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Re: Kierkegaard’s apparent lack of clarity of thought

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  • KTP
    ... that ... he ... is ... back ... Oops, that should have read page 473. I typed the whole note in a previous post and I think it got lost. I should have
    Message 1 of 21 , Jan 18, 2007
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      --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "KTP" <nnn88388@...> wrote:
      >
      >
      >
      > Hi Jim S,
      >
      > I doubt whether I can sustain this conversation with you or others but
      > let me point out a couple of observations.
      >
      > Read carefully the paragraph that ends with your quote on page 262 of
      > the Lowrie quote. Maybe even some stuff on page 261. Then remember
      that
      > there is a lot between page 262 and page 473-474.
      >
      > SK is writing from different points of view and flip-flops quite often
      > from page to page. Sometimes he has Socrates in mind and other times
      he
      > has his father in mind when he speaks of the ethical. Sometimes the
      > ethical is ethico-religious and other times it is the stoic. When he
      > speaks of existence sometimes it is in possibility and other times it
      is
      > real. Throw in all the stages and it can get very confused. Also, pay
      > close attention to the word "standpoint" on page 262.
      >
      > Whenever I see what seems to be an inconsistancy in SK I have to go
      back
      > and re-read. Most of the time it's me that's inconsistent.
      >
      > p.s. The asterisked note on page 273 is very interesting.
      >
      > NickL
      >



      Oops, that should have read page 473. I typed the whole note in a
      previous post and I think it got lost. I should have saved it before I
      sent it. Anyway, if you have the book, read it there. Or maybe the
      internet gods will repost it later.

      NickL
      >
      >
      > --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" jjimstuart@
      > wrote:
      > >
      > > Dear Kierkegaardians,
      > >
      > > Consider these two quotes from Concluding Unscientific Postscript:
      > >
      > > (1) "The category of transition is itself a beak with immanence, is
      > > a leap." (CUP, Hong p. 295, Lowrie, p. 262)
      > >
      > > (2) "[T]he guilt-consciousness that still lies essentially in
      > > immanence is different from the consciousness of sin. In guilt-
      > > consciousness, it is the same subject, who by holding the guilt
      > > together with the relation to an eternal happiness becomes
      > > essentially guilty, but the identity of the subject is such that the
      > > guilt does not make the subject into someone else, which is the
      > > expression for a break. But a break, in which the paradoxical
      > > accentuation of existence
      > > consists, cannot intervene between an existing person and the
      > > eternal, because the eternal embraces the existing person
      > > everywhere, and therefore the misrelation remains within immanence.
      > > If a break is to establish itself, the eternal itself must define
      > > itself as a temporality, as in time, as historical, whereby the
      > > existing person and the eternal in time have eternity between them.
      > > This is the paradox (concerning which reference is made to the
      > > foregoing in Section II, Chapter II, and to what follows in B)."
      > > (Hong, p. 532, Lowrie, p. 474)
      > >
      > > Now consider this third statement:
      > >
      > > (3) For Johannes Climacus, an individual can make the transition
      > > from the aesthetic sphere of existence to the ethical sphere of
      > > existence.
      > >
      > > It seems to me that (1), (2) and (3) are mutually inconsistent.
      > >
      > > (1) together with (3) entails:
      > >
      > > (4) The ethical individual has made (or continues to make) the break
      > > with immanence.
      > >
      > > But (2) entails that:
      > >
      > > (5) The ethical individual is wholly within immanence, as he has not
      > > yet made the leap to the sphere of religiousness B (the sphere of
      > > the paradoxical religiousness, the sphere of the religiousness of
      > > transcendence).
      > >
      > > (4) and (5) contradict each other, so (1), (2) and (3) are mutually
      > > inconsistent.
      > >
      > > But the category of transition and the immanence/transcendence
      > > distinction are fundamental to K's subjective philosophy.
      > >
      > > That K should appear to contradict himself so blatantly in the same
      > > book suggests a lack of clarity of thought on his part. Such an
      > > apparently fundamental logical error makes me question K's claim to
      > > be serious about the truth.
      > >
      > > Am I misreading or misinterpreting Kierkegaard?
      > >
      > > Am I misguided to question Kierkegaard's competency when it comes to
      > > truth?
      > >
      > > Jim Stuart
      > >
      >
    • KTP
      ... O.K. here it is: That is to say: within the total determination in which we find ourselves. The reader will remember (in the Second Section of Chapter II,
      Message 2 of 21 , Jan 18, 2007
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        > Oops, that should have read page 473. I typed the whole note in a
        > previous post and I think it got lost. I should have saved it before I
        > sent it. Anyway, if you have the book, read it there. Or maybe the
        > internet gods will repost it later.
        >
        > NickL
        > >

        O.K. here it is:

        "That is to say: within the total determination in which we find ourselves. The reader will remember (in the Second Section of Chapter II, in connection with the discussion of the Fragments) that the paradoxical accentuation of existence plunges deep into existence. This is the specifically Christian characteristic, and it will come again to the fore in Section B. The spheres are thus related: immediacy; finite common sense; irony; ethics with irony as incognito; humor; religiousness with humor as incognito; and then finally the Christian religiousness, recognizable by the paradoxical accentuation of existence, by the paradox, by the breach with immanence, and by the absurd. Religiousness with humor as incognito is therefore not yet Christian religiousness. Even if this latter is the hidden inwardness, it is nevertheless related to the paradox. It is true that humor also has to do with the paradox, but it cautiously keeps itself within immanence, and it constantly seems as if it was aware of something different—hence the jest."

        NickL


         

      • jimstuart46
        Jim R., Thank you for your response. I am sympathetic to most of what you write, particularly in view of Willy s correction (on the other forum) to the leap
        Message 3 of 21 , Jan 19, 2007
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          Jim R.,

           

          Thank you for your response. I am sympathetic to most of what you write, particularly in view of Willy's correction (on the other forum) to the leap quote.

           

          Willy points out that:

           

          << The Hong quote reads, "The category of transition is itself a break with in immanence, is a leap."  >> (CUP, Hong, p. 295)

           

          A "break in" immanence isn't as clear-cut as my erroneous "break with" immanence.

           

          I disagree with your conception of the aesthetic-to-ethical transition. You appear to interpret K (or, more precisely, Climacus) as arguing that this transition, if made, is a once-in-a-lifetime leap, whereas I read K as suggesting that the ethical individual repeats the leap each day. So whereas Saint Paul says "I die daily", the ethical individual says "I leap out of the aesthetic sphere into the ethical sphere daily".

           

          On my reading the ethical individual makes a break in immanence (or, as for Lowrie, a "breach of immanence") every day. I still feel that this idea is in tension with Climacus' claim that the complete break with immanence takes place with the leap to the sphere of religiousness B.

           

          But given my misquotation, I am prepared to admit my strong criticism of Kierkegaard for apparent inconsistency was unjustified.

