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Vietnam War history

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  • Greg Cannon
    I got this article from a friend at Central_Asia_Now@yahoogroups.com and thought you all might be interested. Sorry there s no link to the article. Message: 1
    Message 1 of 5 , Oct 31, 2005
    • 0 Attachment
      I got this article from a friend at
      Central_Asia_Now@yahoogroups.com and thought you all
      might be interested. Sorry there's no link to the
      article.

      Message: 1
      Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2005 14:52:20 -0000
      From: "awjfire" <williamfeuer@...>
      Subject: Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains Secret

      A little off-topic maybe, but may be of interest...

      October 31, 2005 By SCOTT SHANE in the NYTimes

      WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 - The National Security Agency has
      kept secret
      since 2001 a finding by an agency historian that
      during the Tonkin
      Gulf episode, which helped precipitate the Vietnam
      War, N.S.A.
      officers deliberately distorted critical intelligence
      to cover up
      their mistakes, two people familiar with the
      historian's work say.

      The historian's conclusion is the first serious
      accusation that
      communications intercepted by the N.S.A., the
      secretive
      eavesdropping and code-breaking agency, were falsified
      so that they
      made it look as if North Vietnam had attacked American
      destroyers on
      Aug. 4, 1964, two days after a previous clash.
      President Lyndon B.
      Johnson cited the supposed attack to persuade Congress
      to authorize
      broad military action in Vietnam, but most historians
      have concluded
      in recent years that there was no second attack.

      The N.S.A. historian, Robert J. Hanyok, found a
      pattern of
      translation mistakes that went uncorrected, altered
      intercept times
      and selective citation of intelligence that persuaded
      him that
      midlevel agency officers had deliberately skewed the
      evidence.

      Mr. Hanyok concluded that they had done it not out of
      any political
      motive but to cover up earlier errors, and that top
      N.S.A. and
      defense officials and Johnson neither knew about nor
      condoned the
      deception.

      Mr. Hanyok's findings were published nearly five years
      ago in a
      classified in-house journal, and starting in 2002 he
      and other
      government historians argued that it should be made
      public. But
      their effort was rebuffed by higher-level agency
      policymakers, who
      by the next year were fearful that it might prompt
      uncomfortable
      comparisons with the flawed intelligence used to
      justify the war in
      Iraq, according to an intelligence official familiar
      with some
      internal discussions of the matter.

      Matthew M. Aid, an independent historian who has
      discussed Mr.
      Hanyok's Tonkin Gulf research with current and former
      N.S.A. and
      C.I.A. officials who have read it, said he had decided
      to speak
      publicly about the findings because he believed they
      should have
      been released long ago.

      "This material is relevant to debates we as Americans
      are having
      about the war in Iraq and intelligence reform," said
      Mr. Aid, who is
      writing a history of the N.S.A. "To keep it classified
      simply
      because it might embarrass the agency is wrong."

      Mr. Aid's description of Mr. Hanyok's findings was
      confirmed by the
      intelligence official, who spoke on condition of
      anonymity because
      the research has not been made public.

      Both men said Mr. Hanyok believed the initial
      misinterpretation of
      North Vietnamese intercepts was probably an honest
      mistake. But
      after months of detective work in N.S.A.'s archives,
      he concluded
      that midlevel agency officials discovered the error
      almost
      immediately but covered it up and doctored documents
      so that they
      appeared to provide evidence of an attack.

      "Rather than come clean about their mistake, they
      helped launch the
      United States into a bloody war that would last for 10
      years," Mr.
      Aid said.

      Asked about Mr. Hanyok's research, an N.S.A. spokesman
      said the
      agency intended to release his 2001 article in late
      November. The
      spokesman, Don Weber, said the release had been
      "delayed in an
      effort to be consistent with our preferred practice of
      providing the
      public a more contextual perspective."

      Mr. Weber said the agency was working to declassify
      not only Mr.
      Hanyok's article, but also the original intercepts and
      other raw
      material for his work, so the public could better
      assess his
      conclusions.

