Re: [neoplatonism] Re: Soul/Body Problem...
- The question, Michael, is what the soul is. To vulgar dualism nowadays
(Hollywood's, for instance) it's a "fluid" that can be exchanged,
stored, etc. To platonists and aristotelians alike one can say it was
the data "behind" a given entity. That's why I compared it to what
happens in the virtual world nowadays: a character in a computer game,
for instance, is the manifestation on the screen of a certain set of
data regarding its shape, color, position, etc. Shape, color,
position, etc are Aristotle's categories and the set of data defining
the parameters for that "virtual body", though not it, but its
"mathemathical counterpart", is its algorithm, its "soul". Therefore
they couldn't say the soul is in the body (although Hollywood can),
but that the body is "in" the soul (that is, the soul is the
ontological bases of the body, not the opposite).
Hope that helps better now! :-)
On 11/4/05, Malcolm Schosha <malcolmschosha@...> wrote:
> --- In email@example.com, Michael Chase <goya@u...> wrote:
> > Le 4 nov. 05, à 13:30, Caio Rossi a écrit :
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > Using different references in order to help understanding:
> > >
> > > The body (and by that I mean the psyche too, or, in Buddhist
> > > all the skandhas) is "in" the soul because this is the "set of
> > > (an individual's "potential possibilities", or algorithm, in
> > > mathematical terms) which the (Aristotelian) categories which
> > > the body stem from.
> > M.C. Um, if you say so.
> > >
> > > Saying the soul is "in" the body is no more precise than saying
> > > the algorithm that inFORMS an animated gif is in the animated gif
> > > itself. Its algorithm (the animated gif's "soul") is
> > > "above" its manifestation in a website, therefore not
> exactly "in" it.
> > >
> > > Hope that helps,
> > M.C. Many thanks for your efforts, but I have to confess I'm now
> > considerably more confused than I was before.
> >Best wishes,
> > Michael Chase
> Interestingly, Stoicism does not allow this dualism between body and
> soul, but the human form, the soul, and God are all considered to be
> material. The excerpt I have copied below gives what seems to me a
> fairly good summery of Stoic materialism (which has nothing in common
> with the word materialism as it now commonly used).
> Malcolm Schosha
> 3. Stoic Physics
> The fundamental proposition of the Stoic physics is that "nothing
> incorporeal exists." This materialism coheres with the sense-
> impression orientation of their doctrine of knowledge. Plato placed
> knowledge in thought, and reality, therefore, in the ideal form. The
> Stoics, however, place knowledge in physical sensation, and reality --
> what is known by the senses -- is matter. All things, they said,
> even the soul, even God himself, are material and nothing more than
> material. This belief they based upon two main considerations.
> Firstly, the unity of the world demands it. The world is one, and
> must issue from one principle. We must have a monism. The idealism of
> Plato resolved itself into a futile struggle involving a dualism
> between matter and thought. Since the gulf cannot be bridged from the
> side of ideal realm of the forms, we must take our stand on matter,
> and reduce mind to it. Secondly, body and soul, God and the world,
> are pairs which act and react upon one another. The body, for
> example, produces thoughts (sense impressions) in the soul, the soul
> produces movements in the body. This would be impossible if both were
> not of the same substance. The corporeal cannot act on the
> incorporeal, nor the incorporeal on the corporeal. There is no point
> of contact. Hence all must be equally corporeal.
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- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, Michael Chase <goya@u...> wrote:
>Well, it should also be borne in mind that even "Orphics", whatever one takes this disputed
> It just seems too
> simple to me to say : oh yeah, Plato was an Orphic when he was a kid,
> so he didn't like the body : then he changed his mind when he grew up
> and realized the body and the physical world in general are OK after
term to mean, are not committed to the position that the body and the physical world are
inherently evil, but that embodied beings are in need of redemption or salvation, and
hence that the terms of their embodiment are problematic in some sense.
This is not the same as believing that embodiment is evil, or that one's 'soma', were one to
understand it properly and not mistake its nature, might not cease to be a 'sema'.
- Le 7 nov. 05, à 19:55, jensav55 a écrit :
> --- In email@example.com, Michael Chase <goya@u...> wrote:M.C. This is an interesting distinction, but I'm not sure whether it
> > It just seems too
> > simple to me to say : oh yeah, Plato was an Orphic when he was a
> > so he didn't like the body : then he changed his mind when he grew
> > and realized the body and the physical world in general are OK after
> > all.
> Well, it should also be borne in mind that even "Orphics", whatever
> one takes this disputed
> term to mean, are not committed to the position that the body and the
> physical world are
> inherently evil, but that embodied beings are in need of redemption
> or salvation,
works in detail. Are there actually any Orphic texts that state this
distinction? It seems to me that while the doctrine that embodied
beings are in need of redemption or salvation need not *entail* that
the body and the physical world are inherently evil, it doesn't exclude
this last possiblity either. Why, one wonders, would it be urgent to
flee from this world (Theaetetus 176b) unless it were in some since
evil, if not "inherently", then at least as far as the effects it has
on our psychism are concerned?
> andM.C. Perhaps. And yet, there are some texts which suggest quite
> hence that the terms of their embodiment are problematic in some
> This is not the same as believing that embodiment is evil, or that
> one's 'soma', were one to
> understand it properly and not mistake its nature, might not cease to
> be a 'sema'.
strongly that the "Orphic" goal is not simply some change of
perspective, enabling us to look on the brighter side of being
incarnated, but the literal *cessation* of the process of incarnation.
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