           

          Jim Stuart

           

        • jimstuart46
          Nick, Thank you for your thoughtful comments and for typing up Climacus footnote. I nearly included it in my original quote. Given my misquotation of the
          Message 4 of 21 , Jan 19, 2007
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            Nick,

             

            Thank you for your thoughtful comments and for typing up Climacus' footnote. I nearly included it in my original quote.

             

            Given my misquotation of the "break in immanence" quote, these words of yours are particularly poignant:

             

            << Whenever I see what seems to be an inconsistency in SK I have to go back and re-read. Most of the time it's me that's inconsistent. >>

             

            I'll be less impetuous in jumping to criticize Kierkegaard in the future.

             

            Jim Stuart

             

          • James Rovira
            Thanks for the reply, Jim S. The idea that the leap from the aesthetic to the ethical is either once for all or chosen continually hadn t really entered into
            Message 5 of 21 , Jan 19, 2007
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              Thanks for the reply, Jim S.  The idea that the leap from the aesthetic to the ethical is either once for all or chosen continually hadn't really entered into my thinking in that post -- I was just focused on the problem at hand. Since the ethical sphere is the sphere of decision or choice rather than simply being-as-you-are, it probably makes sense that the ethical individual continually chooses to be an ethical individual.

              That's seems to me to be the way it is anyhow.

              The way I see it, though, there's no real going back once you've made that leap.  You can act aesthetically and ignore your ethical obligations, but I don't think you can ever -be- an aesthetic individual again.  That's hard to say...maybe after a long time the decisions become unselfconscious. 

              I'm just speculating at this point, though.  Working from K's ideas rather than with them.

              Jim R
            • Médéric Laitier
              Dear James, Thank you for this very challenging post. I must admit I find the questions you raise here very difficult. Immanence, transcendance, and coherence
              Message 6 of 21 , Jan 23, 2007
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                Dear James,

                Thank you for this very challenging post. I must admit I find the questions you raise here very difficult. Immanence, transcendance, and coherence appear to be quite difficult to put together in one sentence. And adding e few other sentences just make the question additionally complicated.

                Before getting any further, I would like to know wherefrom the (3) passage is. Indeed as it reads: "For Johannes Climacus, an individual etc." so I am led to suppose it is not from CUP or it would be pretty strange, given that CUP is by Johannes Climacus. So, can you explicit the context of this citation?

                Thank you in advance,

                Sincerely,
                Mederic


                --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" <jjimstuart@...> wrote:
                >
                > Dear Kierkegaardians,
                >
                > Consider these two quotes from Concluding Unscientific Postscript:
                >
                > (1) "The category of transition is itself a beak with immanence, is
                > a leap." (CUP, Hong p. 295, Lowrie, p. 262)
                >
                > (2) "[T]he guilt-consciousness that still lies essentially in
                > immanence is different from the consciousness of sin. In guilt-
                > consciousness, it is the same subject, who by holding the guilt
                > together with the relation to an eternal happiness becomes
                > essentially guilty, but the identity of the subject is such that the
                > guilt does not make the subject into someone else, which is the
                > expression for a break. But a break, in which the paradoxical
                > accentuation of existence
                > consists, cannot intervene between an existing person and the
                > eternal, because the eternal embraces the existing person
                > everywhere, and therefore the misrelation remains within immanence.
                > If a break is to establish itself, the eternal itself must define
                > itself as a temporality, as in time, as historical, whereby the
                > existing person and the eternal in time have eternity between them.
                > This is the paradox (concerning which reference is made to the
                > foregoing in Section II, Chapter II, and to what follows in B)."
                > (Hong, p. 532, Lowrie, p. 474)
                >
                > Now consider this third statement:
                >
                > (3) For Johannes Climacus, an individual can make the transition
                > from the aesthetic sphere of existence to the ethical sphere of
                > existence.
                >
                > It seems to me that (1), (2) and (3) are mutually inconsistent.
                >
                > (1) together with (3) entails:
                >
                > (4) The ethical individual has made (or continues to make) the break
                > with immanence.
                >
                > But (2) entails that:
                >
                > (5) The ethical individual is wholly within immanence, as he has not
                > yet made the leap to the sphere of religiousness B (the sphere of
                > the paradoxical religiousness, the sphere of the religiousness of
                > transcendence).
                >
                > (4) and (5) contradict each other, so (1), (2) and (3) are mutually
                > inconsistent.
                >
                > But the category of transition and the immanence/transcendence
                > distinction are fundamental to K's subjective philosophy.
                >
                > That K should appear to contradict himself so blatantly in the same
                > book suggests a lack of clarity of thought on his part. Such an
                > apparently fundamental logical error makes me question K's claim to
                > be serious about the truth.
                >
                > Am I misreading or misinterpreting Kierkegaard?
                >
                > Am I misguided to question Kierkegaard's competency when it comes to
                > truth?
                >
                > Jim Stuart
                >
              • jimstuart46
                Dear Mederic, You write:
                Message 7 of 21 , Jan 23, 2007
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                  Dear Mederic,

                  You write:

                  << Before getting any further, I would like to know wherefrom the
                  (3) passage is. Indeed as it reads: "For Johannes Climacus, an
                  individual etc." so I am led to suppose it is not from CUP or it
                  would be pretty strange, given that CUP is by Johannes Climacus. So,
                  can you explicit the context of this citation? >>

                  (3) from from me. It is just a statement of what I take to be
                  Johannes Climacus's position.

                  Ideally I would have liked a direct quote from CUP saying the same
                  thing, but I could not put my hands on such a quote. I expect Willy
                  would have such a quote from CUP up his sleeve.

                  I hope this lack of a direct quotation in (3) does not detract from
                  my argument. I would have thought that (3) itself is uncontroversial.

                  Jim Stuart
                • Will Brown
                  Meddy, in line with your question, may I suggest something here in respect to the use of the term guilt consciousness ? It would be that SK lines things up
                  Message 8 of 21 , Jan 23, 2007
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                    Meddy, in line with your question, may I suggest something here in respect to the use of the term "guilt consciousness"? It would be that SK lines things up for us and unless that lineup is respected, the possibility of a glitch is greatly enhanced in representing what he was saying. Here is the lineup. I will make a few comments.

                    "The dialectical reader will readily see that this investigation is going backward instead of forward. In §1 the task was assigned: simultaneously to relate oneself absolutely to the absolute telos (end, goal) and relatively to relative ends. Just as a beginning was to be made on this, it appeared that first of all immediacy had to be surmounted or the individual had to die to it before there could be any question of carrying out the task in §1. §2 made suffering the essential expression of the existential pathos, suffering as dying to immediacy, suffering as the distinctive mark of an existing person's relation to the absolute telos. In §3, guilt is made the decisive expression of the existential pathos, and the distance from the task in §1 is even greater, yet not in such a way that the task is forgotten but in such a way that the examination, with an eye on the task and immersing itself in existence, goes backward."  (CUP, Hong, pp.525-26; Lowrie, pp. 468-69)

                    SK is saying that he first described the goal, then the way to the goal, and now, finally, how to get on the way to the goal. Guilt consciousness is the seeing of the whole self as guilty in respect to freedom, which I would relate back to the leap to guilt from innocence that missed the rung of freedom and describe as an insight into the self being the misrelation.

