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Richard Nixon and the origins of affirmative action

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  • Ram Lau
    Richard Nixon and the origins of affirmative action Dean J. Kotlowski Incredible but true, declared Fortune magazine at the time of Richard M. Nixon s death
    Message 1 of 1 , Sep 6, 2004
      Richard Nixon and the origins of affirmative action

      Dean J. Kotlowski
      "Incredible but true," declared Fortune magazine at the time of
      Richard M. Nixon's death in 1994. "It was the Nixonites who gave us
      employment quotas."(1) Until recently, many scholars and journalists
      have credited Democratic Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
      Johnson with initiating affirmative action. Yet it was a Republican
      president who first sanctioned formal goals and time frames to raze
      barriers to minority employment. Nixon, recalled civil rights leader
      James Farmer, was the strongest president on affirmative action--up
      to that point."(2)

      Scholars remain divided over how much credit Nixon deserved for
      affirmative action and what factors nudged him toward this
      controversial policy. In Presidential Studies Quarterly, J. Larry
      Hood traced the president's policies to his personal belief in
      racial equality. In Nixon Reconsidered, Joan Hoff agreed, reminding
      readers of "Nixon's long-standing commitment to minority hiring"
      dating back to his service in the Eisenhower administration.(3)
      Finding little principle behind Nixon's policy, Hugh Davis Graham
      emphasized the president's political motive, enigmatic personality,
      ambivalence to civil rights, and decentralized policymaking. Graham
      also noted that Nixon moved away from affirmative action as the 1972
      election approached. While all of these scholars credited Nixon's
      liberal subordinates with helping to shape affirmative action,
      Graham went furthest in crediting administration officials with the
      policy's achievements.(4)

      Reconciling the twists and turns in Nixon's affirmative action
      policy proves easier when one recognizes the obvious: Richard Nixon
      was a very complex man. As his closest aides have pointed out, the
      president could be cynical, manipulative, and realistic, and
      alternately idealistic, courageous, and pugnacious. Nixon's changing
      domestic policy and evolving staff structure reflected his intricate
      personality. This article contends that Nixon's opposition to
      discrimination, his pragmatism, and his political instincts all
      influenced his approach to affirmative action. Weighing
      philosophical and practical considerations against political
      opportunism, Nixon sometimes favored and sometimes resisted this
      policy. As vice president, he learned the importance of fighting
      racial bias in the workplace. As president, several factors,
      including the need to open construction work to competitive labor,
      led him to approve the "Philadelphia Plan," an affirmative action
      program for the building trades. Yet when that plan hindered Nixon's
      courtship of white blue-collar workers, he backtracked. With Nixon's
      fragile support, affirmative action developed in fits and starts,
      and sporadic presidential interest freed bureaucrats to apply their
      own standards, with varying degrees of success.(5)

      The practice of affirmative action developed neither at once nor
      according to a single grand scheme. Rather, it emerged gradually as
      the federal government moved to open the lily-white building trades
      to minorities. Federal action to end discrimination in the building
      trades was long overdue. To maintain a scarce labor supply (and high
      wages), construction unions traditionally had restricted admission
      to their apprenticeship programs to friends or family members, a
      practice that stung minority groups. To be sure, the AFL-CIO
      leadership espoused principles of non-discrimination and equality of
      opportunity and officially supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964
      outlawing job bias. Yet many union locals, particularly in the
      building trades, refused to admit African Americans. "When I was a
      plumber," AFL-CIO President George Meany once remarked, "it never
      occurred to me to have niggers in the union."(6) By 1967, African
      Americans comprised just eight percent of construction trade
      unionists, and the plumbing, sheet-metal, electrical, asbestos, and
      elevator trades had only 1,400 black members out of a brotherhood of

      The federal government moved slowly against segregation in the
      building trades. To stop discrimination in businesses employed by
      the federal government, in 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower
      established the President's Committee on Government Contracts,
      chaired by Vice President Nixon. The committee was greatly
      restricted in carrying out its assignment, however. Sensitive to the
      prerogatives of Congress--and southern politicians--Eisenhower
      directed committee members to promote "justice and equality through
      leadership and persuasion" rather than coercion and punishment. The
      committee, he informed Nixon, must not evolve into a federal "Fair
      Employment Practices Commission" empowered to investigate charges of
      bias and issue sanctions. Such a commission would, in Ike's view,
      foster racial "antagonisms."(8) Sharing Eisenhower's sentiments,
      Nixon and his committee responded to complaints of racial and
      religious discrimination on a case-by-case basis and attempted to
      coax employers into changing their hiring practices. The committee
      categorically ruled out the use of quotas to compel the employment
      of minorities, and it never canceled a contract or blacklisted an
      employer suspected of bias.(9)

      Many labor unions effectively resisted opening their apprenticeship
      programs to minorities, and lacking enforcement powers as well as
      personnel and funds, the President's Committee on Government
      Contracts secured few skilled jobs for blacks. To show good faith,
      AFL-CIO officials often cited statistics showing incremental
      progress in admitting black members. Meanwhile, George Meany, a
      member of the committee, defended its tame policy of persuasion,
      mediation, and conciliation and refused to compel union locals to
      alter their admission practices. Pleased with the AFL-CIO's
      promotion of non-Communist labor unions overseas, Nixon declined to
      press strongly for integration of trade unions. In one of its few
      breakthroughs, the committee in 1960 gained employment for three
      African American rodmen on a federal construction project in
      Washington, D.C. The NAACP estimated that at that pace blacks would
      require 138 years to secure access to skilled-craft training and

      In fighting discrimination in the building trades, Presidents
      Kennedy and Johnson proved somewhat more aggressive than their
      Republican predecessor. In 1963, the NAACP braved police violence to
      picket Philadelphia's white-dominated building trades. Following
      that outburst, Kennedy directed his Committee on Equal Employment
      Opportunity to monitor hiring practices on federal construction
      projects. Two years later, Johnson signed Executive Order 11246,
      which reaffirmed the government's commitment to promote "equal
      employment opportunity" in companies holding federal contracts.
      While both orders recommended "affirmative action," neither JFK nor
      LBJ endorsed specific goals or timetables for desegregating the
      construction unions.(11)

      The move toward affirmative action came instead from the Labor
      Department. In the 1960s, the department's Office of Federal
      Contract Compliance (OFCC) became a magnet for liberals dedicated to
      opening unions to African Americans. Between 1965 and 1967, OFCC
      policy inched toward the forbidden terrain of racial quotas,
      initially requiring bidders on government contracts to submit
      written affirmative action plans for minority employment. Slowly,
      the agency adopted a result-oriented approach in which the
      government awarded contracts to companies that set targets for
      hiring minorities. In what became known as the Philadelphia Plan,
      LBJ's Labor Department experimented with such numerical "timetables"
      for construction contractors in St. Louis, Cleveland, and