      The intelligence official gave a different account. He
      said N.S.A.
      historians began pushing for public release in 2002,
      after Mr.
      Hanyok included his Tonkin Gulf findings in a
      400-page, in-house
      history of the agency and Vietnam called "Spartans in
      Darkness."
      Though superiors initially expressed support for
      releasing it, the
      idea lost momentum as Iraq intelligence was being
      called into
      question, the official said.

      Mr. Aid said he had heard from other intelligence
      officials the same
      explanation for the delay in releasing the report,
      though neither he
      nor the intelligence official knew how high up in the
      agency the
      issue was discussed. A spokesman for Gen. Michael V.
      Hayden, who was
      the agency's. director until last summer and is now
      the principal
      deputy director of national intelligence, referred
      questions to Mr.
      Weber, the N.S.A. spokesman, who said he had no
      further information.

      Many historians believe that even without the Tonkin
      Gulf episode,
      Johnson might have found a reason to escalate military
      action
      against North Vietnam. They note that Johnson
      apparently had his own
      doubts about the Aug. 4 attack and that a few days
      later told George
      W. Ball, the under secretary of state, "Hell, those
      dumb, stupid
      sailors were just shooting at flying fish!"

      But Robert S. McNamara, who as defense secretary
      played a central
      role in the Tonkin Gulf affair, said in an interview
      last week that
      he believed the intelligence reports had played a
      decisive role in
      the war's expansion.

      "I think it's wrong to believe that Johnson wanted
      war," Mr.
      McNamara said. "But we thought we had evidence that
      North Vietnam
      was escalating."

      Mr. McNamara, 89, said he had never been told that the
      intelligence
      might have been altered to shore up the scant evidence
      of a North
      Vietnamese attack.

      "That really is surprising to me," said Mr. McNamara,
      who Mr. Hanyok
      found had unknowingly used the altered intercepts in
      1964 and 1968
      in testimony before Congress. "I think they ought to
      make all the
      material public, period."

      The supposed second North Vietnamese attack, on the
      American
      destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy, played an outsize
      role in
      history. Johnson responded by ordering retaliatory air
      strikes on
      North Vietnamese targets and used the event to
      persuade Congress to
      pass the Gulf of Tonkin resolution on Aug. 7, 1964.

      It authorized the president "to take all necessary
      steps, including
      the use of armed force," to defend South Vietnam and
      its neighbors
      and was used both by Johnson and President Richard M.
      Nixon to
      justify escalating the war, in which 58,226 Americans
      and more than
      1 million Vietnamese died.

      Not all the details of Mr. Hanyok's analysis,
      published in N.S.A.'s
      Cryptologic Quarterly in early 2001, could be learned.
      But they
      involved discrepancies between the official N.S.A.
      version of the
      events of Aug. 4, 1964, and intercepts from N.S.A.
      listening posts
      at Phu Bai in South Vietnam and San Miguel in the
      Philippines that
      are in the agency archives.

      One issue, for example, was the translation of a
      phrase in an Aug. 4
      North Vietnamese transmission. In some documents the
      phrase, "we
      sacrificed two comrades" - an apparent reference to
      casualties
      during the clash with American ships on Aug. 2 - was
      incorrectly
      translated as "we sacrificed two ships." That phrase
      was used to
      suggest that the North Vietnamese were reporting the
      loss of ships
      in a new battle Aug. 4, the intelligence official
      said.

      The original Vietnamese version of that intercept,
      unlike many other
      intercepts from the same period, is missing from the
      agency's
      archives, the official said.

      The intelligence official said the evidence for
      deliberate
      falsification is "about as certain as it can be
      without a smoking
      gun - you can come to no other conclusion."

      Despite its well-deserved reputation for secrecy, the
      N.S.A. in
      recent years has made public dozens of studies by its
      Center for
      Cryptologic History. A study by Mr. Hanyok on signals
      intelligence
      and the Holocaust, titled "Eavesdropping on Hell," was
      published
      last year.

