Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.
 

Re: [Kierkegaardians] Re: Repentance -- Part 0

Expand Messages
  • James Rovira
    Just out of curiousity, what the heck does that sentence mean anyhow? The immanence of duration to the present always has a greater potential for
    Message 1 of 23 , Oct 31, 2007
      Just out of curiousity, what the heck does that sentence mean anyhow?

      The immanence of duration to the present always has a greater potential for transformation than it appears to have." (Giles Deleuze: An Introduction, Todd May, p. 55)

      I know I'm missing quite a bit of context, of course. 

      Jim R
    • Will Brown
      From the page offered by Googling immanence of duration I would guess that they were trying to describe presence without including self-presence. I don t
      Message 2 of 23 , Nov 1, 2007
        From the page offered by Googling 'immanence of duration' I would
        guess that they were trying to describe presence without including
        self-presence. I don't think Presence can be grasped until presence to
        self is vouchsafed, and I think that is what SK is saying when he
        speaks to coming to oneself. Once presence is give, the world must be
        present, and that opens the door for the finding of Presence, however
        one wants to tag it. wb



        --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "James Rovira"
        <jamesrovira@...> wrote:
        >
        > Just out of curiousity, what the heck does that sentence mean anyhow?
        >
        > The immanence of duration to the present always has a greater
        potential for
        > transformation than it appears to have." (Giles Deleuze: An
        Introduction,
        > Todd May, p. 55)
        >
        > I know I'm missing quite a bit of context, of course.
        >
        > Jim R
        >
      • James Rovira
        Thanks, Will. That makes a little more sense. Sounds a bit like Heidegger s discussion of Being? Jim R
        Message 3 of 23 , Nov 1, 2007
          Thanks, Will.  That makes a little more sense.  Sounds a bit like Heidegger's discussion of Being?

          Jim R

          On 11/1/07, Will Brown < wilbro99@...> wrote:

          From the page offered by Googling 'immanence of duration' I would
          guess that they were trying to describe presence without including
          self-presence. I don't think Presence can be grasped until presence to
          self is vouchsafed, and I think that is what SK is saying when he
          speaks to coming to oneself. Once presence is give, the world must be
          present, and that opens the door for the finding of Presence, however
          one wants to tag it. wb

        • jimstuart46
          Willy, Thank you for your first response to my remarks about repentance – your post Repentance 1 (#6534). Let me comment on some of the points you make.
          Message 4 of 23 , Nov 1, 2007
            Willy,

            Thank you for your first response to my remarks about repentance –
            your post "Repentance 1" (#6534).

            Let me comment on some of the points you make.

            First, we are in agreement that for K many key ethical and religious
            words acquire a new meaning for the spiritual person, compared with
            the psychical-sensate person. The question for us is how does the word
            "repentance" acquire a new meaning.

            On my reading, the aesthete is a fickle and self-centred person who
            lacks the ability to make genuine commitments and resolutions. Compare
            the aesthete of E/O I with Judge William. JW values ways of living
            which require deep and substantial commitments, for example marriage,
            whereas the aesthete flits from one thing to another in an effort to
            escape boredom. So an aesthetic understanding of repentance may
            involve small, piecemeal inner movements involving minor and
            insubstantial resolutions to turn one's back on bad ways of behaving
            and turn over a new leaf.

            For the ethical individual, repentance means a fundamental change of
            outlook, a resolve to turn away from selfish ways of behaving, from a
            basically pleasure-loving and self-centred outlook and toward a
            self-denying and "good works" outlook. You make the excellent point
            that JW's talk of repentance and choosing oneself signifies the same
            (or a very similar) inner movement to Johannes de Silentio's talk of
            infinite resignation.

            So I agree "repentance" gains a new meaning in the transferred
            language, but, the meaning I read K as advocating for the spiritual
            person is still very different from yours.

            I don't agree with your interpretation of the following quote from F&T:

            "Whenever the individual after he has entered the universal feels an
            impulse to assert himself as the particular, he is in temptation, and
            he can labor himself out of this only by penitently abandoning himself
            as the particular in the universal." (F&T, Lowrie, pp. 64-65; Hong, p. 54)

            You interpret this as follows:

            "When one slips back into the temporal, the esthetic, the recognition
            of that slip is akin to entering the confessional and doing penance."

            Once again you speak as if the ethical individual has exited the
            temporal altogether, and if he slips back into the temporal, this is
            equivalent to slipping back into the aesthetic way of existing.

            But as I say, I read K as arguing that the ethical individual is fully
            involved in his earthly existence as he strives to perform good works
            – to carry out his ethical tasks. He has one foot in the temporal and
            one foot in eternity. The individual who has left the temporal behind
            completely is the mystic.