      While the department was careful to avoid iron-clad goals--or quotas
      prohibited under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act--the distinction
      between goals and quotas was often unclear. U.S. Comptroller General
      Elmer B. Staats, for example, saw no difference between the two. A
      long-time bureaucrat and a stickler for protecting the will of
      Congress, Staats viewed the Philadelphia Plan as an out-and-out
      scheme to promote racial quotas. In November 1968, he ruled the plan
      in violation of the Civil Rights Act, whereupon the Johnson
      administration dropped the Philadelphia Plan.(13)

      Overall, the Democrats' record fighting discrimination in the
      federal construction projects proved spotty. In early 1969 the US.
      Commission on Civil Rights criticized the OFCC for failure to "set
      minimum standards of the agency's programs" and blacklist
      contractors suspected of bias.(14) Lingering discrimination provoked
      unrest, and protests flared across the North. In late 1969, racial
      disputes delayed construction projects at the University of
      Washington, Tufts University, and the State University of New York
      at Buffalo. Elsewhere, African American demands for admittance to
      unions aroused white resentment. After Pittsburgh's mayor pressed
      construction unions to admit blacks, white workers descended upon
      City Hall, brandishing American flags and signs declaring "Wallace
      in '72" and "We Are the Majority." In Chicago, a government probe of
      union bias propelled rank and file workers into the streets. "I had
      to wait my turn ... getting my apprenticeship," fumed one
      protester. "Why should these guys be given special consideration,
      just because they happen to be black?"(15) Later that year, the A.
      Philip Randolph Institute, a civil rights think tank, took the
      government to task for a flagging commitment to affirmative
      action. "Too many agencies see their enforcement role in passive
      terms," the Institute's report concluded. "They do not use
      sufficiently whatever authority they have to prod the individuals
      and institutions they deal with into undertaking positive moves to
      end discrimination."(16)

      The Nixon administration's record on desegregating the building
      trades proved somewhat better than that of its predecessors mainly
      because after his inauguration in 1969, the new president defended
      the use of numerical goals. In response to criticism of the slow
      progress under previous administrations, Nixon reaffirmed the
      federal government's commitment to opening construction unions to
      minorities. Then, moved by assorted considerations--economics,
      timely advice, principle, politics, anti-union sentiment, and
      concern for the prerogatives of the executive branch--he endorsed a
      revised version of the Philadelphia Plan.

      The Philadelphia Plan's rebirth was tied to a basic economic issue:
      the scarcity of skilled construction workers that had inflated the
      cost of new housing. Responding to a domestic task force report, in
      February 1969 Nixon asked Labor Secretary George P. Shultz and
      Housing and Urban Development Secretary George W. Romney to study
      the impact of "restrictive practices of construction unions" on the
      housing industry.(17) One week later, the president urged Shultz and
      Romney "to work on problems of discrimination in the building trade
      unions" as well.(18)

      These routine directives spurred federal officials to revisit the
      matter of discrimination in the building trades. After considerable
      delay and little consultation with each other, officials in the
      Labor and Housing Departments hammered out separate reports to the
      president. Drafted by Undersecretary Richard C. Van Dusen, HUD's
      paper confirmed that racial discrimination was one culprit in the
      shortage of skilled workers and spiraling housing costs. Among other
      remedies, Romney and Van Dusen recommended "forceful, effective
      enforcement of the law--the statutes and Executive Orders
      prohibiting discrimination and requiring affirmative action."(19)
      The Labor Department's report, a rambling overview of problems
      facing the construction industry, danced around the issue of

      The Labor Department soon became the prime force behind the
      rejuvenation of the Philadelphia Plan, however, as Shultz and his
      lieutenants espoused numerical goals to secure better jobs for
      African Americans. Shultz's commitment to racial equality was
      plain. "I am deeply interested in civil rights matters," he informed
      one labor leader, "and feel the Department of Labor can--and should--
      play a significant role in assuring equal opportunities to all
      Americans."(21) In early 1969, Shultz warned southern textile mills
      that their government contracts "would be withdrawn and canceled" if
      they rejected a "reasonable program of affirmative action" to hire
      black workers.(22) Four months later, he decreed that contractors
      must make written commitments to correct any deficiencies in their
      equal employment posture. "I believe," the secretary later
      wrote, "the affirmative action concept is indispensable to the
      Presidents domestic program."(23)

      With Shultz's support, Assistant Labor Secretary for Wages and
      Standards Arthur A. Fletcher, one of the highest ranking blacks in
      the administration, redrafted the Philadelphia Plan in June 1969.
      The revised plan required federally assisted contractors on projects
      exceeding $500,000 to show good faith in hiring minorities. After
      consulting with contractors in the Philadelphia area, the OFCC was
      to establish numerical "ranges" for employment of African Americans.
      Iron workers employed on federal projects, for example, were to
      employ five to nine percent blacks in 1970, with ranges increasing
      each year thereafter. Despite its apparently sweeping mandate, the
      revised Philadelphia Plan covered just five counties in eastern
      Pennsylvania. Moreover, contractors failing to achieve the plan's
      goals did not instantly suffer sanctions; only employers who did not
      show "good faith" in meeting OFCC targets faced losing their

      To a certain extent, pressure from Congress and civil rights
      organizations shaped the administration's fair employment policy.
      During a meeting with the president in February 1969, Roy Wilkins,
      executive secretary of the NAACP, expressed "a sense of urgency
      concerning race problems in the country" and the need for "reform in
      areas such as employment, job discrimination, and the enforcement of
      FEP clauses in Federal Contracts."(25) Less than two weeks later,
      Nixon ordered his lieutenants to address the issue of discrimination
      in the construction trades. Shultz issued his ultimatum to the
      southern textile mills following criticism of federal employment
      policy by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and Senator
      Harrison A. Williams Jr., Democrat from New Jersey and chair of the
      Subcommittee on Labor. Before announcing the revised Philadelphia
      Plan, Fletcher offered to meet with Wilkins to discuss "the many
      problems of our mutual concern."(26) While not always fitting
      the "iron triangle" label that scholars have applied to alliances
      between like-minded interest groups and government officials,
      organized groups and members of Congress nonetheless roused the
      administration into a more activist fair employment stance.(27)

      The revised Philadelphia Plan encountered formidable opposition,
      some of it expected, some not. George Meany and the AFL-CIO found
      the plan's emphasis on quotas and deadlines unacceptable, and for
      the second time, Comptroller General Staats ruled that the plan
      violated the Civil Rights Act by mandating quotas. Senators who
      usually backed Nixon administration programs--conservative
      Republicans and southern Democrats--united to oppose the
      Philadelphia Plan. Senate Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen,
      Republican of Illinois, threatened to rally Congressional
      appropriation committees to deny funding for the plan. " [T]his
      thing is about as popular as a crab in a whorehouse" to Senate
      Republicans, Dirksen told the president, adding that "I myself will
      not be able to support you on this ill-conceived scheme."(28) After
      Dirksen's death that September, Senator Sam Ervin, Democrat of North
      Carolina and chair of the Judiciary Committee, picked up the
      gauntlet against the Philadelphia Plan. To prove the plan breached
      the Civil Rights Act--a law he ironically had voted against--Ervin
      convened hearings.(29)