      Two historians who have written extensively on the
      Tonkin Gulf
      episode, Edwin E. Moise of Clemson University and John
      Prados of the
      National Security Archive in Washington, said they
      were unaware of
      Mr. Hanyok's work but found his reported findings
      intriguing.

      "I'm surprised at the notion of deliberate deception
      at N.S.A.," Dr.
      Moise said. "But I get surprised a lot."

      Dr. Prados said, "If Mr. Hanyok's conclusion is
      correct, it adds to
      the tragic aspect of the Vietnam War." In addition, he
      said, "it's
      new evidence that intelligence, so often treated as
      the Holy Grail,
      turns out to be not that at all, just as in Iraq."
    • Ram Lau
      A Google search gives: http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1031-03.htm Published on Monday, October 31, 2005 by the New York Times Vietnam Study, Casting
      Message 2 of 5 , Oct 31, 2005
      • 0 Attachment
        A Google search gives:

        http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1031-03.htm

        "Published on Monday, October 31, 2005 by the New York Times
        Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains Secret
        by Scott Shane"

        The Vietnam War never seemed so noble before (comparatively speaking).

        Ram


        --- In prezveepsenator@yahoogroups.com, Greg Cannon <gregcannon1@y...>
        wrote:
        >
        > I got this article from a friend at
        > Central_Asia_Now@yahoogroups.com and thought you all
        > might be interested. Sorry there's no link to the
        > article.
        >
        > Message: 1
        > Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2005 14:52:20 -0000
        > From: "awjfire" <williamfeuer@h...>
        > Subject: Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains Secret
        >
        > A little off-topic maybe, but may be of interest...
        >
        > October 31, 2005 By SCOTT SHANE in the NYTimes
        >
        > WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 - The National Security Agency has
        > kept secret
        > since 2001 a finding by an agency historian that
        > during the Tonkin
        > Gulf episode, which helped precipitate the Vietnam
        > War, N.S.A.
        > officers deliberately distorted critical intelligence
        > to cover up
        > their mistakes, two people familiar with the
        > historian's work say.
        >
        > The historian's conclusion is the first serious
        > accusation that
        > communications intercepted by the N.S.A., the
        > secretive
        > eavesdropping and code-breaking agency, were falsified
        > so that they
        > made it look as if North Vietnam had attacked American
        > destroyers on
        > Aug. 4, 1964, two days after a previous clash.
        > President Lyndon B.
        > Johnson cited the supposed attack to persuade Congress
        > to authorize
        > broad military action in Vietnam, but most historians
        > have concluded
        > in recent years that there was no second attack.
        >
        > The N.S.A. historian, Robert J. Hanyok, found a
        > pattern of
        > translation mistakes that went uncorrected, altered
        > intercept times
        > and selective citation of intelligence that persuaded
        > him that
        > midlevel agency officers had deliberately skewed the
        > evidence.
        >
        > Mr. Hanyok concluded that they had done it not out of
        > any political
        > motive but to cover up earlier errors, and that top
        > N.S.A. and
        > defense officials and Johnson neither knew about nor
        > condoned the
        > deception.
        >
        > Mr. Hanyok's findings were published nearly five years
        > ago in a
        > classified in-house journal, and starting in 2002 he
        > and other
        > government historians argued that it should be made
        > public. But
        > their effort was rebuffed by higher-level agency
        > policymakers, who
        > by the next year were fearful that it might prompt
        > uncomfortable
        > comparisons with the flawed intelligence used to
        > justify the war in
        > Iraq, according to an intelligence official familiar
        > with some
        > internal discussions of the matter.
        >
        > Matthew M. Aid, an independent historian who has
        > discussed Mr.
        > Hanyok's Tonkin Gulf research with current and former
        > N.S.A. and
        > C.I.A. officials who have read it, said he had decided
        > to speak
        > publicly about the findings because he believed they
        > should have
        > been released long ago.
        >
        > "This material is relevant to debates we as Americans
        > are having
        > about the war in Iraq and intelligence reform," said
        > Mr. Aid, who is
        > writing a history of the N.S.A. "To keep it classified
        > simply
        > because it might embarrass the agency is wrong."
        >
        > Mr. Aid's description of Mr. Hanyok's findings was
        > confirmed by the
        > intelligence official, who spoke on condition of
        > anonymity because
        > the research has not been made public.
        >
        > Both men said Mr. Hanyok believed the initial
        > misinterpretation of
        > North Vietnamese intercepts was probably an honest
        > mistake. But
        > after months of detective work in N.S.A.'s archives,
        > he concluded
        > that midlevel agency officials discovered the error
        > almost
        > immediately but covered it up and doctored documents
        > so that they
        > appeared to provide evidence of an attack.
        >
        > "Rather than come clean about their mistake, they
        > helped launch the
        > United States into a bloody war that would last for 10
        > years," Mr.
        > Aid said.
        >
        > Asked about Mr. Hanyok's research, an N.S.A. spokesman
        > said the
        > agency intended to release his 2001 article in late
        > November. The
        > spokesman, Don Weber, said the release had been
        > "delayed in an
        > effort to be consistent with our preferred practice of
        > providing the
        > public a more contextual perspective."
        >
        > Mr. Weber said the agency was working to declassify
        > not only Mr.
        > Hanyok's article, but also the original intercepts and
        > other raw
        > material for his work, so the public could better
