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Fwd: Типологическое общество 13.10.2004 в 15: 20

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  • Gurevich
    This is a forwarded message From: Olga Fedorova To: lenak@philol.msu.ru, tatevoskis@mtu-net.ru, kibrik@philol.msu.ru,
    Message 1 of 1 , Sep 30, 2004
      This is a forwarded message
      From: Olga Fedorova <olja@...>
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      Date: Wednesday, September 29, 2004, 5:51:52 PM
      Subject: Типологическое общество 13.10.2004 в 15:20

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      В среду, 13 октября, в 15.20

      состоится очередное собрание


      Wallace CHAFE
      (University of California at Santa Barbara)

      "Where Do Adjectives Come From?"

      The question of whether a grammatically definable class of adjectives is present in all languages has come to the forefront recently through independent suggestions of R.M.W. Dixon and Mark Baker, both of whom believe that adjectives are universal. The Northern Iroquoian languages (Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora) provide a good test of that proposal because such a class is by no means obvious in those languages. At best there is an adjectival subset of verb roots, but even that is questionable. Using Seneca as representative of all six languages, I will discuss several criteria by which such a subset of verb roots might be identified, pointing out problems in each case. The adjectival class, if such a class can be defined grammatically at all, is far from obvious, and I will suggest that languages differ significantly in the clarity with which adjectives can be identified. I will mention the existence of a well-defined adjective class in the related language Cherokee, one that arose after that language had separated from its northern relatives, thus highlighting the absence of such a class in the latter.

      Адрес: I-й гуманитарный корпус МГУ, 10-й этаж, ауд. 1060
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      Приглашаются все желающие!


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      приглашает всех желающих на доклад

      Wallace CHAFE
      University of California at Santa Barbara

      14 октября, 15:20, МГУ, 1-й корпус гуманитарных факультетов, ауд. 9 (1-й этаж)

      Linguists have recently taken two different approaches to the relation
      between language and consciousness. I will contrast my own approach with
      that of another linguist, Ray Jackendoff. Both of us agree that this
      relation cannot be explored without taking other mental phenomena into
      account, in particular thought and imagery. We agree, furthermore, that
      conscious experience includes both imagery and emotions, whether or not
      those experiences can be considered elements of thought. Jackendoff sees
      consciousness as limited to uninterpreted imagery, whose qualities mirror
      those of uninterpreted visual, auditory, or other raw sensory information.
      He presents evidence that such imagery is external to thought, in part
      because it is too particular, in part because it does not allow the
      identification of individuals, and in part because it fails to support
      reasoning. If, in fact, all we are conscious of is uninterpreted imagery
      and imagery does not belong to thought, it follows that we are not
      conscious of thought. In contrast, I distinguish between immediate and
      displaced consciousness, the former involved in direct perception, the
      latter in experiences that are recalled or imagined. Immediate
      consciousness includes not only sensory experiences but also their
      interpretation in terms of ideas, which are positioned within a complex web
      of orientations and relations. Displaced consciousness includes sensory
      imagery that is different in quality from immediate sensory experience, but
      is always accompanied by ideational interpretations that resemble those of
      immediate experience. I suggest that both the imagistic and ideational
      components of consciousness are central components of thought, as I will
      illustrate with linguistic examples.

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      Best regards,
      Gurevich mailto:alpgurev@...
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