      Did the Philadelphia Plan establish quotas? Absolutely not, said
      officials in the Labor Department. Shultz and Fletcher distinguished
      between racial quotas that compelled employers to hire a set number
      of African Americans and goals that simply established numerical
      ranges for minority employment. Under a quota system, employers who
      failed to hire a specific number of minorities would face immediate
      sanctions, while a policy of numerical ranges only punished
      contractors who failed to demonstrate a good faith effort to meet
      their goals. Accordingly, Labor Department Solicitor Laurence H.
      Silberman and Attorney General John N. Mitchell found no conflict
      between the Philadelphia Plan and the Civil Rights Act. At any rate,
      such practical men as Shultz, Fletcher, and Silberman probably were
      more interested in opening skilled jobs to minorities than in
      splitting hairs distinguishing between quotas and goals.(30)

      Historians have puzzled over why Richard Nixon endorsed a scheme
      that set racial goals and offended his conservative supporters in
      Congress. Certainly, the desire to check housing costs led him to
      open the construction trades to more workers. Moreover, the
      Philadelphia Plan had garnered wide support from influential members
      of his administration, from the conservative Mitchell to liberal
      White House staffers Daniel P. Moynihan, Leonard Garment, and
      Bradley H. Patterson Jr. The forceful appeals of George Shultz, a
      reasonable, soft-spoken former dean of the University of Chicago's
      School of Business, no doubt moved Nixon as well; the scholarly
      labor secretary soon emerged as one of the president's premier
      domestic policy advisers. Assistant Secretary Fletcher also proved
      persuasive. "We must set goals, targets and timetables," he told
      reporters in August 1969. "The way we put a man on the moon in less
      than ten years was with gods, targets and timetables."(31)
      Presidential speech writer William Safire later remembered that
      Fletcher "transfixed a Cabinet meeting when he pleaded his case for
      black economic development."(32)

      But personal philosophy also played some role in the president's
      decision to endorse the Philadelphia Plan. By 1969, Nixon's thinking
      on fair employment policy had shifted. In the 1950s, wedded to the
      limited government and pro-business tenets of the Republican party,
      Vice President Nixon had flatly opposed establishing a national Fair
      Employment Practices Commission with authority to police
      discrimination in the private sector, favoring voluntary solutions
      to overcome bias in employment instead. During the 1960 presidential
      campaign, he backed legislation to recognize the work of the
      President's Committee on Government Contracts by making it a
      permanent committee and "end the discriminatory membership practices
      of some local labor unions."(33) In its final report to President
      Eisenhower, Nixon's government contracts committee suggested that
      employers adopt "a positive policy of nondiscrimination."(34) But
      the vice president refused to specify any "positive policies" to
      resolve this problem and left the matter to employers to settle on a
      voluntary basis.(35)

      Over the next decade, Nixon's views evolved further. The riots that
      racked American cities during the sixties signaled national leaders
      that economic status, not just race, continued to separate blacks
      from whites. A practical politician willing to adapt to new
      circumstances, Nixon looked for some means to close the economic gap
      between the races. While espousing equal opportunity, he questioned
      whether giving African Americans an "equal chance" was sufficient.
      (36) Before launching his second presidential bid, Nixon, in
      language worthy of LBJ, told reporters that "people in the ghetto
      have to have more than an equal chance. They should be given a
      dividend." "On this score," he added, "I would be considered almost
      a radical."(37) The Republican candidate reiterated a similar
      position a year later, promising to give "everybody an equal chance
      at the line and then giving those who haven't had their chance,
      who've had it denied for a hundred years, that little extra start
      that they need so that it is in truth an equal chance."(38) Nixon
      saw the Philadelphia Plan as one "extra start" for African Americans
      struggling to obtain better jobs and enter mainstream society. After
      the president accepted the plan, Fletcher declared: "The Nixon
      Administration now has a civil rights vehicle."(39)

      Hugh Davis Graham has contended that Nixon pushed the Philadelphia
      Plan mostly to pit the twin pillars of the Democratic party, labor
      unions and civil rights groups, against one another. There is some
      truth in this argument; cunning and cynical, Nixon was capable of
      such Machiavellian thinking. So were others; Fletcher predicted
      that "the local marriages between civil rights and labor people are
      going to come apart," freeing "civil rights people to go after their
      own issues on their terms."(40) Graham overstated the political
      motive, however. Nixon only resolved to use the Philadelphia Plan to
      split the opposition in late 1969, after labor unions and civil
      rights organizations had coalesced to block his nomination of the
      conservative Clement F. Haynsworth Jr. to the U.S. Supreme Court.
      There is no evidence of presidential interest in dividing the
      Democratic party during early 1969, when Nixon first authorized the
      plan. While the exact date of the president's endorsement remains
      uncertain, Nixon certainly approved the Philadelphia Plan sometime
      before 8 July 1969, when he defended the program before Republican
      congressional leaders.(41)

      In truth, the Philadelphia Plan carried few obvious political
      benefits for Nixon. Beginning in the first year of his presidency,
      Nixon fashioned a reelection strategy to cultivate conservative
      white Southerners and blue-collar ethnics, with less attention to
      African Americans and civil rights organizations. Furthermore, he
      held meetings with AFL-CIO Chief Meany and other labor leaders to
      win their support. Since the Philadelphia Plan favored African
      Americans and antagonized union leaders, working class voters, and
      conservative, white southern politicians, it hardly advanced Nixon's
      long-term electoral objectives.(42)

      In approving the Philadelphia Plan, Nixon temporarily placed
      economics and civil rights ahead of politics. During his meeting
      with Republican congressional leaders in July 1969, the president
      conceded that there were votes in courting conservative construction
      unions. Yet, he argued, "the Republican party ha[d] `temporized' too
      long" over the problem of building trades discrimination and it was
      time to "break the bottleneck." The failure to employ minorities, he
      continued, had driven the cost of housing to alarming heights.(43)
      Six months later, after reading that television newscasts had aired
      Meany's "scathing" criticism of the Philadelphia Plan, Nixon
      admitted its political inexpediency: "While our `liberals' [in the
      administration] won't agree, this [program] hurts us. With our
      constituency, we gained little on the play."(44)

      To the extent politics influenced Nixon's endorsement of the
      Philadelphia Plan, it was politics defined broadly as the pursuit of
      power and prestige at others' expense. Disturbed over "tight union
      control of [the construction] labor supply," the president noted
      that this program "challenges their cont[rol]."(45) Wary of
      congressional encroachment on presidential power, he resolved to
      overturn the comptroller general's "very sweeping" veto of the
      Philadelphia Plan and restore the executive branch's authority over
      fair employment policy.(46) Furthermore, the plan enabled him to
      claim credit for progress in an area where the opposition had
      faltered. After President Johnson abandoned the Philadelphia Plan,
      Nixon adopted it, then privately crowed: "Dem[ocrat]s are token-
      oriented. We are job-oriented."(47) A crafty practitioner of
      electoral politics, Nixon relished exercising power and confounding
      critics with bold initiatives.