            Also the ethical individual can move from the universal to the
            particular in one of two ways – either by slipping back into the
            aesthetic sphere or by making the leap to the religious sphere.

            As I have said before, your account of repentance seems to leave out
            the ethical completely. Similarly, your ethical individual seems
            bizarrely, not to actually live an ethical existence. Hence you
            reluctance to use K's favourite ethical term – "task". For you, the
            ethical individual does not seem to have any ethical tasks. To take on
            an ethical task requires the individual to see himself as fully
            involved in his earthly existence, amidst his family, friends and
            neighbours. He makes commitments like his marriage vows, and, as such,
            his focus is on the present and the future, the realm where his
            commitments are to be carried out, where his tasks are to be accomplished.

            Let me take the opportunity to comment on your old post 5238. (Thank
            you, Mederic, for bring this to the group's attention – the passage
            does offer us an insight into Willy's view. And indeed, it is passages
            like this one which I had in mind when I said that Willy's view of
            repentance was "crazy".)

            First, you talk of a "transcendental self", a term K never uses
            positively to my knowledge.

            Second, you seem to almost get things back to front with your account
            of the change of the individual's conception of himself with the
            transition from the aesthetic sphere to the ethical sphere. On my
            reading, it is the aesthete who has little or no concern for the
            future. Agreed, he has his future projects and plans for his future
            enjoyment, so to this extent he is future oriented. But he does not
            have a conception of the improved (or perfect) person he wishes to
            become. But, in contrast, this is how the ethical individual conceives
            of the future. He aims, in the future, to be perfect in thought and deed.

            You introduce a complication by talking of how the Religiousness A
            personality conceives things. I read K as arguing that the
            Religiousness A personality trusts in God whereas the ethical
            individual trusts in himself.

            Admittedly, a person who trusts in God need have less concern for the
            future because God can be trusted to take care of that. So there is a
            sense in which the Religiousness A individual pays less attention to
            future plans than the ethical personality. But your point is that the
            ethical individual has no interest in the future, so talking about the
            Religious A individual is a red herring.

            Jim
          • Médéric Laitier
            Dear James, You are more than welcome, it is always a pleasure to be digging in that thing, the past, that willyb is so keen to deny the existence of... [;)]
            Message 5 of 23 , Nov 1, 2007
               

              Dear James,

              You are more than welcome, it is always a pleasure to be digging in that thing, the past, that willyb is so keen to deny the existence of... ;) When it is to insure publicity to either his or my own insanity, it is ever a redoubled pleasure [light chuckles possibly placed here].

              I may later take the liberty to offer a few stray comments of my own - only if none of you minds - to your present dispute with that old bat of a camel.

              But for the time being I must admit I quite enjoy the spectacle of the battle from a distance. It feels a bit like falling back into the past. Oooh, my God, I hope this is not another sin!

              It is hard to believe our first exchanges here took place nearly three years ago... Looking back, it seems incredible we coud ever be all so passoniate. As if now -back then- was the decisive moment to capture the evading truth we were desparately tracking in K.'s works... As if...


              Considering it, there is something funny to be here again, and some sadness too, I should think. Yet, reading again the message 314  of yours and I was suddenly struck, anew, by this one citation of CUP you had included there:

              "The infinite merit of the Socratic position was precisely to accentuate the fact that the knower is an existing individual, and that the task of existing is his essential task." (p. 185)

              The task of existing...

              By the way, I cannot remember, how have you dealt with this issue of the dialectic of communication in K.? You know, the direct/indirect thing? Have you ever reached a final settled judgement about what it means?

              Sincerely,
              Mederic



              --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" <jjimstuart@...> wrote:
              >
              > Willy,
              >
              > Thank you for your first response to my remarks about repentance –
              > your post "Repentance 1" (#6534).
              >
              >[...]
              > Let me take the opportunity to comment on your old post 5238. (Thank
              > you, Mederic, for bring this to the group's attention – the passage
              > does offer us an insight into Willy's view. And indeed, it is passages
              > like this one which I had in mind when I said that Willy's view of
              > repentance was "crazy".)
              >
              > Jim
              >
            • Bill
              Jim S., Perhaps you are reading another version of Kierkegard, but I have it that The decision to affirm one s infinitude is an act of daring (Vovestykke)
              Message 6 of 23 , Nov 1, 2007
                Jim S., Perhaps you are reading another version of Kierkegard, but I
                have it that

                "The decision to affirm one's infinitude is an 'act of daring
                (Vovestykke)' performed in the full realizatin that 'in a finite
                sense' it is 'madness' (Postscript, pp. 379, and 380, as quoted by
                Hannay in Kierkegaard.).