                    "From the preceding portion it must be recalled that existential pathos is action or the transformation of existence. The appointed task is simultaneously to relate oneself absolutely to the absolute telos [end,goal] and relatively to relative ends. But this task must now be understood more specifically in its concrete difficulty, lest the existential pathos be revoked within esthetic pathos, as if it were existential pathos to say this once and for all, or once a month, with the unchanged passion of immediacy. If everything were decided on paper, one would start on the ideal task at once; but in existence the beginning must be made by practicing the relation to the absolute telos, and taking power away from away from immediacy. On paper, the individual is a third party, a rapid something that is promptly "at your service." The actual individual is, after all, in immediacy and to that extent is actually in the relative ends absolutely.  Now the individual begins, not, please note, by simultaneously relating himself absolutely to the absolute telos and relatively to the relative ends, but he begins by practicing the absolute relation through renunciation. The task is ideal and perhaps is never accomplished by anyone; it is only on paper that one begins summarily and is promptly finished. In order to relate himself absolutely to the absolute telos, the individual must have practiced renunciation of the relative ends, and only then can there be any question of the ideal task: simultaneously to relate oneself absolutely to the absolute and relatively to the relative. Not prior to this, because before this has been done the individual is continually more or less immediate and to that extent relates himself absolutely to relative ends." (CUP, Hong, pp. 431-32; Lowrie, pp. 386-87)

                    In consciousness of being guilty, which is the seeing of the self being the misrelation, the eternal comes to help by a distancing from, a renunciation of, the finite way of becoming, which leads to a suffering. This suffering is covered like the proverbial blanket in Purity of Heart.

                    "In relation to an eternal happiness as the absolute good, pathos does not mean words but that this idea transforms the whole existence of an existing person. Esthetic pathos expresses itself in words and can in truth signify that the individual abandons himself in order to lose himself in the idea, whereas existential pathos results from the transforming relation of the idea to the individual's existence. If the absolute telos [end, goal] does not absolutely transform the individual's existence by relating to it, then the individual does not relate himself with existential pathos but with esthetic pathos—for example, by having a correct idea, but, please note, by which he is outside himself in the ideality with the correctness of the idea in the ideality of actuality, is not himself transformed into the actuality of the idea." (CUP, Hong, p. 387; Lowrie, p. 347 ) 

                    And finally, through that suffering, the temporal, the finite, is broken and the task is appropriated. Now, and not before, consciousness of guilt can equate to consciousness of sin. If one, from freedom, which implies consciousness of what guilt is, finds themselves guilty again, the situation is equivalent to one, who from being a believing Christian finds themselves in sin by having lost that freedom. Well, that needs polishing, but the point I wish to suggest is there.

                    I think it is through that mechanism that SK separates the guilt that is hereditary sin from the Christian sin before God. At any rate, I offer this suggestion because I see it taking care of the conflict some of you see in SK's scheme of things. For myself, I find no conflict in his total scheme of things; for me it all hangs together because it all begins with that absolute transition from the esthetic sphere to the ethical sphere. Once one's thinking shifts from the relative to the absolute, and follows his scheme through that "narrow pass" it all fits like a glove; or so I would wear it.   ----metaphysical_willy



                    --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, Médéric Laitier <hidepark21@...> wrote:
                    >
                    > Dear James,
                    >
                    > Thank you for this very challenging post. I must admit I find the
                    > questions you raise here very difficult. Immanence, transcendance, and
                    > coherence appear to be quite difficult to put together in one sentence.
                    > And adding e few other sentences just make the question additionally
                    > complicated.
                    >
                    > Before getting any further, I would like to know wherefrom the (3)
                    > passage is. Indeed as it reads: "For Johannes Climacus, an individual
                    > etc." so I am led to suppose it is not from CUP or it would be pretty
                    > strange, given that CUP is by Johannes Climacus. So, can you explicit
                    > the context of this citation?
                    >
                    > Thank you in advance,
                    >
                    > Sincerely,
                    > Mederic
                    >
                    >
                    > --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" jjimstuart@
                    > wrote:
                    > >
                    > > Dear Kierkegaardians,
                    > >
                    > > Consider these two quotes from Concluding Unscientific Postscript:
                    > >
                    > > (1) "The category of transition is itself a beak with immanence, is
                    > > a leap." (CUP, Hong p. 295, Lowrie, p. 262)
                    > >
                    > > (2) "[T]he guilt-consciousness that still lies essentially in
                    > > immanence is different from the consciousness of sin. In guilt-
                    > > consciousness, it is the same subject, who by holding the guilt
                    > > together with the relation to an eternal happiness becomes
                    > > essentially guilty, but the identity of the subject is such that the
                    > > guilt does not make the subject into someone else, which is the
                    > > expression for a break. But a break, in which the paradoxical
                    > > accentuation of existence
                    > > consists, cannot intervene between an existing person and the
                    > > eternal, because the eternal embraces the existing person
                    > > everywhere, and therefore the misrelation remains within immanence.
                    > > If a break is to establish itself, the eternal itself must define
                    > > itself as a temporality, as in time, as historical, whereby the
                    > > existing person and the eternal in time have eternity between them.
                    > > This is the paradox (concerning which reference is made to the
                    > > foregoing in Section II, Chapter II, and to what follows in B)."
                    > > (Hong, p. 532, Lowrie, p. 474)
                    > >
                    > > Now consider this third statement:
                    > >
                    > > (3) For Johannes Climacus, an individual can make the transition
                    > > from the aesthetic sphere of existence to the ethical sphere of
                    > > existence.
                    > >
                    > > It seems to me that (1), (2) and (3) are mutually inconsistent.
                    > >
                    > > (1) together with (3) entails:
                    > >
                    > > (4) The ethical individual has made (or continues to make) the break
                    > > with immanence.
                    > >
                    > > But (2) entails that:
                    > >
                    > > (5) The ethical individual is wholly within immanence, as he has not
                    > > yet made the leap to the sphere of religiousness B (the sphere of
                    > > the paradoxical religiousness, the sphere of the religiousness of
                    > > transcendence).
                    > >
                    > > (4) and (5) contradict each other, so (1), (2) and (3) are mutually
                    > > inconsistent.
                    > >
                    > > But the category of transition and the immanence/transcendence
                    > > distinction are fundamental to K's subjective philosophy.
                    > >
                    > > That K should appear to contradict himself so blatantly in the same
                    > > book suggests a lack of clarity of thought on his part. Such an
                    > > apparently fundamental logical error makes me question K's claim to
                    > > be serious about the truth.
                    > >
                    > > Am I misreading or misinterpreting Kierkegaard?
                    > >
                    > > Am I misguided to question Kierkegaard's competency when it comes to
                    > > truth?
                    > >
                    > > Jim Stuart
                    > >
                    >
                  • Will Brown
                    Ok, so I needed to Beta it...live and learn? Here is the sleeve up which I keep my SK quotes. To look is for free. Find your favorite quote and use it...
                    Message 9 of 21 , Jan 23, 2007
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                      Ok, so I needed to Beta it...live and learn?