      Together these factors persuaded Nixon and his subordinates to
      sponsor the Philadelphia Plan. During 1969, the president met on
      three occasions with Republican congressional leaders to defend it
      and plead for support. Meanwhile, officials in the Departments of
      Labor and justice and within the White House lobbied members of
      Congress to back the program. When the Senate in late 1969
      considered an amendment to kill the Philadelphia Plan, the president
      rallied his lieutenants. House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford of
      Michigan and Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania
      exhorted their troops to reject the amendment. Nixon also appealed
      publicly for votes. A White House statement, hastily typed out by
      Bradley Patterson, reiterated that the Philadelphia Plan "does not
      set quotas; it points to goals."(48) Three days before Christmas,
      Nixon threatened to hold Congress in session to reconsider the plan
      if it went down to defeat. His full-court press paid off. On 23
      December, a coalition of liberal Democrats and moderate Republicans
      salvaged the Philadelphia Plan, allowing Congress to adjourn and the
      president to toast a pre-holiday victory.(49)

      Nixon's apparently staunch support for the Philadelphia Plan proved
      tenuous, however. Because he accepted the plan for no single reason,
      the president lacked an overarching philosophical, practical, or
      political motive to continue the march toward affirmative action.
      Throughout his career, Nixon's choice of civil rights remedies had
      shifted with the prevailing political winds. The economic factors
      that led him to endorse the plan changed as time went on. Moreover,
      because the Philadelphia Plan cut against his reelection strategy,
      the president never felt comfortable with it. Many African Americans
      inside and outside the government applauded Nixon's defense of the
      plan, belying his oft-repeated view that blacks unalterably opposed
      his administration. Yet, after liberal civil rights groups such as
      the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights gave the president scant
      credit for the Philadelphia Plan, Nixon saw little benefit in
      appealing to African Americans. Upon reading that the plan had drawn
      praise from some blacks, he directed Presidential Assistant H. R.
      Haldeman to "be sure our P.R. types make it dear we aren't adopting
      policy for the purpose of being 100% Negro and winning their votes.
      We know this is not possible."(50)

      In arguing for the plan, Shultz had appealed to the president's
      reformist side. Now, Nixon needed labor unions' support for his
      Vietnam policy and anti-inflation program. As Nixon's first term
      closed, White House Special Counsel Charles W. Colson played to the
      president's political instincts, pleading for an alliance with labor
      unions and less emphasis on construction jobs for blacks. Colson
      triumphed in mid-1971 when he persuaded Nixon to transfer Arthur
      Fletcher, the Philadelphia Plan's most effective advocate, from the
      Labor Department to the United Nations. Bidding for union votes, the
      president stressed his opposition to racial "quotas" during the
      election of 1972. After winning reelection, he appointed as Labor
      Secretary New York Building Trades President Peter J. Brennan, a
      longtime opponent of numerical hiring goals.(51)

      If Nixon's commitment to affirmative action faltered, it did not
      vanish completely. By approving the Philadelphia Plan, Nixon sent a
      message, intended or not, that he supported such programs, and he
      never publicly repudiated the plan. During the 1972 election
      campaign, he privately restated his support of numerical goals and
      carefully distinguished them from the dreaded quotas. To make his
      own position "perfectly clear," Nixon ordered White House Counsel
      Leonard Garment to outline a statement separating goals from quotas.
      The technique of drafting state papers to locate a middle ground
      typified Nixon's approach to most civil rights issues; fraught with
      minutia, written in mind-numbing legalese, these statements usually
      clarified nothing.(52)

      In the absence of obvious presidential opposition, officials in the
      federal service felt free to expand affirmative action. The results
      proved mixed. In 1970 and 1971, Labor Department officials pressed
      hiring goals on businesses with federal contracts exceeding $50,000
      and extended those goals to include women. Over the next three
      years, Labor Secretary Shultz and his successor, James D. Hodgson,
      encouraged business, labor, and civil rights groups in American
      communities to design voluntary Philadelphia-style plans to bring
      disadvantaged groups into the building trades. By 1973, 56
      such "hometown" plans existed in cities across the country. Facing
      resistance from labor unions as well as a shortage of funds and
      personnel, however, the department found these plans difficult to
      monitor. Consequently, minorities and women made little progress in
      gaining admittance to the building trades.(53)

      Still, the Philadelphia and hometown plans set important precedents;
      during the 1970s, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
      applied numerical hiring ranges for minorities and women to private
      industry. The president personally lobbied the House and Senate to
      increase EEOC's budget, and at the administration's behest, Congress
      in 1972 granted the agency authority to bring suits against
      employers suspected of bias. Led by Chairman William H. Brown III, a
      Nixon appointee, EEOC used its new powers to press corporations into
      drafting affirmative action programs. By mid-decade, terms like
      goals, timetables, proportional representation, and even quotas had
      entered the lexicon of private industry. EEOC may have exceeded the
      president's wishes, but by then the White House was too preoccupied
      with the Watergate scandal to thwart the agency's initiatives.(54)

      Although tenuous, Nixon's support of affirmative action nonetheless
      helped redefine the civil rights debate in three respects. The
      government to some extent encouraged the civil rights movement to
      shift its goals from individual rights and equality of opportunity
      to group rights and compensatory justice. More importantly, the
      president and his subordinates legitimized new methods to fight
      bias; disadvantaged groups could now seek redress against
      discrimination from the federal bureaucracy as well as through
      litigation, public demonstrations, voting, and legislation. "The
      civil rights movement has not ... slowed down," observed liberal
      Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky in 1971. "It is
      moving in a different manner in the same direction. Many reforms can
      be accomplished in a quiet way through the mechanisms provided by
      our Constitution."(55) Under Democratic President Jimmy Carter,
      federal officials refined and extended affirmative action. Like his
      Republican predecessor, Carter backed "flexible affirmative action
      programs using goals" while opposing "inflexible quotas."(56)

      Finally, by sponsoring affirmative action, the Nixon administration
      moved the civil rights debate from concern with legal equality to
      expanding economic opportunity. In his first inaugural address,
      Nixon intoned: "The laws have caught up with our conscience. What
      remains is to give life to what is in the law."(57) During his first
      year in office, the president extended the federal government's fair
      employment policies, tackled issues like welfare reform and job
      training, and established the Office of Minority Business Enterprise
      to foster "black capitalism" The Philadelphia Plan meshed with the
      administration's emphasis on minority economic development.(58)

      The president's focus on employment for disadvantaged groups
      coincided with the views of civil rights leaders and liberal
      politicians of both parties. In 1967, liberal Senators Jacob Javits,
      Republican of New York, and Philip Hart, Democrat of Michigan, urged
      Congress to "direct its efforts to a new phase of the civil rights
      struggle -- economic opportunity and the problems of our urban
      areas."(59) Roy Wilkins later identified good-paying jobs for
      minorities as the key to "racial peace,"(60) and Senator Cooper
      wrote in 1971 that while "legal rights such as public
      accommodations, etc. have been enacted into law," social and
      economic problems such as "education, housing, employment are very
      much at issue."(61) Two years later, the Reverend Jesse L. Jackson
      considered holding new demonstrations "not at the traditional spot
      of the Lincoln Memorial but at the Department of the Treasury to
      emphasize the black economic struggle."(62)