        > assess his
        > conclusions.
        >
        > The intelligence official gave a different account. He
        > said N.S.A.
        > historians began pushing for public release in 2002,
        > after Mr.
        > Hanyok included his Tonkin Gulf findings in a
        > 400-page, in-house
        > history of the agency and Vietnam called "Spartans in
        > Darkness."
        > Though superiors initially expressed support for
        > releasing it, the
        > idea lost momentum as Iraq intelligence was being
        > called into
        > question, the official said.
        >
        > Mr. Aid said he had heard from other intelligence
        > officials the same
        > explanation for the delay in releasing the report,
        > though neither he
        > nor the intelligence official knew how high up in the
        > agency the
        > issue was discussed. A spokesman for Gen. Michael V.
        > Hayden, who was
        > the agency's. director until last summer and is now
        > the principal
        > deputy director of national intelligence, referred
        > questions to Mr.
        > Weber, the N.S.A. spokesman, who said he had no
        > further information.
        >
        > Many historians believe that even without the Tonkin
        > Gulf episode,
        > Johnson might have found a reason to escalate military
        > action
        > against North Vietnam. They note that Johnson
        > apparently had his own
        > doubts about the Aug. 4 attack and that a few days
        > later told George
        > W. Ball, the under secretary of state, "Hell, those
        > dumb, stupid
        > sailors were just shooting at flying fish!"
        >
        > But Robert S. McNamara, who as defense secretary
        > played a central
        > role in the Tonkin Gulf affair, said in an interview
        > last week that
        > he believed the intelligence reports had played a
        > decisive role in
        > the war's expansion.
        >
        > "I think it's wrong to believe that Johnson wanted
        > war," Mr.
        > McNamara said. "But we thought we had evidence that
        > North Vietnam
        > was escalating."
        >
        > Mr. McNamara, 89, said he had never been told that the
        > intelligence
        > might have been altered to shore up the scant evidence
        > of a North
        > Vietnamese attack.
        >
        > "That really is surprising to me," said Mr. McNamara,
        > who Mr. Hanyok
        > found had unknowingly used the altered intercepts in
        > 1964 and 1968
        > in testimony before Congress. "I think they ought to
        > make all the
        > material public, period."
        >
        > The supposed second North Vietnamese attack, on the
        > American
        > destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy, played an outsize
        > role in
        > history. Johnson responded by ordering retaliatory air
        > strikes on
        > North Vietnamese targets and used the event to
        > persuade Congress to
        > pass the Gulf of Tonkin resolution on Aug. 7, 1964.
        >
        > It authorized the president "to take all necessary
        > steps, including
        > the use of armed force," to defend South Vietnam and
        > its neighbors
        > and was used both by Johnson and President Richard M.
        > Nixon to
        > justify escalating the war, in which 58,226 Americans
        > and more than
        > 1 million Vietnamese died.
        >
        > Not all the details of Mr. Hanyok's analysis,
        > published in N.S.A.'s
        > Cryptologic Quarterly in early 2001, could be learned.
        > But they
        > involved discrepancies between the official N.S.A.
        > version of the
        > events of Aug. 4, 1964, and intercepts from N.S.A.
        > listening posts
        > at Phu Bai in South Vietnam and San Miguel in the
        > Philippines that
        > are in the agency archives.
        >
        > One issue, for example, was the translation of a
        > phrase in an Aug. 4
        > North Vietnamese transmission. In some documents the
        > phrase, "we
        > sacrificed two comrades" - an apparent reference to
        > casualties
        > during the clash with American ships on Aug. 2 - was
        > incorrectly
        > translated as "we sacrificed two ships." That phrase
        > was used to
        > suggest that the North Vietnamese were reporting the
        > loss of ships
        > in a new battle Aug. 4, the intelligence official
        > said.
        >
        > The original Vietnamese version of that intercept,
        > unlike many other
        > intercepts from the same period, is missing from the
        > agency's
        > archives, the official said.
        >
        > The intelligence official said the evidence for
        > deliberate
        > falsification is "about as certain as it can be
        > without a smoking
        > gun - you can come to no other conclusion."
        >
        > Despite its well-deserved reputation for secrecy, the
        > N.S.A. in
        > recent years has made public dozens of studies by its
        > Center for
        > Cryptologic History. A study by Mr. Hanyok on signals
        > intelligence
        > and the Holocaust, titled "Eavesdropping on Hell," was
        > published
        > last year.
        >
        > Two historians who have written extensively on the
        > Tonkin Gulf
        > episode, Edwin E. Moise of Clemson University and John
        > Prados of the
        > National Security Archive in Washington, said they
        > were unaware of
        > Mr. Hanyok's work but found his reported findings
        > intriguing.
        >
        > "I'm surprised at the notion of deliberate deception
        > at N.S.A.," Dr.
        > Moise said. "But I get surprised a lot."
        >
        > Dr. Prados said, "If Mr. Hanyok's conclusion is
        > correct, it adds to
        > the tragic aspect of the Vietnam War." In addition, he
        > said, "it's
        > new evidence that intelligence, so often treated as
        > the Holy Grail,
        > turns out to be not that at all, just as in Iraq."
        >
      • THOMAS JOHNSON
        I have a soft spot for homeboy LBJ and it warms my heart a bit to think that the Tonkin incident went on behind his back. I don t know if anybody caught
        Message 3 of 5 , Oct 31, 2005
        • 0 Attachment
          I have a soft spot for homeboy LBJ and it warms my
          heart a bit to think that the Tonkin incident went on
          behind his back.

