Re: [naturalismphilosophyforum] Re: Possibility
- In a message dated 31/10/2007 09:57:41 GMT Standard Time, philosopherknight@... writes:Steve,The hell we don't. The "if" that you present is most certainly an empty set. I think even Tom would concede that.Who says it most certainly is an empty set?The idea is to let science be our guide.Is this where you are trying to be helpful, being argumentative?Helpful. I think it is unhelpful to confuse the issue by making it look like our claim that we have no free will is based on the belief that it is impossible for the world to be any other way, than the way it is.That would actually put the cause back 100's of years, unless scientists find very strong evidence to support your claim.It might happen but they'd have to rule out randomness or probability completely and more importantly they would have to know that the initial conditions could not have been different.ps.. you might notice I too attack CCFW, all NFWists do, so what is your point about Tom attacking CCFW? This is confusing... note: you were confusing once again.You wander about a bit with what you attack, sometimes it's being "the originator" sometimes it's could have done otherwise in the circumstances and sometimes it's could do otherwise in different circumstances.None of these qualify for being free will at all though, without further explanation.could have done otherwise if could never be CCFW.You yourself agree that if you were "the originator" we could not do otherwise, so you rule that out.and could do otherwise in the circumstances as far as we know is randomness.Really it's hard for anybody to know what this CCFW is that you are attacking and I think it is helpful to discuss that.Stephen
- Thanks Stephen. The "scandal of compatibilism" as I see it is that
many compatibilists believe retributive, non-consequentialist
punishment is justifiable. But why? Danlhinz contrasts merit-based
retributivism and consequentialism at the CFI forum:
"1) the merit-based view, according to which praise or blame would be
an appropriate reaction toward the candidate if and only if she
merits in the sense of `deserves' such a reaction; or 2) the
consequentialist view, according to which praise or blame would be
appropriate if and only if a reaction of this sort would likely lead
to a desired change in the agent and/or her behavior.
Thus far I haven't seen any good compatibilist justifications for
retribution. They all end up supposing that the suffering of the
wrongdoer is an intrinsic good, something to be inflicted whether or
not it has good consequences. This seems to me insupportable.
ps: no sweat about possible worlds, just work at your own pace; but
feel free to post your thoughts/questions here for others to ponder.
--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "stephnlawrnce"
> I've had a stab at exposing the scandal of compatabilism over at
> centre for inquiry.by
> Here is the thread.
> I hope the thread may be of interest, as it's not the usual (dull
> now)circling over, do we, don't we have free will and may be moreI've
> effective in memeing naturalism (our version)
> P.s Tom I've got stuck on this idea of telling the story of how
> come to reject other possible worlds. I think I'll get there. Ifeel
> sure I've established that we act upon epistemic possibilities(need
> to put that in non technical terms) and that options are epistemic
> alternatives but this darned thing logical possibility and how it
> relates to what we could actually or physical do, is more tricky.