      Indicative of his on-again, off-again support of affirmative action,
      Nixon seldom claimed credit for this policy and never ranked it
      among his greatest achievements. During an interview in 1977, the
      former president defended his civil rights policy
      as "misunderstood." I can answer any question [on civil rights] you
      raise," he continued. "But my advice is to leave it alone. Nobody is
      interested in this anymore."(63) In his own memoir, running over
      1,000 pages, Nixon devoted just two pages to affirmative action. Not
      until the issue moved to center stage in the 1980s did he defend
      this important reform. In 1990, Nixon warned President George Bush
      against attacking racial quotas as Senator Phil Gramm, Republican of
      Texas, had proposed. Since the 1950s, the former president
      explained, the "civil rights label on the Republican party was
      indelible," Therefore, he counseled, "there is no [political] reward
      for going after the anti-quota vote."(64)

      Recent attacks on affirmative action by conservative Republicans
      have led some liberals to long for the bygone days of the Nixon
      administration, and to some extent, such nostalgia is justified.
      Nixon defended the Philadelphia Plan in 1969, allowing the practice
      of affirmative action to take hold. Of course, his motives were not
      always impeccable, and his commitment wavered. But if Nixon often
      neglected his offspring, he still must be acknowledged as the sire
      of affirmative action.

      (1) "Where the Quotas Came From," Fortune, 30 May 1994, 174.

      (2) Elliot Zashin, "The Progress of Black Americans in Civil Rights:
      The Past Two Decades Assessed," Daedalus 117 (Winter 1981): 239-62;
      Robert Weisbrot, Freedom Bound: A History of America's Civil Rights
      Movement (New York, 1990), 292-93; John Morton Blum, Years of
      Discord. American Politics and Society, 1961-1974 (New York, 1991),
      169-70; Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992
      (New York, 1993), 217; Bruce J. Schulman, Lyndon B. Johnson and
      American Liberalism (Boston, 1995), 114-23; Herbert S. Parmet,
      Richard Nixon and His America (Boston, 1990), 598-600; Tom Wicker,
      One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream (New York, 1991),
      522-23; Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and
      Development of National Policy, 1960-1972 (New York, 1990), 450-76;
      J. Larry Hood, "The Nixon Administration and the Revised
      Philadelphia Plan for Affirmative Action: A Study in Expanding
      Presidential Power and Divided Government;' Presidential Studies
      Quarterly 23 (Winter 1993): 145-67; Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered
      (New York, 1994), 90-94; James Farmer, quoted in Nixon: An Oral
      History of His Presidency, ed. Gerald S. Strober and Deborah Hart
      Strober (New York, 1994), 113.

      (3) Hood, "The Nixon Administration and the Revised Philadelphia
      Plan," 149; Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 92.

      (4) Graham, Civil Rights Era, 301-46, 446-47; Hoff, Nixon
      Reconsidered, 90-92.

      (5) William Safire, Before the Fall. An Inside View of the Pre-
      Watergate White House (New York, 1975), 97-106; Raymond Price, With
      Nixon (New York, 1977), 29.

      (6) Orley Ashenfelter, "Racial Discrimination and Trade Unionism,"
      Journal of Political Economy 80 (May-June 1972): 435-64; "Racial
      Bias in Trades Unions, Chicago Defender, 20-26 September 1969, 8;
      Weisbrot, Freedom Bound, 90-92, 156; George Meany, quoted in John D.
      Ehrlichman Meeting Notes, 23 December 1969, Papers of the Nixon
      White House, ed. Joan Hoff-Wilson, part 3, John D. Ehrlichman Notes
      of Meetings with the President, 1969-73 (Lanham, Md., 1989),
      microfiche--fiche 8 (hereafter PNWH).

      (7) "EEOC Reveals Statistics on Minority Membership in Unions,"
      Equal Employment Opportunity Commission News, 28 September 1969,
      folder: Equal Employment Opportunity (1), box A10, Arthur E Burns
      Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

      (8) Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard M. Nixon, 4 September 1953, PPS
      307. 10, Richard M. Nixon Pre-Presidential Papers (hereafter NPPP),
      Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, California.

      (9) Nixon to Clarence Mitchell, 29 December 1955, PPS 307.74;
      Summary of Discussion at the Meeting with Representatives of
      Organized Labor, 30 April 1957, PPS 307.97.2; "Nixon's Record on job
      Discrimination," n.d. [1960], PPS 307.164.2, all in NPPP, Nixon

      (10) Nixon to Mitchell, 15 June 1956, FPS 307.85; Robert E. Cushman
      Jr. to Nixon, 29 January 1959, FPS 307.128; Margaret Garrity to
      Agnes Waldron, 25 August 1960, FPS 307.161A; Robert E. McLaughlin to
      Nixon, 22 January 1960, PPS 307.149, all in NPPP, Nixon Library;
      News clipping, "Three Negroes Obtain Rodman Jobs Here," 30 April
      1960, folder: 1960--President's Committee on Government Contracts,
      box 129, James P. Mitchell Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library,
      Abilene, Kansas; "Nixon Receives NAACP Report on Bias in
      Apprenticeship," News from NAACP, 25 February 1960, FPS 307.153,
      NPPP, Nixon Library; Minutes of the Meeting of the Government
      Contracts Committee, 14 September 1953, FPS 307.41, NPPP, Nixon
      Library; Summary of Conference between the President's Committee on
      Government Contracts and Leaders of Organized labor, 15 March 1955,
      5, FPS 307.56, NPPP, Nixon Library; Harry Fleischman to Herbert
      Hill, 9 November 1960, folder: Negroes--Employment, box 525, Jay
      Lovestone Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University,
      Stanford, California; "Randolph Says He, Meany Both Oppose Union
      Bias," Chicago Defender, 17 October 1959, folder: Newspaper Clipping
      File--October, November, December 1959, FPS 307; Summary of
      Discussion at the Meeting with Representatives of Organized Labor,
      30 April 1957, FPS 307.97.2, NPPP, Nixon Library.

      (11) "NAACP Leaders Plead for No Violence; Injuries Mount,"
      Philadelphia Tribune, 1 June 1963, 1, 5; "Negro Policeman Hailed,"
      Philadelphia Tribune, 4 June 1963, 3; Graham, Civil Rights Era, 188,
      278-79; Executive Order 11246, 24 September 1965, Weekly Compilation
      of Presidential Documents 1: 9 (27 September 1965) (Washington,
      1965), 305-9; "A Buzzword Defined," Newsweek, 3 April 1995, 24.

