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Re: [soapbuilders] Re: Super-Encryption AND Digital Signatures

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  • mlong@bridgetonconsulting.com
    ... But BadCipher1 now has RSA_Encrypt(Key1) from the receiver and not the original sender, because the receiver never had access to the sender s RSA private
    Message 1 of 22 , Dec 4, 2003
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      Quoting Rich Salz <rsalz@...>:

      > Good -- a common notation. :)
      >
      > Now, a compromised receiver does the following. First, get the keys:
      > Key2 = RSA_Decrypt[OuterEncryptedKey] [using receiver's RSA private key]
      > CipherValue1 = Decrypt[TripleDES(CipherValue2)]
      > Key1 = RSA_Decrypt[InnerEncryptedKey] [using sender's RSA public key]
      > Next, use those keys to create a bad message:
      > BadCipher1 = Encrypt[TripleDES(*BAD MESSAGE*, Key1)]
      > BadCipher2 = Encrypt[TripleDes(BadCipher1, Key2)]
      >
      > The adversary can now present present the two encrypted keys and
      > BadCipher2, and nobody can prove they didn't come from the original
      > sender. ("But you told me to give 1,000 pills -- here's the message")

      But BadCipher1 now has RSA_Encrypt(Key1) from the receiver and not the
      original sender, because the receiver never had access to the sender's RSA
      private key. Therefore, the proof of who sent the message resides with the
      decryption of Key1 (since it is always encrypted with the sender's private
      key).

      Where is this breaking down?
    • Rich Salz
      ... No, use the original encrypted Key1. ... Right, but there s no proof of what content the sender provided. More precisely, the proof is who generated
      Message 2 of 22 , Dec 4, 2003
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        >>Now, a compromised receiver does the following. First, get the keys:
        >>Key2 = RSA_Decrypt[OuterEncryptedKey] [using receiver's RSA private key]
        >>CipherValue1 = Decrypt[TripleDES(CipherValue2)]
        >>Key1 = RSA_Decrypt[InnerEncryptedKey] [using sender's RSA public key]
        >>Next, use those keys to create a bad message:
        >>BadCipher1 = Encrypt[TripleDES(*BAD MESSAGE*, Key1)]
        >>BadCipher2 = Encrypt[TripleDes(BadCipher1, Key2)]

        > But BadCipher1 now has RSA_Encrypt(Key1) from the receiver and not the
        > original sender

        No, use the original encrypted Key1.

        > Therefore, the proof of who sent the message resides with the
        > decryption of Key1

        Right, but there's no proof of what content the sender provided. More
        precisely, the proof is "who generated Key1", which is even further from
        protecting the content.

        > Where is this breaking down?

        Our terminology, I think.

        Both sender and receiver need Key1 and Key2. Since both 3DES is
        symmetric, Key1 and Key2 can both encrypt and decrypt. Once the
        adversary (compromised receiver) has both keys, he can use them to
        encrypt anthing he wants. Now take that bogus message -- and the keys
        *in their original wrappers* -- and prove the sender didn't generate
        that content.

        Does this help?
        /r$
        --
        Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect
        DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com
        XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html
        XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html
      • mlong@bridgetonconsulting.com
        ... Thanks, I m clear now. Receiver decrypts both wrappers then reuses RSA_Encrypted(Key) for the outbound traffic. Now, my trusted intermediary/trust-broker
        Message 3 of 22 , Dec 4, 2003
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          Quoting Rich Salz <rsalz@...>:
          >
          > No, use the original encrypted Key1.

          Thanks, I'm clear now. Receiver decrypts both wrappers then reuses
          RSA_Encrypted(Key) for the outbound traffic.

          Now, my trusted intermediary/trust-broker scenario to combat this.
          Setup:
          (a) Subdivide users into two categories, i.e., consumers/senders and
          providers/receivers.
          (b) Consumers create endpoints within the intermediary to connect to
          providers.
          (c) Both consumers and providers share Public Key with intermediary, but not
          with each other (not that it matters).
          (d) Providers share authentication information for their respective services
          with the intermediary, but not the consumers. Likewise for consumers.

          The Message:
          (1) Encrypted message sent by consumer "C" to intermediary "I" targeted at
          provider "P".
          (2) "I" authenticates "C" and uses the auth info to determine Public Key match
          for encrypted key.
          (3) "I" fully decrypts the message, then re-encrypts the message based "I"
          Private Key, "P" symmetric algorithm, and "P's" Public Key.
          (3) "I" forwards message to "P" utilizing orthogonal authentication info
          provided by "P" and original sender identification (which doesn't need
          encryption AFAIK)
          (4) "P" authenticates "I" and such decrypts message using "I's" PK.