                I can't find the quote, but Kierkegaard is dismissive of having one
                foot in the finite and another in the eternal. One has to risk
                everyghing to understand faith. Bill
                --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46"
                <jjimstuart@...> wrote:
                >
                > Willy,
                >
                > Thank you for your first response to my remarks about repentance –
                > your post "Repentance 1" (#6534).
                >
                > Let me comment on some of the points you make.
                >
                > First, we are in agreement that for K many key ethical and religious
                > words acquire a new meaning for the spiritual person, compared with
                > the psychical-sensate person. The question for us is how does the
                word
                > "repentance" acquire a new meaning.
                >
                > On my reading, the aesthete is a fickle and self-centred person who
                > lacks the ability to make genuine commitments and resolutions.
                Compare
                > the aesthete of E/O I with Judge William. JW values ways of living
                > which require deep and substantial commitments, for example
                marriage,
                > whereas the aesthete flits from one thing to another in an effort to
                > escape boredom. So an aesthetic understanding of repentance may
                > involve small, piecemeal inner movements involving minor and
                > insubstantial resolutions to turn one's back on bad ways of behaving
                > and turn over a new leaf.
                >
                > For the ethical individual, repentance means a fundamental change of
                > outlook, a resolve to turn away from selfish ways of behaving, from
                a
                > basically pleasure-loving and self-centred outlook and toward a
                > self-denying and "good works" outlook. You make the excellent point
                > that JW's talk of repentance and choosing oneself signifies the same
                > (or a very similar) inner movement to Johannes de Silentio's talk of
                > infinite resignation.
                >
                > So I agree "repentance" gains a new meaning in the transferred
                > language, but, the meaning I read K as advocating for the spiritual
                > person is still very different from yours.
                >
                > I don't agree with your interpretation of the following quote from
                F&T:
                >
                > "Whenever the individual after he has entered the universal feels an
                > impulse to assert himself as the particular, he is in temptation,
                and
                > he can labor himself out of this only by penitently abandoning
                himself
                > as the particular in the universal." (F&T, Lowrie, pp. 64-65; Hong,
                p. 54)
                >
                > You interpret this as follows:
                >
                > "When one slips back into the temporal, the esthetic, the
                recognition
                > of that slip is akin to entering the confessional and doing
                penance."
                >
                > Once again you speak as if the ethical individual has exited the
                > temporal altogether, and if he slips back into the temporal, this is
                > equivalent to slipping back into the aesthetic way of existing.
                >
                > But as I say, I read K as arguing that the ethical individual is
                fully
                > involved in his earthly existence as he strives to perform good
                works
                > – to carry out his ethical tasks. He has one foot in the temporal
                and
                > one foot in eternity. The individual who has left the temporal
                behind
                > completely is the mystic.
                >
                > Also the ethical individual can move from the universal to the
                > particular in one of two ways – either by slipping back into the
                > aesthetic sphere or by making the leap to the religious sphere.
                >
                > As I have said before, your account of repentance seems to leave out
                > the ethical completely. Similarly, your ethical individual seems
                > bizarrely, not to actually live an ethical existence. Hence you
                > reluctance to use K's favourite ethical term – "task". For you, the
                > ethical individual does not seem to have any ethical tasks. To take
                on
                > an ethical task requires the individual to see himself as fully
                > involved in his earthly existence, amidst his family, friends and
                > neighbours. He makes commitments like his marriage vows, and, as
                such,
                > his focus is on the present and the future, the realm where his
                > commitments are to be carried out, where his tasks are to be
                accomplished.
                >
                > Let me take the opportunity to comment on your old post 5238. (Thank
                > you, Mederic, for bring this to the group's attention – the passage
                > does offer us an insight into Willy's view. And indeed, it is
                passages
                > like this one which I had in mind when I said that Willy's view of
                > repentance was "crazy".)
                >
                > First, you talk of a "transcendental self", a term K never uses
                > positively to my knowledge.
                >
                > Second, you seem to almost get things back to front with your
                account
                > of the change of the individual's conception of himself with the
                > transition from the aesthetic sphere to the ethical sphere. On my
                > reading, it is the aesthete who has little or no concern for the
                > future. Agreed, he has his future projects and plans for his future
                > enjoyment, so to this extent he is future oriented. But he does not
                > have a conception of the improved (or perfect) person he wishes to
                > become. But, in contrast, this is how the ethical individual
                conceives
                > of the future. He aims, in the future, to be perfect in thought and
                deed.
                >
                > You introduce a complication by talking of how the Religiousness A
                > personality conceives things. I read K as arguing that the
                > Religiousness A personality trusts in God whereas the ethical
                > individual trusts in himself.
                >
                > Admittedly, a person who trusts in God need have less concern for
                the
                > future because God can be trusted to take care of that. So there is
                a
                > sense in which the Religiousness A individual pays less attention to
                > future plans than the ethical personality. But your point is that
                the
                > ethical individual has no interest in the future, so talking about
                the
                > Religious A individual is a red herring.
                >
                > Jim
                >
              • Bill
                Willy, As I wrote you (Maybe you can post the message to others?) there is no deed behind the doing. This is Nietzsche, but what needs to be done is to find
                Message 7 of 23 , Nov 1, 2007
                  Willy, As I wrote you (Maybe you can post the message to others?)
                  there is no deed behind the doing. This is Nietzsche, but what needs
                  to be done is to find confirmation in K. Obviously, one cannot
                  understand the religious if one has one foot in the finite and
                  another in the Infinite, or eternal. Bill
                  --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "Will Brown" <wilbro99@...>
                  wrote:
                  >
                  > From the page offered by Googling 'immanence of duration' I would
                  > guess that they were trying to describe presence without including
                  > self-presence. I don't think Presence can be grasped until presence
                  to
                  > self is vouchsafed, and I think that is what SK is saying when he
                  > speaks to coming to oneself. Once presence is give, the world must
                  be
                  > present, and that opens the door for the finding of Presence,
                  however
                  > one wants to tag it. wb
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "James Rovira"
                  > <jamesrovira@> wrote:
                  > >
                  > > Just out of curiousity, what the heck does that sentence mean
                  anyhow?
                  > >
                  > > The immanence of duration to the present always has a greater
                  > potential for
                  > > transformation than it appears to have." (Giles Deleuze: An
                  > Introduction,
                  > > Todd May, p. 55)
                  > >
                  > > I know I'm missing quite a bit of context, of course.
                  > >
                  > > Jim R
                  > >
                  >
                • Bill
                  Jim R., One is not outside the past, but within it. One is not looking for a perfect relationship to the Infinite as in Religiousness A, but the relationship
                  Message 8 of 23 , Nov 1, 2007
                    Jim R., One is not outside the past, but within it. One is not
                    looking for a perfect relationship to the Infinite as in Religiousness
                    A, but the relationship to the past as containing everything is to
                    understand Religiouness B.

