only in the activity of thinking that the "I"
      knows itself to be completely at one with that which is active-going into all
      the ramifications of the activity. In the case of no other soul activity is
      this completely so. When, for example, a pleasure is felt, a more sensitive
      observation can quite easily detect to what extent the "I" knows itself to be
      one with something active, and to what extent there is something passive in
      it so that the pleasure merely happens to the "I." And this is the case with
      the other soul activities. But one should not confuse "having thought-images"
      with the working through of thought by means of thinking. Thought-images can
      arise in the soul in the same way as dreams or vague intimations. This is not
      thinking.-To this could be said: If this is what is meant by thinking, then
      the element of will is within thinking, and so we have to do not merely with
      thinking, but also with the will within thinking. However, this would only
      justify one in saying: Real thinking must always be willed. But this has
      nothing to do with the characterization of thinking as given in this d
      iscussion. The nature of thinking may be such that it must necessarily always
      be willed; the point is that everything that is willed is, while being
      willed, surveyed by the "I" as an activity entirely its own. Indeed it must
      be said that just because this is the nature of thinking, it appears to the
      observer as willed through and through. Anyone who really takes the trouble
      to understand all that has to be considered in order to reach a judgment
      about thinking, cannot fail to recognize that this soul activity does have
      the unique character we have described here.
      A personality highly appreciated as a thinker by the author of this book, has
      objected that it is impossible to speak about thinking as is done here,
      because what one believes one is observing as active thinking only appears to
      be so. In reality one is observing only the results of an unconscious
      activity, which is the foundation of thinking. Only because this unconscious
      activity is not observed does the illusion arise that the observed thinking ex
      ists through itself, just as when in an illumination made by a rapid
      succession of electric sparks one believes one is seeing a continuous
      movement. This objection, too, rests on an inaccurate examination of the
      facts. To make it means that one has not taken into consideration that it is
      the "I" itself, standing within thinking, that observes its own activity. The
      "I" would have to stand outside thinking to be deluded as in the case of an
      illumination with a rapid succession of electric sparks. Indeed one could
      say: To make such a comparison is to deceive oneself forcibly, like someone
      who, seeing a moving light, insisted that it was being freshly lit by an
      unknown hand at every point where it appeared.- No, whoever wants to see in
      thinking anything other than a surveyable activity brought about within the
      "I," must first make himself blind to the plain facts that are there for the
      seeing, in order to be able to set up a hypothetical activity as the basis of
      thinking. He who does not so blind himself cannot fail to recognize that
      everything he "thinks into" thinking in this manner takes him away from the
      essence of thinking. Unprejudiced observation shows that nothing belongs to
      thinking's own nature that is not found in thinking itself. If one leaves the
      realm of thinking, one cannot come to what causes it.
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