Re: [Kierkegaardians] Re: Looking for a quotation....
- I agree, for the most part, Kenneth -- how do those answers bear upon your previous questions/comments?I think that listening to oneself as an existing individual is the goal of K's authorship, but I don't think even that is any guarantee we'll be able to understand any given other person much at all. I think there are other conditions involved, conditions relating to the other person.Jim ROn Sat, Dec 5, 2009 at 9:42 AM, Kenneth <karmstrong@...> wrote:
> How could you possibly know what another person knows as a subjective being?
Not at all unless one might learn first to listen to one's self as an existing individual. If there's no value conceivable in one's understanding another subjective individual, Climacus might say that would indicate there's no been no value attached to the double reflexion, to inwardness, to treasuring one's own subjective self. Rather than quote a huge section I will cite this: CUP; BOOK TWO - THE SUBJECTIVE PROBLEM; PART TWO â€" HOW THE SUBJECTIVITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL MUST BE QUALIFIED; CHAPTER II â€" THESES POSSIBLY OR ACTUALLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO LESSING; Â§ 1. THE SUBJECTIVE EXISTING THINKER HAS REGARD TO THE DIALECTICS OF THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION> Is K's philosophy something that we're -required- to know subjectively? Should it be?I am not qualified to make pronouncements about K's philosophy, but I cannot imagine Climacus (or K) handing out such assignments for another existing individual. Climacus accepts no such invitation "Therefore I pray, per deos obsecro: Let no one invite me, for I will not dance."
--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, James Rovira <jamesrovira@...> wrote:
> How could you possibly know what another person knows as a subjective being,
> Kenneth? Didn't K face that problem himself? Is K's philosophy something
> that we're -required- to know subjectively? Should it be?
> Jim R
>> On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 9:49 PM, Kenneth karmstrong@... wrote:> > II; PART II; CHAPTER II ï¿½ï¿½" THE SUBJECTIVE TRUTH, INWARDNESS; TRUTH IS
> > > distinctively different dialectics but you knew that, did you not.
> > I knew what I knew from reading the words of CUP (1941, Swenson/Lowrie)...
> > some pages a few dozen times. I am not trying to trick anyone or educate
> > anyone, but I am trying to discern how much another person knows as
> > a subjective being rather than just a repeater of facts. "*The objective
> > accent falls on WHAT is said, the subjective accent on HOW it is said." BOOK
> > SUBJECTIVITY, p 181*
> > Kenneth
- I agree, Don. What I would say now, to clarify my previous post, is that the author of E/O I is himself essentially a German Romantic but is employing Hegelian models of thought to explicate his views of an aesthetic personality.But once I've said it this way, the aesthete's reflective thought verges on self-reflective thought.I think that both the authors of E/O I and II follow Hegelian models to frame their thought, the good Judge arguing that the ethical is a synthesis proceeding from the contradictions inherent in the aesthetic -- so he argues for the aesthetic validity of marriage, something the aesthete hasn't considered and probably won't, regardless of what the Judge says.Jim ROn Wed, Dec 9, 2009 at 6:57 PM, Don Anderson <don@...> wrote:
JimR, you said:
I'm not sure Don is wrong about seeing Hegel, but I do certainly agree with him that E/O II presents a limited outlook, one that K would not agree with himself. E/O I is strongly Hegelian. E/O II may be more Kantian. It is not yet Kierkegaardian, though, in my opinion.
Thank you for this. I would just comment that I think E/O I is not so much Hegelian (or German idealist) as it is the representation romanticism. As Lillian Swenson remarks in her “forward by the Reviser”, volume 1 is written by a “young romanticist” and volume 2 is written by a “mature ethical idealist.” Both have elements of Hegelianism as well as Kant, Fichte, The Greeks, and others. They rather stand alone as a representative of their position toward existence.