                    There is no need to have an idenity with the past, but is a measure of
                    our entire potential by having risked everything, including one's
                    thought. In risking thought, then even one's denial cannot not-be.
                    Bill
                    --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "James Rovira"
                    <jamesrovira@...> wrote:
                    >
                    > Just out of curiousity, what the heck does that sentence mean anyhow?
                    >
                    > The immanence of duration to the present always has a greater
                    potential for
                    > transformation than it appears to have." (Giles Deleuze: An
                    Introduction,
                    > Todd May, p. 55)
                    >
                    > I know I'm missing quite a bit of context, of course.
                    >
                    > Jim R
                    >
                  • jimstuart46
                    Bill, I will rarely reply to you, as life is just too short to work out what you are saying. But I ll make an exception here. You write: I can t find the
                    Message 9 of 23 , Nov 1, 2007
                      Bill,

                      I will rarely reply to you, as life is just too short to work out
                      what you are saying. But I'll make an exception here.

                      You write:

                      "I can't find the quote, but Kierkegaard is dismissive of having one
                      foot in the finite and another in the eternal. One has to risk
                      everything to understand faith."

                      First, faith cannot be understood. For K, the individual who makes
                      the leap to faith, makes a leap beyond the understanding, makes a
                      leap against the understanding. Hence the inappropriateness of Jim
                      R's claim that "knowledge comes by faith" (#6434).

                      Second, to make the leap to faith, involves risking everything,
                      according to K. I'm not sure that this is inconsistent with my idea
                      of the ethical individual having one foot in the temporal and one
                      foot in the eternal. Even the Christian, according to K, should be
                      involved with the goings on in this world. Otherwise how could the
                      Christian love his neighbour?

                      Jim S.
                    • James Rovira
                      Jim S: I think you ve misunderstood me on the relationship of faith to knowledge, given the way you make reference to my post 6434 in your reply to Bill. I
                      Message 10 of 23 , Nov 1, 2007
                        Jim S:

                        I think you've misunderstood me on the relationship of faith to knowledge, given the way you make reference to my post 6434 in your reply to Bill. 

                        I suspect the key element here is your previous insistence on the reservation of the word "knowledge" for that "knowledge" which we attain objectively and rationally.  While that may or may not be consistent with Kierkegaard's use of the word (it may be...as I said before, we'd need to conduct some kind of lexical study, but I don't have the tools for this), I believe I made it pretty clear that I'm not using the word that way, and that the Christian tradition in which Kierkegaard was educated and in which he wrote does not use it that way. 

                        You only need to remember translations of Genesis that use phrases like, "Adam knew his wife Eve..." to see how "knowledge" here can refer to something with a great deal of emotional and personal importance rather than an objectively understood external thing.  Of course I'm not saying SK read the King James Bible, but seventeenth century English translations are consistent with the pan-Western European Christian tradition in which Kierkegaard was educated. 

