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The Dancing Bear

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  • Will Brown
    Well, this morning, being this morning, and having nothing to do with the case except perhaps as a way of breaking into an intro to the song and dance that
    Message 1 of 2 , Jul 20, 2007
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      Well, this morning, being this morning, and having nothing to do with the case except perhaps as a way of breaking into an intro to the song and dance that follows, I present the following collection of words as my turning over a new leaf in this matter of subjectivity. If any see anything in this collection of words that speaks to them, fine, if not, also fine. In either case, the reader is invited to react to my words in any way they see fit, and that includes the reaction of not reacting.  ~~ willy_nilly ~~

      PS: Those of you who find it difficult to post because of the depth (ahem) of the subject there, may take heart in that what follows is so off the wall as to be an easy target for the humorous response, where your seriousness may enter incognito, as it were, coded in the language of humor of your own choosing, without tipping your hand to the vultures that haunt such a site, looking for easy pickings. In a word, become a vulture yourself and pick on the nonsense that follows. Enjoy! The dancing bear is here only to amuse and entertain!

      http://www.niehs.nih.gov/kids/lyrics/bearwent.htm

      = = == === ===== ========

      There is an act in which the self given in the act also acquires the possibility of identifying itself as the doer of that act. If that identity is made, the act that gives rise to the one who identifies itself as the doer of the act is then subsumed by the identity, providing two separate perspectives from which the identity who now occupies that act may view its self-identity; the subjective and the objective perspectives.

      In the subjective perspective, the act in question is now seen as thinking about oneself, or self-reflection. Since thinking requires something to think about, an image of the self to be thought about must be present before the act of self-reflection may be completed. There are two categories of image that may be found to complete that act, the inner and the outer; the inner being grounded in what may be called the me, the experiential self, the self of experience that accrues with experience, and the outer being grounded in the body, where the body as my body is then placed in the world as the objective, where the objective category is formed out of the subjective category as my world.

      In other words, the subjective perspective derives from the act of identifying the self as the doer of the act in which the self is given. If the act in which the self is given is the act that is reflection, and the reified self, as the doer of the act is to find itself in reflection, it must reflect upon itself, and in doing so, must require an image of the self to be reflected upon. The image to be found is the experiential self, the me to whom things happen, and concomitantly, the world in which these things happen, which is my world.

      The subjective perspective is between me and me and the objective perspective is between me and my world, which must contain me. The stage is now set for the argument as to which relation is controlling; if the former, then the world is imagined and if the latter, the me is the imagined. The problem with that argument is what to do with the me that occupies both; the observed me of the inner taking on an objective hue and the observed me of the outer taking on a subjective hue.

      Since the two perspectives, the inner and the outer, where the outer depends upon the inner, are of different orders, a change in the reflection upon objective me of the inner and the subjective me of the outer will entail a change of order, the two me's being seen as the product of two separate acts, positing the me that can grasp itself in two separate modes; namely, the self that may grasp itself either subjectively or objectively. This is the self completed that holds the two separate perspectives together, necessitated by the singular act of identity from which the two have risen.

      In this form, the act of identity subsumes the act as the doing done by the identity posited in the act. This engenders two categories in which this identity may grasp itself, from which, each engenders two more categories, through which the two engendering categories are now reflected in reverse. As such, there are four levels of reflection, in which the first two are related by an absolute disjunction, while the last two are imaginary products of the second level in self reflection, where self-reflection then shifts from one imagined category to another. Of such a form is the Mandelbrot set created. In other words, the engineer of this that I am always has the last word as the one who sees patterns.