      (12) Graham, Civil Rights Era, 278-91; Hood, "The Nixon
      Administration and the Revised Philadelphia Plan," 146-47; "Labor
      Department Regulations Concerning Equal Employment Opportunity for
      Employees of Contractors on Federally Assisted Construction
      Projects," folder: Discrimination in Colleges and Universities (1),
      box 3, Robert A. Goldwin Papers, Ford Library.

      (13) Graham, Civil Rights Era, 284-97; Hood, "The Nixon
      Administration and the Revised Philadelphia Plan," 147; Hoff, Nixon
      Reconsidered, 91.

      (14) Howard Gilckstein to John A. Hannah, 31 January 1969, folder
      19, box 19, Theodore M. Hesburgh Civil Rights Papers, University
      Archives, Theodore M. Hesburgh Library, University of Notre Dame,
      Notre Dame, Indiana.

      (15) John D. Spellman to John D. Ehrlichman, 16 September 1969,
      folder: Gen HU 2-2 Employment--States and Territories--Montana to
      Puerto Rico, Beginning to 12/31/69, box 18, HU-Human Rights, White
      House Central Files, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Materials
      (hereafter NPM), National Archives, College Park, Md.; "400
      Demonstrate Peacefully in Tufts Job Disputes," New York Times, 8
      November 1969, 19; "Negro Groups Step Up Militancy in Drive to Join
      Building Unions," New York Times, 28 August 1969, 27; "Whites
      Denounce Pittsburgh Mayor," New York Times, 30 August 1969, 1,
      22; "Race Conflict Over Jobs," New York Times, 30 August 1969,
      20; "Trades Probe Delayed; 500 Workers jam Room," Chicago Tribune,
      25 September 1969, 3; "2000 Battle Cops at Jobs Bias Hearing,"
      Chicago Tribune, 26 September 1969, 1, 2; "Whites in Chicago
      Continue Protest," New York Times, 27 September 1969, 18.

      (16) A. Philip Randolph Institute, "The Reluctant Guardians: A
      Survey of the Enforcement of Federal Civil Rights Laws," December
      1969, folder: "The Reluctant Guardians," box 21, Bradley H.
      Patterson Jr. Files, Staff Member and Office Files, NPM.

      (17) James M. McCarthy to Nixon, folder: HU-2 Equality--States and
      Territories--General, Beginning to 12/31/70, box 8, HU-Human Rights,
      Central Files, NPM; Nixon to George P. Shultz, 18 February 1969,
      folder: 1969--White House--Reports Requested for the President, box
      24, George P. Shultz Files--1969-70, General Records of the
      Department of Labor, record group 174, National Archives.

      (18) Daniel P. Moynihan to Shultz, 3 March 1969, folder: HU 2-2
      Employment-Executive Beginning-8/7/69, box 17, HU-Human Rights,
      Central Files, NPM.

      (19) George W. Romney to Nixon, n.d. [late June 19691, folder: WH 1-
      1 Memoranda to the President etc. 1970-1971 (2 of 2), box 74,
      Subject Files, Richard C. Van Dusen Files, General Records of the
      Department of Housing and Urban Development, record group 207,
      National Archives.

      (20) Shultz to Nixon, 30 July 1969, folder: 1969--White House--
      President (July), box 24, Shultz Files--1969-70, record group 174.

      (21) George P. Shultz interviewed on ABCs Issues and Answers, 16
      February 1969, 4, box 135, Shultz Files--1969-70, record group 174;
      Shultz to Don Slaiman, 25 February 1969, folder: 1969 AFL-CIO, box
      16, Shultz Files--1969-70, record group 174.

      (22) George P. Shultz interviewed on Meet the Press, 27 April 1969,
      8, box 135, Shultz Files--1969-70, record group 174.

      (23) Shultz to Heads of All Agencies, 17 June 1969, folder: Labor
      Dept. June-December, box 3, Commerce Department Files, Maurice H.
      Stans Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota;
      Shultz to Maurice H. Stans, 24 October 1969, folder: Labor Dept.
      June-December, box 3, Commerce Department Files, Stans Papers.

      (24) Arthur A. Fletcher to Heads of All Agencies, 27 June 1969,
      folder 5, box 18, Laurence H. Silberman Papers, Hoover Institution
      Archives; "Philadelphia Plan Contractors Exceed Minority Goals,"
      Department of Labor News, 31 March 1972, folder: Philadelphia Plan
      (I of 2), box 142, Leonard Garment Files, Staff Member and Office
      Files, NPM; "Statement by Assistant Secretary Arthur A. Fletcher on
      Philadelphia Plan Guidelines," Department of Labor News, 23
      September 1969, and "For Backgrounder on the Philadelphia Plan
      Vote," n.d. [December 1969], folder: Philadelphia Plan (2 of 2), box
      143, Garment Files, NPM.

      (25) Robert J. Brown, Memorandum for the President's File Re:
      Meeting with Roy Wilkins, 7 February 1969, PNWH, part 2, The
      President's Meeting File, fiche 69-2-2 (emphasis in original).

      (26) Harrison A. Williams Jr. to Clarence Mitchell, 15 April 1969
      and "Suggested Questions LCCR Conference with Secy. Shultz, DOL," 25
      April 1969, folder: Department of Labor 1966-1971, box D63,
      Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) Papers, Manuscript
      Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Fletcher to Roy
      Wilkins, 18 June 1969, folder: Department of Labor 1966-1971, box
      D63, LCCR Papers.

      (27) Graham, Civil Rights Era, 362-65.

      (28) Notes on Meeting with AFL-CIO, n.d., folder 2, box 28,
      Silberman Papers; Elmer B. Staats to Shultz, 5 August 1969, folder
      2, box 18, Silberman Papers; Everett M. Dirksen to Shultz, 7 August
      1969, Everett M. Dirksen Papers, Everett McKinley Dirksen
      Congressional Leadership Research Center, Pekin, Illinois; Quoted in
      Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York, 1978),

      (29) U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on the
      Philadelphia Plan, 91st Congress 1st Session, October 27 and 28 1969
      (Washington, 1970), 1-45; Congressional Quarterly, Congressional
      Quarterly Almanac (1964) (Washington, 1965), 696; "For Backgrounder
      on the Philadelphia Plan Vote," n.d. [December 1969], folder:
      Philadelphia Plan (2 of 2), box 143, Garment Files, NPM.

      (30) "Statement by Secretary Shultz on Philadelphia Plan
      Guidelines," 23 September 1969, Department of Labor News and
      Pamphlet, "Philadelphia Plan: Questions and Answers," n.d., folder
      3, box 18, Silberman Papers; "Statement by Assistant Secretary
      Arthur A. Fletcher on Philadelphia Plan Guidelines," 23 September
      1969, Department of Labor News, folder: Philadelphia Plan (2 of 2),
      box 143, Garment Files, NPM; David Barr to Laurence H. Silberman, 11
      September 1969, folder 1; "Synopsis of Argument: The Revised
      Philadelphia Plan for Construction Compliance is a Lawful Exercise
      of the Authority of the Secretary of Labor under Executive Order
      11246.7 n.d., folder 2; John N. Mitchell to Shultz, 22 September
      1969, folder 2, all in box 18, Silberman Papers; Graham, Civil
      Rights Era, 447.