                        I could probably present this argument more effectively if I knew German and/or Danish, or if I'd done more recent reading in 17th century Puritan theology, esp. in Germany.

                        I will say I believe it's inaccurate to summarize Climacus's position in CUP with the words, "faith cannot be understood," as you do below.  Our understanding of faith itself is never the issue.  Climacus, it seems, believes we can understand faith itself very well, as he writes about what faith is and what it is not at some length. That's the whole difference between RA and RB.  Our ability to grasp the -object- of faith -objectively-, with the rational understanding, now, that's another issue.  No, the object of faith is beyond objective knowledge and is actually offensive to the rational understanding.  It is paradoxical, unassimilable to rational thought. 

                        Saying that faith has an "object" does not mean that our faith is "objective" -- it simply means that the "object" of our faith is not ourselves, no matter how close we are to it.

                        Jim R

                        On 11/1/07, jimstuart46 <jjimstuart@...> wrote:

                        First, faith cannot be understood. For K, the individual who makes
                        the leap to faith, makes a leap beyond the understanding, makes a
                        leap against the understanding. Hence the inappropriateness of Jim
                        R's claim that "knowledge comes by faith" (#6434).

                      • Will Brown
                        JS, I can make the same metaphor work for me, so there is a problem. The esthetic has both feet in the world and with the transition moves one foot out of the
                        Message 11 of 23 , Nov 1, 2007
                          JS, I can make the same metaphor work for me, so there is a problem.
                          The esthetic has both feet in the world and with the transition moves
                          one foot out of the world into the eternal. That still says nothing
                          about the movement of that foot from the world to the eternal and how
                          that happens. It is that 'how' that separates us. wb

                          -- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" <jjimstuart@...>
                          wrote:
                          >
                          > Bill,
                          >
                          > I will rarely reply to you, as life is just too short to work out
                          > what you are saying. But I'll make an exception here.
                          >
                          > You write:
                          >
                          > "I can't find the quote, but Kierkegaard is dismissive of having one
                          > foot in the finite and another in the eternal. One has to risk
                          > everything to understand faith."
                          >
                          > First, faith cannot be understood. For K, the individual who makes
                          > the leap to faith, makes a leap beyond the understanding, makes a
                          > leap against the understanding. Hence the inappropriateness of Jim
                          > R's claim that "knowledge comes by faith" (#6434).
                          >
                          > Second, to make the leap to faith, involves risking everything,
                          > according to K. I'm not sure that this is inconsistent with my idea
                          > of the ethical individual having one foot in the temporal and one
                          > foot in the eternal. Even the Christian, according to K, should be
                          > involved with the goings on in this world. Otherwise how could the
                          > Christian love his neighbour?
                          >
                          > Jim S.
                          >
                        • Bill
                          Jim R, When you write that what is objective is not ourselves , do we not have to understand this not only in terms of ourselves because we do not have any
                          Message 12 of 23 , Nov 2, 2007
                            Jim R, When you write that what is objective is "not ourselves", do
                            we not have to understand this 'not' only in terms of ourselves
                            because we do not have any model of perfection? So, in fact, when
                            you attibute what is not ourselves, you are also attributing what
                            cannot not-be.

                            The question would be then Who attributes the second attribution to
                            correct the first? You understand faith as the self-renuciation of
                            Religiousness A that cannot grasp faith except as a beyond with no
                            movement foreward of the self triumphant to be a self. It is clear
                            you misunderstand faith as Kierkegaard describes it.

                            "But since the understanding cannot 'negate' or 'go beyond'
                            itself 'absolutely, it can only conceive by means of itself
                            (Fragments, p. 55.).' (as quoted by Hannay, p. 108, Kierkegaard.)."

                            To write that there is somethng not objective is to infer that you
                            are better, despite not being able to attribute any greater
                            perfection for the self-renunciation of your own thought. However, a
                            correct understanding of Kierkeggard does not demean the subject. In
                            fact it is to reveal who (qui) is the subject. This is key to
                            understanding Kierkegaad.

                            One understands the no in what cannot not-be not in terms of having
                            to deny oneself, but to affirm what it means to be a self. It the
                            capacity of creativity, or the unfolding of what it means to be
                            different, that is the capability of the self. Instead of the
                            eternal merely being some accident that befalls thought, it is the
                            power of knowledge, the Good, that allows one to know that one is
                            different; or that a good will is 'concrete in the same degree that
                            it is abstract(SUD, pp. 164-5.)' by which manyness makes out of
                            itself in the concrete here and now. This is the basis of one's
                            relationship to the Absolute.

