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15234Re: A Systematic Pattern of Obstruction in the Investigation of the 9/11 Hijacke

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  • LeaNder
    Oct 1, 2005
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      > Do you have any more info on Richard Barlow? Any links? Was his
      investigation deliberately obstructed?
      Well, I won't comment on what feels like a too narrow angle on Israel
      in world affairs, but I have to admit that I didn't even know about
      the Lavon affair, before reading your mails.

      And Khan surfaced lately with connections in South Africa, which had
      more the angle you are looking for.

      Concerning Barlow there is much on the net. What speeks for him is this:



      (a) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of the Treasury shall pay, out of
      any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to Mr. Richard
      M. Barlow of Santa Fe, New Mexico, the sum of $1,100,000 for
      compensation for losses incurred by Mr. Richard M. Barlow relating to
      and a direct consequence of--

      (1) personnel actions taken by the Department of Defense
      affecting Mr. Barlow's employment at the Department (including Mr.
      Barlow's top secret security clearance) during the period of August 4,
      1989, through February 27, 1992; and

      (2) Mr. Barlow's separation from service with the
      Department of Defense on February 27, 1992."

      I sent the globalresearch link already. [They are under attack as
      being antisemites, have you noticed?:

      Cheney + Pakistan = Iraq

      In the documentary they interviewed a couple of other people that
      affirmed his story, like Milton Beardon, former CIA chief in Pakistan,
      UN weapons inspector David Albright, there was also a Sherman Funk,
      about whom I can't find much [seems to be himself a whistleblower
      Inspector General at the State Department:

      but there is much more:

      Drinking Kool Aid is nothing really new it seems:


      Political Intelligence

      News: What happens when U.S. spies get the goods-- and the government
      won't listen?

      By Ken Silverstein & David Isenberg

      January/February 2002 Issue

      In 1989, an intelligence analyst working for then-Secretary of Defense
      Dick Cheney issued a startling report. After reviewing classified
      information from field agents, he had determined that Pakistan,
      despite official denials, had built a nuclear bomb. "I was not out
      there alone," the analyst, Richard Barlow, recalls. "This was the same
      conclusion that had been reached by many people in the intelligence

      But Barlow's conclusion was politically inconvenient. A finding that
      Pakistan possessed a nuclear bomb would have triggered a
      congressionally mandated cutoff of aid to the country, a key ally in
      the CIA's efforts to support Afghan rebels fighting a pro-Soviet
      government. It also would have killed a $1.4-billion sale of F-16
      fighter jets to Islamabad.

      Barlow's report was dismissed as alarmist. A few months later, a
      Pentagon official downplayed Pakistan's nuclear capabilities in
      testimony to Congress. When Barlow protested to his superiors, he was

      [and it seems there was the usual elaborate smear campaign, that left
      him down and out including a broken marriage]

      Three years later, in 1992, a high-ranking Pakistani official admitted
      that the country had developed the ability to assemble a nuclear
      weapon by 1987. In 1998, Islamabad detonated its first bomb. "This was
      not a failure of intelligence," says Barlow. "The intelligence was in
      the system."

      Barlow's case points to an issue that has largely been overlooked in
      the post-September 11 debate about how to "fix" the nation's spy
      networks: Sometimes, the problem with intelligence is not a lack of
      information, but a failure to use it.

      In the early days of the Vietnam War, a CIA analyst named Sam Adams
      discovered that the United States was seriously underestimating the
      strength of the Vietcong. The agency squelched his findings and he
      left in frustration. During the Reagan years, Melvin Goodman, then a
      top Soviet analyst at the agency, reported that the "Evil Empire" was
      undergoing a severe economic and military decline. Goodman was
      pressured to revise his findings--because, he says, then-CIA director
      William Casey wanted to portray a Soviet Union "that was 10 feet tall"
      in order to justify bigger military budgets. (Reagan's Secretary of
      State, George Shultz, put it more delicately in his memoirs: Reports
      from Casey's CIA, he wrote, were "distorted by strong views about

      At about the same time Barlow issued his warnings about Pakistan, an
      Energy Department analyst named Bryan Siebert was investigating Saddam
      Hussein's nuclear program. His report concluded that "Iraq has a major
      effort under way to produce nuclear weapons," and recommended that the
      National Security Council look into the matter. But the Bush
      administration--which had been supporting Iraq as a counterweight to
      the Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran--ignored the report. It was only in
      1990, after Saddam invaded Kuwait, that clear-eyed intelligence
      reporting on Iraq came into fashion.

      More recently, the Clinton administration went to great lengths to
      protect Boris Yeltsin, who was viewed as a critical partner in Russia
      after the collapse of the Soviet Union. One former intelligence
      analyst says that Al Gore and his national security adviser, Leon
      Fuerth, would "bury their heads in the sand" if presented with any
      derogatory report about Yeltsin. "Taking unpopular positions means
      that you get bad reviews and don't get promoted," he says. "Some
      analysts simply stop pursuing information because they know that it
      can get them into trouble."

      A different type of political filtering takes place when the CIA
      relies on "liaison relationships" with foreign intelligence agencies,
      whose reports are often colored by the biases of the local elite. One
      notorious example came in Iran in the 1970s, when despite decades of
      cooperation with the secret police, the U.S. government failed to
      grasp the extent of public opposition to the Shah. Less than four
      months before Khomeini's revolution toppled the Iranian monarchy in
      early 1979, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that the Shah was
      "expected to remain actively in power over the next 10 years."

      In Pakistan, the CIA has worked closely with the powerful
      Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) ever since the two
      institutions teamed up in the 1980s to fund and direct the Afghan
      guerrillas. After the Taliban took power in 1996, the CIA relied on
      the Pakistanis for help in monitoring the regime. But the agency
      reportedly got little support or information from its ally in
      Islamabad--probably because isi was also one of the Taliban's primary
      backers. "We have consistently misled ourselves because we don't have
      our own sources of information," warns Burton Hersh, author of The Old
      Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA. "If we had had
      people working the bazaars in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, we would have
      seen that there is a lot of unhappiness and that even
      upper-middle-class people were thinking about joining up with bin Laden."

      Reforms of U.S. intelligence--whether they involve bigger budgets,
      better recruiting, or more effective spying--won't make much of a
      difference, Hersh and others warn, as long as officials are unwilling
      to hear the bad news.
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