      (31) "George P. Shultz, Memorandum of Meeting of the President with
      George Meany and Secretary Shultz, 13 March 1969, folder: 1969 AFL-
      CIO, box 16, Shultz Files--1969-70, record group 174; Leonard
      Garment to Kenneth Cole, 22 August 1969, folder: August 1969, box 1,
      Garment Files and Bradley H. Patterson Jr. to Garment, 11 July 1969,
      folder: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1 of 5), box 28,
      Patterson Files, NPM; "Labor is Unfamiliar with New Secretary,"
      Detroit Free Press, 13 December 1968s, 2B; John D. Ehrlichman,
      Witness to Power. The Nixon Years (New York, 1982), 92; Press
      Conference of Secretary of Labor George P. Shultz, 6 August 1969,
      10, box 135, Shultz Files--1969-70, record group 174.

      (32) Safire, Before the Fall, 585; Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 5.

      (33) Nixon Handwritten Comment on Charles K. McWhorter to Nixon, 14
      December 1957, folder: Civil Rights, box 153, General
      Correspondence, NPPP, National Archives and Records Administration--
      Pacific Southwest Region, Laguna Niguel, California; "The Great
      Debate: Presidential Candidates Reply to Questions From the Scripps-
      Howard Newspapers," 22 September 1960, U.S. Senate, Committee on
      Commerce, Freedom of Communications Final Report, part 3, The Joint
      Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M.
      Nixon and Other 1960 Campaign Presentations (Washington, 1961), 447.

      (34) "President's Committee on Government Contracts, Pattern for
      Progress. Final Report to President Eisenhower from the Committee on
      Government Contracts (Washington, 1961), 14-15.

      (35) "Nixon to Cushman, 9 December 1960, PPS 307.177, NPPP, Nixon

      (36) Nixon to Lt. Lewis C. Olive, 20 July 1956, Nixon to Mrs. John
      Canning, 13 February 1957, Nixon to Leonard Clark, 22 July 1960,
      folder: Civil Rights, box 153, General Correspondence, NPPP,
      National Archives--Pacific Southwest Region; H. R. Haldeman, The
      Haldeman Diaries. Inside the Nixon White House, 7 October 1971
      (Santa Monica, Cal., 1994) (CD-ROM); see also Sitkoff, Struggle For
      Black Equality, 184-209.

      (37) "Nixon Gives Views on Aid to Negroes and the Poor," New York
      Times, 20 December 1967, 22.

      (38) Detroit Free Press, 26 January 1969, 3B.

      (39) "For Backgrounder on the Philadelphia Plan Vote," n.d., folder:
      Philadelphia Plan (2 of 2), box 143, Garment Files, NPM.

      (40) See Graham, Civil Rights Era, 325; Ehrlichman Meeting Notes, 22
      December 1969, PNWH. 3, fiche 7; Quoted in "For Backgrounder on the
      Philadelphia Plan Vote," n.d. [December 1969], folder: Philadelphia
      Plan (2 of 2), box 143, Garment Files, NPM.

      (41) Dean J. Kotlowski, "Trial by Error: Nixon, the Senate, and the
      Haynsworth Nomination," Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (Winter
      1996): 71-91; Ehrlichman Meeting Notes, 23 December 1969, PNWH. 3,
      fiche 8; John D. Ehrlichman, telephone interview with author, 6
      February 1995, Atlanta, Georgia; Diary of White House Leadership
      Meetings--91st Cong., 8 July 1969, folder: White House-Congressional
      Leadership Meeting 7/8/69, box 106, Robert T. Hartmann Papers, Ford

      (42) H. R. Haldeman to Harry S. Dent Jr., 31 October 1969, folder:
      HU 2 Equality--Executive 6/14/6910/31/69, box 2, HU-Human Rights,
      Central Files, NPM; Nixon Handwritten Comment on Undated News
      Summary; March 1969, PNWH, part 6, series B, Annotated News
      Summaries, fiche 3; H. R. Haldeman Meeting Notes, 11 July 1970,
      PNWH, part 5, H. R. Haldeman Notes of White House Meetings, 1969-73,
      fiche 69; Charles W. Colson Exit Interview, 12 January 1973,16-19,
      NPM; Haldeman Diary, 13 March 1969; "Nixon Woos Meany, 34 AFL-CIO
      Leaders," Detroit News, 30 October 1969, 20A; Shultz to Dwight
      Chapin, 30 September 1969, folder: 1969--White House-President
      (September-October), box 22, Shultz Files--1969-70, record group 174
      and Diary of White House Leadership Meetings--91st Cong., 7 July
      1970, folder: White House-Congressional Leadership Meeting 7/7/70,
      box 107, Hartmann Papers.

      (43) Richard Nixon, quoted in Diary of White House Leadership
      Meetings--91st Cong., 8 July 1969, folder: White House-Congressional
      Leadership Meeting 7/8/69, box 106, Hartmann Papers.

      (44) Quoted in John R. Brown III to Ehrlichman and Garment, 14
      January 1970, folder: Philadelphia Plan (1 of 2), box 142, Garment
      Files, Staff Member and Office Files, NPM.

      (45) Ehrlichman Meeting Notes, 20 December 1969, PNWH, part 3, fiche

      (46) Ehrlichman Meeting Notes, 20 and 22 December 1969, PNWH, part
      3, fiche 7.

      (47) Ehrlichman Meeting Notes, 22 December 1969, PNWH, part 3, fiche

      (48) Patrick J. Buchanan to Nixon, "One Observer's Notes of the
      Leadership Meeting," 8 July 1970, PNWH, part 2, fiche 69-7-6;
      Ehrlichman Meeting Notes, 20 and 22 December 1969, PNWH, part 3,
      fiche 7; Diary of White House Leadership Meetings--91st Cong., 8
      July 1969, folder: White House-Congressional Leadership Meeting
      7/8/69, box 106, Hartmann Papers; Ehrlichman to Mitchell, 20 August
      1969, folder: Ehrlichman Chronological File (17 July-22 October
      1969), box 51, John D. Ehrlichman Files and Memorandum for Clyde
      Flynn, 2 September 1969, folder: EEOC, box 33, John W. Dean III
      Files--both in Special Files, NPM; "Senate Votes Against
      Philadelphia Work Plan," Los Angeles Times, 19 December 1969, 22;
      Gerald R. Ford to Colleagues in the House of Representatives, 20
      December 1969, folder 2, box 18, Silberman Papers; Nixon, Memoirs,
      438; "Statement by the President," 19 December 1969, folder: HU 2--
      Equality--General 7/1/70-7/31/70, box 7, HU-Human Rights, Central
      Files, NPM; Patterson to Garment, "Notes from the First Term," 28
      November 1973, folder: Memoranda--Incoming Memoranda (to Garment)
      1969-73, box 1, Leonard Garment Papers, Library of Congress.