                            "While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of
                            itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside",
                            what is "different" what is "not itself"; and /this/ No is its
                            creative deed. This inversion of the value-posting eye - this /need/
                            to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself [Repetition
                            is a movement forward from within oneself-my addition] - is the
                            essence of /resentment/: in order to exist slave morality always
                            first needs a hostile external world; it needs, psysiologically
                            speaking, external stimuli [objective-my addition] in order to act at
                            all - its action is fundamentally reaction.

                            The reverse is the case with the noble mode of valuation; it acts and
                            grows spontantiiously, it seeks its opposite only so as to affirm
                            itself more gratefully and triumphantly... - filled with life and
                            passion through and through - "we noble ones, we good, beautiful,
                            happy ones!" (pp. 472-3, Genalogy of Morals, Basic Writings of
                            Nietzsche, Kaufmann, trans., emphasis in the original)."

                            "Man is the valuating animal, as such (p. 506, ibid.)."



                            --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "James Rovira"
                            <jamesrovira@...> wrote:

                            > Jim S:
                            >
                            > I think you've misunderstood me on the relationship of faith to
                            knowledge,
                            > given the way you make reference to my post 6434 in your reply to
                            Bill.
                            >
                            > I suspect the key element here is your previous insistence on the
                            > reservation of the word "knowledge" for that "knowledge" which we
                            attain
                            > objectively and rationally. While that may or may not be
                            consistent with
                            > Kierkegaard's use of the word (it may be...as I said before, we'd
                            need to
                            > conduct some kind of lexical study, but I don't have the tools for
                            this), I
                            > believe I made it pretty clear that I'm not using the word that
                            way, and
                            > that the Christian tradition in which Kierkegaard was educated and
                            in which
                            > he wrote does not use it that way.
                            >
                            > You only need to remember translations of Genesis that use phrases
                            like,
                            > "Adam knew his wife Eve..." to see how "knowledge" here can refer to
                            > something with a great deal of emotional and personal importance
                            rather than
                            > an objectively understood external thing. Of course I'm not saying
                            SK read
                            > the King James Bible, but seventeenth century English translations
                            are
                            > consistent with the pan-Western European Christian tradition in
                            which
                            > Kierkegaard was educated.
                            >
                            > I could probably present this argument more effectively if I knew
                            German
                            > and/or Danish, or if I'd done more recent reading in 17th century
                            Puritan
                            > theology, esp. in Germany.
                            >
                            > I will say I believe it's inaccurate to summarize Climacus's
                            position in CUP
                            > with the words, "faith cannot be understood," as you do below. Our
                            > understanding of faith itself is never the issue. Climacus, it
                            seems,
                            > believes we can understand faith itself very well, as he writes
                            about what
                            > faith is and what it is not at some length. That's the whole
                            difference
                            > between RA and RB. Our ability to grasp the -object- of faith
                            > -objectively-, with the rational understanding, now, that's another
                            issue.
                            > No, the object of faith is beyond objective knowledge and is
                            actually
                            > offensive to the rational understanding. It is paradoxical,
                            unassimilable
                            > to rational thought.
                            >
                            > Saying that faith has an "object" does not mean that our faith is
                            > "objective" -- it simply means that the "object" of our faith is not
                            > ourselves, no matter how close we are to it.
                            >
                            > Jim R
                            >
                            > On 11/1/07, jimstuart46 <jjimstuart@...> wrote:
                            >
                            > > First, faith cannot be understood. For K, the individual who makes
                            > > the leap to faith, makes a leap beyond the understanding, makes a
                            > > leap against the understanding. Hence the inappropriateness of Jim
                            > > R's claim that "knowledge comes by faith" (#6434).
                            > >
                            > >
                            >
                          • Bill
                            Jim S., I think faith can be understood in terms of a change in the self that Kierkegaard mentions, but does not describe. It is the triumphant of the
                            Message 13 of 23 , Nov 2, 2007
                              Jim S., I think faith can be understood in terms of a change in the
                              self that Kierkegaard mentions, but does not describe. It is the
                              triumphant of the individual that Nietzsche describes as the noble.

                              This as, Nietzsche at least, describes does not take too long to
                              understand. There is what is called the movement of concepts that
                              occur with the infiniteness of time. One has to have this
                              experience, or this description of speed will seem only like science
                              ficition.

                              I agree Jim R. is at least confused, and so I agree the concept of a
                              real difference does not go all the way to opposition. We do not
                              touch the Infinite except "ambiguously", as Kierkegaard was quoted by
                              Willy as writing. This movement (and Kierkegaard admits movement can
                              not be mirrored by language) has to pass into what it already was,
                              but without finding identity.

                              For example, if one understands segments of a line as opposites, one
                              will never be able to understand the entire line. The only way to
                              understand segements is in terms of one's own creativity that
                              controls the process of differentation. One understands the process
                              of transformation, a change in oneself, if one understands duration
                              in terms of oneself.

