In the last section we saw that Polemarchus — with quiet encouragement from Socrates — has abandoned his father’s contractual view of justice while interpreting the maxim of Simonides to mean that justice entails a custodial obligation toward friends, to give to friends “something good and nothing bad.” And we noted that, according to this interpretation, the obligation to pay one’s debts in the ordinary sense — and indeed the principle of private property itself — will be subordinated to the obligation to take care of one’s friend. So, in the case of friends, justice apparently means pretty much the same thing as loyalty.

Friendship, however, is a term of distinction (unless you think that everybody is your friend), so with his next question Socrates moves to the other side of that distinction:

“Then what? Is one to give back to enemies whatever happens to be owed them?”

Before we consider the response of Polemarchus to this question, let’s take a moment to ask if Socrates has drawn the distinction correctly here. Is it necessary that anybody who is not your friend is your enemy? In other words, is the class of “not-my-friends” co-extensive with the class of “my-enemies”? For anyone who is not living in a family- or clan-based society it seems clear that these two classes are not co-extensive. There will be people who are not exactly friends, they may be strangers, but they are not necessarily enemies for that reason. A related set of questions will come up pretty soon — toward the end of Socrates’ conversation with Polemarchus — but for now we should note that it is Socrates, not Polemarchus, who first implies that friend and enemy are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the class of human relationships. But I think it is fair to say that Socrates has already guessed that this is what Polemarchus thinks, so Socrates is evidently pushing him where he wants to go.

If Socrates had asked about justice toward strangers, then it might be that, where one’s custodial obligation toward one’s friends is absent one’s contractual obligation to pay one’s debts would remain. It turns out that, for Polemarchus, calling the person an enemy means that contractual obligation disappears.

But we should pay careful attention to how Polemarchus expresses himself at this point. Responding to Socrates’ question, “Is one to give back to enemies whatever happens to be owed them?” Polemarchus says,

“Absolutely, just what’s owed them, and I suppose that what’s owed from an enemy to an enemy is the very thing that’s fitting, something bad.”

Bloom gives this as: “That’s exactly it. Just what’s owed to them. And I suppose that an enemy owes his enemy the very thing which is also fitting: some harm.”

What strikes me about this response by Polemarchus is how excited he is. He speaks like a chess player springing a carefully prepared trap, slamming a piece down on the board and saying, “Check!” Polemarchus clearly thinks that his answer is very clever, so much so that in this case he doesn’t even try to conceal that he is expressing his own interpretation of Simonides. It’s not, “Simonides supposes…” it’s “I suppose that what’s owed from an enemy to an enemy is the very thing that’s fitting, something bad.” Previously Polemarchus began to speak for himself by calling upon Zeus to endorse his intepretation of Simonides. But this is the first time he is actually speaking in the first person.

It is not for nothing that Polemarchus has as brothers two of the most accomplished sophist/rhetoricians of the time (both present, but silent, in the Republic). Without saying so, Polemarchus has completely altered the previously understood meaning of “what is owed,” so that now what is owed is not repayment of debts but benefits to friends and harms to enemies. This is a striking example of sophistical ambiguity.

The reason I mention this is to prepare you for what comes next, for in the argument that occupies the next two pages (up to 334b) you will see Socrates give a textbook demonstration of sophistical argument. Many commentators have noted the sophistical character of Socrates’ argument without, however, identifying the reason for it: namely that Socrates is responding to a sophistical argument by Polemarchus. When Polemarchus makes the clever response to Socrates that I just quoted, you can just about see Socrates mentally rolling up his sleeves and saying to himself, “If what this fellow wants is a lesson in sophistical argument, that’s what he is about to get!”

Lance

Dear Slow Readers of Plato’s Republic,

After a hiatus of more than two years I am about to resume my slow reading of the Republic. Actually I have not been idle, since I have been conducting a slow reading of the Republic with a group of children, mostly about 14 years of age, and we are now discussing the making of the polis in book 2.