                      Here is the sleeve up which I keep my SK quotes. To look is for free. Find your favorite quote and use it... ----willy
                       
                      http://www.geocities.com/wilbro99/ 
                       
                      > --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" jjimstuart@
                      > wrote:
                      > >
                      > > Dear Mederic,
                      > >
                      > > You write:
                      > >
                      > > << Before getting any further, I would like to know wherefrom the
                      > > (3) passage is. Indeed as it reads: "For Johannes Climacus, an
                      > > individual etc." so I am led to suppose it is not from CUP or it
                      > > would be pretty strange, given that CUP is by Johannes Climacus. So,
                      > > can you explicit the context of this citation? >>
                      > >
                      > > (3) from from me. It is just a statement of what I take to be
                      > > Johannes Climacus's position.
                      > >
                      > > Ideally I would have liked a direct quote from CUP saying the same
                      > > thing, but I could not put my hands on such a quote. I expect Willy
                      > > would have such a quote from CUP up his sleeve.
                      > >
                      > > I hope this lack of a direct quotation in (3) does not detract from
                      > > my argument. I would have thought that (3) itself is uncontroversial.
                      > >
                      > > Jim Stuart
                      > >
                      >
                    • Médéric Laitier
                      Dear James, I hope this lack of a direct quotation in (3) does not detract from my argument. Well, let s hope not indeed. I asked only because I was not
                      Message 10 of 21 , Jan 23, 2007
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                        Dear James,

                        "I hope this lack of a direct quotation in (3) does not detract from my argument."

                        Well, let's hope not indeed. I asked only because I was not familiar with any place where K. would have expressed words about Climacus and his view of a transition between one sphere and the other. I was curious to read the passage where he had, if he had. There was no malice in my question.

                        So let's see now how you had put it, keeping somewhere back in mind the question whether it is non-contraversial:

                        > For Johannes Climacus, an individual can make the transition from the aesthetic sphere of existence to the ethical sphere of existence. <

                        I don't know really. I am pretty sure we have had this conversation before: what is a sphere of existence? He surely does use such a pharse on several occasions, but the explicition of a transition between the aesthetical one and the ethical one, well somehow, I cannot recollect. I have a faint memory of a choice at some place which seemed quite crucial but no trace of a transition talk. I don't know if a choice can properly speaking be considered as a transition between the two spheres in Kierkegaardian terms. I am not saying it cannot, I am saying: I don't know. Perhaps it is an idea to give it a try to find an answer to this question. What do you say, James? Shall we try?

                        What we would need is some background information about the word: transition to understand it the proper way, that is proper to the context, or again the way K. did  or at least as he seemd to. Then, we would need to see if it could fit in between Spheres, the aesthetical and the ethical. And then we would have to wonder why we cannot find anywhere a passage where he explicitly discusses the "transition" between the aesthetical and the ethical sphere that is to say, if he never discusses it.

                        Would it seem a fair way to engage the question?

                        Willy, want to join in? Anyone else?

                        Waiting for your respective answers, I remain

                        Yours sincerely,
                        Mederic

                        --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" <jjimstuart@...> wrote:
                        >
                        > Dear Mederic,
                        >
                        > You write:
                        >
                        > << Before getting any further, I would like to know wherefrom the
                        > (3) passage is. Indeed as it reads: "For Johannes Climacus, an
                        > individual etc." so I am led to suppose it is not from CUP or it
                        > would be pretty strange, given that CUP is by Johannes Climacus.
                        > So, can you explicit the context of this citation? >>
                        >
                        > (3) from from me. It is just a statement of what I take to be
                        > Johannes Climacus's position.
                        >
                        > Ideally I would have liked a direct quote from CUP saying the
                        > same  thing, but I could not put my hands on such a quote. I
                        > expect Willy  would have such a quote from CUP up his sleeve.
                        >
                        > I hope this lack of a direct quotation in (3) does not detract from
                        > my argument. I would have thought that (3) itself is uncontroversial.
                        >
                        > Jim Stuart
                        >
                      • KTP
                        Mederic, I can only offer my bombastic greekness and say that transition is metabasis as when SK speaks of the transition to another mode, a metabasis is
                        Message 11 of 21 , Jan 23, 2007
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                          Mederic,

                          I can only offer my bombastic greekness and say that 'transition' is
                          'metabasis' as when SK speaks of the transition to another mode, a
                          'metabasis is allo genos', a little trick, pulling a rabbit out of the
                          hat; when he wants to point to a logical contradiction with no
                          explanation (no mention of an existential leap and the explanation that
                          goes with it).

