Re: Looking for a quotation....
Thanks for your patience. I presume this is all quite remedial to the other members. Perhaps your foregoing explanation has already answered my next question, and I may be just staring past the obvious. Just by reading I have accumulated some degree of working-definition, but in my head itâs still floating out there disconnected.
K finds it critical that an existing individual properly distinguish spheres as being subject to either a âqualitativeâ dialectic or a âquantitativeâ dialectic. Can you help me connect this to your explanation?
--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, James Rovira <jamesrovira@...> wrote:
> Yes, Kenneth, the concept of the dialectic is central to K's pseudonymous
> authorship. The relationship between the stages is dialectical. The two
> main sources for dialectic in K is Plato/Socrates (Greek tradition
> generally, perhaps), and Hegel (particularly in his book The Science of
> In the Greek tradition, a dialectic is simply a conversation between two
> people which consists of one person asking yes or no questions and the other
> providing answers. These questions lead to a conclusion which the person
> being queried has to accept if s/he has answered yes to all previous
> questions. Plato's dialogs generally follow this format.
> -Is Socrates a man?
> -Are all men mortal?
> -Therefore, isn't Socrates mortal?
> This form of dialectic becomes abbreviated in the syllogism, which simply
> presents the same argument in the form of a major premise, minor premise,
> and conclusion. The major premise is usually a statement about a specific
> subject, the minor premise usually a general truth that everyone would agree
> with, and the conclusion is arrived at by combining the two:
> Major premise: Socrates is a man.
> Minor premise: All men are mortal.
> Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
> The enthymeme, many of which are described in Aristotle's book Rhetoric, is
> a further abbreviation, namely, an abbreviation of the syllogism into a
> single sentence which connects a claim (statement you want your listeners to
> support) to a reason (reason you give your listeners for accepting your
> claim) using the words "because" or "for."
> The claim is the conclusion of the syllogism, and the reason is the major
> premise. The minor premise is left unstated, because it is a general truth
> that your audience already agrees with. Aristotle loved enthymemes for this
> reason, as they require your listeners to participate in the reasoning
> process, completing it, making the argument more convincing.
> So the syllogism above, stated in enthymeme form, would be:
> Socrates is mortal because he is a man.
> claim reason
> conclusion major premise
> A 20thC British philosopher named Toulmin used the words "claim" and
> "reason" to describe these parts of an enthymeme, and "warrant" to describe
> the unstated minor premise that connects the claim to the reason.
> The grammar of the sentence becomes important later on in western
> philosophy, a particular point of concern for Hegel. Just note that the
> subject is "Socrates" and the predicate is "mortal" -- what does it take for
> you to become a "subject" in a sentence like this, a thing possessing
> properties? More importantly, what does it take for you to become
> _self-consciously_ a subject, so that you are aware of yourself as a
> discreet "thing" (so to speak) possessing properties and able to act?
> The Hegelian dialectic is a variation of the Socratic dialectic. Hegel
> argues in Science of Logic that when a concept arises, it always and
> immediately implies its opposite, which negates it. So to use a simplistic
> spatial image, if you come up with a concept "up," you imply the concept
> "down" with it -- even if you don't realize immediately that you have done
> Every concept has within it its opposite and negation.
> The concept and its negation unite into a third concept that contains both
> but invalidates both as independent entities. So the separate concepts "up"
> and "down" may be unified in the concept of "three-dimensional space," so
> that "up" and "down" don't really make sense by themselves anymore.
> Kierkegaard's pseudonyms usually thought in terms of a Hegelian dialectic
> but paid serious and consistent attention to the Socratic form of the
> Jim R
> On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 11:03 PM, two_k_dad karmstrong@... wrote:
> > I am a newbie here. I am not sure how to properly use the messaging. I
> > appreciate your kind invitation.
> > RE: My views of K... I find a shared "wonder" with him but of
> > intellectually much smaller caliber. I resonate with the portion I seem to
> > grasp. My background is not philosophy. I came across his name repeatedly.
> > Tried a little taste. A year later I've read several of his works, and some
> > several times.
> > If I were to start a discussion it would be this:
> > Although I've attempted to digest 20-30 works of SK, I'm embarrassed for my
> > deficient grasp of "dialectic", "dialectical", "dialectician". My education
> > never included these words in any way similar to SK's usage... which seems
> > to rest on a very explicit concept and is bound to have been published
> > somewhere. I spent some time searching on-line but without satisfaction.
> > Where might one discover the school for the dialectically challenged?
> > Kenneth A
- I agree, Don. What I would say now, to clarify my previous post, is that the author of E/O I is himself essentially a German Romantic but is employing Hegelian models of thought to explicate his views of an aesthetic personality.But once I've said it this way, the aesthete's reflective thought verges on self-reflective thought.I think that both the authors of E/O I and II follow Hegelian models to frame their thought, the good Judge arguing that the ethical is a synthesis proceeding from the contradictions inherent in the aesthetic -- so he argues for the aesthetic validity of marriage, something the aesthete hasn't considered and probably won't, regardless of what the Judge says.Jim ROn Wed, Dec 9, 2009 at 6:57 PM, Don Anderson <don@...> wrote:
JimR, you said:
I'm not sure Don is wrong about seeing Hegel, but I do certainly agree with him that E/O II presents a limited outlook, one that K would not agree with himself. E/O I is strongly Hegelian. E/O II may be more Kantian. It is not yet Kierkegaardian, though, in my opinion.
Thank you for this. I would just comment that I think E/O I is not so much Hegelian (or German idealist) as it is the representation romanticism. As Lillian Swenson remarks in her “forward by the Reviser”, volume 1 is written by a “young romanticist” and volume 2 is written by a “mature ethical idealist.” Both have elements of Hegelianism as well as Kant, Fichte, The Greeks, and others. They rather stand alone as a representative of their position toward existence.