      (49) "Nixon Assails `Dirty Pool' on Job Bias Plan, Hints Extra
      Session," Los Angeles Times, 22 December 1969, 1; Harlow to Nixon,
      22 December 1969, folder: HU 2-2 Employment--Executive 8/9/69-
      12/31/69, box 17, HU-Human Rights, Central Files, NPM; "Congress
      Ends Session; Nixon Gains a Victory," Wall Street Journal, 24
      December 1969, 2.

      (50) "Pluses for Nixon," New York Amsterdam News, 3 January 1970,
      10; William H. Brown III to Nixon, 24 December 1969, folder: HU 2-2
      Employment--Executive 8/9/69-12/31/69, box 17; American Advancement
      League to Nixon, 27 December 1969, folder: HU 2 Equality--States and
      Territories--General Beginning to 12/31/70, box 8; Whitney Young to
      Nixon, 11 July 1969, folder: Gen HU 2-2 Employment--States and
      Territories--Montana to Puerto Rico, Beginning to 12/31/70, box 18,
      Andrew G. Freeman, Executive Director of Philadelphia Urban League,
      to Nixon, 7 August 1969, folder: Gen HU 2-2 Employment--States and
      Territories--Montana to Puerto Rico, Beginning to 12/31/70, box 18,
      all in HU-Human Rights, Central Files, NPM; Leadership Conference on
      Civil Rights Memorandum, "Congress Takes Crucial Civil Rights
      Actions as First Session Ends," 23 December 1969, folder: Memoranda
      1969, box D5, LCCR Papers; Nixon Handwritten Comment on News
      Summary, 17 January 1970, PNWH, part 6, series B, fiche 22.

      (51) Charles W. Colson to Nixon, n.d., folder: Building and
      Construction Trades Meeting with the President 5/26/70, box 20,
      Charles W. Colson Files, Special Files, NPM; Haldeman Diary, 20 July
      1971; Colson to Nixon, 2 July 1971, folder: Memorandums for the
      President (2 of 2), box 1, Colson Files, NPM; see also Colson to
      Haldeman, 30 April 1971, folder: H. R. H. Memos (January-June 1971)
      (1 of 3), box 2; Memo, Colson to Ehrlichman, 28 June 1971, folder:
      John Ehrlichman (1 of 2), box 7; Memo, Colson to Hodgson, 26 July
      1971, folder: Department of Labor, box 56--all in Colson Files,
      Special Files, NPM; "Remarks on Accepting the Presidential
      Nomination of the Republican National Convention," 23 August 1972,
      Public Papers of the Presidents. Richard Nixon (1972) (Washington,
      1974), 788; and Charles W. Colson Meeting Notes, 17 November 1972,
      folder: Presidential Meeting Notes (6 of 8), box 17, Colson Files,

      (52) Nixon to Philip E. Hoffman, 11 August 1972, folder: Ex HU 2-2
      Employment 3/1/72-12/31/72, box 17, HU-Human Rights, Central Files,
      NPM; Garment to William Rhatican (plus attachment), 25 September
      1972, folder: September 1972, box 6, Garment Files, NPM.

      (53) "Labor Department Details Contractors Equal Job Opportunity
      Standards" Department of Labor News, 3 February 1970, folder 1, box
      18, Silberman Papers; "Regulations for Widening Job Opportunities of
      Women Issued by Labor Department" Department of Labor News, 2
      December 1971, folder: Equal Rights for Women Amendment (1 of 4),
      box 86, Garment Files, NPM; Department of Labor News, 9 February
      1970, folder 1, box 28, Silberman Papers; "Equal Employment
      Opportunity Push Launched," Department of Labor News, 9 July 1970,
      folder: WF-2 Inquiries and Information (July) 1970, box 270, James
      D. Hodgson Files--1970, record group 174; "Status of the Contract
      Compliance Construction Program," April 1973, folder: Ex PQ 2 1/1/73-
      6/29/73 (2 of 2), box 4, PQ-Procurement, Central Files, NPM;
      Fletcher to Hodgson, 26 August 1970, folder: WF-2 Inquiries &
      Information (August) 1970, box 270, Hodgson Files--1970, record
      group 174; Memo, Patterson to Garment, 26 October 1970, folder:
      Civil Rights Problems, box 21, Patterson Files, NPM; John V. Lindsay
      to Frederick O'Neal, 24 January 1973, folder: WF-1 New York Plan,
      box 83, Peter J. Brennan Files--1973, record group 174; Herbert
      Hill, "Black Labor and Affirmative Action: An Historical
      Perspective," in The Question of Discrimination, ed. Steven Shulman
      and William Darity Jr. (Middletown, Conn., 1989), 238-39.

      (54) Patterson to Garment, "Notes from the First Term," 28 November
      1973, folder: Memoranda--Incoming Memoranda (to Garment) 1969-1973,
      box 1, Garment Papers, Library of Congress; Hoff, Nixon
      Reconsidered, 93-94; William H. Brown III, telephone interview with
      author, 15 September 1994, Philadelphia, Penn.; Laurence H.
      Silberman, "Road to Racial Quotas" Wall Street Journal, 11 August,
      1977, 22.

      (55) "Graham, Civil Rights Era, 450-73; John Sherman Cooper to
      Samuel Starks, 17 November 1971, folder: Civil Rights Commission
      1969-72, box 117, John Sherman Cooper Papers, Margaret I. King
      Library, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.

      (56) John Dumbrell, The Carter presidency: A Re-Evaluation (New
      York, 1993), 93.

      (57) "Nixon, Sworn in as 37th President, Dedicates Office to Peace,"
      New York Times, 21 January 1969, 22.

      (58) U.S. Civil Service Commission News, 8 August 1969, folder:
      Equal Employment Opportunity (4), box 2, Robert E. Hampton Papers,
      Ford Library; Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 115-32; Maurice H. Stans,
      One of the President's Men: Twenty Years with Eisenhower and Nixon
      (Washington, 1995), 168-79.

      (59) Philip Hart and Jacob Javits to Cooper, 11 September 1967,
      folder: Civil Rights 1967-68, box 116, Cooper Papers.

      (60) Roy Wilkins, "New Jobs for Blacks Key to Racial Peace," Detroit
      News, 31 May 1970, 3E.

      (61) Cooper to Stark, 17 November 1971, folder: Civil Rights
      Commission 1969-72, box 117, Cooper Papers.

      (62) "Black Movement Alters Emphasis," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1
      April 1973, 1B.

      (63) Quoted in David Frost, "I Gave Them a Sword": Behind the Scenes
      of the Nixon Interviews (New York, 1978), 177.

      (64) Nixon, Memoirs, 437-38; Rowland Evans and Robert D.
      Novak, "Nixon's Civil Rights," Buffalo News, 26 December 1990, C3.

      Dean J. Kotlowski is a visiting lecturer in the Department of
      History at Indiana University.

      COPYRIGHT 1998 Phi Alpha Theta, History Honor Society, Inc.
      COPYRIGHT 2000 Gale Group
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