Re: Identity (was Re: Digest Number 103)
- Yikes! This is starting to sound like a JFK assassination theory, with
bullet trajectories, time of death, and so on. (What if there was a hidden
gunman?!) I think I'll stop pondering this for a while and get back to
"normal" subjects like nanotube gas tanks.
> From: Eugene Leitl <eugene.leitl@...-muenchen.de>
> Dan Green writes:
>> There's a very strong emotional need for a feeling of direct continuity of
>> self. The fact that duplicates would retain a feeling of continuity is not
>> very satisfying to the one being duplicated. Suppose someone held a gun to
>> your head and said, "Don't worry. As we speak, an exact duplicate of you is
>> being made, and the duplicate will remember all your experiences right up
>> until the time I pull the trigger." I would not feel relieved that my "self"
>> was being preserved. The other self about to be born would seem like just
>> that...an "other," while I faced doom.
> Hmm, interesting variant. Assuming that the death is semiinstanteous
> (i.e. takes less than few 10 ms, a biological time quantum), there is
> not enough time for the different persona to consciously diverge.
> The fork is still there, of course, but one branch of it gets
> terminated well before the doomed clone can become aware of the
> (people say rather unpleasant) process of being killed. (The cloned
> process is stopped at the next subjective time tick after cloning
> because pieces of disintegrating brain tissue flying across the room
> can't think very well). Since their histories are essentially
> identical -- of course real physical persons will start to diverge due
> to their internal system noise even if physical input be indeed
> identical -- hold it, we're talking about two persons now. That's the
> fly in the ointment.
> It would make a slight difference if this was a simulation of two
> persons, and the input was strictly identical, and the system noise
> pseudorandom and not true random. Because the bifurcation wouldn't
> have occured at the time of the cloning: both trajectories after the
> cloning "fork" would overlap perfectly, i.e. they would be the same
> person. It would be thus a pathological fork of zero amplitude, a
> non-fork. The shit only would only hit the fan when the brain of one
> of us is blown out of the cranium, but it would not be a subjective
> fork, because me/him won't observe it.
> Even in the latter, ameliorated case I would strongly object against
> such an experiment on ethical principles (especially, if the subject
> of the experiment is me), because I consider terminating a potential
> person, whether a newborn or an adult clone, highly objectionable,
> especially in the context of a death threat to him (remember, there is
> only one clone until the fork).
> So summa summarum you're imposing severe psychological stress on a
> person, and prevent "birth" of a second person (extrapolate the likely
> trajectories of terminated branch of the fork into the future), not
> giving him opportunity to diverge.
> You go straight to jail, buster.
> > The Nanotechnology Industries mailing list.
> "Nanotechnology: solutions for the future."
- Dan Green writes:
> From: Dan Green <greenco@...>Nah, not bullets. Trajectories through persona state space, not real
> Yikes! This is starting to sound like a JFK assassination theory, with
> bullet trajectories, time of death, and so on. (What if there was a hidden
space. Standard scientific lingo, really. The only way how you can
argue it stringently, without resorting to a lot of metaphysical arm
> gunman?!) I think I'll stop pondering this for a while and get back to
> "normal" subjects like nanotube gas tanks.
> Dan G.