      After all of that playing with language, some Danish wag were then to come along and say something about subjectivity being the truth, the reified self thus formed in that play of words could not but see such a statement as suggesting acosmism. The truth as the inner cannot mean other than that the outer is all an illusion:

      "To give thinking supremacy over everything else is gnosticism; to make the subjective individual's ethical actuality the only actuality could seem to be acosmism. That it will so appear to a busy thinker who must explain everything, a hasty pate who traverses the whole world, demonstrates only that he has a very poor idea of what the ethical means for the subjective individual. If ethics deprived such a busy thinker of the whole world and let him keep his own self, he would very likely think, `Is this anything? Such a trifling thing is not worth keeping. Let it go along with all the rest' –then, then it is acosmism. But why does a busy thinker like that talk and think so disrespectfully of himself? Indeed, if the intention were that he should give up the whole world and be satisfied with another's person's ethical actuality, well, then he would be in the right to make light of the exchange. But to the individual his own ethical actuality ought to mean, ethically, even more than heaven and earth and everything found therein, more than world's history's six thousand years, and more than astrology, veterinary science, together with everything the times demand, which esthetically and intellectually is a prodigious narrow-mindedness. If it is not so, it is the worst for the individual himself, because then he has nothing at all, no actuality at all, because to everything else he has at the very most only a relation of possibility." (CUP, Hong, p. 341; Lowrie, p.305) 

      If what this Danish wag were suggesting is that the error occurred in the first step, where the identity of a self as the doer of the act in which the self that is to be the doer is given is that error, then the truth that subjectivity is the truth cannot be seen until that error is corrected, which is to say, the ending of the act of identity; which, of course, would bring the identity contained to an end. That this might then be resisted could be expressed as follows:

      "People generally consider the ethical altogether abstractly and therefore they seem to have a secret horror of it. The ethical is then looks upon as something alien to personal being, and one shrinks from abandoning oneself to it, for one cannot quite be sure what it may lead to in the course of time. Many are afraid of death in the same way, because they entertain obscure and confused ideas about the soul passing over in death into another order of things, where laws and customs prevail which are altogether different form those they have learnt to recognize in this world. The reason for such a fear of death is the individual's reluctance to be transparent to himself, for providing one is willing it is easy to see the absurdity of this fear. Similarly with the ethical; a person who fears transparency will always shun the ethical, for really the ethical wants nothing else." (E/O, Hannay, P. 545)

    • Bill
      ... wrote: Willy, Great to hear from you again. Yes, I agree with Kierkegaard that the error is in the first step, or at least in the beginning. The problem
      Message 2 of 2 , Jul 20, 2007
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        --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "Will Brown" <wilbro99@...>
        wrote:
        Willy, Great to hear from you again.

        Yes, I agree with Kierkegaard that the error is in the first step, or
        at least in the beginning. The problem is always how to drag the
        beginning in to time. As soon as it is done, then the beginning is
        lost, and one has to drag another one in to time. This is where
        Schelling begins, and this argument was not lost on Kierkegaard.

        In my own experience I wondered so to speak where everything came
        from when seeing the world by being indifferent to it(again from
        Schelling), and proceeded to ask "Have I always been this way?".

        The subject at this point is one which understands its ignorance and
        desires to know something (one answers the question with a 'no'), or
        one answers a question with a 'yes' and one no longer knows what one
        understands. One screams in distress to the 'yes' with the question
        "Then why did I ask". One goes from no to yes as one who desires
        one's nothingness to one who wants nothing outside himself if one is
        know anything. I wanted for example to be as 'flat' as the ground
        beneath my feet.

        There are a couple of principles you might consider. First, for Kant
        the subjet is empty. There is not a door, but as Kierkegaard
        describes, but a 'false door' to understand any act of thought. Any
        thought does not implicate the one who thinks it. If I have a
        thought, I think it, but this does not refer to the nature of the
        thinker. If I believe I am always in the world (however that came
        about)I do not understand this thought by understanding where it came
        from. I am already in the world, and looking back through a door is
        not the answer I need.

        In other words, one is not open to one's actual existence, or project
        in the world (the existential self), because it cannot be reduced to
        its positive existence-its emptyness of being in the world without
        knowning this 'throwness' in to the world. Schelling insists that
        the self must be a "repetition" of itself. Of course this was not
        lost on Kierkegaard, as well. One's beginning cannot be dragged into
        light, but it must be the act of the Absolute. (see p. 21, The
        Indivisible Remainder, Zizek.).

