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Fw: [Kierkegaardians] Re: my biased view of salvation

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  • Donald Anderson
    JR, my view is that I have not denied anything that I intended now or before. Here is my point about you! I havn t heard you describe how K incorporates that
    Message 1 of 77 , Apr 10, 2008

      JR, my view is that I have not denied anything that I intended now or before.

      Here is my point about you! I havn't heard you describe how K incorporates that doctrine into his writing. Much of what you have said leads me to believe that you don't get it. So convince me that you get it!

      Don

      --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "James Rovira" <jamesrovira@...> wrote:
      >
      > Probably a good idea to keep in mind that Luther called the epistle of
      > James an epistle of straw, so that posted quotation highlights
      > differences between K and Luther.
      >
      > Don, you need to read your own words more carefully. This will be the
      > second time recently you've denied saying something that's right in
      > front of you, in print. Let's just focus on the first two or three
      > sentences:
      >
      > <<Roger, I think you missunderstand Kierkegaard completely as does JR.
      > Perhaps I should not say completely. That's too strong. However it is
      > clear to me that K makes it clear that the one docrine that underlies
      > all that he says throughout is the doctrine of faith alone (sola
      > fides) when it comes to salvation.>>
      >
      > Broken down:
      >
      > 1. Roger and JR completely misunderstand K.
      > 2. Qualification: the word "completely" is too strong.
      > 3. The most important doctrine to K was sola fide.
      >
      > Let me simplify further. Anyone reading the following:
      >
      > 1. You misunderstand K.
      > 2. K's most important doctrine was sola fide.
      >
      > would assume the "misunderstanding of K" was a denial of some kind
      > that the most important doctrine to K was sola fide.
      >
      > What you seem to want me to believe now is that your first sentence --
      > me and Roger completely misunderstand K -- is completely unrelated to
      > the statement that the most important doctrine to K was sola fide:
      >
      > << Nowhere do I say that anyone 'claimed that K did not believe in sola fide.>>
      >
      > But then go on to say that you think Roger seems to believe this:
      >
      > <<What I was saying is that what Roger has been claiming appears to be
      > that K does not.>>
      >
      > Which leaves me with the impression that you don't even know what you
      > yourself think.
      >
      > At any rate, it seems you think that K was very set on sola fide while
      > Roger seems to imply that K was not.
      >
      > I appreciate your willingness to be convinced of the accuracy of my
      > position about K, but I don't know where you think I have it wrong
      > since you isolate Roger on the sola fide issue. Yes, I do think K
      > believes in sola fide. I don't think that belief meant quite the same
      > thing to him as it did to Luther. I do think K had significant
      > disagreements with Luther on a few points, works being one, and free
      > will another. Is any of this what you're thinking of when you say I
      > don't understand K? You'll have to be a bit clearer for me to respond
      > to you.
      >
      > Jim R
      >

    • Donald Anderson
      Apoorear, you seem to take exception to my saing that inherited sin expresses the fact that each subject inherits the disposition in a primordial sense Here
      Message 77 of 77 , Apr 23, 2008

        Apoorear, you seem to take exception to my saing that 'inherited sin expresses the fact that each subject inherits the disposition in a primordial sense'  Here is the passage I was refering to. I used the term 'primordial' instead of 'primitive' because I think of them as roughly equivelent but I should have used 'primitive' instead.

        Does the concept of hereditary sin differ from the concept of the first sin in such a way that the particular individual participates in inherited sin only through his relation to Adam and not through his primitive relation to sin? CA, Hong, p. 26)

        Does this change anything?

        Next you, to me, seemed to use the following paragraph as H's primary argument for why his arguments are not pelagian.

        >
        > Obviously this view is in no way guilty of any Pelagianism. The race has
        > its history, within which sinfulness continues to have its quantitative
        > determinability, but innocence is always lost only by the qualitative
        > leap of the individual. It is no doubt true that this sinfulness, which
        > is the progression of the race, may express itself as a greater or
        > lesser disposition in the particular individual who by his act assumes
        > it, but this is a more or less, a quantitative determination, which does
        > not constitute the concept of guilt. (CA, Hongs, pp. 37-8)

        I consider the following paragraph to be H's primary argument that his arguments are not pelagian. 

         

        No matter how the problem is raised, as soon as Adam is placed fantastically on the outside, everything is confused. To explain Adam's sin is therefore to explain hereditary sin. And no explanation that explains Adam but not hereditary sin, or explains hereditary sin but not Adam, is of any help. The most profound reason for this is what is essential to human existence: that man is individuum and as such simultaneously himself and the whole race, and in such a way that the whole race participates in the individual and the individual in the whole race. If this is not held fast, one will fall either into the Pelagian, Socinian, and philanthropic singular or into the fantastic. The matter-of-factness of the understanding is that the race is numerically resolved into an einmal ein [one times one]. What is fantastical is that Adam enjoys the well-meant honor of being more than the whole race or the ambiguous honor of standing outside the race. (CA, Hongs, p28)

         

        Inherited sin is not quantitative but the matter of an individuum, The individual participates in the race and the race participates in the individual. In the next paragraph he says "the individual is both himself and the race." The individual and the race are a 1 times 1, the individual times the race equals one.

         

        Perhaps you could provide your interpretation that integrates your interpretation into this new paragraph I have introduced.

