At the end of the last section I promised next to look at another pair of “hooks” the first of which is the principle that Polemarchus cites from Simonides and the second being what Socrates says in response. And I said that the crucial question to ask with respect to both of these passages is, what is being omitted, by Polemarchus in the first instance and by Socrates in the second? We will see that in the first passage Polemarchus omits truth-telling, which was one of the two requirements of justice according to Cephalus. And we will see that, in response, Socrates follows up by omitting the reference to weapons, which was the essential detail in the counter-example that Socrates uses to refute Cephalus.The analysis of these two omissions will show that Polemarchus is moving away from his father’s definition of justice toward a quite different notion of justice, and that Socrates, far from resisting him, is subtly encouraging Polemarchus to distance himself from his father’s definition of justice.

The first hook involves a speech by Polemarchus the end of which we have already discussed at length — where Polemarchus expressed his opinion that what Simonides had said was said beautifully, but we have not yet discussed the actual words. According to Polemarchus, Simonides said that it’s just to give what’s owed to each person. Now, bearing in mind that Polemarchus is citing Simonides in defense of his father’s definition of justice, it seems reasonable to compare his father’s definition of justice (as Socrates formulated it) with what Polemarchus quotes from Simonides, since the argument of Polemarchus seems to be that his father’s definition “certainly is” the definition of justice because the same thing was said by Simonides, who is a famous poet and who said it beautifully. But IS the statement of Simonides in fact the same as the definition of Cephalus? Here is what Socrates said in formulating the definition of Cephalus:

> “But about this very thing, justice, shall we simply claim in this way that it is truth and giving back anything one takes from anyone?”
>

It is clear that they are not the same. The statement that Polemarchus attributed to Simonides reproduces the second part of the definition that Socrates attributed to Cephalus, about giving back what one has taken, but it does not contain the part about the truth.

What should we say is the intention of Polemarchus at this point? He broke into the conversation between Socrates and Cephalus at the point when Cephalus had just conceded that Socrates had refuted his definition of justice. Polemarchus interrupted, saying that his father’s phrase “certainly is” the definition of justice, at least if Simonides should be believed. Based only this phrase — “certainly is” — you would expect to find that Polemarchus is speaking with the intention of defending his father’s conception of justice. But is he really doing that? What is the testimony of his words? So far Polemarchus has offered 3 things:

1. Simonides said that it’s just to give what’s owed to each person.
2. Polemarchus has opined that what Simonides said was beautiful.
3. Now we find that, in citing Simonides, Polemarchus has omitted any reference to truth-telling, whereas Cephalus had said that truth-telling is one of the requirements of justice.

What is the effect of the defense offered by Polemarchus? We have already observed that the substitution of “beautifully” for “rightly” tends to put the position of Cephalus/Simonides/Polemarchus beyond the reach of rational argument. The principle that Polemarchus attributes to Simonides is essentially the same as one part of the definition of Cephalus, so, at most, attributing it to Simonides only reinforces the opinion of Cephalus by grounding it on the authority of a famous name.

But what about the omission of truth-telling? First, we should ask, Is the omission intentional or accidental? Based on the principle of logographic necessity, we must assume that everything in the text expresses the intention of the author — i.e. Plato. But there remains the possibility that Plato intends this omission to be understood as an expression of unconsciousness on the part of Polemarchus.

By omitting truth-telling from the definition of justice, Polemarchus is deviating — whether consciously or unconsciously — from his father’s definition of justice. What was the role of truth-telling for Cephalus? Cephalus had said that one of the main benefits he had enjoyed from being rich was that it saved him from having to cheat or lie to anyone against his will. And I suggested that by this Cephalus probably meant the sort of lie that one might tell to extenuate one’s inability to repay a debt when it is due. This suggests something important about his understanding of justice, namely it seemed that Cephalus is essentially a man of commerce who has a contractual notion of justice, where honoring contracts is the main aspect of justice and acknowledging the truth about one’s resources is crucial in making it possible to peacefully resolve breach-of-contract disputes.

On the basis of this last observation a possible conclusion begins to come into view: If the requirement of truth-telling as a part of justice is essentially connected to the contractual notion of justice that belongs especially to Cephalus, then the omission of truth as an ingredient of justice by Polemarchus represents a significant step by Polemarchus away from his father’s conception of justice and toward something quite different. But toward what is Polemarchus moving? In just another sentence or two, of course, it will become obvious that Polemarchus holds a conception of justice that is indeed quite different from his father’s — that justice is not about honoring contracts but about helping friends and harming enemies. So the answer to the question I just posed — toward what is Polemarchus moving? — is that he is moving from his father’s conception of justice toward his own.

But there is a big problem with this answer: Polemarchus has not said that he is advocating his own conception of justice which is different from his father’s. Polemarchus broke into the conversation to defend his father’s definition of justice from Socrates’ attack on it. He introduced Simonides’ statement about justice, but only as a proxy for his father’s definition. If Polemarchus had been interested in discovering the truth about justice, he could have said — as Thrasymachus does a bit later — “I have a better definition of justice; try that.” But, of course, that would be no defense of his father’s definition of justice. So it appears that what the quotation from Simonides does for Polemarchus is to give him an equivocal formulation that sounds at first sufficiently like his father’s definition to pass as the same, but which can be used later as the basis for the conception of justice as helping friends and harming enemies.