                          NickL
                        • Bill
                          ... wrote: Jim S., In item (2) Kierkegaard is describing the leap. He has somewhere described it as returning to the very same spot it begain.
                          Message 12 of 21 , Jan 24, 2007
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                            --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, Médéric Laitier
                            <hidepark21@...> wrote:
                            Jim S., In item (2) Kierkegaard is describing the leap. He has
                            somewhere described it as returning to the very same spot it begain.
                            If one starts from immanence, one returns, but changed. Bill
                            > Dear James,
                            >
                            > Thank you for this very challenging post. I must admit I find the
                            > questions you raise here very difficult. Immanence, transcendance,
                            and
                            > coherence appear to be quite difficult to put together in one
                            sentence.
                            > And adding e few other sentences just make the question additionally
                            > complicated.
                            >
                            > Before getting any further, I would like to know wherefrom the (3)
                            > passage is. Indeed as it reads: "For Johannes Climacus, an
                            individual
                            > etc." so I am led to suppose it is not from CUP or it would be
                            pretty
                            > strange, given that CUP is by Johannes Climacus. So, can you
                            explicit
                            > the context of this citation?
                            >
                            > Thank you in advance,
                            >
                            > Sincerely,
                            > Mederic
                            >
                            >
                            > --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" <jjimstuart@>
                            > wrote:
                            > >
                            > > Dear Kierkegaardians,
                            > >
                            > > Consider these two quotes from Concluding Unscientific Postscript:
                            > >
                            > > (1) "The category of transition is itself a beak with immanence,
                            is
                            > > a leap." (CUP, Hong p. 295, Lowrie, p. 262)
                            > >
                            > > (2) "[T]he guilt-consciousness that still lies essentially in
                            > > immanence is different from the consciousness of sin. In guilt-
                            > > consciousness, it is the same subject, who by holding the guilt
                            > > together with the relation to an eternal happiness becomes
                            > > essentially guilty, but the identity of the subject is such that
                            the
                            > > guilt does not make the subject into someone else, which is the
                            > > expression for a break. But a break, in which the paradoxical
                            > > accentuation of existence
                            > > consists, cannot intervene between an existing person and the
                            > > eternal, because the eternal embraces the existing person
                            > > everywhere, and therefore the misrelation remains within
                            immanence.
                            > > If a break is to establish itself, the eternal itself must define
                            > > itself as a temporality, as in time, as historical, whereby the
                            > > existing person and the eternal in time have eternity between
                            them.
                            > > This is the paradox (concerning which reference is made to the
                            > > foregoing in Section II, Chapter II, and to what follows in B)."
                            > > (Hong, p. 532, Lowrie, p. 474)
                            > >
                            > > Now consider this third statement:
                            > >
                            > > (3) For Johannes Climacus, an individual can make the transition
                            > > from the aesthetic sphere of existence to the ethical sphere of
                            > > existence.
                            > >
                            > > It seems to me that (1), (2) and (3) are mutually inconsistent.
                            > >
                            > > (1) together with (3) entails:
                            > >
                            > > (4) The ethical individual has made (or continues to make) the
                            break
                            > > with immanence.
                            > >
                            > > But (2) entails that:
                            > >
                            > > (5) The ethical individual is wholly within immanence, as he has
                            not
                            > > yet made the leap to the sphere of religiousness B (the sphere of
                            > > the paradoxical religiousness, the sphere of the religiousness of
                            > > transcendence).
                            > >
                            > > (4) and (5) contradict each other, so (1), (2) and (3) are
                            mutually
                            > > inconsistent.
                            > >
                            > > But the category of transition and the immanence/transcendence
                            > > distinction are fundamental to K's subjective philosophy.
                            > >
                            > > That K should appear to contradict himself so blatantly in the
                            same
                            > > book suggests a lack of clarity of thought on his part. Such an
                            > > apparently fundamental logical error makes me question K's claim
                            to
                            > > be serious about the truth.
                            > >
                            > > Am I misreading or misinterpreting Kierkegaard?
                            > >
                            > > Am I misguided to question Kierkegaard's competency when it comes
                            to
                            > > truth?
                            > >
                            > > Jim Stuart
                            > >
                            >
                          • jimstuart46
                            Dear Mederic, You are a hard taskmaster. Not content with my excuses and evasions, you press me again for a direct quotation from Kierkegaard concerning the
                            Message 13 of 21 , Jan 25, 2007
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                              Dear Mederic,

                              You are a hard taskmaster. Not content with my excuses and evasions,
                              you press me again for a direct quotation from Kierkegaard
                              concerning the individual making the transition from the aesthetic
                              sphere of existence to the ethical sphere of existence. (See your
                              post 5402)

                              You write:

                              << What we would need is some background information about the word:
                              transition to understand it the proper way, that is proper to the
                              context, or again the way K. did or at least as he seemed to. Then,
                              we would need to see if it could fit in between Spheres, the
                              aesthetical and the ethical. And then we would have to wonder why we
                              cannot find anywhere a passage where he explicitly discusses
                              the "transition" between the aesthetical and the ethical sphere that
                              is to say, if he never discusses it. >>

                              The best I can do is the following two quotes:

                              "The relation between the aesthetic and the ethical – the
                              transition – pathos-filled, not dialectical – and which starts a
                              qualitatively different dialectic. How far are poetry and art
                              reconciled with life? – One thing true in the aesthetic, another in
                              the ethical?" (J & P, Hannay, p. 178, 42-3 IV C 105)

                              "[I]n one sense the spiritual person and the sensate-psychical
                              person say the same thing; yet there is an infinite difference,
                              since the latter has no intimation of the secret of the metaphorical
                              words although he is using the same words, but not in their
                              metaphorical sense. There is a world of difference between the two;
                              the one has made the transition or let himself be carried over to
                              the other side, while the other remains on this side; yet they have
                              the connection that both are using the same words." (WL, Hong 1995,
                              p. 209)

                              Notice in the first quote the word "transition" is used to signify
                              the relation between the aesthetic and the ethical, while in the
                              second quote, K talks of an individual making the transition from
                              one side to the other.

                              I think the two quotes together support my view that an individual
                              can make a transition, or a leap, from one mode of existence to
                              another, higher, mode of existence, such as the transition from the
                              aesthetic to the ethical.

                              I think the ideas of choice, decision and leap can all be
                              appropriately applied to the aesthetic-to-ethical transition.

                              The perceptive individual has a choice whether to exist within the
                              aesthetic sphere of existence or the ethical sphere of existence.
                              She can decide to make the leap from the aesthetic sphere to the
                              ethical sphere.

                              Now, as I said to Jim Rovira recently, I don't see this leap – this
                              transition – as a once-in-a-lifetime movement. I suggest that the
                              aesthetic mode of existence is the natural one, such that each of us
                              wakes up each morning within the aesthetic sphere of existence, as
                              an aesthetic individual. But if I resolve at breakfast, or even
                              while still lying in bed, to obey my absolute ethical requirement
                              for the rest of the day, then I make the leap to the ethical sphere.
                              (K's notion of "repetition" captures the idea that the ethical
                              individual or the religious individual, needs to continually make
                              the leap to their high sphere. We are always "becoming", we never
                              arrive so that we can put our feet up and stop striving. Cf. Saint
                              Paul: "I die daily.")

                              Of course during the day my resolve can weaken, I can become
                              distracted, and I can slip back into the aesthetic sphere.

                              Finally, as I have mentioned to others, I do intend to re-read CUP
                              in the near future, so I shall be looking out for Johannes Climacus'
                              remarks about the category of "transition", with particular
                              reference to the aesthetic-to-ethical transition.

                              I image K writes something about it in his book "Stages On Life's
                              Way". I do not own this book, and I get the impression that it is
                              one of K's "lesser" books. Have you read any of it?

                              Yours,

                              Jim Stuart
                            • jimstuart46
                              Bill, I read Kierkegaard as arguing that when the religious individual makes the leap from the sphere of religiousness A to the sphere of religiousness B, she
                              Message 14 of 21 , Jan 25, 2007
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                                Bill,

                                I read Kierkegaard as arguing that when the religious individual makes
                                the leap from the sphere of religiousness A to the sphere of
                                religiousness B, she makes a decisive break with immanence.

                                She does not land "in the same place".

                                I think the passage where K describes the "returning to the same
                                place" has to do with his view that outwardly the person of faith
                                cannot be distinguished from the aesthetic individual.

                                Jim Stuart
                              • Médéric Laitier
                                Dear James, I wish to present you my apologies for the delay in giving you an answer. It is by no means intended a lack of consideration but, if anything,
                                Message 15 of 21 , Jan 28, 2007
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                                  Dear James,

                                  I wish to present you my apologies for the delay in giving you an answer. It is by no means intended a lack of consideration but, if anything, rather the contrary.