          Therefore, as long as the message authenticates for "I", then it must come
          from "I" where the original sender has been authenticated and message properly
          decrypted and re-encrypted. Naturally, this relies on the authentication
          information being well protected from both perspective of "C","P", and "I".

          Tell me where this break, please.

          Thx,

          -Matt
        • Rich Salz
          A simpler fix is for the sender to do SHA1(message), and then encrypt (key1+digest) with their private key. That s simpler because it s a classic digital
          Message 4 of 22 , Dec 4, 2003
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            A simpler fix is for the sender to do SHA1(message), and then
            encrypt (key1+digest) with their private key. That's simpler
            because it's a classic digital signature, and its properties are
            well understood.

            The two biggest problems with your current idea are that
            1. "I" must be online and completely trusted for every single
            message exchange. This gives up all the benefits of public-
            key crypto.
            2. There's no end-to-end security link. What prevents P from
            using his own keypair to forge a message that looks like
            I-on-behalf-of-C?

            A simpler fix for your first scheme might be for the sender to include
            RSA_Encrypt(SHA1(message)) alongside the encrypted key1. Then perhaps
            you include a timestamp, so adversaries can't capture and reply old
            messages.

            I know you think that the standard mechanisms are expensive and full
            of overhead. There's a reason: without them, you leave yourself
            open to various attacks.
            /r$

            --
            Rich Salz Chief Security Architect
            DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com
            XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html
            XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html
          • mlong@bridgetonconsulting.com
            Rich, RSA_Encrypt(SHA1(message) + key1) this looks promising. Also, doesn t eliminate the need for a xml digital signature. You see what I m after, i.e., high
            Message 5 of 22 , Dec 9, 2003
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              Rich,

              RSA_Encrypt(SHA1(message) + key1) this looks promising. Also, doesn't
              eliminate the need for a xml digital signature.

              You see what I'm after, i.e., high security + scalable implementable features
              + compact wire format.

              Thoughts!?!

              -Thx,

              -Matt



              Quoting Rich Salz <rsalz@...>:

              > A simpler fix is for the sender to do SHA1(message), and then
              > encrypt (key1+digest) with their private key. That's simpler
              > because it's a classic digital signature, and its properties are
              > well understood.
              >
              > The two biggest problems with your current idea are that
              > 1. "I" must be online and completely trusted for every single
              > message exchange. This gives up all the benefits of public-
              > key crypto.
              > 2. There's no end-to-end security link. What prevents P from
              > using his own keypair to forge a message that looks like
              > I-on-behalf-of-C?
              >
              > A simpler fix for your first scheme might be for the sender to include
              > RSA_Encrypt(SHA1(message)) alongside the encrypted key1. Then perhaps
              > you include a timestamp, so adversaries can't capture and reply old
              > messages.
              >
              > I know you think that the standard mechanisms are expensive and full
              > of overhead. There's a reason: without them, you leave yourself
              > open to various attacks.
              > /r$
              >
              > --
              > Rich Salz Chief Security Architect
              > DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com
              > XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html
              > XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html
              >
              >
              >
            • Rich Salz
              ... Yeah, there s no such thing as a free lunch. :) Folks often complain about how big SSL is, or how complicated XML DSIG is, etc. Unfortunately, they are
              Message 6 of 22 , Dec 9, 2003
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                > You see what I'm after, i.e., high security + scalable implementable features
                > + compact wire format.
                >
                > Thoughts!?!

                Yeah, there's no such thing as a free lunch. :)

                Folks often complain about how "big" SSL is, or how complicated
                XML DSIG is, etc. Unfortunately, they are that way because they need
                to be in order to be resistant to various threats. And then you have
                to fight the deployment barriers: if SSL, PKCS#7 and/or XML DSIG are
                already everywhere, what's the incentive to try something that hasn't
                had the same level of analysis? Unless you're Ron Rivest (the R of RSA)
                designing a new micro-payment protocol (www.peppercoin.com), you're
                generally better off accepting the trade-offs of commodity security
                mechanisms.

                Now, RSA_PublicKey_Encrypt(SHA1(message) + key1) seems reasonable
                to me. But it's quite possible that there's some obscure corner of
                crypto that makes this a bad idea. I still think it's worth
                posting it to the cryptography mailing list.

                /r$

                --
                Rich Salz Chief Security Architect
                DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com
                XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html
                XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html
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