        I find fascinating your understanding that the self must have a self
        to conceive itself. However, I don't know where this inner and outer
        would be. Is not the problem that one assumes one already knows
        oneself, and therefore a world different from oneself would be
        intollerable? Kierkegaard /begins/ with immediacy, and not with
        reflection. I'm asking why would one assume that one needed a self at
        all? How is it that one is just not part of the world in which one
        assumes one acts(sees), instead of acting "outside" this world? At
        least according to Kierkegaard we understand ourselves when ourselves
        are repeated in Religiousness B or Repetition.

        Thanks for sharing, Bill
        >
        > Well, this morning, being this morning, and having nothing to do
        with
        > the case except perhaps as a way of breaking into an intro to the
        song
        > and dance that follows, I present the following collection of words
        as
        > my turning over a new leaf in this matter of subjectivity. If any
        see
        > anything in this collection of words that speaks to them, fine, if
        not,
        > also fine. In either case, the reader is invited to react to my
        words in
        > any way they see fit, and that includes the reaction of not
        reacting.
        > ~~ willy_nilly ~~
        >
        > PS: Those of you who find it difficult to post because of the depth
        > (ahem) of the subject there, may take heart in that what follows is
        so
        > off the wall as to be an easy target for the humorous response,
        where
        > your seriousness may enter incognito, as it were, coded in the
        language
        > of humor of your own choosing, without tipping your hand to the
        vultures
        > that haunt such a site, looking for easy pickings. In a word,
        become a
        > vulture yourself and pick on the nonsense that follows. Enjoy! The
        > dancing bear is here only to amuse and entertain!
        >
        > http://www.niehs.nih.gov/kids/lyrics/bearwent.htm
        > <http://www.niehs.nih.gov/kids/lyrics/bearwent.htm>
        >
        > = = == === ===== ========
        >
        > There is an act in which the self given in the act also acquires the
        > possibility of identifying itself as the doer of that act. If that
        > identity is made, the act that gives rise to the one who identifies
        > itself as the doer of the act is then subsumed by the identity,
        > providing two separate perspectives from which the identity who now
        > occupies that act may view its self-identity; the subjective and the
        > objective perspectives.
        >
        > In the subjective perspective, the act in question is now seen as
        > thinking about oneself, or self-reflection. Since thinking requires
        > something to think about, an image of the self to be thought about
        must
        > be present before the act of self-reflection may be completed.
        There are
        > two categories of image that may be found to complete that act, the
        > inner and the outer; the inner being grounded in what may be called
        the
        > me, the experiential self, the self of experience that accrues with
        > experience, and the outer being grounded in the body, where the
        body as
        > my body is then placed in the world as the objective, where the
        > objective category is formed out of the subjective category as my
        world.
        >
        > In other words, the subjective perspective derives from the act of
        > identifying the self as the doer of the act in which the self is
        given.
        > If the act in which the self is given is the act that is
        reflection, and
        > the reified self, as the doer of the act is to find itself in
        > reflection, it must reflect upon itself, and in doing so, must
        require
        > an image of the self to be reflected upon. The image to be found is
        the
        > experiential self, the me to whom things happen, and concomitantly,
        the
        > world in which these things happen, which is my world.
        >
        > The subjective perspective is between me and me and the objective
        > perspective is between me and my world, which must contain me. The
        stage
        > is now set for the argument as to which relation is controlling; if
        the
        > former, then the world is imagined and if the latter, the me is the
        > imagined. The problem with that argument is what to do with the me
        that
        > occupies both; the observed me of the inner taking on an objective
        hue
        > and the observed me of the outer taking on a subjective hue.
        >
        > Since the two perspectives, the inner and the outer, where the outer
        > depends upon the inner, are of different orders, a change in the
        > reflection upon objective me of the inner and the subjective me of
        the
        > outer will entail a change of order, the two me's being seen as the