          I don't know if anybody caught presidential historian
          Robert Dallek on Charlie Rose last Fri., but he had
          some interesting things to say about recent 2nd terms
          scandals. Ronald Reagan emerged from Iran Contra,
          where he had dropped to an approval rating poll rating
          in the 30's, after he shook up his staff, including
          bringing in Howard Baker as Chief of Staff,
          apologized, and pursued detente with the Soviets.
          Bill Clinton was able to focus on foreign policy as
          well, nearly getting peace in the Middle East. The
          economy was great, as well. His approval ratings never
          dropped out of the 60s. My sense is that the public
          never really took the Monica scandal very seriously in
          the first place.
          LBJ never recovered from Viet Nam..his credibility was
          shot and could not be restored.
          Nixon left in disgrace.
          Dallek felt that our current inhabitant's prospect for
          rehab is very poor. The Libby indictment has a hint of
          Iran Contra and Iraq war is becoming more and more
          reminiscent of Viet Nam. Even worse, there is no
          realistic foreign policy route to pursue, as all roads
          lead back to Iraq. I personally don't think Bush has
          Reagan's or Clinton's political skills to shake up his
          staff and veer towards the center, and he is not one
          to apologize.
          Move over, James Buchanan and Andrew Johnson, you are
          likely to have company in the lowest rungs of
          ineffective presidents.


