CONF доклады У.Чейфа
- Глубокоуважаемые коллеги!
В предыдещем объявлении о московских докладах Уолласа Чейфа была
допущена ошибка, связанная с темой доклада, который состоится в МГУ
14-го октября. Тема этого доклада: "Язык и сознание".
Приглашаются все желающие.
Language and Consciousness
Linguists have recently taken two different approaches to the relation
between language and consciousness. I will contrast my own approach with
that of another linguist, Ray Jackendoff. Both of us agree that this
relation cannot be explored without taking other mental phenomena into
account, in particular thought and imagery. We agree, furthermore, that
conscious experience includes both imagery and emotions, whether or not
those experiences can be considered elements of thought. Jackendoff sees
consciousness as limited to uninterpreted imagery, whose qualities mirror
those of uninterpreted visual, auditory, or other raw sensory information.
He presents evidence that such imagery is external to thought, in part
because it is too particular, in part because it does not allow the
identification of individuals, and in part because it fails to support
reasoning. If, in fact, all we are conscious of is uninterpreted imagery
and imagery does not belong to thought, it follows that we are not
conscious of thought. In contrast, I distinguish between immediate and
displaced consciousness, the former involved in direct perception, the
latter in experiences that are recalled or imagined. Immediate
consciousness includes not only sensory experiences but also their
interpretation in terms of ideas, which are positioned within a complex web
of orientations and relations. Displaced consciousness includes sensory
imagery that is different in quality from immediate sensory experience, but
is always accompanied by ideational interpretations that resemble those of
immediate experience. I suggest that both the imagistic and ideational
components of consciousness are central components of thought, as I will
illustrate with linguistic examples.
Where Do Adjectives Come From?
The question of whether a grammatically definable class of adjectives is present in all
languages has come to the forefront recently through independent suggestions of R.M.W. Dixon and
Mark Baker, both of whom believe that adjectives are universal. The Northern Iroquoian languages
(Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora) provide a good test of that proposal
because such a class is by no means obvious in those languages. At best there is an adjectival
subset of verb roots, but even that is questionable. Using Seneca as representative of all six
languages, I will discuss several criteria by which such a subset of verb roots might be
identified, pointing out problems in each case. The adjectival class, if such a class can be
defined grammatically at all, is far from obvious, and I will suggest that languages differ
significantly in the clarity with which adjectives can be identified. I will mention the
existence of a well-defined adjective class in the related language Cherokee, one that arose
after that language had separated from its northern relatives, thus highlighting the absence of
such a class in the latter.