God and Love in Platonism, etc.
- Sorry, late night finger problem with my last post - the final quote
"The ineffable principle of things, however, as it is more excellent
than every power, so likewise it transcends Providence. But if some one
should dare to assert, that it
providentially attends to all things, it must be said that this IS in no
other way than as desirable to all things . . ."
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, Tim Addey <tim@...> wrote:
>Very interesting, thanks, Tim. I need to go look at these propositions again in Dodd's edition, if I can find it in one of my many piles of books...! Will get back to you when I uncover it, I hope, this afternoon.
> Dennis - Yes, that seems to me to be right: The One (or The Good) is not
> self-sufficient. Propositions 9 and 10 postulate at least three classes
> of realities: the first includes all those things which depend upon
> something other than itself for the perfection of its hyparxis and/or
> its energy; the middle class includes all those things which provide for
> their own perfection; finally there is that which entirely transcends
> any form of dependence (whether that dependence is met by others or itself).
> If the Good is self-sufficient then the question of "why anything else"
> would be valid (but unanswerable). Proclus, I think, hints at this at
> the close of his Ten Doubts Concerning Providence - he writes (65, 1)
> "All the Gods, therefore, energise providentially. . . (8) . .all the
> Gods primarily exert a providential energy, because they are primarily
> good . ." and then, (at 66, 5) "The ineffable principle of things,
> however, as it is more excellent than every power, so likewise it
> transcends Providence. But if some one should dare to assert, that it
> providentially attends to all things, it must be said that this in in no
> other way than as desirable to all things . . ." Thus, if I read it
> aright, desire is only to be attributed to things second and third, and
> not to the first.
> vaeringjar wrote:
> > In a few posts recently on both the subject of "The One: why the rest?"
> > and "Love", there have been references to self-sufficiency or
> > self-adequacy, either explicitly or (it seems to me) implicitly. I
> > wonder if Proclus' tenth proposition in his Elements of Theology has
> > some light to throw on the difficulties raised:
> > "Everything which is sufficient to itself is inferior to that which is
> > simply good."
> > In other words, the tree we're barking up may well be a perfectly good
> > tree to bark at, but perhaps not the best one.
> > Tim Addey
> I am afraid I don't quite follow you there, Tim. I take Proclus there to
> be referring, in "everything" as things other than the One or the Good.
> Can you elaborate a bit for us, perhaps? Thanks.
> Dennis Clark