                              If one understands this passing through what comes in to time in
                              terms of the time of one's own time it appears to have no identity
                              but only the measure of one's potential.

                              With this in mind, then referring to faith, if one is distinct from
                              extension (the Infinite coming in to time), this is only possible in
                              terms of one's own thought, or what cannot not-be. What appears is
                              never necessary, but the necessity of one's thought 'is',as
                              Kierkegaard explains necessity.


                              I will add that according to Deleuze one is limited to two dimensions
                              of understanding, extenstion and thought in understanding one's
                              potential, or faith. This is perhaps from his reading of Spinoza.
                              Bill
                              --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46"
                              <jjimstuart@...> wrote:
                              >
                              > Bill,
                              >
                              > I will rarely reply to you, as life is just too short to work out
                              > what you are saying. But I'll make an exception here.
                              >
                              > You write:
                              >
                              > "I can't find the quote, but Kierkegaard is dismissive of having
                              one
                              > foot in the finite and another in the eternal. One has to risk
                              > everything to understand faith."
                              >
                              > First, faith cannot be understood. For K, the individual who makes
                              > the leap to faith, makes a leap beyond the understanding, makes a
                              > leap against the understanding. Hence the inappropriateness of Jim
                              > R's claim that "knowledge comes by faith" (#6434).
                              >
                              > Second, to make the leap to faith, involves risking everything,
                              > according to K. I'm not sure that this is inconsistent with my idea
                              > of the ethical individual having one foot in the temporal and one
                              > foot in the eternal. Even the Christian, according to K, should be
                              > involved with the goings on in this world. Otherwise how could the
                              > Christian love his neighbour?
                              >
                              > Jim S.
                              >
                            • Will Brown
                              I disagree with you, which is the usual between us; it all depends upon how one interprets the metaphor of stance. Why do you say what you say? In your own
                              Message 14 of 23 , Nov 2, 2007
                                I disagree with you, which is the usual between us; it all depends
                                upon how one interprets the metaphor of stance. Why do you say what
                                you say? In your own words, and from your own ideas. Otherwise, I
                                cease responding to you...you now being stuffed with Deleuze. wb

                                --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "Bill" <billybob98103@...> wrote:
                                >
                                > Willy, As I wrote you (Maybe you can post the message to others?)
                                > there is no deed behind the doing. This is Nietzsche, but what needs
                                > to be done is to find confirmation in K. Obviously, one cannot
                                > understand the religious if one has one foot in the finite and
                                > another in the Infinite, or eternal. Bill
                                > --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "Will Brown" <wilbro99@>
                                > wrote:
                                > >
                                > > From the page offered by Googling 'immanence of duration' I would
                                > > guess that they were trying to describe presence without including
                                > > self-presence. I don't think Presence can be grasped until presence
                                > to
                                > > self is vouchsafed, and I think that is what SK is saying when he
                                > > speaks to coming to oneself. Once presence is give, the world must
                                > be
                                > > present, and that opens the door for the finding of Presence,
                                > however
                                > > one wants to tag it. wb
                                > >
                                > >
                                > >
                                > > --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "James Rovira"
                                > > <jamesrovira@> wrote:
                                > > >
                                > > > Just out of curiousity, what the heck does that sentence mean
                                > anyhow?
                                > > >
                                > > > The immanence of duration to the present always has a greater
                                > > potential for
                                > > > transformation than it appears to have." (Giles Deleuze: An
                                > > Introduction,
                                > > > Todd May, p. 55)
                                > > >
                                > > > I know I'm missing quite a bit of context, of course.
                                > > >
                                > > > Jim R
                                > > >
                                > >
                                >
                              • Will Brown
                                JS, I had a response written and ready to go. I have just read your response to meddy [6534] and it strikes me that I must retool my response mechanism; where
                                Message 15 of 23 , Nov 2, 2007
                                  JS, I had a response written and ready to go. I have just read your response to meddy [6534] and it strikes me that I must retool my response mechanism; where before I thought we were reading the same author differently, I now see that we are not reading the same author at all, even if the books are the same. So saying, I shall change gears and begin anew by working on a response to [6534].   wb


