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Re: SMTP-SASL auth failure caching.

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  • Victor Duchovni
    ... In http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4954#section-6, the enhanced status code for AUTH failures is defined as: 535 5.7.8 Authentication credentials invalid
    Message 1 of 77 , Dec 1, 2007
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      On Sat, Dec 01, 2007 at 10:43:53PM +0000, Keean Schupke wrote:

      > have added a dsn_valid() check, and swapped to using strtoul, along
      > with unsigned long for all time values... no negative times.

      In http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4954#section-6, the enhanced status
      code for AUTH failures is defined as:

      535 5.7.8 Authentication credentials invalid

      which extends:

      http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3463#section-3.8

      which only defines 5.7.0-5.7.7

      It may be appropriate to further check the enhanced status code (if
      present) and skip responses where 535 is accompanied by an enhanced
      status code other than 5.7.8. On the other hand, the 535 response is not
      currently supposed to be accompanied by any other enhanced status code,
      so this may be too pedantic.

      --
      Viktor.

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      If my response solves your problem, the best way to thank me is to not
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    • Victor Duchovni
      ... Yes, that s the idea. Also CPUs have historically gotten faster year-by-year. Moore s law is looking a bit more feeble lately, we are getting the
      Message 77 of 77 , Dec 4, 2007
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        On Tue, Dec 04, 2007 at 09:04:19PM +0000, Keean Schupke wrote:

        > How about we make the key iterations a config variable, and let the
        > user make the balance between speed and security?

        Yes, that's the idea. Also CPUs have historically gotten faster
        year-by-year. Moore's law is looking a bit more feeble lately, we are
        getting the feature-size scaling (more cores per die) but the clock-rate
        seems to have stalled for a bit.

        Finally, the table will not be in the chroot jail, proxymap/proxywrite
        won't be chrooted even when other processes are. So some "postfix"
        processes will have less access to the table than others.

        Anyway this is all coverging to something sensible. The question for
        the smtp(8) side is whether making the password hash the key is the
        best choice. We could make "nexthop user" the key, and stick the
        password hash in the result. That way deletion will actually work.

        Otherwise, new passwords will be set before the fail map entry expires,
        and the table entry becomes orphaned.

        If this change is made, the entry is valid only if not expired, and the
        password hash matches. Looks a lot an /etc/shadow entry with a user name
        and PKCS#5 v2 password hash, only it perversely records invalid passwords!

        --
        Viktor.

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        If my response solves your problem, the best way to thank me is to not
        send an "it worked, thanks" follow-up. If you must respond, please put
        "It worked, thanks" in the "Subject" so I can delete these quickly.
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