          Tom

          --- Ram Lau <ramlau@...> wrote:

          > A Google search gives:
          >
          > http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1031-03.htm
          >
          > "Published on Monday, October 31, 2005 by the New
          > York Times
          > Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains Secret
          > by Scott Shane"
          >
          > The Vietnam War never seemed so noble before
          > (comparatively speaking).
          >
          > Ram
          >
          >
          > --- In prezveepsenator@yahoogroups.com, Greg Cannon
          > <gregcannon1@y...>
          > wrote:
          > >
          > > I got this article from a friend at
          > > Central_Asia_Now@yahoogroups.com and thought you
          > all
          > > might be interested. Sorry there's no link to the
          > > article.
          > >
          > > Message: 1
          > > Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2005 14:52:20 -0000
          > > From: "awjfire" <williamfeuer@h...>
          > > Subject: Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains
          > Secret
          > >
          > > A little off-topic maybe, but may be of
          > interest...
          > >
          > > October 31, 2005 By SCOTT SHANE in the NYTimes
          > >
          > > WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 - The National Security Agency
          > has
          > > kept secret
          > > since 2001 a finding by an agency historian that
          > > during the Tonkin
          > > Gulf episode, which helped precipitate the Vietnam
          > > War, N.S.A.
          > > officers deliberately distorted critical
          > intelligence
          > > to cover up
          > > their mistakes, two people familiar with the
          > > historian's work say.
          > >
          > > The historian's conclusion is the first serious
          > > accusation that
          > > communications intercepted by the N.S.A., the
          > > secretive
          > > eavesdropping and code-breaking agency, were
          > falsified
          > > so that they
          > > made it look as if North Vietnam had attacked
          > American
          > > destroyers on
          > > Aug. 4, 1964, two days after a previous clash.
          > > President Lyndon B.
          > > Johnson cited the supposed attack to persuade
          > Congress
          > > to authorize
          > > broad military action in Vietnam, but most
          > historians
          > > have concluded
          > > in recent years that there was no second attack.
          > >
          > > The N.S.A. historian, Robert J. Hanyok, found a
          > > pattern of
          > > translation mistakes that went uncorrected,
          > altered
          > > intercept times
          > > and selective citation of intelligence that
          > persuaded
          > > him that
          > > midlevel agency officers had deliberately skewed
          > the
          > > evidence.
          > >
          > > Mr. Hanyok concluded that they had done it not out
          > of
          > > any political
          > > motive but to cover up earlier errors, and that
          > top
          > > N.S.A. and
          > > defense officials and Johnson neither knew about
          > nor
          > > condoned the
          > > deception.
          > >
          > > Mr. Hanyok's findings were published nearly five
          > years
          > > ago in a
          > > classified in-house journal, and starting in 2002
          > he
          > > and other
          > > government historians argued that it should be
          > made
          > > public. But
          > > their effort was rebuffed by higher-level agency
          > > policymakers, who
          > > by the next year were fearful that it might prompt
          > > uncomfortable
          > > comparisons with the flawed intelligence used to
          > > justify the war in
          > > Iraq, according to an intelligence official
          > familiar
          > > with some
          > > internal discussions of the matter.
          > >
          > > Matthew M. Aid, an independent historian who has
          > > discussed Mr.
          > > Hanyok's Tonkin Gulf research with current and
          > former
          > > N.S.A. and
          > > C.I.A. officials who have read it, said he had
          > decided
          > > to speak
          > > publicly about the findings because he believed
          > they
          > > should have
          > > been released long ago.
          > >
          > > "This material is relevant to debates we as
