Re: [nanotech] Re: On inloading, humanity, the soul and atheism
- In a message dated 10/31/2003 2:59:36 AM Pacific Standard Time, mgubrud@... writes:
Then a duplicate brain could be assembled - unfortuantely it
would be frozen - or some kind of simulation implemented, perhaps using
a reduced model of the primary molecular dataset. The latter would, in
my view, almost certainly not be a faithful simulation of the deceased
person, but it might pass as a clunky, tinny, imperfect simulation.I see no basis for making this claim. Why would the reproduction have to be in any way distinguishable from the original?
Not. If you really believe you are dead in this scenario, why do you
care about the "inloaded me"? Here your choice of terms is highly
suspicious. If we accept the term "inload" as technical jargon, we
can't allow that to be used to beg the question of "me" vs. "not me."
So okay, the inload that doesn't know you're dead - why would it have
been kept in the dark? - carries on for you. Why is this a good thing?
Particularly if the inload is not human, as is likely unless we really
believe that nanoassemblers can build living human beings... Why is it a
good thing to have humans replaced by simulations of humans? Of course
this wouldn't be a good thing. It's patently insane - and inhumane.On what basis do you claim that it's insane to want to replace humans with something we happen to think is better (in almost every quantifiable sense)?Honestly, Mark, you keep making claims like this as if they're undeniable truth, when in reality they're just opinions more indicative of your fears than of any great "truth."Derek
- In a message dated 11/4/2003 6:04:30 PM Pacific Standard Time, bittercrank@... writes:
For me, and many, faith is a matter of continuous questioning; at least the healthy version of it.Most of your post is an argument about the definition of faith, really. But part of the definition of faith is having complete trust in something. Complete trust precludes continuous questioning by definition.Derek