Re: Looking for a quotation....
- Jim R,
Kierkegaard has never been a candidate to be anyone's religion. He has
never determined anyone's belief. Should his works and all human
literature perish, every existing individual human being would face
precisely the same tasks with the same tools. The tasks are important
because they exist. The tools (inwardness and the qualitative
dialectic) were not invented by man. That K or anyone else has said
anything relevant is 'accidental,' not essential.
If I have misunderstood being labeled idolatrous, I beg to be disabused.
--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, James Rovira <jamesrovira@...>
> Kenneth -- I'm finally going to get to my reading of one of the
> you provide. Just one for now.with
> My view of the word "dialectic" is that it is not in itself associated
> any specific content, but that it is a way of framing all kinds ofspecific
> content."quantitative" and
> I believe the same about Kierkegaard's use of the phrases
> "qualitative" dialectic. We could have either about anything. Thespecific
> definition of these terms depend upon the uses to which they are putin
> Qualitative refers to a fundamental change in quality.
> Quantitative refers to an increase in quantity -- but what we have is
> more of the same.of a
> Applying these words to a dialectic describes the content or outcome
> dialectic, the word "dialectic" probably being understood in aHegelian
> sense as I described in an earlier post. A thesis arises, gives birthto an
> antithesis, the two resolve themselves into a synthesis (verysimplistic
> version of Hegel's dialectic, but this is email). Thethesis/antithesis
> pair means a contradiction of some kind is involved.another, or
> A quantitative dialectic brings opposing forces to bear upon one
> faces some kind of contradiction, and produces as its synthesis moreof the
> same basic forces.that the
> A qualitative dialectic faces a contradiction and takes a leap, so
> concept (or subjectivity, etc.) becomes something completely differentpassion
> (echoes of Monty Python).
> So in this quotation:
> <<When one is indisposed to make the leap, so indisposed that this
> makes the chasm infinitely wide, then the most ingenious contrivancefor the
> purpose will help one not at all. Lessing sees very clearly that theleap,
> as being decisive, is subject to a qualitative dialectic, and permitsno
> approximating transition. His answer is therefore a jest. It is veryfar
> from being dogmatic; it is entirely correct dialectically, and it issure,
> personally evasive. Instead of hurriedly discovering the principle of
> mediation, he makes use of his old legs and his heavy head. To be
> anyone who has young legs and a light head can doubtless leap.THE
> CUP, Copyright ~ 1941, by* **Princeton University Press*, BOOK TWO -
> SUBJECTIVE PROBLEM; PART TWO ï¿½ HOW THE SUBJECTIVITY OF THEINDIVIDUAL MUST
> BE QUALIFIED; CHAPTER II ï¿½ THESES POSSIBLY OR ACTUALLYATTRIBUTABLE TO
> LESSING, p. 95>>say,
> The subject under discussion here is a leap from one state to another,
> from the aesthetic to the ethical sphere or from the ethical to theto
> religious. The phrase "approximating transition" refers to what a
> "quantitative" dialectic would look like. If we're an aesthetic
> personality, we gradually look more and more and more like an ethical
> personality while remaining an aesthetic personality. We come right up
> being an ethical personality...but remain, essentially, an aestheticwith no
> personality who has become very like an ethical personality.
> But a subjectivity engaged in a qualitative dialectic would face the
> contradictions involved in an ethical existence and make the leap --
> approximations -- to being an ethical personality.the
> The same would be true of the person making a leap from the ethical to
> religious.not my
> Just so that you know, these are all concepts to me. Kierkegaard is
> religion. He does not determine my belief about myself or my life.Should
> his works all perish, I would continue just fine. He is useful to me,have
> though, in that he poses questions that are important to me (because I
> decided that they are important apart from anything he may have said).I do
> not define myself in terms of K's philosophy nor do I define others inthose
> terms. I think it is idolatrous to do so, and betrays a fundamental
> misunderstanding of the material itself to do so.
> I honestly don't think K would have it any other way.
> Jim R
- I agree, Don. What I would say now, to clarify my previous post, is that the author of E/O I is himself essentially a German Romantic but is employing Hegelian models of thought to explicate his views of an aesthetic personality.But once I've said it this way, the aesthete's reflective thought verges on self-reflective thought.I think that both the authors of E/O I and II follow Hegelian models to frame their thought, the good Judge arguing that the ethical is a synthesis proceeding from the contradictions inherent in the aesthetic -- so he argues for the aesthetic validity of marriage, something the aesthete hasn't considered and probably won't, regardless of what the Judge says.Jim ROn Wed, Dec 9, 2009 at 6:57 PM, Don Anderson <don@...> wrote:
JimR, you said:
I'm not sure Don is wrong about seeing Hegel, but I do certainly agree with him that E/O II presents a limited outlook, one that K would not agree with himself. E/O I is strongly Hegelian. E/O II may be more Kantian. It is not yet Kierkegaardian, though, in my opinion.
Thank you for this. I would just comment that I think E/O I is not so much Hegelian (or German idealist) as it is the representation romanticism. As Lillian Swenson remarks in her “forward by the Reviser”, volume 1 is written by a “young romanticist” and volume 2 is written by a “mature ethical idealist.” Both have elements of Hegelianism as well as Kant, Fichte, The Greeks, and others. They rather stand alone as a representative of their position toward existence.