“So tell me,” I said, “heir to a share in the discussion, what do you say that Simonides says that speaks rightly about justice?” “ That it’s just,” he said, “to give what’s owed to each person, and in saying this he seems to me to put it beautifully.”

In the previous section, commenting on the passage quoted above, I observed in passing the curious fact that, while Socrates asks Polemarchus what Simonides says that "speaks RIGHTLY about justice," Polemarchus in his reply does not say that Simonides spoke rightly, but instead says that, "in saying this he seems to me to put it beautifully.”
In the previous section I promised to come back to this point, so I will do that now.

This is one of those places in Plato's text where we are confronted with something that at first seems completely insignificant, and the only thing that might arrest our attention is that it seems a bit odd. After all, we are deaing here only with the fact that Socrates and Polemarchus use two different adverbs to characterize how Simonides spoke on the subject of justice. Socrates says that, according to Polemarchus, Simonides spoke rightly, and Polemarchus says that, in his opinion, Simonides spoke beautifully. But neither of these words plays a role in the ensuing conversation between Socrates and Polemarchus, so what is the reason why we should pay attention to the difference between these words now?

As usual, a slow reading of the text supplies us with a reason for inquiring into the significance of these two words -- rightly and beautifully: Socrates asks Polemarchus, "...what do you say that Simonides says that speaks rightly about justice?" If you have been reading the preceding few sentences closely enough, you are likely to find yourself saying at this point something like, "Wait a minute! Is Socrates speaking the truth here? Where does Polemarchus say that Simonides spoke rightly? Nowhere. Polemarchus did not say this at all!" And this is not an obscure point. The relevant text in which Polemarchus speaks about Simonides is right there on the same page. So now we have, not merely an oddity, but a problem in the text that demands our attention. This problem in the text calls forth a number of questions, the first two of which are:

(1) Why does Socrates attribute to Polemarchus something that Polemarchus plainly did not say? And (2) Does this "misquotation" by Socrates help to explain why Polemarchus says that Simonides spoke beautifully (instead of rightly)?

A preliminary answer to the second question follows almost immediately, and considering it first will help to bring into view the nature of the somewhat concealed struggle between Socrates and Polemarchus that is taking place in this passage, so let me start with that and then go back to the first question. The answer to the second question is: Yes, recognizing that Socrates has misquoted Polemarchus does help to explain why Polemarchus responds by saying that in his opinion Simonides spoke beautifully. How? It allows us to discover that Polemarchus and Socrates are now engaged in a double conversation whose duality is caused by the adverbial misattribution contained in Socrates’ question.

If Socrates had simply asked, “What do you say that Simonides says about justice?” then Polemarchus would have simply replied, “Simonides said that it is just to give to each person what is owed…” He would have had no reason to add, "...and in saying this he seems to me to put it beautifully.” But Socrates did not ask this simple question. Instead he added an adverbial modifier — “rightly” — that functions here implicitly as a separate assertion by Socrates to the effect that, “Polemarchus said that what Simonides said about justice is right.” But, as we have seen, Polemarchus did not say that Simonides spoke rightly (at least he did not say this explicitly). So Polemarchus feels constrained to give an answer whose duality mirrors the duality of Socrates’ question. In the first part of his response he answers Socrates’ explicit question by paraphrasing what Simonides said. Then, in the second part of his response, Polemarchus contradicts Socrates’ assertion (without explicitly denying it), by stating a completely different opinion as his own. It is as if Polemarchus had said, “Here, Socrates, is what Simonides said about justice. In addition, I want to correct your misquotation of what I just now said. I did not say that Simonides spoke rightly. It fact it is my opinion that when Simonides said what he said about justice he spoke beautifully.”

In short, the reason why Polemarchus states his assessment of the speech by Simonides is to correct the misquotation by Socrates. But we still don’t know what Polemarchus means when he says that, in his opinion, Simonides spoke beautifully (and not necessarily rightly) about justice, which is why I said that this is only a preliminary answer to the second question. So let’s now turn back to the first question, which is, Why does Socrates attribute something to Polemarchus that Polemarchus plainly did not say?

The context in which the misquotation occurs is strangely personal, at least it is immediate in the sense of “in person”. Most often, when a person is misquoted, the person who is misquoted is either not present or is not being directly addressed. But Socrates in this case doesn't misquote Polemarchus in a journal article or while talking to some third party. He misquotes him to his face. If you or I were in the position of Polemarchus, probably we would say out loud what we imagined saying as readers a moment ago: "Wait a minute! That's not what I said!" And very likely we would also ask, "Socrates, why did you put this word, 'rightly', into my mouth when you know it's not what I said?"

Later I will turn to why Polemarchus does not ask this question, but first let's try to imagine what Socrates might have said if Polemarchus had asked him this question. Wouldn't Socrates most likely say something like the following? "Well, I know you might not have used exactly that word, but I thought it was what you meant, and I still think it is what you would have to mean in this context." Polemarchus would reply, "What context are you talking about?" And Socrates would answer, "Just a moment ago you said that your father's formula 'certainly is' the definition of justice 'if Simonides is to be believed (or listened to or obeyed).' That's the context. When you said, '...if Simonides is to be believed,' I thought that raised the question, Why should Simonides be believed (or listened to)? And the only reason I could think of why somebody should be believed is that what he said is right. And since you clearly think that Simonides should be believed, I inferred from that that you must also think that what Simonides said about justice is right."

What could Polemarchus reply? He might say, “Socrates, if I say to you, “You really ought to listen to X when he plays the cithara, would you think I was telling you that X plays rightly?” “Well, yes, I might think that.” “But, Socrates, would you really believe that that is the reason why I might think you ought to listen to X play the cithara?” “Well,” continues Socrates, “If X plays the music rightly, wouldn’t his playing sound beautiful?” “Maybe yes, and maybe no,” Polemarchus would answer, “And that’s just the point, Socrates. If the music is played beautifully, that’s what makes me want to listen to it, and that’s what makes me think that you will want to listen to it also — if you share my taste in music, that is. If his playing doesn’t strike me as beautiful, even if he plays all the notes “rightly,” I wouldn’t tell you that you ought to listen to it — if I think you share my taste in music.”

[To be continued...]