Re: [Kierkegaardians] Re: Kierkegaard: My Personal Interest and writing a paper
- Jim S -- thanks for the response. It's a relief to read clear, direct writing. I hope I can respond in kind.
In the first paragraph of the post you quoted I said,
<<Now about objective truth: in my opinion, Climacus in CUP makes it very clear that he's not against objective truth as a category in itself, but is against the use of objective approaches to truth to gain self-knowledge. He's perfectly fine with the historian doing the historian's task to gain historical knowledge. He's totally against the historian doing the historian's task to gain self-knowledge. That is the object of his mockery.>>
I probably should have specified that we gain self-knowledge "subjectively" but that is what I had in mind. I think the real point of disagreement between us -may- be that you identify "certainty" with "objective approaches to truth" -- one of my previous posts emphasized that objective approaches to truth can -never- yield certain knowledge, only approximate knowledge, which is why it is rejected for the most important issues, such as our eternal happiness. Climacus seems to use two different words in CUP: "certainty" and "certitude." "Certitude" is associated with faith, which in traditional Christian thought is a organ of -knowledge-, is a form of subjective knowing, but is still very much a matter of being certain.
I'm thinking of CUP p. 55 in the Hong's translation. Climacus is speculating that the Christian could be a speculative thinker, but "he does not build an eternal happiness on his speculative thought. Instead, he handles speculative thought with suspicion, lest it trick him out of the certitude of faith (which at every moment has within itself the infinite dialectic of uncertainty) into indifferent objective knowledge." Climacus mentions in the sentence before that the believer on a daily basis acquires "the certain spirit of faith."
So faith is -subjective certainty- or "certitude" while from an objective standpoint faith is very uncertain, even contradictory or paradoxical, as we see from Climacus's later description of the paradoxes of Religiousness B. Faith being "subjectively certain" but "objectively paradoxical" (I'm quoting myself to emphasize the specific phrases) is the "infinite dialectic of uncertainty" Climacus mentions on p. 55, as I quoted above.
Now about this:
<< I am not convinced that "the only issue is epistemic". Isn't the
issue also metaphysical? Isn't K in fact denying that "Christian
truths are truths for everyone at all times"? Isn't K actually
rejecting the idea of Christian dogma as truth "out there"?>>
Rejecting the idea of Christian dogma as truth "out there" is different from rejecting the idea of Christian dogma. The point is that Christian dogma is supposed to be truth "in here" -for everyone-. Otherwise, pretty much everything Climacus says about the transition to RB being the final establishment of the subjective individual through its "break with immanence" is nonsensical, unless also you say that the transition to the ethical stage is not for everyone, or the transition to RA, etc. Is that what you mean? That, say, Climacus views all spheres of existence as equally valid? That he doesn't privilege RA over the ethical, or the ethical over the aesthetic? Perfectly cool to be an aesthetic person who seduces women then leaves them? :)
- Glad you have one professor to tell you the truth about everything, Bill :).
Jim ROn 10/30/07, Bill < billybob98103@...> wrote:
Jim R., You did mention that Kierkegaard and Deleuze were not worth
comparing. That is an attribution about Deleuze. But, I'm not really
interested in trying to argue about arguing with you.
What I've been reading is from Todd May who is a Professor of Religion
and Philosophy. I don't think a professor with this title would be
persuing an interest in Deleuze that did not also reflect his interest
in religion. Perhaps, you might try to find a similiar interest?