                                  --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" <jjimstuart@...> wrote:
                                  >
                                  > Willy,
                                  >
                                  > Thank you for your first response to my remarks about repentance –
                                  > your post "Repentance 1" (#6534).
                                  >
                                  > Let me comment on some of the points you make.
                                  >
                                  > First, we are in agreement that for K many key ethical and religious
                                  > words acquire a new meaning for the spiritual person, compared with
                                  > the psychical-sensate person. The question for us is how does the word
                                  > "repentance" acquire a new meaning.
                                  >
                                  > On my reading, the aesthete is a fickle and self-centred person who
                                  > lacks the ability to make genuine commitments and resolutions. Compare
                                  > the aesthete of E/O I with Judge William. JW values ways of living
                                  > which require deep and substantial commitments, for example marriage,
                                  > whereas the aesthete flits from one thing to another in an effort to
                                  > escape boredom. So an aesthetic understanding of repentance may
                                  > involve small, piecemeal inner movements involving minor and
                                  > insubstantial resolutions to turn one's back on bad ways of behaving
                                  > and turn over a new leaf.
                                  >
                                  > For the ethical individual, repentance means a fundamental change of
                                  > outlook, a resolve to turn away from selfish ways of behaving, from a
                                  > basically pleasure-loving and self-centred outlook and toward a
                                  > self-denying and "good works" outlook. You make the excellent point
                                  > that JW's talk of repentance and choosing oneself signifies the same
                                  > (or a very similar) inner movement to Johannes de Silentio's talk of
                                  > infinite resignation.
                                  >
                                  > So I agree "repentance" gains a new meaning in the transferred
                                  > language, but, the meaning I read K as advocating for the spiritual
                                  > person is still very different from yours.
                                  >
                                  > I don't agree with your interpretation of the following quote from F&T:
                                  >
                                  > "Whenever the individual after he has entered the universal feels an
                                  > impulse to assert himself as the particular, he is in temptation, and
                                  > he can labor himself out of this only by penitently abandoning himself
                                  > as the particular in the universal." (F&T, Lowrie, pp. 64-65; Hong, p. 54)
                                  >
                                  > You interpret this as follows:
                                  >
                                  > "When one slips back into the temporal, the esthetic, the recognition
                                  > of that slip is akin to entering the confessional and doing penance."
                                  >
                                  > Once again you speak as if the ethical individual has exited the
                                  > temporal altogether, and if he slips back into the temporal, this is
                                  > equivalent to slipping back into the aesthetic way of existing.
                                  >
                                  > But as I say, I read K as arguing that the ethical individual is fully
                                  > involved in his earthly existence as he strives to perform good works
                                  > – to carry out his ethical tasks. He has one foot in the temporal and
                                  > one foot in eternity. The individual who has left the temporal behind
                                  > completely is the mystic.
                                  >
                                  > Also the ethical individual can move from the universal to the
                                  > particular in one of two ways – either by slipping back into the
                                  > aesthetic sphere or by making the leap to the religious sphere.
                                  >
                                  > As I have said before, your account of repentance seems to leave out
                                  > the ethical completely. Similarly, your ethical individual seems
                                  > bizarrely, not to actually live an ethical existence. Hence you
                                  > reluctance to use K's favourite ethical term – "task". For you, the
                                  > ethical individual does not seem to have any ethical tasks. To take on
                                  > an ethical task requires the individual to see himself as fully
                                  > involved in his earthly existence, amidst his family, friends and
                                  > neighbours. He makes commitments like his marriage vows, and, as such,
                                  > his focus is on the present and the future, the realm where his
                                  > commitments are to be carried out, where his tasks are to be accomplished.
                                  >
                                  > Let me take the opportunity to comment on your old post 5238. (Thank
                                  > you, Mederic, for bring this to the group's attention – the passage
                                  > does offer us an insight into Willy's view. And indeed, it is passages
                                  > like this one which I had in mind when I said that Willy's view of
                                  > repentance was "crazy".)
                                  >
                                  > First, you talk of a "transcendental self", a term K never uses
                                  > positively to my knowledge.
                                  >
                                  > Second, you seem to almost get things back to front with your account
                                  > of the change of the individual's conception of himself with the
                                  > transition from the aesthetic sphere to the ethical sphere. On my
                                  > reading, it is the aesthete who has little or no concern for the
                                  > future. Agreed, he has his future projects and plans for his future
                                  > enjoyment, so to this extent he is future oriented. But he does not
                                  > have a conception of the improved (or perfect) person he wishes to
                                  > become. But, in contrast, this is how the ethical individual conceives
                                  > of the future. He aims, in the future, to be perfect in thought and deed.
                                  >
                                  > You introduce a complication by talking of how the Religiousness A
                                  > personality conceives things. I read K as arguing that the
                                  > Religiousness A personality trusts in God whereas the ethical
                                  > individual trusts in himself.
                                  >
                                  > Admittedly, a person who trusts in God need have less concern for the
                                  > future because God can be trusted to take care of that. So there is a
                                  > sense in which the Religiousness A individual pays less attention to
                                  > future plans than the ethical personality. But your point is that the
                                  > ethical individual has no interest in the future, so talking about the
                                  > Religious A individual is a red herring.
                                  >
                                  > Jim
                                  >
                                Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.