                                  I have tried to gather some pieces from here and there to make a point that would be somewhat scientific and that would answer your propositions nicely.

                                  But then, all of a sudden, I felt some disquiet and had the feeling that, for some reason, it would be purposeless.

                                  Not that science is not a valuable commodity - of all the most precious perhaps.

                                  Rather, was science or a piece thatof an adequate answer to your posting - for memory appended below?

                                  The core of its content seemed to me to be concerned with interiority, inwardness.

                                  The problem was then how to communicate anything essential about the inwardness that is the "object" of the ethical science in K's papers.

                                  In our discussion, in our conversation, we seem to have reached a point when there is no room left for more science.

                                  I am persuaded that you know at least as much as I do about ethics - probably more eventually for you seem to have an education broader  in this field of philosophy than is mine.

                                  The issue left between us, consequently is not what but rather how you and I experience individually this absolute or categorical imperative:

                                  You must.

                                  Having read that the task is that of the individual, and the highest one, I am not quite confident enough at present to take a new step in this field in your direction. I don't know which stept would really be appropriate at this moment.

                                  One tiny little point I may wish to add, though, concerns the following statement of yours:

                                  "Dear Mederic, You are a hard taskmaster."

                                  Are you sure that I am such a hard taskmaster. Isn't there a slight confusion of roles, here, in your statement?

                                  Who does eventually sets the tasks of yours?

                                  I must press, in fact, that in my friendly relation to you I am not and wish not be anything like it. Not even close to it. I would be a fraud here and a serious one if I did let hear I have anything to do with that authority of yours. All I could, possibly - but even that would be the beginning of a new scandal - be is an occasion. But no! Definitely, all I am and will be is clown.

                                  I must thank you, though, for here you have helped me to experience in a more significant manner the possible signification of the statement by K. that ultimately it is impossible to be helpful to someone else in the field of ethics.

                                  So, thank you!

                                  I would be glad to give our conversation a continuation, possibly with the presentation/discussion of some of the pieces taken from CUP I had first considered in my foolishness as a suitable answer.

                                  I feel it is possible that, now, this renewed conversation could take a more significant turn.

                                  Of course I am not completely sure it would eventually - who could? - but perhaps, we shall see.

                                  Well, I have nothing more to add for the time being, well yes, one:

                                  Hoping for you that your true taskmaster shall be hard enough but not desperately hard, I will assure you that I remain

                                  Yours sincerely,
                                  Mederic



                                  --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" <jjimstuart@...> wrote:
                                  >
                                  > Dear Mederic,
                                  >
                                  > You are a hard taskmaster. Not content with my excuses and evasions,
                                  > you press me again for a direct quotation from Kierkegaard
                                  > concerning the individual making the transition from the aesthetic
                                  > sphere of existence to the ethical sphere of existence. (See your
                                  > post 5402)
                                  >
                                  > You write:
                                  >
                                  > << What we would need is some background information about the word:
                                  > transition to understand it the proper way, that is proper to the
                                  > context, or again the way K. did or at least as he seemed to. Then,
                                  > we would need to see if it could fit in between Spheres, the
                                  > aesthetical and the ethical. And then we would have to wonder why we
                                  > cannot find anywhere a passage where he explicitly discusses
                                  > the "transition" between the aesthetical and the ethical sphere that
                                  > is to say, if he never discusses it. >>
                                  >
                                  > The best I can do is the following two quotes:
                                  >
                                  > "The relation between the aesthetic and the ethical – the
                                  > transition – pathos-filled, not dialectical – and which starts a
                                  > qualitatively different dialectic. How far are poetry and art
                                  > reconciled with life? – One thing true in the aesthetic, another in
                                  > the ethical?" (J & P, Hannay, p. 178, 42-3 IV C 105)
                                  >
                                  > "[I]n one sense the spiritual person and the sensate-psychical
                                  > person say the same thing; yet there is an infinite difference,
                                  > since the latter has no intimation of the secret of the metaphorical
                                  > words although he is using the same words, but not in their
                                  > metaphorical sense. There is a world of difference between the two;
                                  > the one has made the transition or let himself be carried over to
                                  > the other side, while the other remains on this side; yet they have
                                  > the connection that both are using the same words." (WL, Hong 1995,
                                  > p. 209)
                                  >
                                  > Notice in the first quote the word "transition" is used to signify
                                  > the relation between the aesthetic and the ethical, while in the
                                  > second quote, K talks of an individual making the transition from
                                  > one side to the other.
                                  >
                                  > I think the two quotes together support my view that an individual
                                  > can make a transition, or a leap, from one mode of existence to
                                  > another, higher, mode of existence, such as the transition from the
                                  > aesthetic to the ethical.
                                  >
                                  > I think the ideas of choice, decision and leap can all be
                                  > appropriately applied to the aesthetic-to-ethical transition.
                                  >
                                  > The perceptive individual has a choice whether to exist within the
                                  > aesthetic sphere of existence or the ethical sphere of existence.
                                  > She can decide to make the leap from the aesthetic sphere to the
                                  > ethical sphere.
                                  >
                                  > Now, as I said to Jim Rovira recently, I don't see this leap – this
                                  > transition – as a once-in-a-lifetime movement. I suggest that the
                                  > aesthetic mode of existence is the natural one, such that each of us
                                  > wakes up each morning within the aesthetic sphere of existence, as
                                  > an aesthetic individual. But if I resolve at breakfast, or even
                                  > while still lying in bed, to obey my absolute ethical requirement
                                  > for the rest of the day, then I make the leap to the ethical sphere.
                                  > (K's notion of "repetition" captures the idea that the ethical
                                  > individual or the religious individual, needs to continually make
                                  > the leap to their high sphere. We are always "becoming", we never
                                  > arrive so that we can put our feet up and stop striving. Cf. Saint
                                  > Paul: "I die daily.")
                                  >
                                  > Of course during the day my resolve can weaken, I can become
                                  > distracted, and I can slip back into the aesthetic sphere.
                                  >
                                  > Finally, as I have mentioned to others, I do intend to re-read CUP
                                  > in the near future, so I shall be looking out for Johannes Climacus'
                                  > remarks about the category of "transition", with particular
                                  > reference to the aesthetic-to-ethical transition.
                                  >
                                  > I image K writes something about it in his book "Stages On Life's
                                  > Way". I do not own this book, and I get the impression that it is
                                  > one of K's "lesser" books. Have you read any of it?
                                  >
                                  > Yours,
                                  >
                                  > Jim Stuart
                                  >
                                • Will Brown
                                  Meddy, what follows is my thinking out loud, so to speak. I have a hunch that you will agree that the only thing holding anything together here is the hub
                                  Message 16 of 21 , Jan 30, 2007
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                                    Meddy, what follows is my thinking out loud, so to speak. I have a hunch that you will agree that the only thing holding anything together here is the hub about which all of this hubbub spins, that being the message that is Kierkegaard; without which, as a given, there would be no commonality of discourse possible between the disparate views that gather around this particular hub we call the Kierkegaardians. If so, perhaps we share, or perhaps not, a sense of what I have called in my discourses with JR the beating of a dead horse.