         

        Aloha,

        Don


        --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, apoorear <no_reply@...> wrote:
        >
        >
        > Thanks Don, I'll try to be a bit clearer-- and also to correct something
        > that, thanks to that second paragraph from the Introduction you cited,
        > now seems to me to be an error in what I wrote before.
        >
        > First, the passage I had primarily in mind from CA pp. 37-8 (Hongs):
        >
        > Obviously this view is in no way guilty of any Pelagianism. The race has
        > its history, within which sinfulness continues to have its quantitative
        > determinability, but innocence is always lost only by the qualitative
        > leap of the individual. It is no doubt true that this sinfulness, which
        > is the progression of the race, may express itself as a greater or
        > lesser disposition in the particular individual who by his act assumes
        > it, but this is a more or less, a quantitative determination, which does
        > not constitute the concept of guilt.
        >
        > The first thing I'd like to emphasize is that this is the direct context
        > of the line in which H. expressly dissociates himself from Pelagianism
        > (recall that this was the orignal context of the discussion I
        > interrupted.)
        >
        > The second point to notice is that what H. says, in order to dissociate
        > himself from Pelagianism, is effectively that to acknowledge the freedom
        > of the act of sinning in the qualitative sense (`the qualitative
        > leap of the individual') is not to deny the increase over time of
        > sinfulness in the quantitative sense (i.e. the kind of sinfulness that
        > attaches itself to the history of the human race and which increases
        > over time).
        >
        > Now I was assuming two further things, one of which I see no reason to
        > give up and the other which I now think is clearly a mistake.
        >
        >
        >
        > The assumption I see no reason to give up is that, when H. refers to
        > that kind of sinfulness the characterization of which makes reference to
        > the history of the human race, and whose determinability is quantitative
        > rather than qualitative – I assume that this is a reference to what
        > he calls elsewhere hereditary sin.
        >
        > What can we conclude so far? First, that the distinction between the
        > qualitative and the quantitative is indeed integral to Haufniensis'
        > overall project, as a `psychologically orienting deliberation on the
        > dogmatic issue of hereditary sin' (my emphasis) and especially in
        > relation to the issue of the relationship of his approach to
        > Pelagianism. And, second, that this distinction maps on directly to the
        > distinction and contrast between the act of sinning on the part of the
        > individual, and the sinfulness of the race, viz. hereditary sin.
        >
        > (Note that it is not true, therefore, that Haufniensis only use of the
        > qualitative / quantitative distinction is critically or polemically
        > oriented against Hegel, as in the joke about tennis balls on p. 32 –
        > compare the Peanuts cartoon in which in which ten milligrams equal one
        > centigram, ten decigrams one gram, and ten grams one grampa!)
        >
        > So the implication of the passage I've cited thus seems to be that
        > Pelagianism involves a failure properly to acknowledge the role of
        > sinfulness in this historical, quantitative sense: it constitutes a
        > rejection of the doctrine of hereditary sin. And we can sum up by saying
        > that H's response to the envisaged charge of Pelagianism is
        > precisely to point to the distinction between a qualitative and a
        > quantitative sense of sinfulness, and to the fact that, as he sees it,
        > the doctrine of hereditary sin has to do with sin in the latter,
        > quantitative sense.
        >
        > Now it's also true that the distinction between the qualitative and
        > the qualitative seems to be closely associated with H's sense of the
        > limits of psychological explanations vis-à-vis sin and sinfulness.
        > What I now see was clearly a mistake in my earlier post (I plead
        > carelessness) was my way of characterizing this association, i.e. my
        > suggestion that psychology can explain sin in the quantitative, but not
        > in the qualitative sense. Whilst it is true, of course, that H.
        > emphasizes the limits of psychological explanations vis-à-vis the
        > qualitative leap of sinning, he does not conclude from this that
        > psychological explanations can only explain sin in the quantitative
        > sense. (This is clear from the distinction between psychology and
        > dogmatics in the second passage you cited from the intro.) Rather, what
        > he concludes is that psychological explanations are of limited value
        > vis-à-vis sin in the qualitative sense (e.g. that they are restricted
        > to an explanation of sin's real possibility, rather than its
        > actuality or ideal possibility – of course these crucial
        > distinctions remain to be properly clarified in all this.).
        >
        >
        >
        > Having hopefully cleared that up, my basic challenge to you, I think,
        > remains in place. My worry was that your remarks about Haufniensis and
        > Pelagianism didn't properly take account of the distinction between
        > sin in the quantitative sense and sin in the qualitative sense (i.e.
        > between sinfulness, as explained by the doctrine of hereditary sin, and
        > the act of sinning on the part of the individual, as explained, though
        > merely qua 'real possibility', by psychology ).
        >
        >
        >
        > Specifically, I was worried that your remark that 'inherited sin
        > expresses the fact that each subject inherits the disposition to sin in
        > a primordial sense', for example, fails properly to take into
        > account the fact that hereditary sin (what you call here `inherited
        > sin') cannot, for Haufniensis, serve as any kind of explanation for
        > the disposition to sin in the qualitative sense. Given the passage
        > I've cited from p. 37, the most we could expect from the doctrine of
        > hereditary sin, by way of an explanation of the disposition to sin the
        > qualitative sense, is that this disposition increases over time (it
        > accounts for whether a given individual has a `greater or lesser
        > disposition' in this regard). What the doctrine of hereditary sin
        > could not possibly do, given Haufniensis' category distinctions, is
        > provide an explanation for why the individual acts on the disposition to
        > sin, or indeed why the individual has this disposition to any degree at
        > all.
        >
        >
        >
        > To that extent (and to make my basic point explicit) Haufniensis is
        > surely closer to Pelagianism than any position which makes explanatory
        > appeal the doctrine of hereditary sin in order to account for the
        > disposition to sin in the individual.
        >
        >
        >
        > Sorry this is so prolix – I tried to be as clear as possible!
        >
        >
        >
        > apoorear
        >
        >
        >
        >

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