          > Americans
          > > are having
          > > about the war in Iraq and intelligence reform,"
          > said
          > > Mr. Aid, who is
          > > writing a history of the N.S.A. "To keep it
          > classified
          > > simply
          > > because it might embarrass the agency is wrong."
          > >
          > > Mr. Aid's description of Mr. Hanyok's findings was
          > > confirmed by the
          > > intelligence official, who spoke on condition of
          > > anonymity because
          > > the research has not been made public.
          > >
          > > Both men said Mr. Hanyok believed the initial
          > > misinterpretation of
          > > North Vietnamese intercepts was probably an honest
          > > mistake. But
          > > after months of detective work in N.S.A.'s
          > archives,
          > > he concluded
          > > that midlevel agency officials discovered the
          > error
          > > almost
          > > immediately but covered it up and doctored
          > documents
          > > so that they
          > > appeared to provide evidence of an attack.
          > >
          > > "Rather than come clean about their mistake, they
          > > helped launch the
          > > United States into a bloody war that would last
          > for 10
          > > years," Mr.
          > > Aid said.
          > >
          > > Asked about Mr. Hanyok's research, an N.S.A.
          > spokesman
          > > said the
          > > agency intended to release his 2001 article in
          > late
          > > November. The
          > > spokesman, Don Weber, said the release had been
          > > "delayed in an
          > > effort to be consistent with our preferred
          > practice of
          > > providing the
          > > public a more contextual perspective."
          > >
          > > Mr. Weber said the agency was working to
          > declassify
          > > not only Mr.
          > > Hanyok's article, but also the original intercepts
          > and
          > > other raw
          > > material for his work, so the public could better
          > > assess his
          > > conclusions.
          > >
          > > The intelligence official gave a different
          > account. He
          > > said N.S.A.
          > > historians began pushing for public release in
          > 2002,
          > > after Mr.
          > > Hanyok included his Tonkin Gulf findings in a
          > > 400-page, in-house
          > > history of the agency and Vietnam called "Spartans
          > in
          > > Darkness."
          > > Though superiors initially expressed support for
          > > releasing it, the
          > > idea lost momentum as Iraq intelligence was being
          >
          === message truncated ===
        • Ram Lau
          ... Speaking of ineffective presidents, don t forget kin of Barbara Bush, Franklin Pierce (D-NH). Now, more than ever, Dick Nixon looks like a savior. Ram
          Message 4 of 5 , Oct 31, 2005
          • 0 Attachment
            > Move over, James Buchanan and Andrew Johnson, you are
            > likely to have company in the lowest rungs of
            > ineffective presidents.

            Speaking of ineffective presidents, don't forget kin of Barbara Bush,
            Franklin Pierce (D-NH).

            Now, more than ever, Dick Nixon looks like a savior.

            Ram
          • THOMAS JOHNSON
            Oh yeah.. Now we know where junior gets his political skills.. I d put Tyler, W Harrison ( number one vote getter for the thinning out the herd award for not
            Message 5 of 5 , Oct 31, 2005
            • 0 Attachment
              Oh yeah.. Now we know where junior gets his political
              skills.. I'd put Tyler, W Harrison ( number one vote
              getter for the 'thinning out the herd' award for not
              wearing enough clothes to inauguration), and Harding
              in there as well.
              Any other nominees?

              --- Ram Lau <ramlau@...> wrote:

              > > Move over, James Buchanan and Andrew Johnson, you
              > are
              > > likely to have company in the lowest rungs of
              > > ineffective presidents.
              >
              > Speaking of ineffective presidents, don't forget kin
              > of Barbara Bush,
              > Franklin Pierce (D-NH).
              >
              > Now, more than ever, Dick Nixon looks like a savior.
              >
              >
              > Ram
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
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