                                    My solution to this quandary has been to investigate a bright line difference I see rising from these disparate views as a singular line that separates one set of views absolutely from another set of views. What I have found fascinating about that line is that it is precisely the line I see Kierkegaard drawing between the esthetic and ethical spheres of existence, as if the difference in interpretation has settled into the same absolute difference as the absolute difference being spoken to in the drawing of the bright line.

                                    This leads me to speculate that if another sees the hubbub as I see the hubbub, the possibility arises of communicating that difference as communicating the knowledge of that difference, and through that communication, perhaps find a universal platform from which to view the message that is Kierkegaard. We could call this elevated position The Hill of Beans, for that is probably what it is not worth.  ----willy


                                    --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, Médéric Laitier <hidepark21@...> wrote:
                                    >
                                    > Dear James,
                                    >
                                    > I wish to present you my apologies for the delay in giving you an
                                    > answer. It is by no means intended a lack of consideration but, if
                                    > anything, rather the contrary.
                                    >
                                    > I have tried to gather some pieces from here and there to make a point
                                    > that would be somewhat scientific and that would answer your
                                    > propositions nicely.
                                    >
                                    > But then, all of a sudden, I felt some disquiet and had the feeling
                                    > that, for some reason, it would be purposeless.
                                    >
                                    > Not that science is not a valuable commodity - of all the most precious
                                    > perhaps.
                                    >
                                    > Rather, was science or a piece thatof an adequate answer to your posting
                                    > - for memory appended below?
                                    >
                                    > The core of its content seemed to me to be concerned with interiority,
                                    > inwardness.
                                    >
                                    > The problem was then how to communicate anything essential about the
                                    > inwardness that is the "object" of the ethical science in K's papers.
                                    >
                                    > In our discussion, in our conversation, we seem to have reached a point
                                    > when there is no room left for more science.
                                    >
                                    > I am persuaded that you know at least as much as I do about ethics -
                                    > probably more eventually for you seem to have an education broader in
                                    > this field of philosophy than is mine.
                                    >
                                    > The issue left between us, consequently is not what but rather how you
                                    > and I experience individually this absolute or categorical imperative:
                                    >
                                    > You must.
                                    >
                                    > Having read that the task is that of the individual, and the highest
                                    > one, I am not quite confident enough at present to take a new step in
                                    > this field in your direction. I don't know which stept would really be
                                    > appropriate at this moment.
                                    >
                                    > One tiny little point I may wish to add, though, concerns the following
                                    > statement of yours:
                                    >
                                    > "Dear Mederic, You are a hard taskmaster."
                                    >
                                    > Are you sure that I am such a hard taskmaster. Isn't there a slight
                                    > confusion of roles, here, in your statement?
                                    >
                                    > Who does eventually sets the tasks of yours?
                                    >
                                    > I must press, in fact, that in my friendly relation to you I am not and
                                    > wish not be anything like it. Not even close to it. I would be a fraud
                                    > here and a serious one if I did let hear I have anything to do with that
                                    > authority of yours. All I could, possibly - but even that would be the
                                    > beginning of a new scandal - be is an occasion. But no! Definitely, all
                                    > I am and will be is clown.
                                    >
                                    > I must thank you, though, for here you have helped me to experience in a
                                    > more significant manner the possible signification of the statement by
                                    > K. that ultimately it is impossible to be helpful to someone else in the
                                    > field of ethics.
                                    >
                                    > So, thank you!
                                    >
                                    > I would be glad to give our conversation a continuation, possibly with
                                    > the presentation/discussion of some of the pieces taken from CUP I had
                                    > first considered in my foolishness as a suitable answer.
                                    >
                                    > I feel it is possible that, now, this renewed conversation could take a
                                    > more significant turn.
                                    >
                                    > Of course I am not completely sure it would eventually - who could? -
                                    > but perhaps, we shall see.
                                    >
                                    > Well, I have nothing more to add for the time being, well yes, one:
                                    >
                                    > Hoping for you that your true taskmaster shall be hard enough but not
                                    > desperately hard, I will assure you that I remain
                                    >
                                    > Yours sincerely,
                                    > Mederic
                                    >
                                    >
                                    >
                                    > --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46" jjimstuart@
                                    > wrote:
                                    > >
                                    > > Dear Mederic,
                                    > >
                                    > > You are a hard taskmaster. Not content with my excuses and evasions,
                                    > > you press me again for a direct quotation from Kierkegaard
                                    > > concerning the individual making the transition from the aesthetic
                                    > > sphere of existence to the ethical sphere of existence. (See your
                                    > > post 5402)
                                    > >
                                    > > You write:
                                    > >
                                    > > << What we would need is some background information about the word:
                                    > > transition to understand it the proper way, that is proper to the
                                    > > context, or again the way K. did or at least as he seemed to. Then,
                                    > > we would need to see if it could fit in between Spheres, the
                                    > > aesthetical and the ethical. And then we would have to wonder why we
                                    > > cannot find anywhere a passage where he explicitly discusses
                                    > > the "transition" between the aesthetical and the ethical sphere that
                                    > > is to say, if he never discusses it. >>
                                    > >
                                    > > The best I can do is the following two quotes:
                                    > >
                                    > > "The relation between the aesthetic and the ethical – the
                                    > > transition – pathos-filled, not dialectical – and which starts
                                    > a
                                    > > qualitatively different dialectic. How far are poetry and art
                                    > > reconciled with life? – One thing true in the aesthetic, another
                                    > in
                                    > > the ethical?" (J & P, Hannay, p. 178, 42-3 IV C 105)
                                    > >
                                    > > "[I]n one sense the spiritual person and the sensate-psychical
                                    > > person say the same thing; yet there is an infinite difference,
                                    > > since the latter has no intimation of the secret of the metaphorical
                                    > > words although he is using the same words, but not in their
                                    > > metaphorical sense. There is a world of difference between the two;
                                    > > the one has made the transition or let himself be carried over to
                                    > > the other side, while the other remains on this side; yet they have
                                    > > the connection that both are using the same words." (WL, Hong 1995,
                                    > > p. 209)
                                    > >
                                    > > Notice in the first quote the word "transition" is used to signify
                                    > > the relation between the aesthetic and the ethical, while in the
                                    > > second quote, K talks of an individual making the transition from
                                    > > one side to the other.
                                    > >
                                    > > I think the two quotes together support my view that an individual
                                    > > can make a transition, or a leap, from one mode of existence to
                                    > > another, higher, mode of existence, such as the transition from the
                                    > > aesthetic to the ethical.
                                    > >
                                    > > I think the ideas of choice, decision and leap can all be
                                    > > appropriately applied to the aesthetic-to-ethical transition.
                                    > >
                                    > > The perceptive individual has a choice whether to exist within the
                                    > > aesthetic sphere of existence or the ethical sphere of existence.
                                    > > She can decide to make the leap from the aesthetic sphere to the
                                    > > ethical sphere.
                                    > >
                                    > > Now, as I said to Jim Rovira recently, I don't see this leap –
                                    > this
                                    > > transition – as a once-in-a-lifetime movement. I suggest that the
                                    > > aesthetic mode of existence is the natural one, such that each of us
                                    > > wakes up each morning within the aesthetic sphere of existence, as
                                    > > an aesthetic individual. But if I resolve at breakfast, or even
                                    > > while still lying in bed, to obey my absolute ethical requirement
                                    > > for the rest of the day, then I make the leap to the ethical sphere.
                                    > > (K's notion of "repetition" captures the idea that the ethical
                                    > > individual or the religious individual, needs to continually make
                                    > > the leap to their high sphere. We are always "becoming", we never
                                    > > arrive so that we can put our feet up and stop striving. Cf. Saint
                                    > > Paul: "I die daily.")
                                    > >
                                    > > Of course during the day my resolve can weaken, I can become
                                    > > distracted, and I can slip back into the aesthetic sphere.
                                    > >
                                    > > Finally, as I have mentioned to others, I do intend to re-read CUP
                                    > > in the near future, so I shall be looking out for Johannes Climacus'
                                    > > remarks about the category of "transition", with particular
                                    > > reference to the aesthetic-to-ethical transition.
                                    > >
                                    > > I image K writes something about it in his book "Stages On Life's
                                    > > Way". I do not own this book, and I get the impression that it is
                                    > > one of K's "lesser" books. Have you read any of it?
                                    > >
                                    > > Yours,
                                    > >
                                    > > Jim Stuart
                                    > >
                                    >
                                  • jimstuart46
                                    Dear Mederic, Thank you for your post. Please do not feel you always need to reply to my posts. I often do not reply to posts addressed to me if I feel I have
                                    Message 17 of 21 , Jan 31, 2007
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                                      Dear Mederic,

