Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

CONF доклады У.Чейфа

Expand Messages
  • Gurevich
    Message 1 of 1 , Sep 21, 2004
    • 0 Attachment
      Глубокоуважаемые коллеги!

      В предыдещем объявлении о московских докладах Уолласа Чейфа была
      допущена ошибка, связанная с темой доклада, который состоится в МГУ
      14-го октября. Тема этого доклада: "Язык и сознание".

      Приглашаются все желающие.

      Language and Consciousness
      Wallace Chafe

      Linguists have recently taken two different approaches to the relation
      between language and consciousness. I will contrast my own approach with
      that of another linguist, Ray Jackendoff. Both of us agree that this
      relation cannot be explored without taking other mental phenomena into
      account, in particular thought and imagery. We agree, furthermore, that
      conscious experience includes both imagery and emotions, whether or not
      those experiences can be considered elements of thought. Jackendoff sees
      consciousness as limited to uninterpreted imagery, whose qualities mirror
      those of uninterpreted visual, auditory, or other raw sensory information.
      He presents evidence that such imagery is external to thought, in part
      because it is too particular, in part because it does not allow the
      identification of individuals, and in part because it fails to support
      reasoning. If, in fact, all we are conscious of is uninterpreted imagery
      and imagery does not belong to thought, it follows that we are not
      conscious of thought. In contrast, I distinguish between immediate and
      displaced consciousness, the former involved in direct perception, the
      latter in experiences that are recalled or imagined. Immediate
      consciousness includes not only sensory experiences but also their
      interpretation in terms of ideas, which are positioned within a complex web
      of orientations and relations. Displaced consciousness includes sensory
      imagery that is different in quality from immediate sensory experience, but
      is always accompanied by ideational interpretations that resemble those of
      immediate experience. I suggest that both the imagistic and ideational
      components of consciousness are central components of thought, as I will
      illustrate with linguistic examples.


      Where Do Adjectives Come From?

      Wallace Chafe

      The question of whether a grammatically definable class of adjectives is present in all
      languages has come to the forefront recently through independent suggestions of R.M.W. Dixon and
      Mark Baker, both of whom believe that adjectives are universal. The Northern Iroquoian languages
      (Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora) provide a good test of that proposal
      because such a class is by no means obvious in those languages. At best there is an adjectival
      subset of verb roots, but even that is questionable. Using Seneca as representative of all six
      languages, I will discuss several criteria by which such a subset of verb roots might be
      identified, pointing out problems in each case. The adjectival class, if such a class can be
      defined grammatically at all, is far from obvious, and I will suggest that languages differ
      significantly in the clarity with which adjectives can be identified. I will mention the
      existence of a well-defined adjective class in the related language Cherokee, one that arose
      after that language had separated from its northern relatives, thus highlighting the absence of
      such a class in the latter.
    Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.