Below I have included the text of the last message I posted prior to my hiatus. I want to invite members to share their thoughts about what would be the best way to resume. The list archives are available, of course, so any member can catch up by simply reading the older messages. But there may be other ways, so please share your thoughts.

Meanwhile, I have encountered some perplexities in the text, mostly from Book 2, about which I could use some assistance, so while waiting for your responses to my invitation I will depart from the consecutive reading and post my perplexities.

Lance

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the last section we saw that Polemarchus — with quiet encouragement from Socrates — has abandoned his father’s contractual view of justice while interpreting the maxim of Simonides to mean that justice entails a custodial obligation toward friends, to give to friends “something good and nothing bad.” And we noted that, according to this interpretation, the obligation to pay one’s debts in the ordinary sense — and indeed the principle of private property itself — will be subordinated to the obligation to take care of one’s friend. So, in the case of friends, justice apparently means pretty much the same thing as loyalty.

Friendship, however, is a term of distinction (unless you think that everybody is your friend), so with his next question Socrates moves to the other side of that distinction:

“Then what? Is one to give back to enemies whatever happens to be owed them?”

Before we consider the response of Polemarchus to this question, let’s take a moment to ask if Socrates has drawn the distinction correctly here. Is it necessary that anybody who is not your friend is your enemy? In other words, is the class of “not-my-friends” co-extensive with the class of “my-enemies”? For anyone who is not living in a family- or clan-based society it seems clear that these two classes are not co-extensive. There will be people who are not exactly friends, they may be strangers, but they are not necessarily enemies for that reason. A related set of questions will come up pretty soon — toward the end of Socrates’ conversation with Polemarchus — but for now we should note that it is Socrates, not Polemarchus, who first implies that friend and enemy are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the class of human relationships. But I think it is fair to say that Socrates has already guessed that this is what Polemarchus thinks, so Socrates is evidently pushing him where he wants to go.

If Socrates had asked about justice toward strangers, then it might be that, where one’s custodial obligation toward one’s friends is absent one’s contractual obligation to pay one’s debts would remain. It turns out that, for Polemarchus, calling the person an enemy means that contractual obligation disappears.

But we should pay careful attention to how Polemarchus expresses himself at this point. Responding to Socrates’ question, “Is one to give back to enemies whatever happens to be owed them?” Polemarchus says,

“Absolutely, just what’s owed them, and I suppose that what’s owed from an enemy to an enemy is the very thing that’s fitting, something bad.”

Bloom gives this as: “That’s exactly it. Just what’s owed to them. And I suppose that an enemy owes his enemy the very thing which is also fitting: some harm.”

What strikes me about this response by Polemarchus is how excited he is. He speaks like a chess player springing a carefully prepared trap, slamming a piece down on the board and saying, “Check!” Polemarchus clearly thinks that his answer is very clever, so much so that in this case he doesn’t even try to conceal that he is expressing his own interpretation of Simonides. It’s not, “Simonides supposes…” it’s “I suppose that what’s owed from an enemy to an enemy is the very thing that’s fitting, something bad.” Previously Polemarchus began to speak for himself by calling upon Zeus to endorse his intepretation of Simonides. But this is the first time he is actually speaking in the first person.

It is not for nothing that Polemarchus has as brothers two of the most accomplished sophist/rhetoricians of the time (both present, but silent, in the Republic). Without saying so, Polemarchus has completely altered the previously understood meaning of “what is owed,” so that now what is owed is not repayment of debts but benefits to friends and harms to enemies. This is a striking example of sophistical ambiguity.

The reason I mention this is to prepare you for what comes next, for in the argument that occupies the next two pages (up to 334b) you will see Socrates give a textbook demonstration of sophistical argument. Many commentators have noted the sophistical character of Socrates’ argument without, however, identifying the reason for it: namely that Socrates is responding to a sophistical argument by Polemarchus. When Polemarchus makes the clever response to Socrates that I just quoted, you can just about see Socrates mentally rolling up his sleeves and saying to himself, “If what this fellow wants is a lesson in sophistical argument, that’s what he is about to get!”

Lance





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