                                      Thank you for your post.

                                      Please do not feel you always need to reply to my posts. I often do
                                      not reply to posts addressed to me if I feel I have nothing of
                                      significance to say or if I feel the thread has gone far enough.

                                      I was indeed thinking of not replying to your post as, although I
                                      was interested to read what you had to say, I didn't feel I had
                                      anything to usefully add.

                                      However, I had come across a footnote in a book I am currently
                                      reading which is directly relevant to this thread.

                                      The book is "Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and
                                      Positions" by Clare Carlisle, and in it she discusses Kierkegaard's
                                      three works of 1843 – Either/Or, Repetition and Fear and Trembling.
                                      She focuses her attention on what K has to say about movement and
                                      becoming. For K the individual achieves inner transformation through
                                      various movements in which possibilities are actualized as the
                                      individual makes the leap to existence and then makes free self-
                                      movements within existence.

                                      I thoroughly recommend Ms Carlisle's book.

                                      I have just come across a footnote in the book where Carlisle
                                      discusses exactly my thought about K's use of the idea of immanence
                                      and his immanence/transcendence distinction. This is what she says:

                                      "I must clarify the meaning of immanence here, for it may be applied
                                      to Kierkegaard in at least two senses. In the narrower sense,
                                      immanence refers to the domain of rationality, of conceptual
                                      reflection: this is the immanence Kierkegaard associated with
                                      Hegelian philosophy, and which, he claims, is incapable of producing
                                      any movement. This immanence is constituted by necessity; it is
                                      defined in opposition to existence and its freedom. So in this
                                      sense, human existence always breaks with immanence; its self-
                                      actualization continually produces the new. On the other hand, in
                                      its wider sense immanence refers to the entire human, worldly realm,
                                      to the extent of human powers; as such, it stands opposed to
                                      transcendence, which means the actualization of God's power. It is
                                      in this second sense that infinite resignation represents the
                                      greatest immanent movement." (Carlisle, page 156, fn 31)

                                      So Carlisle is kinder to Kierkegaard that I was. She talks of K
                                      using the word "immanence" in two different ways, while I just
                                      accuse him of inconsistency and lack of clarity of thought. But as
                                      my own thought has been less than clear in recent posts I ought not
                                      to be too hard on him!

                                      So, if I paste my quotes from my first post in this thread:

                                      (1) "The category of transition is itself a beak in immanence, is a
                                      leap." (CUP, Hong p. 295, Lowrie, p. 262)

                                      (2) "[T]he guilt-consciousness that still lies essentially in
                                      immanence is different from the consciousness of sin. In guilt-
                                      consciousness, it is the same subject, who by holding the guilt
                                      together with the relation to an eternal happiness becomes
                                      essentially guilty, but the identity of the subject is such that the
                                      guilt does not make the subject into someone else, which is the
                                      expression for a break. But a break, in which the paradoxical
                                      accentuation of existence
                                      consists, cannot intervene between an existing person and the
                                      eternal, because the eternal embraces the existing person
                                      everywhere, and therefore the misrelation remains within immanence.
                                      If a break is to establish itself, the eternal itself must define
                                      itself as a temporality, as in time, as historical, whereby the
                                      existing person and the eternal in time have eternity between them.
                                      This is the paradox (concerning which reference is made to the
                                      foregoing in Section II, Chapter II, and to what follows in B)."
                                      (CUP, Hong, p. 532, Lowrie, p. 474)

                                      Then any suggestion of inconsistency between these two sentences
                                      disappears if "immanence" is used in Carlisle's narrower sense in
                                      quote (1) and used in Carlisle's wider sense in quote (2).

                                      This all makes sense to me now. Are you also convinced, Mederic?

                                      Yours,

                                      Jim
                                    • Bill
                                      ... wrote: Jim S, Does the quote from Movements and Positions mean that the self must find a comfortable relation to the experience of the
                                      Message 18 of 21 , Feb 1, 2007
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                                        --- In kierkegaardians@yahoogroups.com, "jimstuart46"
                                        <jjimstuart@...> wrote:
                                        Jim S, Does the quote from Movements and Positions mean that the self
                                        must find a comfortable relation to the experience of the Infinite?
                                        If this is so, then it is possible that one's relationship to oneself
                                        could change over time if there is some other context in which one
                                        can no longer feel the same sense of pride? Bill
                                        > Dear Mederic,
                                        >
                                        > Thank you for your post.
                                        >
                                        > Please do not feel you always need to reply to my posts. I often do
                                        > not reply to posts addressed to me if I feel I have nothing of
                                        > significance to say or if I feel the thread has gone far enough.
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