Now let’s turn to the response of Socrates, which contains the second hook — the second of the two omissions — that I wanted to discuss.

We have already considered the first part of Socrates’ response to the citation of Simonides by Polemarchus, in which Socrates attempts to seize the initiative by saying that he doesn’t understand what Simonides means and demanding that Polemarchus explain. Now let’s read the second part of his reply:

> "For it’s obvious that he doesn’t mean this, the thing that we were talking about just now, giving anything that’s been entrusted to him back to anyone whatsoever when, not being of sound mind, [332A] he demands it. And yet this that he entrusted to someone is certainly owed him, isn’t it?”
> “Yes.”
> “But it is not by any means to be given back at a time when someone not of sound mind demands it?”
> “True,” he said.
>

In this passage, when Socrates refers to “…the thing that we were talking about just now…” he is referring to what he said in his conversation with Cephalus at 331c5, so let’s quote that again in order to compare the two passages and see if anything is different or missing:

> “…if someone were to receive weapons from a friend, a man of sound mind, and he kept demanding them back when out of his mind, that one ought not to give back things of that sort, and that anyone who gave them back would not be just, and neither would anyone who was willing to tell all the truth to a person in that condition.”
>

Now let’s compare the two passages and see what, if anything, Socrates has omitted in this speech to Polemarchus that was present in his speech to Cephalus.

In both speeches a person has entrusted something to someone else. In both cases the owner of the things entrusted returns in a maddened state of mind and demands the return of the things that the other has received from him.

So much for what is the same. Now let’s see what is different:

When Socrates was speaking to Cephalus he specified that the things entrusted to the other were weapons. But now, when he cites that same point in speaking to Polemarchus, Socrates does not mention weapons at all but speaks of “anything that’s been entrusted to him…”

A second difference concerns telling the truth. We saw above that Polemarchus had already omitted his father’s requirement of telling the truth when he reported what Simonides said about justice. When Socrates was speaking to Cephalus, after saying that it would not be just to give back the man’s weapons if he demanded them back when in a maddened condition, Socrates added that it would also not be just to tell the truth to a person in that condition. But now, in speaking to Polemarchus, Socrates is as silent about truth as Polemarchus was. Socrates follows Polemarchus in omitting the truth and adds to that the omission of the reference to weapons, which was crucial to Socrates’ refutation of Cephalus. For when Socrates spoke of a man who had deposited weapons with another and then returned in a maddened condition to demand them back, the reason this posed a problem was the possibiility that, if the weapons were returned to their owner when he was mad he might use them to inflict harm either to himself or to someone else, such as the person with whom the weapons had been deposited.

In sum: When Socrates responds to what Polemarchus has said about Simonides, he joins Polemarchus in omitting truth-telling as a requirement of justice, and, in addition, Socrates omits the reference to weapons as the thing deposited, thereby completely removing the teeth of his own argument against Cephalus. (We should also observe that, without the reference to weapons as the thing that has been deposited, the argument that the things received should not be returned if the owner demands them back when in an unsound mental condition makes very little sense. At the least, it should provoke a question — such as, “Why should they not be returned to him? If he has loaned me some books of poetry, or the collected dialogues of Plato, and comes back in a maddened condition and demands them back, why should I not give him his books?” But Polemarchus does not ask any question, but simply says, “True.”

I think that the absurdity of this reply by Polemarchus argues in favor of the suggestion I made earlier that his omission of truth-telling was meant by Plato to be seen as an example of unconsciousness on the part of Polemarchus.

But we cannot imagine that Socrates is unconscious in giving this absurd response, so we need to ask why he responds in this way.

We have noted that. although Polemarchus seems to want to defend his father, he seems to be defending a conception of justice that is quite different from his father’s. Now let us ask, is Socrates interested in defending the correctness of his refutation of Cephalus?

If that were in fact the intention of Socrates, would he not simply ask Polemarchus about his omission of his father’s requirement of truth-telling and also ask how Simonides’ definition answers the counterexample involving weapons? But Socrates does not do either of these things. So it seems that Socrates has no intention of forcing Polemarchus to recognize that he is no longer defending his father. At the same time, Socrates abets the deviation of Polemarchus from his father’s conception of justice. Socrates does this by focusing on Simonides, the proxy for Cephalus, and asking Polemarchus to explain what Simonides means. For example, after his incomplete summary of his refutation of Cephalus, he says to Polemarchus,

> “So it’s likely that Simonides means something other than this sort of thing in saying that the giving of what’s owed is just.”
>

And from his response it is clear that Socrates is now pushing Polemarchus toward the place to which he wants to go:

> “He sure does, by Zeus,” he said, “for he assumes that friends owe it to friends to do something good and nothing bad.”
>

This is the first time that Polemarchus swears an oath. We could read the oath as simply a way of speaking emphatically. But perhaps we should recall the logical structure of oaths, which we discussed when Cephalus swore an oath at 328E. As we observed then, the way an oath works is that the speaker is calling upon the listener to believe that he is speaking the truth by inviting the god to punish him if he is lying. But what is the assertion for whose truth Polemarchus calls upon Zeus as a witness? Is Zeus supposed to guarantee the truth of the statement that “…friends owe it to friends to do something good and nothing bad?” No, not at all. Polemarchus is calling upon Zeus to endorse the correctness of his interpretation of Simonides. For the first time Polemarchus is beginning to speak for himself — which is exactly what Socrates wants him to do!

Lance