        > product of two separate acts, positing the me that can grasp itself
        in
        > two separate modes; namely, the self that may grasp itself either
        > subjectively or objectively. This is the self completed that holds
        the
        > two separate perspectives together, necessitated by the singular
        act of
        > identity from which the two have risen.
        >
        > In this form, the act of identity subsumes the act as the doing
        done by
        > the identity posited in the act. This engenders two categories in
        which
        > this identity may grasp itself, from which, each engenders two more
        > categories, through which the two engendering categories are now
        > reflected in reverse. As such, there are four levels of reflection,
        in
        > which the first two are related by an absolute disjunction, while
        the
        > last two are imaginary products of the second level in self
        reflection,
        > where self-reflection then shifts from one imagined category to
        another.
        > Of such a form is the Mandelbrot set created. In other words, the
        > engineer of this that I am always has the last word as the one who
        sees
        > patterns.
        >
        > After all of that playing with language, some Danish wag were then
        to
        > come along and say something about subjectivity being the truth, the
        > reified self thus formed in that play of words could not but see
        such a
        > statement as suggesting acosmism. The truth as the inner cannot mean
        > other than that the outer is all an illusion:
        >
        > "To give thinking supremacy over everything else is gnosticism; to
        make
        > the subjective individual's ethical actuality the only actuality
        could
        > seem to be acosmism. That it will so appear to a busy thinker who
        must
        > explain everything, a hasty pate who traverses the whole world,
        > demonstrates only that he has a very poor idea of what the ethical
        means
        > for the subjective individual. If ethics deprived such a busy
        thinker of
        > the whole world and let him keep his own self, he would very likely
        > think, `Is this anything? Such a trifling thing is not worth
        > keeping. Let it go along with all the rest' –then, then it is
        > acosmism. But why does a busy thinker like that talk and think so
        > disrespectfully of himself? Indeed, if the intention were that he
        should
        > give up the whole world and be satisfied with another's person's
        > ethical actuality, well, then he would be in the right to make
        light of
        > the exchange. But to the individual his own ethical actuality ought
        to
        > mean, ethically, even more than heaven and earth and everything
        found
        > therein, more than world's history's six thousand years, and more
        than
        > astrology, veterinary science, together with everything the times
        > demand, which esthetically and intellectually is a prodigious
        > narrow-mindedness. If it is not so, it is the worst for the
        individual
        > himself, because then he has nothing at all, no actuality at all,
        > because to everything else he has at the very most only a relation
        of
        > possibility." (CUP, Hong, p. 341; Lowrie, p.305)
        >
        > If what this Danish wag were suggesting is that the error occurred
        in
        > the first step, where the identity of a self as the doer of the act
        in
        > which the self that is to be the doer is given is that error, then
        the
        > truth that subjectivity is the truth cannot be seen until that
        error is
        > corrected, which is to say, the ending of the act of identity;
        which, of
        > course, would bring the identity contained to an end. That this
        might
        > then be resisted could be expressed as follows:
        >
        > "People generally consider the ethical altogether abstractly and
        > therefore they seem to have a secret horror of it. The ethical is
        then
        > looks upon as something alien to personal being, and one shrinks
        from
        > abandoning oneself to it, for one cannot quite be sure what it may
        lead
        > to in the course of time. Many are afraid of death in the same way,
        > because they entertain obscure and confused ideas about the soul
        passing
        > over in death into another order of things, where laws and customs
        > prevail which are altogether different form those they have learnt
        to
        > recognize in this world. The reason for such a fear of death is the
        > individual's reluctance to be transparent to himself, for providing
        one
        > is willing it is easy to see the absurdity of this fear. Similarly
        with
        > the ethical; a person who fears transparency will always shun the
        > ethical, for really the ethical wants nothing else." (E/O, Hannay,
        P.
        > 545)
        >
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